Critical Readings on the Manchus in Modern China (1616–2012)

Volume Two

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Edited by

Lars Laamann

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2013

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013935135

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ISBN 978-90-04-22761-3 (vol. 1 hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-22764-4 (vol. 2 hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-22765-1 (vol. 3 hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-22766-8 (vol. 4 hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-22757-6 (set hardback)

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Printed by Printforce, United Kingdom

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■ Source: Wang, Chen-main, 'Claiming dynastic legitimacy: Qing strategies during the Dorgon era', in Perry Link (ed.), *The scholar's mind: Essays in honor of Frederick W. Mote*, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2009, pp. 147–179.

CLAIMING DYNASTIC LEGITIMACY: QING STRATEGIES DURING THE DORGON ERA

Chen-Main Wang

By almost any measure, the Qing was the most successful alien dynasty in Chinese history. Their defeat of the various Ming dynasty armies arrayed against them, for instance, was accomplished without unusually long and bitter resistance or great loss of life. Some historians have interpreted this fact as having resulted from a simple choice on the part of Ming rulers—roving bandit armies or invading Manchu forces. A more accurate portrayal of those momentous events must also take into account serious Manchu efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people and to correct some of the failings of late Ming rule.

For the Manchu leaders, mid-1644 marked the beginning of a new era. At that moment, they decided to dedicate themselves to the dual tasks of conquering the vast Chinese hinterland and of establishing themselves as its legitimate rulers. Being a small tribal society as compared to the teeming Chinese masses, they were fully aware that they could not rule by force of arms alone. Instead, they recognized early on that it was also vital that they establish a legitimate claim to the Mandate of Heaven. During that critical period of conquest, Dorgon (November 17, 1612–December 31, 1650), a Manchu prince of remarkable talent and foresight, played a critical role.[1]

Dorgon was named one of the two regents when the emperor Taizong 太宗 (1592–1643) died in September, 1643 and his son, Fulin, ascended the throne at the age of 6 *sui*. As a senior regent during the early Shunzhi 順治 era (1644–1661), Dorgon quickly rose to a position of dominance at court.[2] Over a period of six and one half years beginning with the entry of Manchu forces into China proper in 1644, he assumed a major role in overseeing the conquest of the Chinese heartland and in establishing key court policies that were to remain largely in effect throughout the entire Qing era. In short, he was a central figure in laying a solid foundation upon which the Qing dynasty was to rest for more than two centuries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Dorgon's personal role and accomplishments as a court regent in the critical early years of the Manchu conquest and establishment of its dynasty. The research is based on a thorough examination of early Qing documents, of Dorgon's recorded conversations with Manchu and Chinese officials, and of records of the various policies he formulated in seeking to establish a plausible and principled explanation for the Manchu invasion and establishment of a government. The paper will not address military aspects of the Manchu conquest; instead it will focus on the strategies Dorgon devised in claiming legitimacy for the invasion. By clarifying Dorgon's motives and strategies, I hope to show more precisely what his contributions were to the establishment of this most successful of conquest dynasties in Chinese history.

The Turning Point

The capture of Beijing by roving rebel bands in April of 1644 represented both a golden opportunity and a major challenge for the Manchu people. Because the collapse of Ming forces in the north had been unexpectedly sudden, the Manchu leadership was forced to react quickly to a fluid military and political situation. There was little time to prepare either to conquer China or to rule it. There Manchus' banner organization plus a Chinese-style administrative structure that had only recently been adopted was poor equipment for the assumption on short notice of the enormous problems of governing a large, diverse, and populous nation.[3] Furthermore, they lacked a full understanding, in terms either of their strength or their ambitions, of the roving rebel armies. Nonetheless, upon receipt of news that Beijing had fallen into Chinese rebel hands, the Manchu leaders carefully and shrewdly faced these new circumstances and changed their traditional policy from one of raid and pillage to that of principled opposition to rebel depredations.

Ever since Nurhaci (1559–1626) had first led Manchu armies against the Ming, the two sides had been in a state of continuous conflict. Over a period of years, Manchu armies had destroyed or captured Ming forts and cities in the north and defeated various Ming expeditions sent against them, thereby gradually expanding their control over the greater part of Manchuria. In addition, on several occasions Huang Taiji (1592–1643) had sent large raiding parties into Chinese proper. Those armies bypassed the fortified cities of Liaodong province and entered China through poorly defended passes along its northern front. While plundering treasure and livestock, the Manchus also took hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens back with them as slaves.[4] In the process they stirred up much hatred for themselves among the Chinese population and earned the name "northern caitiff" in official Chinese records.

Initially, the Manchus regarded Chinese rebel armies as potential allies in their plans to conquer China. As various rebel forces ran rampant over northwestern China, the Manchus sometimes attempted to establish contact with them. One and a half years before the fall of Beijing to the rebel forces of Li Zicheng 李自成 (1605?–1645), Huang Taiji sought to establish amicable relations with Li and his followers. In his instructions to reconnaissance forces sent into China proper, he stated, "Should you happen to meet with roving rebel bands, tell them that you have noticed that the Ming political leadership is in such a mess as to cause widespread disorder and that the expedition from our country is in response to that situation. [You] should use friendly language in seeking to pacify them and warn our soldiers not to kill even one or two rebels by mistake, thereby turning them hostile. If they want to send an envoy to see me, immediately bring their envoy here. Or, if they have a letter for me, promise to forward that letter immediately."[5]

As late as early March, 1644, Dorgon, acting on behalf of the six-year-old Fulin (1638–1661), who was now addressed as Emperor Shunzhi, sent "all marshals who occupy areas west of Ming lands" a letter stating that "you and I are separated by mountains and rivers. I have heard only of your reputation for winning victories and taking cities, but I am unable to discern your names or titles clearly. Therefore I will not use [your names and titles] in this letter and hope [you] will not object to this. [The reason that] I now write to you is that I desire to join with you in planning [strategies] and in uniting our forces to seize the central plain. Should [we] unify the world, all wealth and honor will be ours to share. I am unaware as to what your opinion [of this] might be."[6]

The Manchus apparently did not receive any response from the rebels to this proposal, nor did they receive any information as to the rebels' intentions prior to their occupation of Beijing on April 24, 1644. Therefore, when Dorgon led the Manchu armies southward on May 14, the goal was still to take up arms against the Ming dynasty and to "pacify the central plain."

At this juncture Han officials in the service of the Qing court came to play an important role in urging Manchu leaders to change their policy towards the Ming people. Five days before the Qing expeditionary force began to move forward, Fan Wencheng 范文程 (1597–1666), a Han official close to Dorgon, submitted a thoughtful and farsighted memorial.[7] Fan pointed out, first, that only the Manchus and the Chinese rebel leaders were strong enough to contend for the imperial throne, because Ming leaders were hopelessly trapped in calamities of their own making. Second, to compete effectively with the rebel armies of Li Zicheng, the Manchus would have to pay particular attention to the problem of winning popular support. The Qing should forbid its soldiers from harassing the people and should try to gain their allegiance whenever possible. Fan also suggested that the Manchus give up the raid-and-run strategy that they had previously used, and instead employ able officials to administer all territories that they might conquer in moving southward. If news of these policies were to spread, Fan argued, the Han Chinese north of the Great River [i.e., the Yellow River] would readily submit after receiving orders from the Qing to do so.[8] These suggestions were later taken up and refined by Hong Chengchou 洪承疇 (1593–1665), a former Ming official with a reputation for being an able administrator and military strategist.[9]

As Qing armies were advancing toward Shanhaiguan, Dorgon received a report on May 18 stating that the rebel armies of Li Zicheng had just succeeded in capturing the Ming capital and that Emperor Chongzhen 崇禎 (1611–1644) had committed suicide. Dorgon immediately convened a conference of his top aides to assess problems of overall strategy and sought Hong's advice on the current political and military situation because Hong was the only former Ming official who had proven himself able to deal with roving rebel armies.[10] Hong responded with a comprehensive written analysis of the situation and offered some strategic advice for the Manchus to follow in establishing themselves as the rulers of China.[11]

Hong offered three key points of advice. First, he put forward the concept of a "righteous army," stating "this expedition is especially for the purpose of getting rid of the rebels, and our goal is to eliminate them." This proposal was adopted, and the Manchu invasion of China subsequently assumed the form of a righteous expedition to relieve the distress and suffering of the Chinese people. Second, he recommended the adoption of a stern policy of carrot and stick, as it were. With the promise of a return to law and order, he recommended that the Qing insist that "if anyone opposes us, they will be killed.... [but] those officials who open their city gates and pledge their allegiance to us will be promoted.... For those who oppose us, who do not submit, on the day a city is captured the officials of the city will be executed...." This idea was adopted as well and it impacted heavily on former Ming officials, who were under pressure both from the army of Li Zicheng and from the Manchus.

Third, Hong's memorial urged the adoption of a policy whereby the Manchus would state their intention to kill no one who opposed them, burn no houses, and to confiscate no money or other valuables, and to cause not even the slightest trouble to Ming people or soldiers. Once adopted, this represented a major change in Qing policy toward the Chinese people. Clearly, the intention now was to draw a sharp distinction between their own armies and the rebel forces; the latter, it was implied, were unrestrained in their acts of plunder and rapine.

The effect of Hong's memorial was considerable and Dorgon immediately applied its principle points to the new situation. Two days later a letter from Wu Sangui 吳三桂 (1612–1678), the Ming commanding general at Shanhaiguan, arrived at Dorgon's headquarters. Caught between Qing and rebel Chinese forces, Wu stated that he wished to join the Qing and fight the rebels. Seeking to gain favor with the Manchus, Wu made a vague promise to cede territory to the Qing in the future and added, "the rebels have accumulated much gold, valuables, and young boys and girls. Once your righteous army arrives, all of the [rebels' belongings] will become yours."[12] Apparently Wu still believed that the Manchus were greedy for plunder and Chinese captives, and that their current expedition was simply another raid.

To Wu's surprise, Dorgon's reply painted a very different picture of Qing intentions and purposes. Dorgon first pointed that the Manchus had always wanted to maintain friendly relations with the Ming. He also explained that their earlier expeditions into Chinese territory were intended only to compel the Ming government to adopt policies of friendship instead of conflict. Second, he stated that their present purpose was to come to Chinese aid in resisting the depredations of rebel armies. He also stated that upon hearing of the capture of the capital by roving rebel bands and the tragic death of the Ming emperor, he had become so angry that his hair stood on end. Accordingly he had decided to lead Manchu armies of love and righteousness to exterminate the rebels and to rescue the people from fire and water. In conclusion, Dorgon stated that the Manchus did not ask anything in return for their "righteous action" and did not care for the "gold, silk, and young people" mentioned in Wu's letter. Asking only that Wu and his forces surrender, Dorgon cited the case of Guan Zhong 管仲 (?–645 BC) of the Spring and Autumn period to illustrate that an official of an opposing regime, once welcomed by a former opponent and given official position, could go on to achieve notable success.[13] Dorgon also promised to reward Wu and his descendants with great wealth and noble titles.[14] Wu eventually accepted these conditions and joined Dorgon in defeating the forces of Li Zicheng at Shanhaiguan.

It is important to note in this regard that in his correspondence with Wu Sangui, Dorgon had already adopted the expression "righteous army" in reference to his own forces. This was one means of justifying the Manchu invasion. The practice and its rationale continued to be employed by the Manchus in their campaigns against loyalist forces. On the day of the battle at Shanhaiguan, Dorgon addressed his armies as follows: "On this occasion, our expedition intends to rid [the country] of mobs, to save the people, to eliminate all roving rebels, and to bring peace to the world. Today we enter Shanhaiguan and advance westward. We must not kill innocent people, nor steal money and other valuables, nor burn houses. Those who do not follow this order will be punished."[15] A manifesto drafted by Fan Wencheng also stated that "the coming of our righteous troops is to exact revenge for your emperor-father. We will kill only rebels. Our troops will be strictly disciplined and will not cause you harm."[16] Echoing this Manchu proclamation, Wu Sangui was instructed to issue a proclamation stating that because the Great Qing dynasty wished to continue the good relations which had existed in past generations between the Han Chinese and Manchu peoples, it had specially deputized the regent to mobilize troops to quell all rebellious activities. Everyone should respectfully rely on the good intentions of the Qing forces in pacifying the people and should immediately surrender to them.[17]

Thus assured of the Manchu's humane intentions, many Chinese who had feared the approaching army and had sought refuge in the mountains began to return to their homes.[18] As the Manchu armies advanced southward, local officials and the general population along the way welcomed them. The Manchus responded in kind and instructed the local officials to continue with their duties.[19] As a result, Dorgon and his armies met only limited and sporadic resistance as they moved southward toward Beijing. Li Zicheng's forces had already begun their retreat westward, having abandoned the city of Beijing. The Qing leadership, having thereby passed a major turning point, now began to act as the founders of a new dynasty that possessed the heavenly mandate.

From Righteous Army to Legitimate Government

When the Manchus entered Beijing on June 6, 1644, the country had to a considerable degree fallen into chaos and division. Occupying an empty throne meant that many vital matters required immediate attention. Staffing the central bureaucratic structure represented a matter of considerable urgency, while the economy and society in general awaited restoration to some degree of normalcy. Outside the immediate area under Manchu control, rebel bands numbering in the hundreds of thousands continued to roam over north and west China, posing a serious threat both to local populations and to their new Manchu overlords. The most important problem facing the Qing leadership, however, was that of convincing the Han Chinese of the legitimacy of their assumption of the Dragon Throne.

That effort required the Manchus both to explain why they had laid claim to the throne rather than permitting a potential Ming dynasty claimant to do so, and to create as quickly as possible an effective administration to address the many problems confronting the nation.

On the first matter, Dorgon had raised the banner of a "righteous army" and adopted the slogan "taking revenge for your emperor-father," in eliminating roving rebel bands along the line of his advance from Shanhaiguan to Beijing, but neither of these measures seemed adequate justification for having assumed sovereignty over the vast Chinese world. Dorgon was undoubtedly aware that most Han Chinese, and especially former government officials, intellectuals, and commoners then residing in Beijing, had grown to fear Manchu expansion and Manchu destruction of Chinese cities of the kind that had happened in north China. Even after the brief interregnum in Beijing of the Shun 順 regime, the short-lived dynasty founded by the rebel Li Zicheng, few Chinese had any real enthusiasm for alien occupancy of the national seat of government.[20] As a result, rumors, fear, and suspicion enveloped the areas that had fallen under Manchu control.

Against this backdrop, Dorgon issued a series of proclamations as soon as Manchu forces entered the city of Beijing. Those public notices and the performance of various ritual observances were intended to reveal key Manchu objectives and the desire to gain the confidence of the Chinese population. Shrewdly and sensitively, Dorgon realized that certain modifications in Manchu policies and statements of the intention would be needed in view of the changing political and military conditions. If the Manchus were to establish a solid claim to sovereignty in China, some fundamental adaptations on their part to the realities of Chinese culture and tradition were absolutely vital.

Three major themes characterized the proclamations that Dorgon issued during the first several weeks of the Manchu occupation of Beijing. Echoing the claim that the Manchu represented a "righteous army" which had come to save the Chinese people, roving rebel armies were blamed for both the fall of the Ming and the suicide of the last Ming emperor. A proclamation issued on the day following the occupation of Beijing announced that "Li Zicheng, a commoner of the former Ming dynasty, had formed a band of villains, pressed forward, and caused the fall of the capital, whereupon he killed the master [of the Ming] and exposed his body, and both pressured and seized the properties of one and all—princes, princesses, imperial sons-in-law, officials, and the common people. He inflicted torture and indulged in atrocities."[21] The point was that Li Zicheng, a mere commoner of the former dynasty, was solely to blame for the fall of the Ming and the resulting plunder of the capital.

Another public notice explained that the underlying causes of the Ming demise were inherent weaknesses in Chinese society. "Haughtiness, profligacy, and the breakdown of the law under the Ming had caused roving rebel bands to seize the opportunity to indulge in atrocities."[22]

A second feature of the public relations campaign was an attempt to explain why the Manchus had abandoned the role of an enemy to be the ruler and friend of the Chinese people. This involved, first, the attempt to defend their past hostility toward the Ming. A proclamation from Dorgon stated: "In the past, our country wished to have friendly relations with your Ming dynasty and to enjoy eternal peace. [However], our several letters [addressed to your emperor] received no reply, thereby causing us to launch expeditions deep [into your lands] on four occasions. It was hoped that your dynasty would awake and repent. Unexpectedly, your dynasty refused to comply. Now it has been destroyed by roving rebel bands and all issues [formerly existing between us] belong to the past. There is no longer any need to discuss them."[23]

The language, contents, and patience of this proclamation all reveal that Dorgon and his advisors tried to adopt a friendly posture in downplaying the past hostility between the Manchus and the Ming dynasty. For example, the proclamation quoted above was addressed to officials and commoners of the "southern dynasty." In another proclamation, after mentioning the existence of public disorder in the Chinese hinterland, Dorgon stated that "although then an enemy state, we feel deep sorrow" for the atrocities committed by rebel armies.[24]

Also relevant to the Manchus' attempt to win acceptance by the Chinese people was their use of an old idiom, namely, "the world does not necessarily belong to any one person, nor do the people necessarily belong to any one person. Only he who possesses virtue can be the ruler [of the world and its people]."[25] In seeking to justify their seizure of power, the Manchu leadership apparently lacked the confidence to declare openly

that, despite their alien background, they did not intend to retreat to their homeland.

A third feature of the campaign to win the support of the general population was an attempt to demonstrate that the Manchus were a people possessed of high moral principle. At least three separate arguments were advanced to demonstrate their sincerity in wanting to bring peace and public order to China. The first was their stated determination to exterminate all rebel armies that were terrorizing the countryside.[26]

Another was their stated resolve to remain in China and to make Beijing their capital. Because of their earlier practice of raid-and-run against the Chinese, rumors that they intended to massacre the general population and retreat to the north began to circulate soon after their capture of the city. In order to quell these suspicions, Dorgon stated on several occasions the Manchu intention to remain in China and to assume the role of national leadership.[27] Toward that end, the Manchus actively sought the submission of all public officials and the general population in areas lying outside the capital city. Whenever Dorgon sent an official into a given area seeking its surrender, he promised both promotions for local officials and peace for the common people, while stating that serious punishments would be inflicted upon those who offered resistance.[28]

On July 18, 1644, Dorgon issued a proclamation for dissemination in all those areas which had not yet come under Manchu control. In it he sought, first, to depict previous relations between the Ming government and the Manchus in the best terms possible.[29] He praised the founder of the Ming for having expelled the barbarian Mongol court from Chinese soil and praised the last Ming emperor (Chongzhen) for his courteous and temperate manner and for his promotion of public benevolence and filial piety. In this document the Ming were no longer referred to as an "enemy state" or a "southern dynasty." Instead it asserts that amicable relations had long existed between the two peoples and that it was now the Manchus' intention to act righteously on behalf of the Chinese people.

In this proclamation the many vices of the rebel leader Li Zicheng were spelled out in greater detail than ever before. Li was depicted as nothing more than a vicious common criminal who brought terrible devastation to Beijing and its inhabitants, forced the empress to commit suicide, burned the palaces, and fostered evil ways among both officials and the gentry. He also stole gold and silver to build camps for his army and treated the common people as if they were of no more value than common grass. In blaming Li Zicheng for the devastation of Beijing, in eulogizing the goodness of former Ming emperors, and in seeking to portray former Manchu relations with the Ming dynasty in favorable terms, Dorgon sought to ease the transition to Qing rule.

Following the Manchu occupation of Beijing Dorgon ordered the observance of three days of mourning for the former Emperor Chongzhen, the conferral upon him of an appropriate posthumous title, and full internment rites in the imperial cemetery. Funeral services were also held for the empress and the imperial concubines who committed suicide or had been killed in the tragic event.[30] His adoption of the slogan of "make revenge for your emperor-father" and in ordering the conduct of full memorial services for Emperor Chongchen in many cases had the desired effects. Frederic Wakeman has provided a good example. "Announcing his allegiance to the Qing on June 6, Song Quan 宋權 (1598–1652) spoke on behalf of many other local defense leaders in north China when he said: 'I am a minister of the Ming but the Ming has perished, and there is nothing to belong to. Whoever has the ability to take revenge upon the enemies of Ming, those murdering bandits, is thereupon my ruler.'"[31] No matter whether Song Quan was speaking his own mind or not, we can assume that Dorgon's actions in this instance provided some officials with an excuse to surrender.

Even some officials who decided not to surrender felt obliged to express their appreciation for the display of "righteous behavior." For example, when the Ming loyalist official Shi Kefa 史可法 (1602–1645) rejected Dorgon's call for him to surrender, he nonetheless expressed approval of some recent Manchu actions in his reply, where he wrote "recently learned quite suddenly that the great General Wu Sangui had enlisted the aid of soldiers from your honorable country to destroy and expel the rebellious [Li Zi]cheng. Moreover, when Your Highness entered the capital, you immediately made arrangements for funeral services to be held for our former Emperor and Empress, for the performance of the proper ceremonial rights, for the cleaning of the imperial palaces, for the pacification and unification of the common people, and for the abolition of the decree relating to shaving of the head, all in order to show proper remembrance for my dynasty. All of those measures are such as can shake antiquity and shed brilliance upon the present. [For these reasons], all who are officials would not fail to prostrate themselves in reverence and to raise their hands to their heads."[32]

Other measures were adopted to provide suitable livelihoods for surviving members of the former imperial clan and to give the public recognition to martyrs to the Ming cause. Right after the Manchus entered Beijing, Dorgon ordered that all Ming princes who submitted themselves to the Qing could keep their titles and be well-treated by the new dynasty.[33] Many related orders were issued to offer Ming imperial clan protection and necessities of life. Yet Dorgon acted with greater violence in crushing any conspiracy of the imperial families of the Ming.[34] More lenient criminal laws and lower tax rates were announced, and a call to public service of all able and worthy people was issued as a means of bringing relief to the masses. The purpose of these measures, as stated in the proclamation, was "not to grow rich off the world, but to serve the real needs of saving China."[35]

Two other matters deserve mention. One is Dorgon's statement that "[we] do deeply deplore none of any direct descendants of [the emperor of] your Ming dynasty who survived [this disaster.]"[36] This statement stretches the bounds of believability, but its intent seems to be to imply that the Ming dynasty had definitely come to an end. It also laid the foundation for a claim to legitimacy as the future rulers of China.

Second interesting assertion relates to the political situation: "There are those among you who, remembering the imperial family of the Ming, are with united hearts and dedication assisting in the establishment of a worthy prince to protect the left side (i.e., south) of the Yangtze. This is reasonable. We will not seek to prevent this."[37] Considering the great distance between Beijing and Nanjing, it is unlikely that the Manchus were aware that a Southern Ming court had been established there a month earlier.[38] Some scholars have suggested that because the Manchus were fully engaged in repressing rebel armies in the Shaanxi area, they purposely did not wish to arouse the hostility of the Chinese in the south.[39] The remark may also have been intended to serve the purpose of relaxing the vigilance of the Southern Ming about the Manchus' plans for a "great enterprise."

With the steady advance of Manchu forces in the northern provinces of Shangdong, Henan, and Shanxi during the month of August, 1644, Dorgon boldly decided to challenge the Southern Ming. That he had earlier decided on this course of action is clear from the fact that he had already sent Feng Quan 馮铨 (1595–1672), a Grand Secretary, as his personal representative to offer sacrifices to the spirits of Emperor Taizu 太祖 (1328–98) and all other former emperors of the Ming. The funeral ode opened with the words "now, that the rebel Li Zicheng has overthrown the Ming imperial house, Heaven's blessing on the Ming has ended."[40] The next day Emperor Taizu's sacrificial tablet was moved to the temple honoring emperors of all former dynasties.[41] This public activities were clearly intended to signify the end of the Ming dynasty and implied that the Qing court was unlikely to tolerate the existence of a Ming claimant to the throne in the south.

This intention was again made clear, on October 30, 1644, when attendants of the six-year-old Emperor Shunzhi convened a grand ceremony in Beijing to offer sacrifice to Heaven and Earth upon his ascendancy to the throne. He had already performed this ceremony a year earlier at Shenyang when Emperor Taizong passed away. The reason he was called upon to perform it again in Beijing was to remind the general population that a new royal line now occupied the Dragon Throne. In his prayer to Heaven and Earth, Emperor Shunzhi stated that his ascension to the throne was due to Heaven's blessing and to the support of the general populace.[42] In this way, the Manchu leadership again demonstrated its intention to assume the leadership of the Chinese world.

As the power behind the throne, Dorgon could not tolerate the existence of a Ming court in the south. On August 28, 1644, he politely but resolutely stated in a letter to Shi Kefa, a leading figure at the Southern Ming court, that the Manchus were not their enemy. He went on to observe that "Our country has pacified Beijing. We secured it from the roving rebels, not from your Ming dynasty." He then went on to state that the Manchus had made great efforts to "avenge the insult" that the rebels had inflicted on the Ming. But the people in south China had failed to give thought as to how to return the favor and instead had seized the opportunity to set up a rival claimant to the throne. This behavior was like "having two suns in the heaven" and "behaving like a determined enemy" of the Qing. Should this situation continue, the Qing would be compelled to move military units south to engage the forces of the Southern Ming.[43]

A similar attitude was expressed to an envoy sent to Beijing by the Southern Ming court. Before Dorgon's letter of August 28 arrived, the Southern Ming had already sent a delegation to Beijing to negotiate with the Manchus. The delegation brought with it large quantities of gold, silver, and other precious gifts, but the Manchus received them coldly and with little respect.[44] Dorgon instructed Grand Secretary Ganglin (?–1651) to meet with the delegation, Ganglin brusquely informed the delegates that the Qing had already sent an expedition to deal with the Southern Ming, which, he stated, had committed three "crimes"—namely, failing to rescue the former Emperor Chongzhen, acting without proper authorization in enthroning Prince Fu 福王 (?–1646) as emperor, and raising an army to oppress the masses.[45] That this statement was official policy at the time is reflected in a proclamation issued on November 24, 1644 that repeated the three "crimes" of which the Southern Ming was said to be guilty. Moreover, in service of these objectives, another Qing military expedition was sent against the southern Ming forces.[46]

From these actions by the Qing leadership it is clear that they regarded themselves as the sole legitimate rulers of China and that anyone daring to enthrone a member of the former Ming house was seeking to insult them and thus subject to immediate attack and suppression. It was also made clear that this policy applied not only to the Southern Ming court in Nanjing but to any similar overt or covert action taking place anywhere in China. From 1645 to 1648 Governor-General Hong Chengchou of Jiangnan adopted a vigorous policy of apprehending members of the former Ming imperial family and crushing all suspected conspiracies. Persons judged guilty of conspiracy were immediately put to death and the heads of imperial relatives and important loyalist officials were publicly displayed as a warning to the general public.[47] In the Proclamation on the Pacification of Eastern Zhejiang and Fujian dated March 12, 1947, and the Proclamation on the Pacification of Guangdong of August 25, 1947, all references to Ming princes were accompanied by the term "rebellious," and they and their followers became targets of official suppression.[48] Although not yet in control of all of China the Manchus had come of age as its rulers.

The Establishment of the Qing Government

When the Manchus entered Beijing they realized full well that their actions would be carefully watched by their Chinese subjects, and in particular by the literate classes. They also understood that they faced two important issues: how to establish an effective civil government staffed by capable and honest officials and how to make those officials obey the Manchu royal house. Dorgon was fully aware of the difficulty of these tasks. He was aware of the need to set high standards of conduct for government officials and to avoid any appearance of expediency in the actions of the imperial house.

Immediately after the young Shunzhi emperor ascended the throne, Dorgon needed to staff government bureaucracies at all levels throughout the newly conquered territories. The problem was complicated by the fact that during Li Zicheng's brief Shun interlude many governmental officials had chosen either to cooperate with the rebel regime or to resign and take refuge in their home areas. After Li Zicheng's retreat from Beijing, many who had accepted official positions with his regime were driven from office by the local population.

So the task facing Dorgon and the Manchus was to restaff the bureaucracy and to restore governmental control and basic public services as soon as possible. Just as they had done along their march from Shanhaiguan to Beijing, they began by asking all officials to continue in government service. All former officials, whether they had served the rebel government or not, were asked to join the new government, and a proclamation was issued promising all who did so a promotion of one step in grade.[49] The response to this offer was favorable; throughout north China only a few failed to answer the call.

A second means of re-staffing the bureaucracy was recommendation. During the first month of the Manchu seizure of Beijing, officials began to recommend their acquaintances to the new regime. Then, on July 27, 1644, Dorgon formally instructed court officials to submit the names of qualified individuals known to them.[50] According to official records three officials alone submitted the names of eighty former officials within a period of one month.[51] Hong Chengchou, as Governor-General of Jiangnan from 1645 to 1648, recommended many officials of the former dynasty to the court.[52] The policy served both to undermine the morale of the Southern Ming court and to induce many experienced and able bureaucrats to join the new regime.

That Dorgon understood the risks involved in this policy is clear from the historical records. As early as July 21, 1644, a Chinese official had warned him about the potentially serious consequences of recruiting officials who had served the rebel regime or may previously have been guilty of malfeasance in office. But Dorgon replied, "At the beginning of an administration, people are needed in government. Regarding all those officials who have surrendered to us, since they were recommended and then employed by us, we should not be overly critical of them."[53] On October 6 of the same year, he made this point even clearer, stating in proclamation that "all civil and military officials, all soldiers and commoners, no matter whether originally [you] belonged to the roving rebel camp or were forced to surrender to them, if you can [willingly] submit to our dynasty, you will be permitted to serve with us."[54] His approach is well reflected in the remark that "the officials I have appointed are not necessarily all good, for this is like having to choose a commanding officer from among dwarfs. But even if someone is not ideal, he will be sent to serve."[55]

Dorgon's expediency in this respect should not be interpreted to mean that he had a low regard for political matters or for honesty and efficiency in government. On the contrary, he knew full well that Ming officialdom had been notorious for its partisan politics, for the involvement of eunuchs in governmental affairs, and for widespread corruption. He was also aware that the situation had worsened during the brief interregnum of the Shun dynasty, and that a bureaucracy containing mainly corrupt and ineffective officials would both undermine Qing rule and jeopardize its chances of winning popular support.

That he was aware of these dangers can be seen in several statements he made following the Manchus' entry into Beijing. He pointed out that the demise of the Ming dynasty was attributable to widespread graft and official malfeasance, the appointment of unqualified people to government posts, and the failure of senior administrators to make clear distinctions in granting awards and imposing punishments.[56] In a public proclamation issued on July 23, 1644, he said, "the fall of the Ming dynasty was entirely owing to the widespread practice of bribery, to the failure to distinguish between competence and incompetence, and the failure to draw a proper distinction between right and wrong among the officials."[57] These were the reasons, he believed, why corrupt individuals had occupied official posts while those who were upright in behavior had retreated from public life. He concluded that "political disorder and national collapse all began with these causes; no crime is greater than that."[58]

A year later, when speaking to the Grand Secretaries about the state of officialdom under Ming rule, Dorgon observed that "Although lacking in merit military officers claimed rewards, while civil officials perverted justice for personal aggrandizement."[59] When issuing instructions to the Censorate on August 3, 1645, he characterized in some detail the problems of official misbehavior that Ming emperors had faced. "During the Ming era officials purloined both name and reputation, greedily sought wealth and property, formed cliques and excluded outsiders without restraint, practiced deceit as a matter of course, and indulged in artifice and flattery as a means of realizing their aims. They submitted memorials at all and annoyed their lord with requests, thus causing him to become confused in purpose and disordered in his use of people and his practice of government. This led to rebellion, to alienation of the people, and to disaster from which there was no escape."[60]

Dorgon adopted two strategies to rectify matters. The first was to ask on many occasions that the names of virtuous and worthy people be submitted to the throne for appointment to government positions.[61] He adopted a policy of making officials responsible for the actions of the people they recommended. All officials were to be rewarded or punished according to the official performances of people they had recommended.[62]

The second strategy was to tighten discipline throughout the bureaucracy. In addition to repeated warnings that all officials must be on their best behavior, censors were instructed to impeach any official found guilty of corruption.[63] Dorgon personally examined all reports of corruption and frequently ordered a thorough investigation of charges and severe punishments for the guilty. Five people were beheaded for corruption in Fujian province in 1650.[64]

Another of Dorgon's important steps was early restoration, in November of 1644, of the civil service examinations. This system, which both reflected the commitment of the new government to key Confucian values and was expected to function as the primary means of recruiting qualified people into government service, had long enjoyed the support of the Chinese intellectual class.[65]

The restoration of the examination system was related to the issue of Manchu hair style, which in turn relation to rebellion. Zhang Cunren 張存仁 (?–1652), Governor General of Zhejiang province, reported in a memorial to the throne that "recently there are those who have given thought to rebellious activities because of their opposition to having to cut their hair [in the Manchu style]. Would it not be better to instruct all education intendants to hold civil service examinations as a means of recruiting intellectuals? Then the educated will purge their minds of rebellion in hopes of becoming officials."[66]

The recommendation won the immediate support of Dorgon, and when examinations were held in 1645 at the provincial level in all areas under Qing control, the response was excellent. Dorgon was surprised to learn that 3,000 *xiucai* degree holders had sat for the provincial examinations in the Shuntian area alone.[67] The following year, when the metropolitan examinations were held, the quota for successful candidates was increased to 400 from the normal figure of 300, in order to mark the restoration of the system. This was regarded as "an examination in successfully recruiting talents for the government (*deren zhike* 得人之科)."[68] Of the 373 successful candidates, many later enjoyed outstanding careers. Four rose to the rank of Grand Secretary, eight to Minister, fifteen to Vice Minister, and three to Governor General.[69] The Qing leadership clearly wished to make full use of the civil service examination system to recruit able and talented people to their service.

Fan Wencheng, Dorgon's Han advisor, pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the successful candidates in the metropolitan examination of 1646 were northerners.[70] The failure of southerners to participate in the examinations in large numbers may have been related to the massacre at Yangzhou in May, 1645, by the Qing soldiers in response to local defense to the Manchu conquest.[71] It may have been due as well to the suppression of local resistance to the adoption of Manchu male hair styles throughout the Jiangnan area, and especially in the city of Jiading in the middle of 1645.[72] In response to that situation, Fan and other officials proposed that another provincial examination be held in 1646 and yet another at the metropolitan level a year later. Dorgon agreed.[73]

The results of these two examinations were encouraging. Among the three hundred candidates who became *jinshi* at the metropolitan exams, one hundred and twenty four, including the *zhuangyuan*, came from south China. This showed that the new dynasty could attract southern as well as northern intellectuals to its cause.[74] And there were other positive signs as well. The metropolitan examination of 1649 produced another 395 recipients of the *jinshi* degree, so that during the seven-year span of Dorgon's regency a total of 1,068 candidates were awarded the highest examination degree, thus adding importantly to the reservoir of talent eligible for civil service appointments. As the new officials were called upon to replace holdovers from the previous regime, the bureaucracy came increasingly to identify with the new dynasty. The policy of active recruitment to government service from among the ranks of the educated class served importantly in both north and south China in winning the hearts and minds of that vital segment of society.

The re-establishment of the civil service examinations conveyed another important political message to the Chinese people. In Ming dynasty examination practice, students often found it useful to study questions that had been posed in previous examinations. This was possible because the answers given by the top candidates and other model writings were often printed and offered for sale. This practice was allowed to continue under the new dynasty, and it soon became apparent that the questions which had been posed during the three metropolitan examinations under the Dorgon regency all revealed an abiding concern for the well being of the nation and the population at large. Three questions predominated in the examination of 1646: how to rid the new government of bad policies and practices of the former regime, how to achieve amicable working relations between Manchu and Han officials and with the population at large, and how to assist the emperor in securing the services of worthy people.[75]

In 1647, for example, examination candidates were asked to explain what means the emperor should employ to obtain truly talented people for government service, what means should be adopted to cause governmental officials to rid themselves of corrupt practices carried over from the former regime, and what means were available to meet current military expenses while simultaneously lowering taxes.[76] In 1649, the candidates were asked to explain what policies should be adopted to assist the Manchu and Chinese peoples in learning to work together in service of the common good, how best to enrich the country and to restore normal conditions to the peasantry, and how to cause people who are obstinate in nature to change their hearts and put aside any idea of rebellion.[77]

Two realities are implicit in these questions. The first is that the Manchu leadership had a good grasp of contemporary conditions in China and was serious in seeking workable solutions to deal with those problems. Second, the Manchus, although an alien dynasty, were sincere in seeking viable means of bringing peace and harmony between the Manchu and Chinese people.[78] The questions they put before the examination candidates reveal a commitment to the achievement of those ends. As their questions and the answers given by the top candidates gained a wider audience, it became apparent that Dorgon and his advisors had achieved good success in shaping a new vision of government and society in China.

Legitimacy and Manchu Rule

For the Manchus, claiming dynastic legitimacy in China did not require adoption of a Chinese lifestyle. In 1644 they had reason to be proud of their ethnic identity, of their distinctive banner system, of the enormous territorial gains they had achieved in recent decades. Many Manchus regarded personal advancement in civil or military ranks and material gain more highly than matters of dynastic legitimacy. As a senior leader of his people, Dorgon was obliged to honor native Manchu traditions and to keep their welfare in mind. An examination of Dorgon's record reveals his concerns in these regards as well as his efforts to claim dynastic legitimacy.

Although the official records fail to show whether Dorgon and other Manchu leaders actually faced any opposition from their own people in seizing imperial power in China, Dorgon must have been aware that this was the case. Frederic Wakeman has observed that among the Manchu nobility there were two camps on the issue. "There was, on the one hand, the tribal tradition of military aristocratism, incorporated in the *beile* 貝勒 and *beise* 貝子 who were disinclined to occupy north China and who preferred earning merit and wealth by hit-and-run raids across the Great Wall. And on the other hand, there was the Jin tradition of imperial rule, symbolized by the imperial institution itself and in the legacy of the khanate bequeathed to all later Manchu rulers by Nurhaci."[79] It may have been that Emperor Taizong had this tradition in mind when he spoke of the "Great Enterprise" and when, on several occasions, he sent raiding parties deep into north China with the two purposes of weakening Chinese military forces and enriching the Manchus. The easy pillage of northern cities and the enslavement of Chinese captives on those occasions tended to make Manchus create a degree of disrespect for the Chinese, even to those Chinese officials who opted to serve the new dynasty.[80] In fact, many Manchu nobles became disgruntled when Emperor Taizong chose to entertain Hong Chengchou in lavish fashion and to grant him special honors following his capture by Manchu forces.[81] According to a Korean source, soon after the Manchu troops occupied Beijing, Ajige, Dorgon's brother, suggested that they carry out a limited massacre in order to awe the Chinese into obedience.[82]

Later, when dealing with other Manchu leaders, Dorgon found it expedient to give careful consideration to Manchu political traditions. The critical element in that respect was the banner system Nurhaci had founded in 1601 and which became in time a key reason for Manchu military prowess.[83] That system has been correctly characterized as "the basic social-political-military organization of the Manchu people, and the core of hereditary soldiers in the Imperial Ch'ing [Qing] organization."[84] As Nurhaci's sons were named to lead various banners, those positions quickly came to signify both political power and aristocratic privilege. This is why the early Qing histories often describe individual banner leaders as protecting their own men and seeking benefits on their behalf. In turn, individual banners served as "power bases for leading figures in the early Qing."[85] This is why Dorgon, the leader of the plain white banner, found it expedient to respect the interests of other banners and their leaders.[86]

Another important element in the traditional Manchu political structure was the so-called Deliberative Council, another of Nurhaci's creations. It was initially organized as an informal council of eight *beile* who met to discuss state affairs. Later, with the addition of various princes and grand ministers to its membership, it was renamed the Deliberative Council (*Yizhengchu*), and still later the Deliberative Council of Princes and High Officials (*Yizheng wang dachen huiyi*). In the pre-conquest era, as its members were drawn from the Manchu nobility, it represented a form of "collective aristocratic rule."[87] But following the conquest, possibly because Dorgon wanted to strengthen his own authority, he named several Chinese officials to its membership. Although the influence of the Deliberative Council declined over time, it has been aptly described as "the most influential shaper of policy in early Ch'ing [Qing]."[88] On the other hand, its continued existence tended to reinforce the principle of collective aristocratic rule. Therefore, although Dorgon had been named Prince Regent, he could ignore neither the opinions nor the interests of other Manchu nobles and their respective banner forces, particularly at a time when the conquest phase had not yet been completed.

During his regency Dorgon felt compelled to respect cultural traditions and practices established by Emperor Taizong. Although he did much to mollify Manchu attitudes toward the Chinese and to adopt Chinese political institutions, Dorgon needed to honor various elements of Manchu culture and values.[89] He rejected the suggestion that his people adopt Chinese clothing styles, reasoning that these were unsuited to military combat.[90] In this respect he often cited the example of the Jurchen, who were the ancestors of the Manchu people and who had founded the Jin dynasty in the twelfth century. In his eyes, the Jin had committed a serious mistake in adopting Chinese customs and values while forgetting their own language and traditions. He also felt that the Jin had collapsed because their people had lost their skills in riding and archery.[91] He instructed his officials to keep these lessons in mind so that future Manchu generations would maintain their martial skills.[92] This objective remained a key consideration for his generation as it undertook the task of conquering the vast Chinese world.

It is therefore easy to understand why Dorgon sought to enforce his "five major practices" following the Manchu seizure of power. The first three of them related to the settlement in China of immigrant Manchu families. When Manchu tribal peoples followed their armies into China in the hundreds of thousands, their settlement became a priority consideration for the new regime. The land was expropriated and the Chinese captives were employed to farm the land. These practices dated back to the times of Nurhaci, when such measures were adopted to free the soldiery from the agricultural duties.[93] In pursuit of his policy, Dorgon ordered the confiscation of vast areas of land in Beijing and neighboring counties and justified this action with the phrase "making use of ownerless lands and imperial estates." As a result, land in seventy-seven counties over a span of 2,000 *li* was seized and given to immigrant Manchu families. Many thousands of Chinese were forced to migrate, landless and homeless, to other areas.[94]

Closely related to this policy was a practice called "*touchong* 投充" whereby Chinese citizens did agricultural labor for the immigrant Manchus. These laborers were often the very ones who had been dispossessed of their land. The Manchus had acquired vast tracts of land as a result of their expropriation policies, but were unable to farm it themselves, so these skilled hands were needed to work the fields. As the new owners of the land, the Manchus offered both shelter and legal protection to its former owners, or to refugees, or even criminals, under this system of *touchong*. As a result, many Chinese peasants were reduced to the status of mere serfs or slaves.[95]

As many Manchu families migrated into China following the conquest, many of their Chinese slaves seized the opportunity to flee, thus depriving them of needed manpower. In response, the government adopted severe measures, including the execution of all slaves who fled their masters and of anyone who may have given them shelter.[96]

Other controversial and stringent policies were those that required the citizenry at large to adopt Manchu hair style and manner of dress. Deriving from practices of the former Jin dynasty and subsequently adopted by Nurhaci when he founded the Later Jin dynasty, these requirements were imposed on all captive peoples as a symbol of submission.[97] Nurhaci's purpose in this practice was to hinder the escape of captives, who, if reaching Chinese territory, had to fear being taken for Manchus and abused or executed. Emperor Taizong was rigorous in imposing this requirement on all captives, and thus prominent individuals such as Hong Chengchou and Wu Sangui, both leading political and military leaders who later served the Manchu cause with distinction, were required to comply.

On the day following the entry of Manchu armies into Beijing, Dorgon announced that the hair and dress policy would be generally enforced.[98] However, possibly owing to some complaints and local resistance, he rescinded the measure three weeks later with the statement: "In the past, because there was no means of recognizing those who had submitted [to our rule], I issued a decree requiring the shaving of the head so as to distinguish those who had submitted from the rebels. Now, having learned that this is contrary to the wishes of the people, and because it was our original purpose to pacify the people through civility, officials and the common people, all acting as it suits them individually, henceforth may keep their hairstyles as before."[99] There is reason to believe that this policy was not universally applied, because Dodo (1614–1649), the commanding general of the Manchu armies then attacking the forces of the Southern

Ming, informed local inhabitants, that "wherever our Grand Army has penetrated, our policy is that the heads of all [opposing] military personnel must be shaved, [but] not those of civilians."[100]

But when news of the capture of Nanjing reached Dorgon on June 20, 1645, two days later he informed the Grand Secretaries that the policy requiring shaving of the head would be restored. On July 8, 1645, a public proclamation was issued: "The reason why the regulation requiring the shaving of the head heretofore has not been universally applied and that people were temporarily allowed to follow their own convenience, was that we wished to await the pacification of the world. Now, both within and without are as one family, and I am as the father and the people are as our sons. Father and son are as one, so how can there be any differences between them? If they lack uniformity [in hairstyle and dress], in the end will they not be of two minds, and not be like people of different countries?.... All are now ordered to shave their heads; those who obey will be the people of our nation, while those who hesitate will be regarded as rebels who, opposing our instructions, must be given heavy punishment? Should [any official] again memorialize on this matter, seeking to permit the people of pacified areas to follow Ming regulations as before, rather than abiding by the regulations of this dynasty, he shall be executed without benefit of pardon."[101]

Considering the timing and the contents of this pronouncement by Dorgon, many scholars have concluded that it either represented an attempt by the Manchus to conceal their real intentions until the Southern Ming had been subjugated or was a reflection of the arrogant belief that they had already subjugated the whole of China.[102]

While the progress of the Manchu conquest of China was certainly important to Dorgon, his consideration of court politics and native Manchu values was also important. For instance, when he decided to rescind the policy requiring the Chinese to adopt Manchu dress and hairstyles, members of the Manchu court probably pointed out that doing so violated the traditions of the imperial house. Many must have thought it embarrassing to have two groups at court and in government offices, one wearing Manchu clothing and hair styles and the other appearing in the traditional Chinese manner. As long as that problem persisted, Dorgon must have been under pressure to address it.

The matter created dissension among court officials. Feng Quan, who had actively collaborated with the eunuch clique under the Ming, shaved his head in recognition of the regime change, and this brought criticism. Another court official, Sun Zhixie 孫之獬 (?–1647), who had been the first to shave his head, instructed both his family members and their retainers to follow suit.[103] That Dorgon felt that it was his responsibility to protect those who had followed his order to adopt Manchu dress and hair styles is suggested in comments he penned on a letter of resignation he had received from Li Ruoling 李若琳 (?–1657). There Dorgon stated that "I am aware that you, Li Ruoling, as the first person to shave your head, made yourself an object of hatred by the multitude, ... there is no need to ask for retirement."[104] Dorgon's remarks strongly suggest that as long as Li was loyal to the Qing and faithfully performed his duty, he would protect him and deal with those who ridiculed him because he shaved his head in the Manchu fashion. In sum Dorgon seem to have sought both to put an end to meaningless power struggles at court and to preserve basic Manchu customs.

But his patience seems to have come to an end following the receipt of several memorials from Chinese officials that cited the importance of maintaining the essentials of Chinese culture and that may also have contained criticism of Feng Quan. After the arrival of a message from Dodo announcing the victory of his forces in the south, Dorgon angrily addressed the Grand Secretaries as follows: "Recently I have read some memorials that seek to make their point on the matter of shaving the head by referring to the institutions of rites and music. These [two matters] are totally unrelated. How can it be said that our dynasty has no institutions of rites and music? What sincerity of purpose can there be in saying that we should not follow the institutions of our dynasty, but should instead follow Ming institutions? If it is said that one 'physical being is received from one's parents and must not be harmed, this of course makes sense. But if one repeatedly persists in speaking of rites and music, this is illogical verbiage. I have always been fond of officials and let them act as they please. Those who have not wanted to shave their heads have not been forced to do so, but now, since there is such talk as this, I will promulgate an imperial decree ordering officials and common people alike to shave their heads."[105]

This statement suggests that Dorgon had simply reached a point where he could no longer tolerate opposition or divisive behavior on this matter. Chinese officials who expressed opposition to the imposition of Manchu hair and dress styles on the population at large seemed to have been unaware of, or indifferent to, the fact that they were implicitly speaking critically of Manchu customs and values, which were the very basis of Manchu identity, or that, should Dorgon have failed to respond to their criticism in a firm and resolute manner, he might have lost the support of his own countrymen in the process. Under the circumstances, it is understandable why he chose to act as he did.

Conclusion

The seven years of Dorgon's regency were a period of great transformation for both the Manchu people and the Han Chinese. When Dorgon died at the end of 1650, except for feeble and sporadic resistance by loyalist Ming forces in the southeast corner of the empire, the greater part of China had come fully under Manchu control. The new Qing administration functioned efficiently and smoothly. But Dorgon's contributions went well beyond those of supervising the military conquest and organizing the new government. His achievements in establishing dynastic legitimacy and attracting the support of his own people and of the Chinese population were also vital.

Dorgon's success can be attributed to two great talents he had. First, he was a keen observer of the human condition. This talent equipped him to deal with the changes occurring within the Manchu aristocracy and to suppress both military and civil upheavals then taking place within China. He also clearly possessed great talent for administration. The problems he faced as Senior Regent after the Manchu invasion included the many demands of a new administration, racial tensions between the Manchu and Han people, partisan struggles among various Chinese political factions, and the pressing needs of military campaigns in west and south China. Had he not been able to balance all of these competing claims on his time and to resolve problems as they arose, it is unlikely that the Great Enterprise undertaken by his people would in the end have proven successful.

A key factor in his success as a leader of his own people, and subsequently of all China, was his Machiavellian talent for timely and decisive policy change, shrewed political manupilation, and merciless suppression of those who opposed him, the Manchus, and the Qing dynasty. While the Manchus had previously practiced a policy of raid-and-pillage against the Ming, with the fall of Beijing to Chinese rebel forces and the receipt of Wu Sangui's request for aid in restoring order, Dorgon quickly positioned the Manchu banners as a "righteous army" and ordered a march on Beijing. When in northeast China resistance to his armies collapsed, Dorgon proved to be an efficient and able administrator in supervising military campaigns in west and south China, in guiding the establishment of a new and effective government administration, and in reducing racial tensions between Manchus and Chinese.

His skill as a political leader is visible in these respects: his success in resolving problems between Manchus and Chinese, in labeling the southern Ming courts as rebellious regimes, in creating amicable working conditions between holdovers from the Ming administration and his own officials, in moving quickly to set high government standards in both policies and service, and in recruiting new talent to serve in the government. When stern action seemed to be necessary, as in the case of requiring the entire population to adopt the Manchu hairstyle, he demonstrated that he could act both swiftly and decisively.

In cultural terms, Dorgon can be regarded as a skilled interpreter of cross-cultural relations. Given the many cultural differences which existed between the Manchu and the Chinese, as well as their long history of military conflict, he faced a most difficult task in promoting amicable relations and mutual understanding. In times, both sides came to understand and appreciate Dorgon's intent to establish a capable and efficient administration. Others within the Manchu leadership also came in time to respect the Chinese culture and political traditions, and to realize that the Manchus could not govern by military power alone.

Given the quality of his leadership in these many respects under the most difficult of conditions, Dorgon may fairly be said to have laid a solid and lasting foundation for the Manchu people as the rulers of China for the next two and one-half centuries.

Notes

1. Several biographies of Dorgon are available, including Zhou Yuanlian 周遠廉 and Zhao Shiyu 趙世瑜, *Huangfu shezhengwang Duoergun* 皇父攝政王多爾袞 (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1993); Chen Zuorong 陳作榮 and Zhao Yi 趙毅, *Duoergun pingzhuan* 多爾袞評傳 (Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1993); and Shi Mingxing 史明星, *Duoergun* 多爾袞 (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991).

2. Dorgon was soon to gain a dominant position as can be seen from the different titles he was subsequently awarded, such as Regent Uncle in 1644, Imperial Regent Uncle in 1645, and Imperial Father Regent in 1648, while the other regent, Jurgalang, was demoted to Assistant Regent in 1644, and further still to *Junwang* (second degree prince) in 1648. Arthur W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912)* (rpt., Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 216–17 and 397–98.

3. Before invading China in 1644, the Manchus had founded in juxtaposition with their own traditional bureaucratic structure three bodies organized on the Ming model, namely, the Six Ministries (in 1631), the Censorate (in 1635), and the Three Palace Academies (in 1635). These three organizations served as training grounds for their civil officials. Robert Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency 1661–1669* (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 32–33. However, these organizations existed only in miniature and represented but a small part of the Chinese imperial system, and, as Oxnam has pointed out, there were some major differences between these offices and their counterparts in the Ming government. For these differences, see ibid., pp. 31–34.

4. Although many scholars of early Qing have noticed the Manchu raiding strategy, no consensus has yet been reached concerning Manchu attacks and gains. For example, according to Li Xun 李洵 and Xue Hong 薛虹, there were only three large-scale raids, in autumn 1636, from autumn 1638 to September 1939, and late autumn 1642, respectively. Li Xun and Xue Hong, *Qingdai quanshi* 清代全史, Vol. 1 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 372–77. Ren Changzheng 任長正 has concluded that Huang Taiji dispatched armies into Chinese territory on four occasions prior to 1639. These raids took place in 1628–29, 1634, 1636, and 1638–39. Ren Changzheng, "Qing Taizu Taizong shidai Ming Qing hezhan kao" 清太祖太宗時代明清和戰考, in *Dalu zazhi shixue congshu* 大陸雜誌史學叢書, series 1, no. 7 (Taipei: Dalu zazhishe, 1960), pp. 23–59. Another scholar points out that the Huang Taiji five times launched raids between 1929 and 1943. These occurred in 1629, 1934, 1636, 1939 and 1642, and resulted in 950,000 Chinese being taken back to Liaodong as captives. Xie Jingfang 謝景芳, "Mingmo Huang Taiji beinu zhongyuan renkou kaoshi" 明末皇太極北擄中原人口考實, *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* 中國史研究, 3(1995): 94–100.

5. *Qing shilu* 清實錄, Taizong, *juan* 63, Chongde, 7th year, 10th month, Rentzu.

6. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiuso 中央研究院歷史語言研究所 (ed.), *Ming Qing shiliao* 明清史料 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1972), *bin*, p. 89a.

7. There are two different interpretations concerning Fan's relations with Dorgon. Some scholars have concluded that Fan was not close to Dorgon because he seemed to be inactive during Dorgon's regency. See, Adam Y.C. Lui, *Two Rulers in One Reign: Dorgon and Shun-chih, 1644–1660* (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1989), pp. 29–31; and Jin Chengji 金成基, "Fan Wencheng jianlun" 范文程簡論, *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, 5 (1982): 155–66. However, other scholars have objected this view and pointed to the titles and honors Dorgon bestowed on Fan. Furthermore, Fan was not in good health at that time. Wang Sizhi 王思治, "Fan Wenzheng pingyi" 范文程評議, in Wang Sizhi, *Qingshi lungao* 清史論稿 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1987), pp. 225–26; and Wang Jingze 王景澤, "Guanyu Fan Wencheng de jidian kaozheng" 關於范文程的幾點考證, *Xinan shifan daxue xuebao* 西南師範大學學報, 3 (1998): 106–107.

8. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 3/21b–22a; *Baqi tongzhi* 八旗通志 (rpt., Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), Vol. 10, pp. 4190–91. As early as 1633, a Han official, Zu Kefa 祖可法 (?–1656), had suggested to the Manchus that they should try to win the hearts of the Ming people when they seized their cities. Ye Kaoshu 葉高樹, *Xiang Qing Mingjiang zhi yanjiu* 降清明降之研究 (Taipei: Department of History, National Taiwan Normal University, 1993), p. 78.

9. For Hong's life and career, see Chen-main Wang, *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665): Public Service in a Time of Dynastic Change* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1999).

10. As for Hong's merits and his recommendations for dealing with rebels, ibid., Chapter 2: "Man of Action: The Suppression of Ming Rebels, 1627–38."

11. A full translation of Hong's memorial can be found in Wang, *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665)*, pp. 131–32.

12. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 4/9b.

13. Ironically, Guan Zhong was praised by Confucius for his defense of civil society against invading barbarian hordes. For a brief discussion of Guan Zhong's switch of allegiance and his role in Confucius' eyes, see Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 251–52.

14. Ibid., 4/10a–b; Jiang Liangji 蔣良麒, *Tonghua lu* 東華錄 (Beijing: Zhong-hua shuju, 1980), p. 62.

15. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 4/17b.

16. Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 (ed.), *Qingshi liezhuan* 清史列傳 (rpt., Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928), 5/2a.

17. Ji Liuqi 計六奇, *Mingji beilue* 明季北略 (rpt., Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1969), p. 35.

18. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 4/17b–18a.

19. Ibid., 4/19b–20a. According to Korean reports and Qing records, when the Manchus entered Shanhaiguan, the cities they passed, like Funing 撫寧, Yongping 永平, Changli 昌黎, Tongzhou 通州, Luanzhou 灤州, Kaipingwei 開平衛, Yutian 玉田, Gongluodian 公羅店 and Fengrun 豐潤, offered no resistance. Some opened the city gates to welcome the armies, some presented letters of surrender, and some even offered gifts. When the Manchus approached the capital, the people welcomed them from five *li* outside the city gates with offerings of flowers and incense. *Shen kuan lu* 瀋館錄 (rpt., Shenyang: Liaohai shushe, 1931), 7/14a–15b; *Yijo Sillok–Injo Sillok* 李朝實錄一仁祖實錄 (rpt., Seoul: Kuk-sa p'yonch'an wiwon hoe, 1958), 45/44a; *Ming Qing shiliao, Jia*, p. 65a.

20. On the Shun dynasty, see, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Shun Interregnum of 1644," in *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth Century China*, edited by Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 39–87.

21. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/2b. The final sentences also appeared in other public notices in 5/3a and 5/3b.

22. Ibid., 5/3b.

23. Tan Qian 談遷, *Guo Que* 國榷 (rpt., Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1958), p. 6087. It is interesting to note that a month earlier Dorgon sent Wu Sangui a similar letter in which he stated that in the past there had been three Manchu invasions of China. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 4/10a.

24. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/2b.

25. Tan Qian, *Guo Que*, p. 6087.

26. For example, Dorgon, in his proclamation, quoted the famous remark by Xiang Yu's 項羽 (232 BC–202 BC) "*pofu chenzhou*" 破釜沉舟 (Breaking the cooking vessels and sinking the boats) to show that they had no plans to retreat. Ibid.

27. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/12a–b; 8/1b.

28. Ibid., 5/1b–2a; 5/3b–4a.

29. Tan Qian, *Guo Que*, pp. 6118–19.

30. On his second day in Beijing, Dorgon gave the order to observe full mourning rites for the Emperor Chongzhen. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/2b.

31. Frederic Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 419.

32. Shi Kefa, *Shi Kefa ji* 史可法集 (Shanghai: Kuji chubanshe, 1984), p. 86; Jiang Liangqi, *Tonghua lu*, pp. 66–67.

33. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/2a.

34. In 1646, the Qing government received secret reports that some Ming princes had kept their official seals and were conspiring against the new regime, and as a result a number of Ming princes and their fellow conspirators were put to death after the investigation. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/6b–7a. After that Dorgon changed his attitude toward Ming imperial clan and treated them harshly thereafter. For a discussion of Dorgon's attitude toward Ming imperial families, see, Zheng Kecheng 鄭克晟, "Shilun Duoergun dui Ming huangshi taidu zhi yanbian" 試論多爾袞對明皇室態度之演變, in Zheng Kecheng, *Ming Qing shi tanwei* 明清史探微 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), pp. 307–25.

35. Tan Qian, *Guo Que*, p. 6118.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 6119. This proclamation was not found in the *Shilu*. Compilers of the *Shilu* may have found it improper to record that Dorgon or the Qing government once allowed or encouraged Ming supporters to establish a prince in south China.

38. Prince Fu 福王, Zhu Yousong 朱由崧 (?–1646), was enthroned as Emperor in Nanjing with the reign title Hongguang 弘光 on June 19, 1644.

39. Lynn A. Struve, *The Southern Ming 1644–1662* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 48–49; Li Ge 李格, "Duoergun yu Qingchao tongzhi de jianli" 多爾袞與清朝統治的建立, *Qingshi luncong* 清史論叢, No. 3 (1982), p. 123.

40. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/16b–17a.

41. Ibid., 5/17a.

42. Ibid., 9/1a–4b.

43. Shi Kefa, *Shi Kefa ji*, p. 89; Jiang Liangqi, *Tonghua lu*, pp. 65–67; *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 6/11b–13a.

44. For an account of this delegation, see Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644–1662*, pp. 39–40 and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 405–10.

45. Wang Sizhi 王思治 and Lü Yuancong 呂元聰, "Jiashen zhi bian yu Qingjun ruguan" 甲申之變與清軍入關, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究, 1994.2, p. 8.

46. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 10/9a–b.

47. Wang, *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665)*, pp. 156–59.

48. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 30/10a–b and 33/6a.

49. Dorgon reiterated these calls for submission in his instructions to the Ministry of War on June 7, 1644. A month later, Wang Aoyong 王鰲永 (?–1644), who as a Ming official had previously surrendered, was sent to the provinces of Shandong and Henan to press for their surrender. Ibid., 5/9a. The same proclamation can be found in several different places in the *Qing shilu*. Ibid., 5/6b–7a and 8/4b.

50. Ibid., 5/15b.

51. *Shuzhi yuannian neiwai guanshu zoushu* 順治元年內外官署奏疏 (rpt., Beijing: Beida yanjiusuo, 1931).

52. For Hong's efforts in this regard, see, Wang, *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665)*, pp. 150–56.

53. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/12b–13a; Jiang Liangqi, *Tonghua lu*, p. 64.

54. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 8/4b.

55. *Duoergun shezheng riji* 多爾袞攝政日記 (reprinted in *Biji wubian* 筆記五編, Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1976), 3a.

56. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/7a.

57. Ibid. 5/13a–b.

58. Ibid. 5/13b.

59. *Duoergun shezheng riji*, 3a.

60. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 18/9b.

61. Ibid., 5/7a; 5/11b–12a. *Duoergun shezhengriji*, 2b.

62. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 6/14b.

63. Ibid. 6/15a–b; 18/9a–9b. Adam Yuen-chung Lui has argued that Dorgon did not rely on censors too much but employed *Jishiyuan* 緝事員 as his secret spies and *Qixinlang* 啟心郎 to send secret memorials in the Manchu language directly to him. "Censor, Regent and Emperor in the Early Manchu Period, 1644–1660," *papers on Far Eastern History: Ming and Early Ch'ing China*, 17 (1978): 85–86.

64. Zhou and Zhao, *Huangfu Shezhengwang Duoergun*, pp. 277–81. For a general survey of the corruption in the early Qing, see, Adam, Y.C. Lui, *Corruption in China During the Early Ch'ing Period 1644–1660* (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979).

65. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 9/10b–11a. The restoration of the civil service examination was accompanied by the re-institution of ceremonies honoring Confucius and his descendents. See, Shang Hongkui 商鴻逵, "Lun Qingdai de zunkong he chongfeng Lama jiao" 論清代的尊孔與崇奉喇嘛教, in Shang Hongkuei, *Ming Qing shi lunzhu heji* 明清史論著合集 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1988), pp. 107–11.

66. *Qingshi liezhuan*, p. 14a.

67. *Duoergun shezheng riji*, 10b–11a.

68. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 23/7b–8a.

69. Zhou and Zhao, *Huangfu Shezhengwang Duoergun*, p. 275.

70. Ninety-eight percent of the 373 scholars who passed the *jinshi* examination at that time were natives of north China. This may have been partly owing to the fact that Feng Quan, the Minister of Rites and one of the chief examiners, was a native of the region. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, p. 444.

71. For a discussion of the famous ten-day massacre of the residents of Yangzhou, see Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 556–63.

72. For an account of the suppression of resistance in the Jiading area, see Dennerline Jerry, *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 278–301.

73. Eertai 鄂爾泰 (ed.), *Baji tongzhi* 八旗通志 (Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1989), p. 4191.

74. Zhou and Zhao, *Huangfu Shezhengwang Duoergun*, p. 276. The effect at the local level of reconvening the civil service examinations was also successful. Hilary J. Beattie's case study of Tongcheng, Anhui province, provides a good case in point. Tongcheng was famous for its many distinguished scholars and officials in the late imperial period. And contrary to the general impression that Chinese scholars, well-versed in the tenets of Confucianism, commonly pledged their lives to the principles of loyalty and high morality, most of the Tongcheng elite chose to cooperate with the Qing government and to encourage the next generation to take part in the civil service examinations as soon as they were reinstituted. According to one study, their purpose was "to entrench themselves in their previous position and maintain good relations and influence with the local authorities." Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T'ung-ch'eng, Anwhei," pp. 239–76 in Spence and Wills, *From Ming to Ch'ing*.

75. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 25/3a–4b. For a short introduction to the answers given by the *zhuangyuan*, see Benjamin A. Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 164.

76. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 31/3b–4a.

77. Ibid., 43/9b–10a. Also, see Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China*, pp. 164–65.

78. As Mark C. Elliott has pointed out, Manchu rulers, as early as in the period of Nurhaci, expressed the idea of equality in the employment of officials in order to attract the loyalty and service of talented Han Chinese. And the phrase "Man-Han yijia" 滿漢一家 was frequently used as early as May 1645. Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 212–13. However, the reality did not necessarily measure up to this statement. For example, few Han Chinese were appointed to the position of any head of Six Ministries until 1648.

79. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 302–303.

80. Some Manchu leaders seized every opportunity to show their personal displeasure over this matter. For example, in 1627 Amin (?–1640), one of the four senior *beile*, reportedly remarked: "You are a savage slave. How is it that [you are] so loquacious? Why should I not be allowed to kill you?" when Li Yongfang 李永芳 (?–1634) voiced an opinion contrary to his own. As late as 1643, Manchu officials were known to refer to the good old days, and to complain that "formerly Taizu [Nurhaci] executed the Chinese and favored us Manchus. Now there are even some *wang* [princes] and *zongpingguan* [regional commander] among the Chinese, and among the imperial relatives there are some officials and some commoners. How could we fall so low?" William Schultz and Chen-main Wang, in Hao Yen-ping and Wei Hsiu-mei (eds.), *Tradition and Metamorphosis in Modern Chinese History: Essays in Honor of Professor Kwang-ching Liu's Seventy-fifth Birthday* (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1998), Vol. II, p. 849.

81. For Emperor Taizong's lavish treatment of Hong Chengchou and other captured Ming officials and the reactions of his own officials, see, Wang, *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665)*, pp. 116–17.

82. Wu Han 吳晗, *Chaoxian Lichao shilu zhong de zhongguo shiliao* 朝鮮李朝實錄中的中國史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 3735.

83. Banner was the "basic social-political-military organization of the Manchu people, and the core of hereditary soldiers in the imperial Ch'ing [Qing] military organization. The Manchus originally organized themselves into 4 Banners named after the colors of their flags: yellow, white, red, and blue. These Plain Banners were early doubled by the addition of 4 Bordered counterparts." Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 134. In 1635, sixteen new banners were formed, with these units containing Mongol and Chinese soldiers, respectively, who were at that time already serving in the Manchu military forces. For a description of the formation of the eight banner system, see Elliot, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 56–63.

84. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, p. 135.

85. Elliot, *The Manchu Way*, p. 40.

86. It should be pointed out here that Dorgon and Dodo, the commander of the Bordered White Banner were siblings and thus natural allies.

87. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, p. 851.

88. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, p. 266.

89. For an explanation of Huang Taiji's policy toward the Han Chinese, see Schultz and Wang, "Manchu Strategies of Subversion in the Conquest of China," ibid., pp. 844–50.

90. *Qing shilu*, Taizong, 32/8b–9a.

91. Ibid., 32/9a and 34/26b.

92. Ibid., 34/27a.

93. Wu Zhikeng 吳志鏗, "Qingchu faling yu Manzhou benwei zhengce hudong guanxi zhi yanjiu" 清初法令與滿洲本位政策互動關係之研究 (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, National Taiwan Normal University, 1933), pp. 55–56.

94. Although some people were compensated with free land in other areas of the country, those lands were often of little value because of the poor quality of the soil. For a discussion of this policy and its influence on the Chinese people, see Wu Zhikeng, ibid., pp. 55–56, and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 469–72.

95. The term commonly employed to describe this practice, *"daidi touchung"* (to bring one's land when offering one's services), suggests that a person gave up ownership of one's land when entering this serf-like status. In fact, a person may not have owned the land he claimed, but once a Manchu bannerman accepted someone services, he could claim the land permanently. For a discussion of *"touchong,"* see Wu Zhikeng, ibid., pp. 70–82, and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 472–73.

96. See Wu Zhikeng, ibid., pp. 86–104, and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, p. 476.

97. Chen Shengxi 陳生璽, "Qingchu tifaling de shishi yu Hanzu dizhu jieji de paixi douzheng" 清初剃髮令的實施與漢族地主階級的派系鬥爭, *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, 4 (1985): 67–68.

98. Jiang Liangji, *Tonghua lu*, p. 62, and *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/1b.

99. *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi, 5/7a. One Chinese source indicates that it was Wu Sangui who made this suggestion to Dorgon about head-shaving. Anon., *Souwen xubi* 謏聞續筆. Reprinted in *Biji xiaoshuo daguan* 筆記小說大觀, fascicle 8 (Taipei: Xinxing shuju, 1988), vol. 1, p. 9. But this source is not creditable. Wu Sangui's attitude toward the preservation of Chinese culture is not fully understood.

100. Ji Liuqi 計六奇, *Mingji nanlüe* 明季南略 (rpt., Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1963), pp. 237–38.

101. *Qing shilu*, shunzhi, 17/5a–b.

102. Wang and Lu, "Jiashen zhibian yu Qingjun ruguan," p. 12; Zheng Kecheng 鄭克晟, "Shilun Douergun zai Qingchu tongyi Zhongguo guocheng zhong di lishi zuoyong" 試論多爾袞在清初統一中國過程中的歷史作用, in *Qingdai renwu yanjiu* 清代人物研究, edited by Dai Yi 戴逸 and Luo Ming 羅明 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1992), p. 238; Li Hongbin 李鴻彬, "Duoergun yu shanhaiguan dazhan" 多爾袞山海關大戰 in *Qingshi yanjiu ji* 清史研究集 (Beijing: Guangming Ribaoshe, 1986), p. 85.

103. Jiang Liangqi, *Tonghua lu*, p. 81.

104. Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院 (ed.), *Zhanggu congbian* 掌故叢編 (Taipei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1964), p. 149. Chen Shengxi, "Qingchu tifaling de shishi yu Hanzu dizhu jieji de paixi douzheng," p. 75. A modern scholar, Adam Lui, gives a brief introduction on the case of Feng, Sun and Li, under the heading of "factional strife." See, Lui, *Two Rulers in One Reign*, pp. 37–38.

105. *Duoergun shezheng riji*, 1/a. For the memorials that honoring the Chinese rites and downplaying the shaving of the head, see, for example, Zhong-yang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo 中央研究院歷史語言研究所 (ed.), *Ming Qing shiliao* 明清史料, *jia*, pp. 88a–b.

■ Source: Lui, Adam Yuen-chung, 'Censor, regent and emperor in the early Manchu period (1644–1660)', in *Papers on Far Eastern History*, No. 17 (March 1978), pp. 81–102.

CENSOR, REGENT AND EMPEROR IN THE EARLY MANCHU PERIOD (1644–1660)

Adam Yuen-chung Lui

The relationships and attitudes which took shape during the formative period of alien Manchu rule left a stamp upon the institutions which were to govern China during the ensuing two and a half centuries of the Ch'ing dynasty. An examination of the Censorate (*tu-ch'a yüan* 都察院), in many respects the most characteristic of traditional Chinese institutions, and its response to the dynasty, as well as of the conquerors' use and abuse of their censors (*yü-shih* 御史), may help illuminate the process of dynastic change and stabilization.[1] The present short study attempts to compare the policies and practices towards the Censorate carried out by the Shun-chih 順治 Emperor (1651–1660) with those of his former regent, Dorgon (1644–1650), and to examine in some detail the ambiguities and vicissitudes inherent in the censorial role over the critical decade and a half of their rule.

The Ch'ing Censorate was set up as early as 1636 together with many other institutions which were patterned closely after those of the Ming.[2] The Manchus were wise enough to utilize the administrative expertise of their former enemies to sustain their military victories. In this process, they also sought to impress upon the Chinese their respect for the Chinese tradition, thereby laying a better claim to legitimacy as the successors of the defunct Ming dynasty. In some respects, however, the Manchus had to modify certain aspects of the adopted institutions to fit their alien rule. One of the institutions that needed modification was the Censorate, as we shall see later in the discussion.

The traditional functions of the censorial agencies were threefold: to offer advice on institutional reforms, to serve as "ears and eyes" (*erh-mu*

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[1] For the censorial hierarchy, see Table I; also see Charles O. Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford, 1966) and Huang Pen-chi 黃本驥, *Li-tai chih-kuan piao* 歷代職官表, (reprinted by Chung-hua shu-chü, 1964), *chüan* 2, pp. 97–101.

[2] See Li Li-ming 李立明, *Ch'ing-shih nien-piao* (Hong Kong, 1963), p. 16.

Table I. Censorial Hierarchy under the Ch'ing

Title	Rank	Number
tso-tu yü-shih 左都御史 (censor-in-chief)	1B	2
tso-fu-tu yü-shih 左副都御史 (deputy censor-in-chief)	3A	4
liu-k'o chi-shih-chung 六科給事中 (supervising secretary)	5A	24
chien-ch'a yü-shih 監察御史 (circuit censor)	5B	66

Note: Except for the circuit censors, the censorial personnel were equally divided among the Manchus and the Chinese.

The titles *yu-tu yü-shih* 右都御史 and *yu-fu-tu yü-shih* 右副都御史 were given concurrently to governors-general and governors respecitvely.

The provincial censors (*hsün-an* 巡按) were appointed from among the circuit censors and the number was not fixed.

Information obtained from *Li-tai chih-kuan piao, chüan* 2, p. 97.

kuan 耳目官) of the emperor over the civil and military services, and to maintain a restraining influence on the power of the emperor through the submission of remonstrances.[3] The early Ch'ing government under the Dorgon's regency (1644–1650) welcomed their censors' advice on the ways to set up and consolidate the new regime.[4] To Dorgon, the powerful regent ruling China during the minority of the first Manchu emperor, Shun-chih, the censors, being well-educated in the Confucian way, could be utilized for building up a Confucian government. Censor Chu Ting-ch'ing's 朱鼎清 advocacy of regulating official etiquette, Supervising Secretary Ho Chieh's 郝傑 suggestion on official costumes and rituals and Censor Liu P'ang-lung's request for the re-establishment of the traditional civil service examination were a few of the more notable censorial suggestions which at the very beginning of the new regime were not only accepted but immediately put into practice by the Manchu authorities.[5]

Dorgon was, however, less accepting of the censors' activities as impeachers. Although he issued an edict on behalf of the young emperor in the first year of the Shun-chih reign (1644) to remind the censors of their duty to recommend worthy officials and impeach corrupt and inefficient ones,[6] he was not prepared to give them complete freedom in carrying out this responsibility. As early as 1645, two censors were punished for their inability to substantiate their impeachments with solid evidence.[7] The censors were led to understand that they could not impeach officials on "hearsay" (*feng-wen* 風聞) and that failing to satisfy the authorities would lead to their own punishment. The two political setbacks could have been regarded as isolated cases in which the censors were to blame for failure to produce sufficient evidence. Events of 1648–1649, however, convinced them that Dorgon was bent on curtailing their powers as impeachers and government critics, since they were not only punished for unsuccessful impeachments, but on other charges as well. These punishments, too, came in rapid succession, and some of them were inflicted on slim grounds indeed.

In 1648 Tung Ch'eng-hsüeh 董成學 and Wu Tsan-yüan 吳贊元, two provincial censors, were dismissed from office when their impeachments were rejected.[8] Supervising Secretary Liu Hung-yü 劉鴻儒 was demoted one grade and transferred to a more junior post for making unsubstantiated charges against an official.[9] For allegedly biased opinion in a lawsuit, Provincial Censor Ch'in Shih-chen 秦世禎 was degraded and transferred to an inferior position.[10] Hsü Hung-tsu 許弘祚, a circuit censor, was dismissed from office for accepting gifts.[11] Provincial Censor Liu Chin-yin 劉今尹 was demoted and transferred to a more junior post on grounds of misinterpreting certain government regulations.[12] Circuit Censor Wang Hsieh 王燮, who was then supervising the salt gabelle, was demoted three

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[3] For further information on the traditional functions of censors, see Hsieh Pao-chao, *The Government of China* (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 87–92; T'ao Hsi-sheng 陶希聖, *Ming-Ch'ing cheng-chih chih-tu* 明清政治制度 (Taiwan, 1972), Section A (*shang-pien*), pp. 97–102, 106–109, Section B (*hsia-pien* 下篇), pp. 69–73.

[4] From 1644–1647, the censors submitted thirty-one memorials suggesting improvement of the administration, out of which only three were rejected by the emperor. (*Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* 大清歷朝實錄, compiled by *Man-chou ti-kuo kou-wu yüan* 滿洲帝國國務院, 4664 *chüan*, Tokyo: Okura shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937–1938, vol. I, pp. 25–420). The present reference follows the photo-copy of *Hua-wen shu-chü* 華文書局, and the book is hereafter cited as *SL*. Unless it is specified, the period under discussion is the Shun-chih reign.

[5] Huang *Ch'ing tsou-i* 皇清奏議 (68 *chüan* in 64 *ts'e*, 1936), vol. I, 179–185, 101–107, 133–137.

[6] *SL*., vol. I, p. 75.

[7] Ibid., vol. I, pp. 239, 267.

[8] Ibid., p. 423.

[9] Ibid., p. 429.

[10] Ibid., p. 438.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

grades and transferred to a lesser post because he was found guilt of recommending unworthy junior officials for promotion.[13]

The political climate for the censors seemed equally black in the following year (1649). The plea for leniency toward censors committing unintentional offences offered by Circuit Censor Chang Hsüan 張煊 in the early part of the year was well received but was, in fact, not acted upon.[14] Indeed, that year saw further disciplinary actions taken against the censors. For instance, Chang Jo-chu 常若柱, a supervising secretary, was reprimanded for being unreasonable in a memorial and, having been convicted of submitting false charges, was later dismissed from office. Meanwhile, for his failure to inform the government of corrupt practices that were committed under his jurisdiction, another supervising secretary, Chang Ching 張京, was demoted two grades and transferred to an inferior post outside the Censorate.[15] Of the punishment meted out to censors over the two year period, 1648–1649, the heaviest was that imposed on Chou Shih-k'o, a provincial censor. Convicted of corruption, he was sentenced to death, his wife detained, and his property confiscated.[16] The Regent Dorgon in pronouncing the capital punishment sentence, branded Censor Chou, with some justification, as a member of the civil service who had committed crimes of a very serious nature. In the eyes of the censors who had regarded themselves as the special group of officials supported by tradition to criticize shortcomings of the government without the fear of punishment, the death penalty was far too severe a disciplinary action. Censor Chou's case was to serve as a warning to other censors and became a deterring factor in their role as impeachers and government critics.

Sensitive as he might have been toward criticism, Dorgon, however, continued to rely on the censors for institutional and political advice, while restricting their other functions. What he evidently sought was the legitimation of his (and the Manchu) rule which the traditional censorate could confer, but not the implied limitations on absolute power. Being one of the two regents[17] during the emperor's minority, he could have been regarded as a usurper of the imperial power, hence intolerable to the

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[13] Ibid., pp. 459–460.

[14] Ibid., p. 493.

[15] Ibid., pp. 535, 538.

[16] Ibid., p. 530.

[17] See Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644–1912* (Washington, 1943, reprinted by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., Taipei, 1967), pp. 215–219. The other regent was Jirgalang who was assistant regent in late 1644. Also see pp. 397–398 for his dismissal by Dorgon from this post in 1647.

traditional Confucian scholars for whom the censors were spokesmen. The great majority of the censors were, moreover, racially Chinese,[18] and in spite of (or because of) the necessity of adopting Chinese ways of government and employing the Chinese as civil and military officials, the Manchu authorities were all the more eager to exercise autocratic power. Dorgon therefore had no intention of allowing the dilution of his personal rule and was quick to seize opportunities to teach the censors that whatever censorial power they held rested on his consent. Throughout his regency from 1644–1650, the cowed censors seldom dared to submit memorials of a remonstrative nature. The closest thing to such remonstrance was a memorial sent in 1645 when Supervising Secretary Tu Li-te suggested that the way to maintain peace in the empire was for the emperor (regent) to respect the will of heaven.[19] Even this was a mild remonstrance with no specific reference to any shortcomings of the ruler himself. Besides, the memorial was submitted well before Dorgon took the drastic actions related above to bring the censors into submission.

Our focus upon the activities, role and influence of the censors should not lead us to the conclusion that Dorgon relied solely on his censors for ideas and information. While it is true that during the period of Dorgon's regency the censors (in the capital and provinces) did in fact submit more memorials to the throne than any other group of officials, the governors-general and governors, as shown in Table II, were not far behind. Naturally suspicious of his new subjects, Dorgon shared matters of the most confidential nature only with his own men, all of whom were Manchus. The *ch'i-shih-yüan* 緝事員, ostensibly serving merely as imperial guards, were actually Dorgon's secret agents, spying on events and individuals within the capital. This intelligence network had been brought into being as early as the first year of the Manchu rule,[20] and by 1649 had been extended to the provinces. In the yamen of the governors and governors-general, Manchu officials known as *ch'i-hsin-lang* 啟心郎 were appointed by the Regent, empowered to send secret memorials in the Manchu language directly to their imperial employer. The advice of such Manchu officers in serious matters had to be respected and could not be weighed lightly by governors and governors-general whose own actions were under the

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[18] See Table VI.

[19] *SL.*, vol. I, p. 237.

[20] *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, vol. I, pp. 283–286, information contained in Circuit Censor Chang Kuo-hsien's 張國憲 memorial submitted in 1646.

Table II. Number of Memorials Submitted by Different Groups of Officials under Dorgon's Regency, 1644–1650

Year	Capital Censors	Provincial Censors	Grand Secretaries	Governors-General/ Governors	Department	Others
1644	22	5	9	19	4	28
1645	48	16	7	28	19	21
1646	12	7	7	4	6	5
1647	6	5	3	17	7	3
1648	0	9	0	10	0	1
1649	8	5	3	35	3	2
1650	0	5	0	5	2	1
	96	52	29	118	41	61

Note: Capital Censors included the whole censorial hierarchy minus the Provincial Censors. In the calculation, the following three principles have been observed:

(1) No matter how many signatories, each submission has been regarded as one.

(2) Memorials dealing with personal matters such as application for early retirement have not been included.

(3) Only memorials which initiated actions have been included. Submission of memorials in reply to the Emperor's queries or as a result of committees' deliberations have been omitted.

Source: *Ta-Ch'ing Shih-lu*, Shun-chih reign 大清實錄

This compilation only records memorials that were thought to have some significance to the Government and as such it does not contain all memorials submitted to the Emperor. It remains, however, the most reliable source available.)

constant scrutiny of the Manchu agents.[21] Insofar as the *ch'i-hsin-lang* and *ch'i-shih-yüan* now shared the restraining role of the censors, even though providing the regent with alternate sources of information and advice, the existence of such superficially redundant Manchu agencies as these constituted a real curtailment of the censorial function. Moreover, the *ch'i-hsin-lang*, in influencing the provincial governors and governors-general, who were second only to the censors themselves as memorialists, helped build up the counter-weight to censorial influence.

Dorgon's suspiciousness, high-handedness, and coercive demonstrations were not lost upon his censors. If quiescence is any indication of lack of power, as may be assumed for an institution whose function is to make noises in the right ears, by the last years of Dorgon's reign (1648–1650), the power of the censors had been crippled (see Table II).

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[21] Ibid., 355–382, information obtained in Censor Wang Ying-yüan's 王應元 memorial, submitted in 1649.

Dorgon's death in 1651 presented the censors with a unique opportunity to revive their traditional activities and regain their shorn power.[22] With a young, inexperienced Shun-chih emperor now on the throne, the censors took advantage of the moment to deluge him with advisory memorials on how to improve the administration of the empire. Perhaps not fully comprehending the hidden implications of too ready an acceptance of the memorials of *Chinese* censors, the fledgeling monarch responded favourably to them. His confidence in doing so may have derived from consciousness that unlike Dorgon, who was but a regent ruling in another's name, his legitimacy to rule was beyond doubt. There was no call for him at this point to develop or display the sensitivity which had characterized his predecessor. He found no difficulty, therefore, in accepting much greater activity on the part of the censors even in such sensitive matters as impeachment and remonstrance. This did not blind him to the fact that the behaviour of the censors, particularly the provincial censors (*hsün-an* 巡按), left a great deal to be desired. On the basis of information supplied by Supervising Secretary Yao Wen-jan 姚文然, the emperor became convinced that bad as well as good elements existed within the censorial hierarchy and that a purge was necessary. The performance of the censors was to be reviewed, and they were to be classified along a scale ranging from those worthy of special appointment down to those who should be dismissed summarily. The young emperor drew particular attention to the record of those provincial censors who had been criticized by other officials as being unworthy of their offices. He hoped to set a new style and establish new standards for them by establishing regulations for their conduct and official performance. Newly appointed provincial censors were not to be allowed to entertain guests, accept gifts, or attend banquets. Within three days of learning of their appointment, they were to depart the capital for their destinations, making it impossible for them to capitalize upon their appointments locally. Moreover, in addition to personal servants, they were allowed to make use of no more than eight local clerks and the same number of runners, who were required to return to their former yamen once their jobs with the censor were completed.[23] These measures were obviously designed to prevent censors from gaining any independent local bases of power and influence.

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[22] *Tung-hua lu* 東華錄 (edited by *Wang Hsien-ch'ien* 王先謙 et al.), 509 *chüan* in 30 *ts'e*, Taipei, 1963, p. 101a; also see Hsiao I-shan 蕭一山, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung shih* 清代通史 (5 vols., Taiwan, Commercial Press, 2nd edition, 1967), pp. 379–384.

[23] *SL.*, vol. II, pp. 622, 644–645.

In another edict, the Shun-chih emperor endeavoured to guide the *quality* of censorial decisions. He exhorted the censors to bring to justice not merely the old and weak (as had been the tendency) but also those among the powerful and influential who had committed crimes against the state. They were urged to investigate cases personally rather than rely solely upon information furnished them by local officials. The emperor commanded the personal presence at tea of those about to leave the capital for posts outside, using the occasion to advise them of their responsibilities.[24]

Such regulations and exhortations constituted the basis of the Shun-chih emperor's policy towards the censors. Instead of continuing the jealous, repressive policy of Dorgon which reached its height in the period 1648–1649, admonition of erring censors became the imperial approach after 1651. A good example of this approach was provided when two corrupt officials were successfully impeached by other officials who were not censors. Considering impeachment to be one of the principal responsibilities of the censors, the emperor issued the following instruction. "They (the corrupt officials) are caught only because of another crime. No censors have brought the matter to the Government. Possibly they are afraid of being counter-impeached by other officials for belated action..." Yet the emperor concluded by excusing the censors for their past negligence, exhorting them not "to nurture the bad" by failing to inform the government of any crimes.[25]

With such a change of attitude at the top, and under the new system of review of the censors, the latter found it easier to perform their duties. The number of successful impeachments grew and the censors were less inhibited in offering memorials of a remonstrative character. Several such memorials were submitted in the 1652–1653 period. Taking advantage of a special natural phenomenon which was interpreted as a sign of heavenly displeasure, Ch'en T'iao-yüan 陳調元, a supervising secretary, submitted a memorial in 1652 urging the young emperor to be conscientious because officials would naturally follow his example. The imperial reply was a favourable acceptance (*pao-wen* 報聞).[26] In the following year, Censor Chu Ting-yen 朱鼎延 memorialized the throne to remind the emperor of the destitution of the common people. He suggested the employment of Chinese officials as the emperor's personal attendants since their knowledge of Chinese affairs might enable him to learn more of conditions among his subjects.[27] Another censor, Chao Shih-piao 邵士標, in the same year, pleaded in his memorial that if the emperor by chance made some mistakes, and if censors sent in memorials to remonstrate, even though the wording was strong, he should not punish them.[28] The emperor accepted these memorials with magnanimity, and as a further step, issued an edict to encourage censors to remonstrate against any possible mistakes he might have committed. He pledged that rewards would be meted out to those whose memorials impressed him, and as for the others, he would refrain from punishing them. The emperor seemed prepared to play the role of a true Confucian monarch.[29]

In his receptive mood, the emperor continued to back up the censors by removing institutional obstructions to the smooth performance of the censorial functions. When a censor submitted a memorial, the general administrative procedure was for the emperor to have it despatched to the relevant Board for deliberation. Before 1653, the personnel at the Six Boards had stressed meticulous detail and often required the memorialist to rewrite and to re-submit the memorial. The emperor upon learning of such red tape, warned the Six Boards to forget their former prejudices against the censors and to be more conscientious in their review process. At the same time, he also reminded the censors not to take advantage of imperial support to act selfishly and corruptly.[30]

One of the standing threats to the censors' work was their fear of counter-impeachment, particularly by impeached influential mandarins who were qualified to memorialize the throne directly.[31] In 1653 the emperor helped allay this fear by ruling that an impeached official could only defend himself against the censor's charges, and could in no way be permitted to level counter-accusations against the impeacher.[32]

From 1651–1653, the emperor clearly placed much confidence in the censors who not long before had been cowed into silence by Dorgon's repressive policy. More memorials were now submitted, among which were impeachments as well as remonstrances. The emperor generally

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[24] Ibid., 647; *Tung-hua lu* pp. 112b–113a.
[25] Ibid., p. 834.
[26] Ibid., pp. 810–811.

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[27] Ibid., p. 838.
[28] *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, vol. I, pp. 663–666.
[29] *SL.*, vol. 2, pp. 838–839; *Tung-hua-lu* 東華錄, pp. 178a–b.
[30] Ibid., p. 916.
[31] Hsieh Pao-chao, *The Government of China*, p. 103.
[32] *SL.*, vol. 2, p. 942.

responded satisfactorily and accepted their views as useful for the proper administration of the empire.

Nevertheless, the emperor's confidence in the censors gradually declined from 1654 onwards as less attention became focussed on the shortcomings of the censors themselves. A case in point was the impeachment of Ch'en Ming-hsia 陳名夏, a grand secretary, on charges by other grand secretaries, later substantiated by the government, of acts of disloyalty. The emperor strongly believed that Ch'en's crimes should have been known to the censors who kept quiet only because of unwillingness, for various personal reasons, to be involved in the affair. Their apathy and timidity enraged Shun-chih so much that he punished, in various degrees, every member of the Censorate.[33]

The emperor's disillusionment with the censors was aggravated by the frequency with which their impeachments failed. These failures might have been a result of bias or inaccurate information or both. The experience of Censor Lin Ch'i-lung 林起龍, in 1654 indicated that in spite of his good intentions, the impeachment initiated by him might have been unjustified owing to misinformation and reliance on unfounded rumours. The integrity of Censor Lin himself was unquestionable, and his previous record had been exemplary. The emperor had once intended to promote him to a more senior post outside the Censorate. Lin, however, preferred to remain in the censorial hierarchy, and in a memorial to the throne argued that he could better serve the empire by doing so. The emperor acceded to this request. In 1654, in an over-zealous effort, he impeached a governor-general in charge of river-works and a president of the Board of Works on the grave, but rather vague, charges of cheating the emperor and expropriating money from the common people. The case was reviewed by princes and senior mandarins, and the two impeached officials were sent back to the capital for interrogation. The verdict was totally unfavourable to Lin, who could not produce sufficient evidence to convict the two defendants. As a result, the review committee recommended that Censor Lin be punished and exiled to a distant post for three years. While the emperor was forced to accept their recommendation, he did take into consideration Lin's past record and seemingly good intentions and lessened the punishment to demotion of three grades and transfer to a more inferior post.

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[33] Ibid., p. 971.

The leniency towards Censor Lin was motivated by Shun-chih's sympathy for well-intentioned censors who lacked sufficient firsthand information to make a reasonable case stick. This was a far different case from those in which censors acted out of bias and because of personal interest or corruption. In the latter, the emperor did not hesitate to inflict the heaviest of punishments. In 1655, Shun-chih was infuriated by just such crimes committed by Provincial Censor Ku Jen 顧仁. The matter was brought to the imperial attention by the suicide of a clerk who had once worked in the Board of Civil Service and who left a letter to the effect that the Provincial Censor was highly corrupt and a persecutor of the innocent. The emperor took up the case himself, found that the censor was guilty of the various charges contained in the posthumous letter, and sentenced him to death.[34][35]

Such cases provided plausible justification for the emperor's diminishing confidence in his "ears and eyes", the censors. Timidity, insufficient preparation of cases, and corruption on the part of a few censors stripped the institution itself of the aura with which tradition had imbued it. In two short years, 1654 and 1655, the emperor's attitude toward the censors changed. The emperor's growing awareness of the frailties of his censors may also have been a function of his growing sophistication and understanding of the basic contradiction inherent in the censorial institution itself. His show of distrust may have been based both on experience with their performance and on his own increasing grasp of administrative affairs.

It was not until 1656 that the censors partially regained some of the lost imperial confidence. As before, an impeachment affair worked the change, this time persuading the emperor that the censors could reform themselves and perform their censorial functions conscientiously. Remembering the punishment meted out to them when they failed to take action against Ch'en Ming-hsia, the censors were often on the lookout for undesirable officials. In this instance, led by the Censor-in-Chief, Wei I-chieh 魏裔介, evidence was obtained to impeach successfully another Grand Secretary, Ch'en Chih-lin 陳之遴,[36] convincing the emperor that the censors were not afraid of attacking influential officials when they had committed crimes against the state. This impression was substantiated by other good performances from the censorial group who continued to receive imperial confidence in the latter years of the Shun-chih reign. A striking example of a censor who met the imperial expectations in this period was Yang Yung-chien 楊雍建 whose story illustrates how much a censor could do, if the emperor was prepared to listen to him.

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[34] Ibid., p. 977.
[35] Ibid., p. 1130.
[36] Ibid., vol. III, pp. 1164, 1168–1169.

Yang was a *chin-shih* 進士 whose first appointment was as a district magistrate. Famous for his outspoken attitude and his impartiality in judging legal cases, he was recommended for promotion to the post of supervising secretary by a senior official. Yang showed his remarkable talent in this capacity, submitting seven memorials in one year, all of which were favourably received by the emperor. Because of his efforts, the entire personnel of the Board of Civil Service were punished for mishandling the appointment process.[37]

Encouraged by the great success of Censor Yang and learning that the emperor was once again in a receptive mood, the censors submitted even more memorials in the last year of the reign (1660).[38] In the same year, the famous Censor-in-Chief, Wei I-chiai, successfully impeached two grand secretaries at the same time (Liu Cheng-tsung 劉正宗 and Cheng-k'o-kung 成克鞏).[39] His subordinates, following his example, brought to justice several unworthy senior officials, among whom were the governor of Honan, Chia Han-fu 賈漢復and the governor of Shensi, Chang Tzu-te 張自德, both found guilty of corruption and maladministration.[40] These impeachment activities were all initiated by capital-based censors who held the office of supervising secretary.

Table III. Number of Memorials Submitted by Different Groups of Officials Under the Shun-Chih Emperor's Personal Rule 1651–1660

Year	Capital Censors	Provincial Censors	Grand Secretaries	Governors-General/ Governors	Department	Others
1651	12	3	2	5	10	3
1652	31	6	6	3	10	8
1653	27	2	8	8	10	17
1654	27	0	8	10	6	11
1655	18	1	1	5	9	12
1656	21	3	4	18	21	10
1657	17	7	2	14	9	6
1658	25	8	0	14	13	4
1659	23	6	0	26	8	7
1660	55	16	1	11	16	11
	256	52	32	114	112	89

For notes and source, see Table II.

Table IV. Political Reverses of Censors 1659

Censors Punished	Reasons	Forms of Punishment
hsün-an 巡按	expropriation of public money	dismissal and penal action
hsün-an 巡按	Corruption	dismissal and penal action
hsün-an 巡按	bad recommendation	dismissal and penal action
Supervising Secretary	improper suggestion	censure
hsün-an 巡按	cowardice and failure of duty	dismissal and penal action

Source: Ta-Ch'ing shih-lu, Shun-chih reign, vol. 3, pp. 1417–1567.
大清實錄, 順治

While the emperor now once more confided in censors serving at the capital, his mistrust of the provincial censors remained. The impeachment of the Grand Secretaries was the work of capital censors. Censor Yang was also a supervising secretary stationed at the capital. The memory of the corruption and malpractices of Provincial Censor Ku Jen was hard to erase. Moreover, distance bred mistrust. The Government was always suspicious of co-operation among local officials and the provincial censors for personal benefits. Even in the 1659–1660 period when Shun-chih was greatly impressed by the performance of Censors Yang and Wei, his support for the provincial censors was at best lukewarm. As seen in Table IV, out of the five censors punished in 1659, four were provincial censors and the fifth, a supervising secretary, was only censured instead of being seriously punished, as were the others. In the first year of the succeeding reign (K'ang-hsi 康熙 1661–1722), the new government was so disillusioned with the provincial censors that when one of them, Wu Shao-hsin 仵劭昕, was convicted of corruption and dishonesty and sentenced to the death penalty, the post was abolished from the civil list. The

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[37] For the biography of Yang, see *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan* (80 *chüan* in 80 *ts'e*, 1928 ed.), 6:18a; for some of his memorials submitted to the throne, see *SL.*, vol. III, pp. 1455, 1458, 1491, 1505, 1531.

[38] See Table III.

[39] *SL.*, vol. III, 1613–1614.

[40] Ibid., 1622, 1579, 1586.

Table V. Positions of Officials Successfully Impeached by Censors in the 1644–1660 Period

Position	No.	%
Capital Officials (3rd rank and above)	21	24.1
Provincial Officials (3rd rank and above)	17	19.5
Capital Officials (below 3rd rank)	32	36.8
Provincial Officials (below 3rd rank)	11	12.6
Military Officers	5	5.7
Underlings	1	1.1
Total	87	99.8

Source: Ta-Ch'ing shih-lu, Shun-chih reign
Note: Military Officers and underlings were also below the 3rd rank.

Table VI. Proportion of Manchu and Chinese Circuit Censors 1644–1722

	No.	%
Chinese	566	97.4
Manchu	15	2.6
Total	581	100.0

Source: Ch'ing-ch'ao yü-shih ti-ming lu 清朝御史題名錄

former role of surveillance at the provincial level by the provincial censors was taken up by the governors-general and governors concerned.[41]

The fact that the Shun-chih emperor trusted the censors more than his former regent, Dorgon, was obvious, but this trust depended largely on the efficiency and integrity of the censors themselves. That was the reason why in the 1654–1656 period, the censors, because of their own shortcomings, lost the confidence of the emperor. The abolition of the post of provincial censor was also motivated by the same reason. Looking at the whole reign (1644–1660), however, the censors (as seen in Tables II and III) presented more memorials to the throne than any class of officials. The number of successful impeachments against powerful but undesirable mandarins was also impressive (Table V). Thus, despite the political vicissitudes experienced by censors as a group during Dorgon's regency and Shun-chih's personal rule, they exerted immeasurable influence on the alien government under which they served.

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[41] *SL.* (K'ang-hsi reign), 1/105.

■ Source: Ch'en, Chieh-hsien, 'An examination of Manchu sinicization as reflected in the central government of the early Ch'ing period', in Bernard Hung-Kay Luk, (ed.), *Contacts between cultures.* Volume 4. Eastern Asia: history and social sciences, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, pp. 7–13.

AN EXAMINATION OF MANCHU SINICIZATION AS REFLECTED IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE EARLY CH'ING PERIOD

Chieh-hsien Ch'en

Of the non-Chinese peoples who have entered and occupied China proper during the course of Chinese history, the Manchus are often considered to have become the most thoroughly and obviously sinicized, particularly in their imitation of the central government system. A scholar of an earlier generation in China has stated that when the Manchus first entered China, "in all official positions they followed the Ming administrative system. Any small additions or deletions at this time were mainly the result of differences in the Manchus and Han Chinese people. Consequently, minor changes were made merely to facilitate the rulers." This opinion is basically supportable. However, the establishment of the central government offices in the early Ch'ing period did not as "completely imitate the Ming system" as it might appear on the surface. Not only did the Manchus make changes, they also had a standard and a purpose for sinicization. They did not completely and blindly accept the traditional Chinese system in its entirety. From the specific examples given below, we can see the conditions of that time and the attitude of the Manchus themselves towards sinicization.

First, we examine the establishment of the Liu-pu, or "Six Boards." When Nurhaci established the Later Chin empire, in addition to such general military leaders as the noble rulers or the Eight Banners, he especially appointed five high-ranking ministers and five subordinate officials (in Manchu, *jarguci*), altogether ten in number, to assist in the management of state affairs. The final decision in government affairs, besides resting with the Great Khan Nurhaci, rested with the various noble princes (*beile* in Manchu). In 1622, Nurhaci ordered the eight princes known as *Hošo beile* to discuss together the government of the state. The next year, he again set up eight great officials as assistants and used them to look into whether or not the eight *Hošo beile* were just and fair. He also commanded them to evaluate successes and failures in state affairs and to deliberate on military matters. In 1626, Nurhaci died and his son Hong Taiji (or Abahai) succeeded him as emperor. One month after Hong Taiji ascended the throne, he first ordered the eight great ministers who were in charge of banner affairs to participate in the discussion of governmental matters. This was the first step in diminishing the great power of the *beile*. In 1631, the emperor issued an edict following the Ming dynasty system. He established the Six Boards. Each Board still had a *beile* to manage Board affairs, with several *ch'eng-cheng* and *ts'an-cheng* to assist them. In 1644, the Manchus entered China proper, and the organization of the central government was altered greatly. The management of Board affairs by *beile* was stopped; the *ch'eng-cheng* were changed into ministers (*shang-shu*) and *ts'an-cheng* became vice-ministers (*shih-lang*). Manchus and Chinese were appointed as ministers without a fixed quota. For the most part, however, the vice-ministers were appointed in a ratio of one Manchu to one Chinese.

From the brief history of the establishment of the Six Boards given above, we can see that in the early Ch'ing, the Manchus did indeed imitate the Chinese system in setting up the Six Boards of Civil Office, Rites, Revenue, War, Punishments and Works. However, from 1631, the Manchus started to deviate from their policy of following the Ming system in all things, because at the top of each Board there was a *beile* to manage Board affairs, and the official titles minister (*shang-shu*) and vice-minister (*shih-lang*) did not continue. At the same time, the officials in charge were Manchus, Mongols and Chinese, appointed side by side, so that it would be inevitable that they contain one another's authority. Even though the Manchus entered China proper in 1644 and dispensed with *beile* control of Board affairs, as well as changing the *ch'eng-cheng* and *ts'an-cheng* into ministers and vice-ministers—all on the surface completely imitating the Ming system—they nevertheless appointed Manchu and Chinese officials side by side, an act assuredly not reflecting sinicization. Also, in 1651, *beile* were again put concurrently in charge of Board duties. Although this was stopped in the following year, 1652, in the first year of the Yung-cheng reign (1723) imperial princes and members of the Grand Secretariat were yet once more concurrently put in charge of Board affairs. These all were appointed by the Emperor, and this too was quite different from the Six Boards system of the Han Chinese. In summary, the Manchu attitude towards sinicization indicates that they did not necessarily accept the Han Chinese system in its entirety. The organization of the Six Boards is an example of this.

Secondly, we look at the Grand Secretariat (*Nei-ko*) and the Hanlin Academy. In 1629, Hong Taiji ordered the scholars to divide into two sections and work, respectively, on the translation of Chinese books and on keeping records of Manchu state affairs—in terms of both its achievements and its mistakes. The government institution where these scholars served was called the Literary Hall (*Wen-kuan*). After seven years, Hong Taiji changed the Great Chin Empire into the Great Ch'ing Empire. His reign title was also changed from T'ien-tsung to Ch'ung-te. In accord with the vast scale of the Great Ch'ing Empire, the Literary Hall expanded its structure and also changed its name to *Nei san-yüan* (Three Inner Courts): the Inner Court of Historiography (*Nei Kuo-shih-yüan*) the Inner Court of Secretariat (*Nei Pi-shu yüan*), and the Inner Court of Literature (Nei Hung-wen yüan). This change in organization not only increased the scope of this body's official responsibility, but also enhanced the substance of the Grand Secretariat and the Hanlin Academy.

After entering China proper in the first year of the Shun-chih reign (1644), there was no lack of officials from the Ming dynasty who surrendered to the Ch'ing. Moreover, the grand secretaries, from the government established previously in Manchuria, followed Prince Regent Dorgon and the Shun-chih Emperor to Beijing. Therefore, in 1644, the Three Inner Courts of the Ch'ing system and the Grand Secretariat and Hanlin Academy of the Ming system existed side by side for a short period of time. In 1645, the government issued an order unifying these two institutions, but they still took the Three Inner Courts as the mainstay and only added the two characters *han-lin* to the name of this institution, giving rise to the Nei Han-lin Kuo-shih yüan (the Inner Hanlin Court of Historiography), the Nei Han-lin Pi-shu yüan (the Inner Hanlin Court of Secretariat) and the Nei Han-lin Hung-wen yüan (the Inner Hanlin Court Literature). In the same year, the emperor issued an edict increasing the responsibilities of the Three Inner Courts. And, in 1651, the Ch'ing court ordered again that the rank of the Grand Secretary and that of the Minister of each Board be the same, thus enhancing the position of the Three Inner Courts. However, in 1658, the Shun-chih Emperor, in imitation of the official structure of the Ming dynasty, changed the Nei san-yüan (the Three Inner Courts) into the Nei-ko (the Grand Secretariat) and Han-lin yüan (the Hanlin Academy). Obviously, this was a step towards sinicization. Nevertheless, the Manchus deeply feared that the excessive abuse of Secretariat authority that occurred in Ming times would appear again. Thus, they reduced the rank of the Grand Secretaries to the Fifth Rank and established the Hanlin Academy separately. When viewed from the perspective of the governmental system, this seems to have been transforming the Ch'ing system into the Han Chinese system, but in reality it was only a reduction in the authority of the Grand Secretary of late Ming period.

In 1662, after the Shun-chih Emperor died, the conservative faction of the Manchus seized political power. They took as their pretext the fact that "the office of the Three Inner Courts was established in the time of Hong Taiji" to once again disband the Chinese Grand Secretariat and the Hanlin Academy and to reestablish the Three Inner Courts. This was a reaction of the Manchus against sinicization and also represented a revival of the "ancestral system" of the Ch'ing dynasty. However, in 1670, after the K'ang-hsi Emperor overturned the conservative influence of the Manchus, he again issued an edict that the Three Inner Courts be changed into the Grand Secretariat and be organized according to the old precedent from the fifteenth year of the Shun-chih reign (1659). As a result, the Grand Secretariat was finally and formally established and thenceforth gradually developed. But during the Yung-cheng reign, the Manchus further established the Chün-chi Ch'u (Grand Council), which absorbed the power of the Grand Secretariat, so that the latter again became an organization with no real authority.

The historical facts narrated above concerning the repeated establishment and disbanding of the Grand Secretariat and the Hanlin Academy clearly reveal the competition between Manchu and Chinese culture at that time. In addition, they illustrate the fact that the Ch'ing emperor's attitude towards sinicization was rational and had limitations.

Thirdly, we discuss the office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu* (Notes on the emperors' daily activities). The *Notes on the Emperors' Daily Activities* is a special archival document that records the words and actions of the emperor. This important record was kept by a close attendant to the emperor and had an extremely long history in China. To establish an Office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu* in the Ch'ing dynasty was, of course, the result of sinicization. Nevertheless, there were several matters concerning this practice which are worthy of our careful scrutiny:

a) The Ch'ing dynasty Office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu* was established late. It was only about the tenth year of the K'ang-hsi reign (1671) when it started its work and began to record the activity of the emperor, after court officials had petitioned for this on several occasions.

b) Normally speaking, the Office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu* daily made a direct historical record of the emperor's edicts, his words and actions, the memorials of high-ranking ministers, etc. Consequently, the emperor placed great emphasis upon this record. The responsible officials followed the emperor around, and wrote down his important activities. However, after the K'ang-hsi Emperor established this central government office in about 1671, he did not treat this unit and its officials of both Manchus and Chinese with consistent and uniform respect. For example, in 1675, he issued an order that the diarists did not need to accompany him when he visited his grandmother. Later he also felt that when discussing secret matters in the court the diarists should not necessarily attend. In 1682, he not only began gradually to limit the activities and authority of the diarists, but went one step further to express doubts about the moral character and loyalty of these officials. He also suggested that these officials were not making a record of matters according to actual facts but often had private inclinations to embellish, add or delete. From this we can see that although the K'ang-hsi Emperor depended upon the ancient Chinese system to establish an Office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu*, he did not have respect for the authority of this Office like most Chinese emperors.

c) In the fifty-seventh year of K'ang-hsi's reign (1718), the emperor issued an order to eliminate this central government organ because the officials leaked secrets from the imperial palace and, in recording affairs, "were negligent and perverse." It was only in the first year of Yung-cheng (1723) that this office was re-established, after having been shut down for more than four years.

In summary, the establishment of the Office of the *Ch'i-chü-chu* in the early Ch'ing indicates that the sinicization of the Manchus was based on the attitude of "selecting its [Chinese culture's] best and following it while changing what was not good." It can also be said that they used a realistic assessment of advantages and disadvantages as their standard for evaluation.

Fourthly, we examine the Imperial Household Department. The Office of the Imperial Household (*Nei-wu fu*), during the Ch'ing dynasty, was an institution that managed the affairs of the emperor's family such as clothing, food, travel, marriages, funerals, celebrations, sacrifices, etc. In the Ming dynasty these affairs were all managed by the eunuch-controlled Thirteen Yamen. However the Ch'ing government was quite different from the Ming dynasty in this regard and did not follow the Han Chinese system at all. When the Manchus first entered Beijing, they just established a new office called Nei-wu fu (Imperial Household) to manage the emperor's family. In 1658, the Shun-chih emperor abolished the Imperial Household Department; and, following the Chinese system of the Ming, he established the Thirteen Yamen of the Eunuchs. This can be considered a true expression of sinicization. However, the authority of the eunuchs was highly restricted in comparison to that of the Ming eunuchs. Moreover, three years later, when the Shun-chih emperor died (1661), the Thirteen Yamen of the Eunuchs was abolished again, and the Imperial Household Department was restored and continued to function. After the K'ang-hsi reform of the government during the eighth and ninth years of his reign (1670–1671), the Manchus more or less followed the Chinese system, utilizing the old institutions of the Ming dynasty. But with regard to the Office of the Eunuchs, unlike the case of such institutions as the Grand Secretariat and the Hanlin Academy, they did not restore the Thirteen Yamen but continued the Imperial Household Department to serve the emperor's family until the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. And again, the K'ang-hsi emperor also established the Ching-shih fang in 1677 to regulate the eunuchs, causing the eunuchs truly to become inferiors who were «to answer commands.» Succeeding Ch'ing emperors were able to follow their ancestors' system so that the Ch'ing dynasty did not have the problem of eunuch tyranny disrupting national government affairs. Thus, the eunuchs' offices in the Ming and Ch'ing were quite different. It can be said that, in this respect, the Manchus did not imitate the Chinese system.

Besides this, the establishment of certain offices, such as the Censorate (*Tu-ch'a yüan*) and the Department of Colonial Affairs (*Li-fan yüan*), is worthy of discussion. From the point of view of the officials and the duties of the Censorate, both before and after the Manchus entered China proper, except for the fact that Manchus and Chinese were put in positions of authority side by side—a situation unlike that during the Ming period—there is no doubt that this office possessed the nature of a traditional censorate. But the establishment of the Department of Colonial Affairs was entirely different from that of the Censorate. In the beginning, this office exclusively managed Mongolian affairs (and later both Mongolian and Tibetan affairs) and was a new creation of the Manchus. Because the Department of Colonial Affairs managed non-Chinese affairs, the responsible officials were mostly native Manchus and Mongols. Therefore, among the offices established at the beginning of the Ch'ing, the Department of Colonial Affairs was one that had almost nothing to do with the Ming system.

If we summarize what has been described above, we can understand that establishment of central government offices in the early years of the Ch'ing dynasty was not like what most scholars have imagined—i.e., that

the Manchus completely duplicated the Ming system. From the perspective of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of such offices as the Six Boards and the Grand Secretariat, or the Office of the Imperial Diary and the Imperial Household Department, it can be demonstrated that the Manchus, when appropriating the institutions and organization of the Ming, often had conditions or limitations and were not willing to accept the previous system in its entirety. They would undergo a period of rational consideration and would not just simply follow what had been established before. Moreover, they selected and followed what they found good with a primary emphasis upon self-interest. This type of attitude towards sinicization was already apparent in the early stages of the dynasty. For example, not long after the Six Boards were established in 1631, the Chinese official of the Later Chin Empire Ning Wan-wo, who recommended to Hong Taiji that the Ming system should not be completely followed, said in a memorial:

> ... Although the *Ta-Ming hui-tien* (Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty) is a good book, if our country acts today in complete accord with that book, it will not succeed. They [the Ming] ruled the empire for two or three hundred years, their borders stretched for thousands of miles, and their wealth was incalculable. But the Book, from the time of (their founder) Hung-wu (emperor) to the present, was revised on numerous occasions. Why, today, do we not dare to alter a single character? ... We should consider the fact that the Rulers and Ministers of a particular age must have a system for that particular age!

We can see that whether we are considering the Six Boards or the *Collected Statutes* of the Ming dynasty, at that time it was thought that "to completely follow another's actions will not be successful," for each age ought to have its own institutions and must respond to change. This was the basic attitude in the early Ch'ing to using the Chinese system, and it was also one of the important reasons for the success of the Manchus in ruling China.

Of particular note is the fact that, while the Manchus understood that sinicization could not be avoided, and while they accepted the spiritual essence of the system of the Han Chinese, they still paid attention to the preservation of their own culture. In 1634, Hong Taiji sent down an order the translation of all the Chinese names of officials and Chinese names of cities of the Later Chin Empire into Manchu. At that time, he said:

> I have heard that when a State receives the heavenly mandate to establish a government, each State has its own system and does not simply follow precedent. There never has been a case where a new group rejected its national

> language and turned away to learn the language of another State. Matters that do not neglect origins are able to continue a long time and last forever without being replaced. The various Mongolian princes rejected the Mongolian language, and, for their names, they all followed the Lama system, bringing their State's fortune to a decline into weakness. Now the names of officials in our State are all based on the Chinese language and follow its old titles. To know that something is good and be unable to follow it, or to know that something is bad and be unable to eliminate it, in both of these we have not yet succeded. I have received the Imperial task, and how can I change my State's system and follow after that of another? Henceforth, the names of officials and the names of cities ought all to be changed into Manchu.

This passage clearly indicates that the Manchus were determined to preserve their own culture. At the same time, they also considered that the Mongol's belief in Lamaism had caused the decline in their national fortune, and they believed "to know something is bad and be unable to eliminate it" is not right. In fact, just before and after entering China proper, the Manchus' devotion to Lamaism also possessed a good deal of political significance. They believed in Lamaism, but they did not fawn upon Buddha; they treated the lamas with courteous respect, but they did not enter the Lamaism. Rather, they promoted the Yellow Lamaist religion as a means of controlling the Mongols. Therefore, the Manchus utilized the Lamaism of Tibet in the early Ch'ing period to rule the Lamaist world of Mongolia and Tibet. But they did not, like the Mongols, believe in Lamaism and thereby bring about the daily decline of their State.

In conclusion, during the early years of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Manchus were willing to transform the government system and did not entirely rely upon Ming-dynasty organization. Sinicization was only one tactic for achieving their long-term goal of controlling China. Just like using Lamaism to dominate the Mongols or believing in Lamaism but not fawning upon Buddha, the Manchus were willing to use sinicization for their own purposes and were quite unwilling to be completely assimilated by the Chinese.

■ Source: Lui, Adam Yuen-chung, 'Manchu-Chinese relations and the imperial "equal treatment" policy, 1651–1660', in *Journal of Asian History*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 143–165.

MANCHU-CHINESE RELATIONS AND THE IMPERIAL "EQUAL TREATMENT" POLICY, 1651–1660

Adam Yuen-Chung Lui

Under a new rule of a foreign people, the problem of racial conflicts between the conquerors and the conquered plays a prominent role in politics and society. On the one hand, the conquerors naturally assume a feeling of superiority and look down on the conquered; on the other hand, the latter live under the shadow of fear and helplessness. In China, this problem existed in an acute form in and after June 1644, when Peking was taken by the Manchus. The stability and peace of society, therefore, depended largely on the policies of the Manchu conquerors. After the military conquest, they faced the more difficult task of governing a people which was nearly forty times their own number and whose civilization was far more sophisticated than theirs. Even before entering Peking in 1644, they were politically wise enough to borrow heavily from Ming practices in setting up their government in Mukden and to employ Chinese subjects to help run the administration.[1] After 1644, they continued the policy of supporting former Chinese institutions and appointing former Ming officials to their civil service. They did this for several purposes. First, they required administrative expertise which the Chinese who had surrendered could provide. Second, such a policy made the Manchu conquest more palatable to the Chinese and enabled the new regime to acquire a certain degree of legitimacy. The allegiance of the majority of Chinese, particularly the scholar-official class, was stronger to the Confucian tradition than to any ruling house; the change of dynastic governments was not new to the Chinese, and since the Manchus outwardly conformed to the Chinese tradition, their rule was not seen as intolerable.[2]

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[1] Sea Arthur W. Hummel ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, (Washington, 1943–44). The present reference follows the reprint by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Company, (Taipei, 1967), pp. 231–232, 358–360.

[2] Edwin O. Reischauer & John K. Fairbank, *East Asia, The Great Tradition*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 366, 370, 373–374; John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 77–82.

The basic concern of the first Manchu ruler (the reigning regent, Dorgon) after 1644 remained the preservation of Manchu dominance; the adoption of the Chinese way of government and the appointing of Chinese officials were only a means to achieve such a goal. Having come to rule the Chinese empire through military conquest, the Manchus naturally distrusted the Chinese, despite their indispensable position in the government. To balance and possibly offset the Chinese political influence and to provide political opportunities for their own people, the Manchu authorities, under Dorgon, proclaimed at the outset a "synarchical government structure" which, on paper at least, spelled out an equal participation by Manchus and Chinese in senior government positions. While the Chinese officials were expected to perform administrative and executive duties, the Manchus assumed a supervisory role. The regent, however, was basically not satisfied with the arrangement and in practice appointed many more Manchus to senior government positions.[3] For the first few years of the Manchu rule, practically no Chinese presidents (*shang-shu*) of the Six Boards were appointed and the bannermen virtually dominated the senior positions of governor-general (*tsung-tu*) at the provincial level. Although Dorgon allowed the Chinese censors (*yü-shih*) to offer political formulae to help maintain the newly established government, he discouraged them from exercising the traditional functions of remonstrance and impeachment; such functions were regarded as jeopardizing Manchu power.[4] In an effort to minimize the role of the notorious eunuchs, Dorgon relied on the *Nei-wu fu*, a department staffed exclusively by Manchus, to take care of the work within the palace precincts. Dorgon's reliance on the Deliberative Council, composed exclusively of Manchu princes and Manchu mandarins, to decide military policies was another indication of his distrust of Chinese officials.[5] It goes without saying that the Manchus dominated the military forces of the empire and the banner soldiers were placed at every strategic place of the empire. The government did not hesitate to massacre the entire Chinese population of Yangchou, because of their dogged resistance to Manchu military consolidation aimed at the complete submission of the Chinese.[6]

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[3] See Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback, Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 42.

[4] See Adam Y.C. Lui, *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor, 1644–1660*, (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1978), pp. 24–27.

[5] Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 42–43.

[6] See Wang Hsiu-ch'u, "A memoir of a ten days' massacre in Yangchou", *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, 4, 5, (1937), 515–537.

The Shun-chih emperor took up his personal rule in the early 1650's and when he died in 1661, he left his last will which, among other things, conveyed a message of his repentence for his undue support of the Chinese, resulting in Manchu officials losing heart and becoming disillusioned. As it has been argued elsewhere, the will or a great part of it was fabricated by the succeeding regents led by Oboi for obvious political reasons.[7] In other words, Shun-chih was criticized by his succeeding regents for showing preference to Chinese officials. It is not the concern here to argue the authenticity of the will, but to see whether the charges (or admission) as contained in the will carried any degree of historical truth. If the charges can be substantiated by historical fact, Shun-chih was obviously a "sinophile", a ruler resembling one of the late Ming emperors, assuming a Confucian cloak but acting biasedly and inefficiently. If the charges are false, there is the need to reexamine Shun-chih's policies and ideas towards the problem of Manchu-Chinese relations.

One of the charges, as indirectly expressed in the will, is that Shun-chih deliberately attempted to revive a notorious Chinese institution, the Thirteen Offices for the eunuchs, and unduly favoured the Chief Eunuch, Wu Liang-fu, who had been found guilty of meddling in politics and committing corrupt practices. In defence of the emperor, the setting up of the Thirteen Offices was politically motivated rather than representative of the imperial liking for Chinese institutions. Shun-chih was aware that the *Nei-wu fu*, the department responsible for the up-keep of the palaces, was still dominated by members of the Dorgon clique and others over whom he had no control.[8] Moreover, he maintained that if the Offices were properly controlled, the old Ming malpractice of eunuchs playing politics would not repeat itself under the Ch'ing context.[9] It is worth noting that the re-employment of eunuchs was not only opposed by the Manchu princes, but also by the Chinese officials, some of whom memorialized the emperor to the effect that eunuchs were subversive elements in government.[10]

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[7] Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 205–207.

[8] Ibid., p. 53.

[9] Adam Y.C. Lui, *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor, 1644–1660*, pp. 40–41.

[10] An example of Chinese officials opposing the setting up to the Thirteen Offices was T'u Lai. See *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu*, (compiled by *Man-chou ti-kuo kuo-wu yüan*, 4664 *chüan*, (Tokyo, Okura shuppan kabushiki Kaisha, 1937). This reference follows the photocopy of *Hua-wen shu-chü* (Taipei) and is hereafter cited as *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih reign, II, 913–914. See also *Tung-hua lu* (ed. by Wang Hsieh-ch'ien and others, 509 *chüan* in 30 *ts'e.*

As history reveals later, Shun-chih was proved wrong; whatever safeguards he had made against the eunuchs, he was unable to stop the corruption and other irregularities. The chief eunuch, Wu Liang-fu, was found guilty of serious crimes against the state in 1658. It has been maintained by the regents (Soni, Ebilun, Suhsaha and Oboi) that Shun-chih was too lenient towards Wu; and, according to a modern sinologist, the emperor, in spite of Wu's overt crimes, allowed him to continue in office.[11] If these charges against Shun-chih are true, he was not only pro-Chinese in sentiment and action, but also an unworthy emperor who was blind to the crimes of his own favourite officials.

It has been recorded in history that as early as 1655, Shun-chih issued an edict to warn Wu of his behaviour and in 1658, when Wu's guilt was substantiated, the emperor denounced him publicly and had him arrested for further criminal investigation. There is no historical evidence to support that he had let him continue in office after this denunciation.[12] As can be seen in Appendix I, there is a good chance that Wu was executed before 1661 by the Shun-chih emperor himself. If this was the case, the accusation of the emperor supporting corrupt Chinese eunuchs is completely groundless.

If we take into account that the so-called Shun-chih "favourites" were not all Chinese eunuchs, but also included a Manchu henchman called Tung-i, the charge of his relying fully on the Chinese becomes even more meaningless.[13]

In the will, Shun-chih admitted his undue toleration of bad Chinese officials and the case of Liu Cheng-tsung has been cited as a classic example.[14] In 1660, Liu, a grand secretary, was charged with corruption and other malpractices, but before this date, no solid impeachable evidence had been directed against him either by Manchu mandarins or Chinese censors. The emperor could well have been aware of Liu's crimes but in no way could he take action because of the lack of evidence. In fact, the 1660 impeachment of Liu was initiated by the emperor himself, since

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This reference follows the photocopy of *Wen-hai* Publishing Agency, (Taipei, 1963), Shun-chih reign, pp. 152b–153a.

[11] Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 52–53.

[12] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, III, 1373. No information of Wu being retained in office after 1658 is given in any Chinese authoritative source. Oxnam (*Ruling From Horseback*, p. 53) seems to be the only source to support the above contention, and he probably arrives at this conclusion through speculation.

[13] *Shih-lu*, K'ang-hsi, I, 53; Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 52–53, 65–66.

[14] See *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, III, 1696.

he caused the Chief Censor Wei I-chiai, to take action. The emperor was so frustrated with the inactivity of the Chinese censors that he intended to punish them, after the case was over, for being slow in impeaching Liu.[15] Thus, the choice of Liu Cheng-tsung's case as an indictment of the emperor's liking for bad Chinese officials is a mistake, as it is not supported by historical fact. It only shows shallowness or bias on the part of the forgers of the will.

If the will did not actually reflect Shun-chih's ethnic policies, and if the accusations against him of favouring the Chinese were not true, it is necessary to re-examine Shun-chih's policies towards his Manchu and Chinese officials and the reasons why such reaction was engendered after his death.

Although he did not put Liu Cheng-tsung to death, he had, however, no hesitation in executing another Chinese grand secretary, Ch'en Ming-hsia. This shows quite definitely that he could also be very severe towards Chinese officials, once their crimes were proven. Ch'en was accused by another grand secretary, Ning Wan-wo, of having favoured a return to Ming customs and of having disapproved of the Manchu queue (hair style) requirement. To Shun-chih, Ch'en had committed treason against the reigning dynasty (a crime which was much more severe than the corruption and political irregularities of which Liu was guilty) and, therefore, should be executed.[16]

While it is not true that Shun-chih tolerated all bad Chinese officials, the fact that he made an effort to raise the position of the Chinese in the government is also undeniable. It was brought to the emperor's attention that before 1653, the Manchu officials at the Six Boards were the only ones to have the authority to memorialize the emperor on behalf of their departments, but after this date, Shun-chih decreed that Manchu as well as Chinese officials must submit their memorial jointly, if they spoke for their respective departments.[17] In the same year, the emperor appointed Chinese to the hitherto Manchu-controlled posts of director of the Imperial Banqueting Court (*Kuang-lu-ssu ch'ing*) and deputy chief censor (*Ch'ien-tu yü-shih*).[18]

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[15] One or two impeachments against Liu were launched before 1658, but they were not supported by strong evidence. See *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor*, pp. 115–119.

[16] See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 95; *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 971; *Tung-hua lu*, Shun-chih reign, 194a–b.

[17] *Tung-hua lu*, Shun-chih, 136a.

[18] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 1037.

A step toward further advancement of power and status of the Chinese officials was taken in 1659 by Lu Kuang-hsü, a Chinese censor. His concern was centred on deliberation at the highest political level. He stated, among other things, that before 1659, whenever the emperor asked for advice from any department, the Manchu officials would first draft their documents in the Manchu language which would then be translated into Chinese for the reference of the Chinese officials. Lu advocated that both Manchu and Chinese officials helping the emperor to formulate policies should sit together to make their preliminary drafts and settle whatever differences they had. While the immediate concern was the suspension of provincial censors (*hsün-an*) to the provinces, Lu pleaded that in future meetings on military as well as civil matters, the advice of the Chinese officials should be equated with that of their Manchu colleagues. The members of the Deliberative Council who were Manchu princes and mandarins strongly opposed this suggestion, and counter-charged Lu of being impolite to them. The emperor, however, conceded to Lu's point that both Manchu and Chinese officials, in future deliberation of government policies, should sit together to consider matters on an equal standing. It was a big victory for the Chinese officials, although Lu himself did not benefit from this victory, having been scolded by the emperor for using strong and insolent language against senior members of the civil service sitting on the Deliberative Council.[19]

There were a few cases not included in the will where the emperor apparently favoured the Chinese officials. The execution of Tan-tai, a senior Manchu official who had been fighting for the Manchu cause, might superficially have been regarded as a pro-Chinese and anti-Manchu gesture. Tan-tai was impeached during the Dorgon regency by Chang Hsüan, a Chinese censor, on charges of abuse of power and corruption. Being a henchman of the reigning Dorgon, he was not only exonerated, but succeeded in causing the execution of the Chinese censor on a counter-charge of false accusation. When Shun-chih personally took over the government, he had Tan-tai arrested and executed, knowing very well that he had been guilty of the crimes brought out by Censor Chang and that he had wilfully caused the latter's death.[20] For his crimes, Tan-tai definitely deserved punishment, but the death penalty seems to have been too severe for a

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[19] Ibid., III, 1647, 1656, 1659, 1666.

[20] Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*, 5 vols., (Taiwan: Commercial Press, 2nd ed., 1967), I, 386. For a biography of Tan-tai, see *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, 80 chüan* in 80 *ts'e*, (1928), 4:29b.

Manchu officer who had contributed greatly to the Manchu expansion of power. It would seem that Shun-chih was particularly angry with Tan-tai because of his close association with Dorgon, the regent, who had usurped imperial power; his death could well have been caused by political reasons, though he himself was also to blame for his corrupt practices and arrogance. Naturally, Shun-chih had no prejudice against his own people, the Manchus; he acted only against those who committed crimes against the state (or him), be they Manchus or Chinese.

The punishment of Ma-le-chi, another Manchu official, further indicated his "equal treatment" policy towards members of his bureaucracy: punishing irrespective of racial origins, once guilt was substantiated. Ma-le-chi threatened a Chinese governor-general, Chang Hsüan-hsi, for personal gain. The matter was made public and disclosed to the emperor, whereupon Chang was forced to commit suicide.[21] The fact that Chang was a governor-general, a senior Chinese provincial official, revealed clearly the hitherto over-bearing attitude of the Manchus towards their Chinese colleagues. Ma-le-chi was punished to serve as a warning to other Manchu officials.

So far, we have depicted the emperor's efforts in redressing a Manchu-dominated civil service to an acceptable balance in power and status between the Manchu and Chinese officials. Why did he make such efforts? The main reason was political. An atmosphere of ethnic tension had developed both inside and outside the civil service, possibly because Dorgon was somewhat biased towards his own people. Such tension, as revealed by some Chinese censors, would have been a stumbling block to an efficient government and a possible threat to the security and stability of the empire.[22] As late as 1660, it could happen that Manchu princes and bannermen would use their influence to force peddlers to sell their goods to them at reduced prices, and to steal lumber from merchants; whenever any legal disputes between commoners and servants of Manchu families occurred, the former parties were always found guilty.[23]

Besides the fear of alienating the Chinese elements, Shun-chih's own inclination toward Chinese culture must be taken into account. It was he, rather than Dorgon, who actually initiated the Imperial Banquet Discussions (*ching-yen*) which provided the ruler with a programme of lectures on the Chinese classics and history.[24] Moreover, he accepted with favour memorials requesting him to study the Chinese classics and political treatises, and most probably, he studied them conscientiously in his moments of leisure.[25] While Dorgon and Oboi were military men who manipulated the Chinese system of government for political ends and who had no genuine interest in the Chinese culture, Shun-chih, having no personal military experience, was definitely more disposed to scholarly pursuits. Unlike the regents whose rule was temporary and whose sensitivity to criticism was sharp, the emperor had fewer doubts about his own legitimacy. He was, therefore, in a better position to allow his Chinese officials greater chance of expression and to adopt the Chinese institutions (such as the censorial agencies) in a less inhibitory manner.[26]

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[21] *Tung-hua lu*, Shun-chih, 220b–221a.

[22] One of the memorials describing Manchu-Chinese tension was submitted by Censor Wei I-chiai. See *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, 68 *chüan* in 64 *ts'e*, (1936), I, 349–353. For Manchu-Chinese tension in general, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Fall of Imperial China*, (The Free Press, 1975), p. 87.

[23] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, III, 1628–1630.

Shun-chih's seemingly pro-Chinese efforts, however, were not without their limits. When he realized that he had inadvertently encouraged some Chinese to behave incorrectly, he was quick to take action to rectify such behaviour. He learned with dismay that quite a few Chinese officials were not enthusiastic in arresting runaway Chinese serfs from the Manchu farms. When they were responsible for hearing cases of recaptured serfs, they usually gave out unduly lenient judgments, so that the Manchus who formerly possessed them did not have a fair hearing according to law, and were thus discriminated against.[27] The emperor regarded these Chinese officials as not performing their duties properly and as acting on racial grounds. He threatened with punishment those Chinese officials who broke the law to help their own people.

Similarly, Shun-chih's conformity to the Chinese tradition was conditioned by its political or ideological usefulness. Once such usefulness was absent, the emperor did not take Chinese traditions for granted. A striking example can be seen in 1651 at the inauguration of the emperor's personal rule. A censor, K'uang Lan-ch'ao, memorialized the emperor, advising him to wear full robes and dress on ceremonial occasions, in accordance with the traditional style known as *k'uei-mien*, which was in use in the Chou

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[24] See Lui, *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor*, pp. 41–43.

[25] *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, I, 651–661. See also Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 256 on Shun-chih's interest in Chinese studies.

[26] See Adam Y.C. Lui, "Censor, Regent & Emperor in the Early Manchu Period, 1644–1661", *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 17 (March, 1978), 81–102.

[27] *Tung-Hua lu*, Shun-chih, p. 173a.

dynasty (1122–221 BC). The emperor flatly rejected the suggestion and declared:

> Each dynasty has its own systems. The Court's main concern is to respect Heaven and love the people. This will make the Empire peaceful. Why should the Chin-Han system of dress be revived?[28]

With such a mentality, it would be inappropriate to regard Shun-chih as a blind copyist of Chinese ways.

The professed "equal treatment" was not aimed solely at stopping the Manchu practice of discrimination against the Chinese, but was also intended to prevent the latter from adopting a suspicious and racial attitude towards the Manchus. In 1655, a Chinese censor, Chang Chia, advocated the suspension of the practice of despatching Manchu officials to inspect customs duties, apparently without giving out good reasons. Chang was immediately challenged and impeached by Ta-tu, a Manchu secretary at the Board of Civil Service, who memorialized that the censor's opposition to the appointment of Manchu officials was solely based on personal and racial interests. Shun-chih ruled in favour of Ta-tu; Chang, the Chinese censor, was demoted one rank and transferred to a more junior position.[29] Possibly the one who took great advantage of Shun-chih's seemingly pro-Chinese attitude was Li Ch'eng-hsiang, a middle-ranking Metropolitan official. In one of his memorials, he advised the emperor to staff all capital government posts with Chinese. As this was tantamount to the abrogation of the Manchu synarchical government and the cancellation of all the political power of the Manchus, it was but natural that Shun-chih rebuked the memorialist and rejected his memorial.[30]

We can, therefore, see that the emperor had the least intention of making his government a completely "Chinese oriented" one. Indeed, within a broad framework, Shun-chih was as anxious as Dorgon or Oboi to preserve the Manchu conquest and the privileges resulting from that conquest for his own people. Not only did he keep the synarchical government structure, but for political reasons, he added Manchu princes to the Six Boards for some time, thus bringing to the boards more control by the Manchus. He continued to rely on the Manchu-dominated Deliberative Council as a main source of policy-making, although the composition of such

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[28] Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*, I, 388.

[29] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 1084.

[30] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 854.

Council was broadened to include several Chinese bannermen.[31] Under his personal rule, the Eight Banners militarily dominated the empire as before, and the bannermen continued to receive government subsidies.[32] The enclosure of commoners' land for the Manchus was not relaxed and news of Chinese complaints were not infrequent.[33] The emperor still upheld the idea that the Manchus had the right to keep Chinese serfs and to punish those who fled from their masters' farms.[34]

However, while all the early Manchu rulers aimed at the common goal of maintaining their conquering position and privileges, they differed in degree as to how this could and should be achieved. As mentioned before, Shun-chih assumed a more conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese officials in the belief that they would work more contentedly for the government. To him, ethnic equality should be practised at the official level, provided that this would not jeopardize Manchu rule. Since all officials, Manchus and Chinese alike, served the same government, they, according to Shun-chih, should be treated equally; only by so doing would the smooth running of the government be safeguarded.[35] Although this one-system policy, based largely on the Chinese political tradition, was introduced to gratify the Chinese officials by enhancing their status and power, the Manchus also benefited in a material way from it, simply because this system provided a fairer and fuller institutional procedure for the civil service as a whole.

As early as 1652, the Shun-chih emperor acting on the request of a Chinese censor, Liu Yü-mu, agreed for the first time to provide retiring Manchu officials with the same benefits enjoyed by Chinese officials.[36] In the following year, another Chinese official, Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai, advocated with success that the Manchu whose parents died would observe the same period of mourning as their Chinese counterparts (i.e. twenty-eight months). Before this date, the Manchu officials, following their tribal custom, only took one hundred days off for the mourning period. This successful advocacy would bring the Manchus into the fold of the Confucian ideology of paying more respect to deceased parents and indirectly enabled them to enjoy more leisure time.[37]

Whereas these two memorials were submitted by Chinese officials on behalf of their Manchu colleagues, a few Manchus also took the opportunity to represent their own interests. The most vociferous of them was Ch'i-t'ung-ko, a capital middle-ranking Manchu official who submitted two memorials in 1654, with the aim of promoting the imperial one-system policies. In his first memorial, he pointed out that while Chinese officials committing light offences would only be punished by a suspension of official salaries for a certain period, Manchu officials committing the same offences would be fined. To him both Manchu and Chinese officials should be punished uniformly (i.e. have their salaries suspended for a certain period), if their offences were similar. He further commented that Manchu officials found guilty of committing more serious offences were Liable to dismissal, a heavy punishment not often applied to Chinese officials of the same category who were, instead, usually fined or demoted. He advocated, therefore, that Manchu officials should face the same treatment as Chinese officials, as far as punishment was concerned, and should not be dismissed from office too indiscriminately. He further suggested that suspects, whether Manchu or Chinese officials, should be attended to by one department, the Board of Civil Service. He noted that before this date, Manchu suspects were handled like criminals by the Board of Punishments, while Chinese suspects were more leniently treated by the Board of Civil Service.[38]

In his second memorial, which was submitted several months after the first memorial, he drew imperial attention to other differences between Manchu and Chinese officials. He wrote that: 1) Chinese officials were officially divided into the military and the civil services while Manchu officials were called upon to perform military as well as civil duties and could not be identified as strictly military or civil officials; 2) Chinese officials for each post were institutionally fixed in number, but the number of Manchus appointed to a post varied from time to time; 3) Chinese officials assigned to the same offices were accorded the same ranks, yet Manchu officials holding similar positions might be accorded different ranks,

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[31] Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 70–71.

[32] See Hsieh Pao Chao, *The Government of China (1644–1911)*, (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 56–58.

[33] *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, II, 803–808, 969–978, 1307–1314. For a general description of the enclosure movement, see Ma Feng-ch'en, "Manchu-Chinese Social and Economic Conflicts in Early Ch'ing," in *Chinese Social History*, compiled by E-tu Zen Sun and John de Francis, (American Council of Learned Societies, 1956), pp. 333–351.

[34] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 987, 1051; *Tung-hua lu*, Shun-chih, p. 177b; *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, I, 551–555. See also Ma Feng-ch'en, "Manchu-Chinese Social and Economic Conflicts in Early Ch'ing."

[35] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 854.

[36] Ibid., II, 771.

[37] Ibid., II, 854, 879.

[38] Ibid., II, 948, 983.

depending on negotiation at appointment; 4) Chinese officials could hold concurrent titles but Manchu officials could not and were given only the titles of their positions; 5) the official hierarchy for the Chinese was composed of nine ranks each of which was subdivided into two divisions, that for the Manchus had only seven ranks which were not subdivided; 6) Chinese officials were usually promoted in accordance with seniority, while Manchu officials experienced erratic promotions with disregard of seniority, sometimes reaching senior ranks in a short time, while at other times, waiting for several years or even longer for a minor promotion. Then, he mentioned an anomaly to which he had already called attention in his first memorial: the relative ease for a Manchu official to face dismissal and the lighter punishment accorded to a Chinese official committing similar offence.[39] He not only advocated that both Manchu and Chinese officials be treated equally, but that the Chinese system should be generally applied to both the Chinese and Manchu officials. Thus, his memorials supported with substance the general imperial directive of treating all officials alike and were therefore accepted by the emperor with favour. The above-mentioned overlapping point that could be a sign of inefficiency was ignored by the emperor who was apparently pleased that some officials, particularly Manchu officials, agreed with his policy and were able to argue with strength for the usefulness of adopting the Chinese system for the Manchus.

Though Ch'i-t'ung-ko had pointed out quite a few of the anomalies between Manchu und Chinese officials, it was not a complete list. In 1654, a Chinese president of the Board of Revenue, Ch'en Chih-lin elaborated the point that punishment meted out to Manchu officials was too severe and commented that they were too often and too easily punished by having their properties confiscated and their hereditary rights and titles revoked. He advocated that more discretion on the part of the government should be exercised in the meting out of such punishment because, according to him, hereditary rights and titles were obtained through dedicated service to the state, and should be retained if the offences in question were not too serious.[40] The emperor accepted his memorial with favour.

To what extent did this one-system treatment help in facilitating harmony between Manchu and Chinese officials? As mentioned before, it inadvertently encouraged some Chinese officials to ignore government regulations in order to help their own people, and produced in others the wild hope of instituting an entire Chinese bureaucracy. Those Chinese officials who reacted sensibly to this one-system treatment and actually made efforts to minimize tension were not many but were quite vociferous. Possibly the Chinese censors who advocated retirement benefits and the Chinese mourning for the Manchu officials, and Ch'en Chih-lin who advocated more lenient treatment of the Manchus might be put in this category. The joint efforts of a Chinese censor, Yao Wen-jan, and a Manchu censor, San-tu, in memorializing the emperor on the better treatment of officials (both Manchus and Chinese) suspected of committing offences and placed under custody, could be an act of Manchu-Chinese cooperation.[41] But the one whose intention of promoting harmony was unmistakable and who won imperial praise was Lin Ch'i-lung, a Chinese censor; he advocated that the economic position of the Manchu bannermen be improved by the government.[42]

The majority of the Chinese officials were placated by the imperial conciliatory policy, but to expect them to forget the Manchu conquest and to treat the aliens as their own people was not realistic. Scholars like Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu would never be willing to serve the Manchus, no matter how conciliatory they became.[43]

Some Manchu princes and officials were, however, frustrated by Shun-chih's equal treatment policy. Though their privileges were in no way curtailed (and, indeed, in several instances, increased), the upgrading of their Chinese colleagues directly hurt their ego and power, and indirectly lowered their superior position. Their frustrations, however, were not translated into action until the death of the emperor in 1661. Under the succeeding regents led by Oboi, the one-system treatment as envisaged by Shun-chih, was abandoned; Manchu dominance in government and society returned. The Chinese, in spite of their usefulness in performing executive functions, became once again inferior to their Manchu colleagues. Some Manchu institutions were revived, others expanded. Policy-making was virtually controlled by the Manchu princes and senior Manchu officials. Some of the measures of conforming to the Chinese traditions were discarded. The Manchu officials, for example, returned to their tribal practice of having one hundred days as their mourning duration rather than

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[39] Ibid., 991.

[40] Ibid., 1054.

[41] *Huang-Ch'ing tsou-i*, I, 591–599.

[42] Ibid., II, 827–835.

[43] For further information on Huang Tsung-hsi and Ku Yen-wu, see Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, 351–354, 421–425.

abiding by the Confucian standard of having a two-year mourning period. Attempts were made to convince the Chinese scholar-official class of the absolute power of the Manchu government.[44]

Thus, the attempts by the Shun-chih emperor to achieve harmony through the application of the equal-treatment policy bore little fruit. While the Manchu elements were alienated, the Chinese officials took advantage of the imperial attitude to violate government regulations and to gratify their own national sentiments. A glimpse of cooperation between Chinese and Manchu was seen in the efforts of the minority, represented by Censor Lin Ch’i-lung. The emperor was quick to use him as a model of removing tension among his officials. He was bound to be unsuccessful, since the gap between the conquerors and the conquered was too wide to be patched up by certain conciliatory policies. Censor Lin, for example, could be regarded as a traitor by the Chinese loyalists, and as an imperial sycophant by the Manchu officials. Possibly the result of this one-system policy was a period of reaction against the Chinese officials and their institutions during the Oboi regency that immediately followed the Shun-chih reign.

Appendix I
The Execution of Wu Liang-fu

Wu Liang-fu was the Chief Eunuch of the Thirteen Offices established in 1653 by the Shun-chih emperor. In spite of the precautions taken by the emperor against the meddling of eunuchs in politics,[45] Wu had been found guilty of corruption and other practices. The emperor warned him as early as 1655, but to no avail. When his crimes had been substantiated, in 1658, he was publicly denounced as a bad official and was arrested (*ti-lu*) for further criminal investigation.[46] Later he was executed. The actual date of the execution, however, remained a mystery. By itself, the date was historically insignificant, but if we connect it with the imperial policies, then it becomes a useful indicator. It has been maintained by sinologists such as Oxnam that Wu was allowed in office after 1658, but when the emperor died in early 1661, he was immediately executed by his succeeding regents headed by Oboi.[47] This claim, however, is based on weak evidence, as we shall examine. There is always the possibility that it was Shun-chih rather than the regents who ordered the execution. If this is the case, the charges against the emperor’s toleration of bad Chinese officials and his so-called “Chinese-oriented” policies become groundless, and a new evaluation of the emperor’s policies must be made.

According to some historians (Hsiao I-shan, Hummel and Oxnam), the Shun-chih emperor attended the tonsuring celebration of Wu Liang-fu five (in fact six according to my calculation) days before the emperor died.[48] This, according to them, indicated not only that Wu was alive in the first moon of 1661, but that he also enjoyed the imperial favour. To them, it was very unlikely that Shun-chih would have executed a person whom he liked so much.

Nothing on Wu is recorded in history, official or private, until one month or so later (the second moon of 1661), when the regents, on behalf of the child emperor, K’ang-hsi, issued an edict which stated among other things that Wu had already been beheaded for his crimes.[49] If we take this version as true, then Wu was executed sometime between the first and the second moon of 1661 under the regency.

There is, however, some doubt regarding this version of Wu’s execution. While Hummel, Oxnam and possibly Hsiao I-shan based their information of Wu’s tonsuring ceremony on the research of Meng Sen, the latter obtained his finding solely from a private account titled *P’ing-pu tsa-chi* compiled by Chang Ch’en.[50] Chang was but a secretary at the Grand Secretariat (*chung-shu*) “whose miscellaneous collection on palace affairs was not known to the contemporary outside world”.[51] Being a junior official of the seventh rank, Chang’s account could never be firsthand and was most possibly obtained from hearsay. In the description of the emperor’s attendance of Wu’s tonsuring ceremony, there is only one rather unconnected statement about the matter. The actual wording in translation runs as follows:

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[44] See Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 64–117. An example of Manchu officials observing only one hundred days of mourning leave after 1661 is Te-pao who only took one hundred days off in 1776 on the death of his father (*Kuo-ch’ao ch’i-hsien lei-cheng*, ed. by Li Huan, 1880, 82: 27a–42a).

[45] See Lui, *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor*, pp. 40–41; *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 913–914, *Tung-hua lu*, Shun-chih, 152a–153a.

[46] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, III, 1373, *Ch’ing-shih kao*, ed. by Chao Erh-sun and others, 536 *chüan* in 65 *ts’e*, (1928 ed.), *pen-chi*, 5:8a; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period*, 256–257.

[47] See Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 53, 65, 207.

[48] See Hsiao I-shan, *Ch’ing-tai t’ung-shih*, I, 392, Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period*, p. 258; Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, 206–207.

[49] *Shih-lu*, K’ang-hsi, I, 53; Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 65–66.

[50] *P’ing-pu tsa-chi* (found in *Keng-ch’en ts’ung-pien*, compiled by Chin Chaotan), p. 13.

[51] Ibid., p. 13a.

> On the second day of the first moon (1661), the emperor visited the *Min-chung tz'u* to observe the tonsuring ceremony of the eunuch, Wu Liang-fu. On the fourth day, when the Nine Ministers inquired after the health of the emperor, it was realized that the emperor was ill . . .[52]

Apart from Chang Ch'en's account, Wang Hsi, the official ordered by the Shun-chih emperor to write the last will, also recorded what happened during the last few days of the emperor's life:

> On the first day of the first moon of 1661 (Chinese New Year), I was thirty-four *sui*. Because there was no official celebration for the New Year, I went into the *Yang-hsin* Palace to wish the emperor well. I was then invited to tea by the emperor and afterwards I left. The following day, I went into the imperial residence and asked after the health of the emperor and did not leave until it was dark . . .[53]

In this description, not a word on the imperial attendance of Wu Liang-fu's tonsuring celebration was mentioned. Moreover, according to Wang's record, he was with the emperor inside the palace precincts on the second day of the first moon and did not leave him until dark. This happened to be the date of Shun-chih's attendance of Wu's tonsuring celebration, as described by Chang. If we believe Wang's account, there was no likelihood of the emperor leaving the palaces and visiting a monastery.

Since Wang was in the imperial confidence and responsible for writing the imperial last will,[54] his account seems to be more trustworthy than that of Chang who, after all, had no direct access to the palace precincts. The fact that Wu was a publicly-denounced official after 1658 was told in all official sources[55] and it was quite unlikely for the emperor to attend the ceremony of a publicly-denounced official; even if he had a strong liking for Wu, he would have preferred to attend the tonsuring ceremony in a secretive way. How could a junior official of the Grand Secretariat learn of the secret mission of the emperor? Moreover, it has been argued by Meng Sen that the emperor had been seriously ill before the third day of the first moon of 1661 and died several days later of smallpox.[56] The chance of his attending any public ceremony was small. Indeed, the

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[52] Ibid., p. 2b.

[53] See Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-ch'u san-ta i-an k'ao-shih* in *Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-kan*, No. 36, ed. by Shen Yün-lung, (Taiwan, Wen-hai Publishing, 1969), p. 28.

[54] See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 819.

[55] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, III, 1373; *Ch'ing-shih kao, pen-chi*, 5:18a.

[56] Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-ch'u san-ta i-an k'ao-shih*, pp. 28–29.

emperor had cancelled the usual official celebration of the Chinese New Year, as described by Wang Hsi.

The edict issued by the regents in the second moon of 1661, as contained in the *Shih-lu*, besides mentioning the crimes of Wu and the fact that he had been executed, was also aimed at declaring the abolition of the Thirteen Office. If Wu were executed by the regents, why did the execution take place before the edict of accusation? It was the custom that when an official was sentenced to death, an edict naming his crimes was issued before the execution, even if no public trial had been arranged, unless the official concerned was too powerful, militarily or otherwise, to be allowed to survive a moment longer. Wu was but a denounced eunuch who later became a Buddhist monk (if he was alive at all), certainly, there was no urgency to execute him at once. In other words, if the regents intended to execute Wu, they should have issued edicts before and not after the execution. Otherwise, Wu could have been executed by their predecessor, Shun-chih, and the regents' concern in issuing the edict in the second moon of 1661 was to explain the abolition of the Thirteen Offices.

All these arguments point to the possibility that Wu Liang-fu could have been dead before the regents took up power in 1661. This possibility will be strengthened by the following account. According to the *Ch'ing-shih kao*, Wu Liang-fu was not only publicly denounced but beheaded in 1658 by the Shun-chih emperor.[57] It has been argued by Meng Sen that the *Ch'ing-shih kao* was an unreliable source, because its information came from another more authoritative work, the *Tung-hua lu*. During the editing, the editor of the *Ch'ing-shih kao* left out an important word, *hsin*, which appears in the text of *Tung-hua lu*. To Meng Sen, who was highly critical of the *Ch'ing-shih kao*, the missing word, *hsin* meant "subsequently". Meng then interpreted the statement on Wu's beheading found in the *Tung-hua lu* as meaning, "Wu was publicly denounced in 1658, and was 'subsequently' put to death by the regents in 1661."[58] From a Chinese encyclopaedia, the word could either mean "subsequently" as interpreted by Meng Sen, or "soon" (*hsüan*). In a biographical context, the word is always used to denote a short period of less than one year.[59] There is

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[57] *Ch'ing-shih kao, pen-chi*, 5:18a.

[58] Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, (Taipei, 1960), p. 463.

[59] A few biographical examples are provided here to illustrate the time span the word *hsin* usually indicated:

(A) Wang tsung-cheng was an official serving under the Chia-ch'ing government. On the fourth moon of the twenty-first year of the Chia-ch'ing reign (1816), Wang went home to take care of his ailing father who died (soon or subsequently depending on the meaning little likelihood that the compiler of *Tung-hua lu* would depart from other traditional Chinese scholar-biographers in the use of this word. Thus, *Tung-hua lu*, in spite of its inclusion of the word *hsin* is in line with the *Ch'ing-shih kao's* version; that is, Wu was beheaded a short time, possibly a few months or at most one or two years, after his denunciation in 1658. Since the regents only assumed power in 1661, three years following Wu's denunciation, the two sources tend to support the view that Wu was put to death by the Shun-chih emperor. Besides the two compilations, Wu Ts'eng-ch'i, a nineteenth century scholar, stated in his *Ch'ing-shih kang-yao* that Wu was beheaded in 1658.[60] This is further evidence to support the theory that Wu was executed by the Shun-chih emperor and not by the succeeding regents.

Glossary

Board of Civil Service (Li-pu)	吏部
Board of Punishments (Hsing-pu)	刑部
Board of Revenue (Hu-pu)	戶部
Chang Ch'en	張宸
Chang Chia	張嘉
Chang Hsüan	張煊
Chang Hsüan-hsi	張懸錫
Chao Erh-sun	趙爾巽
Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai	陳啓泰
Ch'en Chih-lin	陳之遴
Ch'en Ming-hsia	陳名夏
Ch'i-t'ung-ko	祁通格
Chief Censor (Tso-tu yü-shih)	左都御史
Chief Eunuch (T'ai-chien)	太監
Chin Chao-fan	金兆藩
Ch'ien-tu yü-shih	僉都御史
Chin-Han	秦漢
Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-kan	近代中國史料叢刊
Ching-yen	經筵
Ch'ing-ch'u san-ta i-an k'ao-shih	清初三大疑案考實
Ch'ing-shih kang-yao	清史綱要
Ch'ing-shih kao	清史稿
Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan	清史列傳
Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih	清代通史
Chung-shu	中書
Deliberative Council (I-cheng wang ta-ch'en hui-i)	議政王大臣會議
Dorgon	多爾袞
Ebilun	遏必隆
Grand Secretary (Ta-hsüeh-shih)	大學士
hsin	尋
hsüan	旋
Hsün-an	巡按
Huang-ch'ing tsou-i	皇清奏議
Huang Tsung-hsi	黃宗羲
Keng-ch'en ts'ung-pien	庚辰叢編
Ku Yen-wu	顧炎武
Kuang-lu ssu ch'ing	光祿寺卿
K'uang Lan-ch'ao	匡蘭兆
K'uei-mien	袞冕
Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng	國朝耆獻類徵
Li Ch'eng-hsiang	李呈祥
Li Huan	李桓
Lin Ch'i-lung	林起龍
Liu Cheng-tsung	劉正宗
Liu Yü-i	劉於義
Liu Yü-mu	劉如謨
Lu Kuang-hsü	陸光旭
Ma-le-chi	麻勒吉
Meng Sen	孟森
Metropolitan Official	京官
Min-chung tz'u	憫忠寺
Nei-wu fu	內務府

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of the word *hsin*). On the seventh moon of the twenty-third year of the Chia-ch'ing reign (1818), he resumed duty, after observing the customary twenty-eight months in mourning. Since nearly the whole of the 1816–1818 period had been spent in mourning, his father must have died in a matter of days after his return home in 1816. In other word, *hsin* in this context shows a period of less than a month and must therefore be interpreted by the meaning of "soon" rather than "subsequently". (*Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan*, 37:3b–5a).

(B) P'eng Wei-hsin was holding the post of Chief Censor in the tenth moon of the thirteenth (last) year of the Yung-cheng Reign (1735). Soon or subsequently (depending on the interpretation of the word, *hsin*), his father died and he had to take a mourning leave of twenty-eight months. In the third year of the Ch'ien-lung Reign (1738), he was once again appointed Chief Censor. The word, *hsin*, here indicates a period of less than one year. (*Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng*, 16:31a).

(C) In the seventh month of the first year of the Yung-cheng reign, (1723), Liu Yü-i was holding the official post of Sub-reader (*Shih-chiang*) at the Hanlin Academy. Soon or subsequently (*hsin*), he was despatched to Shansi to serve as the literary chancellor in charge of local examination, the term of which post lasted for two to three years. In the third year of the Yung-cheng reign (1725), he was promoted junior deputy supervisor of instruction in the Imperial Supervisorate of Instruction. Since from 1723 to 1725, most of Liu's time was spent as the Literary Chancellor, the period from 1723 to his being despatched to Shansi as Literary Chancellor must have been less than one year. The word, *hsin*, therefore means a few months or even a few days. (*Kuo-ch'ao ch'i-hsien lei-cheng*, 17:38a).

[60] Wu Tseng-ch'i, *Ch'ing-shih kang-yao*, 2 vols.; vol. I written in 1852, later reprinted by Commercial Press, 1934, p. 54.

Ning Wan-wo	甯完我
Oboi	鼇拜
pen-chi	本紀
P'eng Wei-hsin	彭維新
P'ing-pu tsa-chi	平圃雜紀
San-tu	散都
Shang-shu	尚書
Shen Yün-lung	沈雲龍
Shih-chiang	侍講
Shun-chih	順治
Six Boards (liu-pu)	六部
Soni	索尼
Suhsaha	蘇克薩哈
sui	歲
Ta-tu	達都
Tan-tai	譚泰
Te-pao	德保
Thirteen Offices	十三衙門
ti-lu	提挈
Tsung-tu	總督
T'u Lai	屠賴
Tung-hua lu	東華錄
Tung-I	佟義
Wang Hsi	王熙
Wang Hsien-ch'ien	王先謙
Wang Tsung-cheng	王宗誠
Wei I-chiai	魏裔介
Wu Liang-fu	吳良輔
Wu Ts'eng-ch'I	吳曾祺
Yang-hsin tien (palace)	養心殿
Yao Wen-jan	姚文然
yü-shih	御史

■ Source: Mish, John L., 'An early Manchu-Chinese patent of nobility', in *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 10, Nos. 1–2 (1954), Sophia University, pp. 270–276.

AN EARLY MANCHU-CHINESE PATENT OF NOBILITY

John L. Mish

The New York Public Library recently acquired a well-preserved scroll with a very clear Manchu text, while the corresponding Chinese text is almost wholly obliterated. The date of this document—a patent of nobility—is 1652, which makes it one of the earliest specimens known, at any rate outside China.[1] Since very little has been published on the subject in western literature,[2] a translation and discussion of this new find may prove of interest to sinologists.

My translation is based entirely on the Manchu text, because—as already stated—the Chinese part has become largely illegible, with the exception of the introductory formula and a few lines of the main text. Besides, Manchu has, after all, a right to be considered on its own merits, and not merely as a means to facilitate the understanding of Chinese texts, as was the customary attitude until a short time ago. Von Zach[3] already drew attention to the greater independence of the Manchu version from the Chinese in such documents; and while the introductory formula is certainly a translation—but not a slavish one—of a Chinese text already in use under the Ming,[4] it is arguable whether the actual citation was not originally in Manchu at such an early date. It is interesting to note in this connection that the words for the Manchu military ranks in our text are rendered phonetically in what remains of the Chinese version, though later on Chinese equivalents existed for all of them.[5]

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[1] Franke, 1. c. p. 41, says that the earliest patent seen by him was dated 1794. The one translated by von Zach was issued 1809. According to Fuchs, 1. c. p. 19, "quite a number" of such early patents appeared in the Peking market in 1929, but by 1939 "scarcely any" could be found.

[2] See bibliography at the end of this paper.

[3] 1. c. p. 262; similarly Fuchs, 1. c. p. 9.

[4] Franke, 1. c. p. 45.

[5] See *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu* 清文彙書 under: *funde bośokû, meiren-i janggin, baitalabure hafan*, also Fuchs, 1. c. p. 30.

Technically speaking, the scroll belongs to the category of government decrees called *kao-ming* 誥命;[6] this word appears at the head of the Chinese version, exactly as described by Franke, 1. c. p. 44. It does not appear in the Manchu part. The entire length of the scroll is 461 cm; the Manchu text woven for the introductory formula, written for the rest) is black on yellow, then black on white; the Chinese text is black on red, then red on blue (almost obliterated). The marginal design consists of dragons and clouds. The material used is silk pasted on paper, with an extra piece of dark orange brocade with woven designs to act as a cover when the scroll is rolled together. The rollers at both ends appear to be of green jade.

The Manchu text of the scroll runs as follows:

Han-i hese.[7] *erdemu be tukiyere, gung de karularangge, gurun-i amba kooli; tondo mujilen-i afaha weile*[8] *be akûmburengge, ambasai jurgan. julgei enduringge han se, coohai horon-i gurun be toktobuhabi. bithei erdemui doro be dasahabi. bi*[9] *julge be alhûdame,*[10] *gung erdemu*[11] *be tukiyeme, bithe, coohai hafan ilibuha.*[12] *ere ejehe*[13] *be gaiha niyalma, tondo*

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[6] Franke, 1. c. p. 40.

[7] *Han-i hese*: the customary Chinese phrase *fêng t'ien ch'êng yün* 馮天承運, i.e. "entrusted by heaven with the care of the empire", is lacking. *Hese* is a much more general term than the Chinese *chih* 制, used in the Chinese version here; this is rather typical for the earlier Manchu period, when exact equivalents for Chinese technical terms had not yet been fixed.

[8] *Afaha weile=chih* 感, and *coohai horon=wu* 武: Manchu cannot imitate the laconic brevity of Chinese without becoming obscure; hence these explanatory phrases tor one single Chinese word.

[9] *Bi*: literally I, although the Chinese text has *ch'ên*, i.e. 辰 the imperial "We". In later Manchu, the plural pronoun *be* or *muse* is used in this sense, but not yet here.

[10] *Julge be alhûdame*: this short phrase, "imitating the ancients", is apparently all the translator could find for the Chinese *ch'in ch'êng wang chih*, 欽承往制, i.e. "we respectfully succeed to the institutions of the past" (cf. Franke, 1. c. p. 45).

[11] *Gung erdemu*: "merit and virtue", is used here to translate *hsien nêng* 縣能, i.e. "excellence and talent". Generally speaking, this early text uses rather free renderings, whereas in later Manchu, especially since the Ch'ien-lung period, there is a tendency to assign one Manchu word to each Chinese character, and then give it all the various meanings of its Chinese equivalent. This sinicized the language, and may have contributed to its comparatively rapid disappearance.

[12] *Bithe coohai hafan ilibuha*: The Chinese text here has *t'ê shê wên wu hsün chieh i chang chi ch'üan* 特設文武漏娜激勸, i.e. we specially established ranks for civil and military merits in order to give encouragement (cf. Franke, 1. c. p. 45). The translator omitted 勳锴以彰激勸 entirely. The last four characters were also omitted in the patent described by Fuchs, 1. c. p. 19.

[13] *Ejehe*: The Chinese text has *jên* 住, i.e. "official position" in general (Franke, however, translates "sign of confidence", 1. c. p. 45). Manchu is here more specific. *Ejehe* as a noun is not to be found in either Zakharov's dictionary or von der Gabelentz's dictionary to the *Ssŭ-shu*; the former gives *ejehe bithe* with the meanings: "memorial, imperial decree,

mujilen-i[14] *beye be yabubu.*[15] *sain mujilen-i geren be uji. mergen mujilen-i majige ba be kimci, jalingga be sere.*[16] *gidaśara be ilibu.*[17] *beye be śolo ume tucibure.*[18] *enteke be mutebuci, kesi*[19] *ama mafa de isinambi, hûturi juse omosi de tutambi,*[20] *beye boo enteheme wesihun banjimbi*[21] *kai. ginggule ume heoledere.*

Tunggar, si dade funde bośokû[22] *bihe. bejing be duleme sandung*[23] *ni golo de cooha genehe sucungga mudan de, jase tucire de, meiren-i janggin*[24] *sira bayara-i emgi nadan inenggi nadan dobori tuwakiyafi juwe jergi cooha gidara de juleri dosika. ginjeo*[25] *be kaha ilaci mudan de, hûng jiyûn men-i*

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instruction, letters patent, laudatory entry in an official's dossier." The real meaning of *ejehe* alone is found in the *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu* only: 勑書乃給世職或大使賫捧出差者, i.e., "letters patent or diploma, to bestow hereditary office, or [a document] by which a high official presents [his intention] to go away on public business." The first of these meanings is obviously applicable here.

[14] *Tondo mujilen-i*: "with a loyal heart", i.e. with loyalty, a common way in Manchu to express abstract nouns, see below *sain mujilen.*

[15] *Beye be yabubu*: Literally, "should make himself go", i.e. "should behave, or conduct himself."

[16] *Jalingga be sere: Serembi* here means "to know beforehand, to anticipate" (see Zakharov, not given by von der Gabelentz), which is pretty close to the Chinese *fang* 芳.

[17] *Gidaśara be ilibu:* "Should stop, or ward off, insults", for the Chinese *yü-wu* 禦侮, which Franke, 1. c. p. 45, renders "ward off encroachment" quoting Legge's translation of the *Shih-ching*, where the phrase occurs in III, 1, iii, 9 (p. 441). But Legge says there "defence from insult", and the same meaning is given in Giles' dictionary. I cannot find the meaning "encroachment" anywhere. The *T'z'ŭ-yüan* 辭源 defines *wu* 吳 by *man-i* 慢易, i.e. to slight; the *Tz'ŭ-hai* 慈槽海 by the same and by *chien-ch'êng* 賤猻, i.e. to insult.

[18] *Beye be śolo ume tucibure*: Literally, "he should not let himself go out after, i.e. enjoy, leisure." *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu* has only the idiom *śolo tuciburakû=pu t'ou k'ung-êrh* 不餓空范, i.e. "not to have a moment's leisure."

[19] *Kesi*: Literally "favour", stands here for Chinese *jung* 栄, i.e. "glory, honour."

[20] *Juse omosi de tutambi*: The verb can be used transitively as well as intransitively, "he will bequeath", or "...happiness will be left to etc." The Chinese text has *yen* 颜, i.e. "it will extend to etc."

[21] *Weshihun banjimbi*: "To live honoured, esteemed"; the Chinese text has *k'ang* 炕上, i.e. "healthy."

[22] *Funde bośokû*: According to the *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu* a *tai-tzŭ*, or officer below the rank of *tso-ling*; a *hsiao-ch'i-chiao* (帶子乃佐領內之官. 驍騎投). Mayers, 1. c. p. 57, no. 387 renders *tso-ling* by "captain", and *hsiao-ch'i-chiao* by "lieutenant" (p. 63, no. 431). Outside Peking, however, *tso-ling* meant "major" (p. 63, no. 429). Zakharov translates accordingly: "first lieutenant, assistant company commander." In the Chinese text the word is left untranslated, and written phonetically thus: 麟撥什隳.

[23] *Sandung:* Exceptional spelling for usual *śandung.*

[24] *Meiren-i janggin*: Equivalent to the Chinese *fu-tu-t'ung* 副都統 (see *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu*), i. e. according to Mayers, either "deputy lieutenant-general" in Peking (1. c. no. 381) or "brigadier-general" in the provincial banners (1. c. no. 421). Zakharov has: "assistant corps commander."

[25] *Ginjeo*: Chinese Chin-chou 錦州, in Manchuria, in the province of Mukden, had great strategic importance as a gate to North-China. Beginning in 1639, the Manchus attacked it several times, and finally took it in 1642. Cf. Hauer, *K'ai-kuo fang-lüeh*, p. 507 sqq.

ilan ing be gidara de, meiren-i janggin sira bayara-i emgi dosika, ginjeo be kaha duici mudan de, narhûn ulan fetehe inenggi, ginjeo hoton-i moringga yafahan cooha wacihiyame tucifi kalka gajime afanjiha de, dashûwan-i galai ilan gûsai bayara[26] *afame mutehekû ulan de fekuci, si babe waliyahakû, asanghi emgi afafi akû oho manggi, baitalabure hafan*[27] *obufi jui jujaha be siraha. wesihun erdemunggei nadaci aniya jakûn biyai orin ilan de.*

amala ming gurun-i doro be baha[28] *mudan de, śanaha*[29] *be dosika inenggi liozei orin tumen cooha be gidara de edei baturu-i emgi moringga yafahan cooha be yafahalafi gidaha. liozei cooha be bośome genefi cing du hiyan de amcanafi gidarade, edei baturu-i emgi gidaha seme baitalabure hafan nonggiha. ijishûn dasan-i ilaci aniya duin biyai ice de.*

abkai fejergi be uhe obuha manggi, julgei enduringge han sei kooli be alhûdame, taizu dergi hûwangdi[30] *gung erdemu be tucibume, abkai tan de weceme adabuha doroi fe geren hafasa be daci jalan*[31] *jalan-i hûsun bume joboho seme, baitalabure hafan jai emu tuwaśara hafan*[32] *be ilaci jergi adaha hafan obuha.*[33] *jalan halame hafan lashalarakû sirambi. ijishûn dasan-i nadaci aniya ilan biyai ninggun de.*

amala weile baha manggi, ilaci jergi adaha hafan be efulefi[34] *baitalabure hafan obuha. jalan halame hafan lashalarakû sirarangge nenehe songkoi. ijishûn dasan-i nadaci aniya ilan biyai orin juwe de.*

abkai fejergi be uhe obuha manggi, julgei enduringge han sei kooli be alhûdame, enduringge eniye be genggiyen enduringge gosingga jalafun hûwang taiheo seme tukiyehe doroi baitalabure hafan de jai emu tuwaśara hafan nonggiha. hûwang heo gaiha urgun-i doroi[35] *julgei enduringge han sei kooli be alhûdame, enduringge eniye genggiyen enduringge gosingga jalafun hûwang taiheo-i wesihun gebu de genggiyen enduringge gosingga jalafun gungnecuke boljonggo hûwang taiheo seme nonggime wesihun gebu tukiyehe doroi, baitalabure hafan jai emu tuwaśara hafan be ilaci jergi adaha hafan obuha. jalan halame hafan lashalarakû sirambi. ijishûn dasan-i uyuci aniya aniya biyai orin ninggun de.*

amala g'ui jeo golo de cooha genehe mudan de cuwan-i cooha amasi jidere de, mederi hûlha jeng ceng gung[36] *se jen giyang,*[37] *guwa jeo*[38] *be gaifi, giyang ning fu*[39] *be gaimbi seme hûlhai nadan minggan funcere cooha olhon de tafaka be gidarade, gûsai hontoho cooha be gaifi teisu bata be gidaha. hûlhai ilan tumen funcere cooha olhon de tafaka be gidarade, jalan be gaifi teisu bata be gidaha. hûlhai juwan tumen funcere cooha alin-i ninggude hûng ni,*[40] *poo, miyoociyang*[41] *kalka faidafi alime gaiha be gidarade gûsai hontoho cooha be gaifi yafahalafi teisu bata be gidaha seme ilaci*

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[26] *Bayara*: The élite troops, or guards. The Chinese text here again retains the Manchu word in phonetic spelling, and even the *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu* gives the phonetic spelling first (*bayara*: 擺牙喇乃衆兵內挑選好者).

[27] *Baitalabure hafan*: This again is rendered phonetically in the Chinese version; the later Chinese equivalent is given in the *Ch'ing-wên pu-hui* 淸文補彙 as *ch'i-tu-yü*, "or hereditary title of the fourth rank" (騎都尉乃四品世職). The three highest ranks of "duke, marquis, and count" (公, 候, 伯) are outside the classification according to *p'in* 品, and therefore not counted. (Cf. Franke, 1. c. p. 43, note 14, and his table, p. 42.) Giles in his dictionary and Mayers (p. 68, no. 455) count all the ranks, and so assign no. 7 to *ch'i-tu-yü*. Zakharov correctly calls it "fourth rank". The title as such is much older; according to the *Tz'ŭ-yüan*, the office was created by Wu Ti of the Han dynasty, and became an honorary title under the T'ang.

[28] *Ming-gurun-i doro be baha*: The Chinese text has more concisely: *ting ting yen ching* 婷婷顏淸, i.e. "having established the tripods in Yenching (modern Peking)", a well-known phrase.

[29] *Śanaha*: The Manchu name fore Shanhaikuan 山海關. This and the remaining part of the scroll are obviously addressed to the son and heir of Tunggar.

[30] *Taizu Dergi Hûwangdi*: Chinese T'ai tsu kao huang ti 太祖高皇帝, the temple name of Nurhaci (1559–1626), the first emperor of the Manchus, though not yet of China, and the real founder of Manchu greatness. His *nien-hao* was *T'ien-ming* 天命, Manchu *abka fulingga*. For further details see A. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, under "Nurhaci", and also Hauer, *Das Mandschurische Kaiserhaus*, in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen an der Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität zu Berlin*, vol. 29, part 1. p. 16 (1926).

[31] *Jalan*: Manchu military unit, not translated, but only transliterated in the *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu*. According to Zakharov, four to five *jalan* made up one banner (army corps).

[32] *Tuwaśara hafan*: Later Chinese equivalent 雲騎尉乃五品世職, i.e., *yün ch'i yü*, or hereditary title of the fifth rank (*Ch'ing wên pu hui*). This title served as a unit of calculating the rank, so that "adding one *tuwaśara hafan* to your *baitalabure hafan*" raises the holder to the next grade. (The whole system is well explained by Franke, 1. c. p. 43.) See also the *Tz'ŭ-hai* under 雲騎尉: 凡封爵皆以雲騎麟始而累加之, 始合兩雲騎尉爲騎都尉, 冑騎尉二十一等公是. "Whenever noble rank is bestowed, it always starts with *yün ch'i yü*, and the same is then added, so that two *yün ch'i yü* make a *ch'i tu yü*, and twenty-six *yün ch'i yü* make a duke of the first grade." This use of the title belongs to the Manchus only, but the title as such was established by the Sui dynasty (see *Tz'ŭ-yüan*).

[33] *Baitalabure hafan jai emu tuwaśara hafan be ilaci jergi adaha hafan obuha*: The previous decree, by adding one *tuwaśara hafan* to the *baitalabure hafan*, made the title hereditary for three generations instead of the two of the simple *baitalabure hafan*. Now, this decree, by adding another *tuwaśara hafan*, raises the holder to the next dignity, i.e. *adaha hafan* of the third degree, inheritable through four generations. The Chinese equivalent is *san têng ch'ing chü tu yü* 三等輕車都尉. Cf. Franke's table, 1. c. p. 42.

[34] *Efulefi . . . obuha*: Literally, "we took away . . . and made you . . .".

[35] *Urgun doro*: Any act to celebrate a joyful event at court.

[36] *Jeng ceng gung*: Chêng Ch'êng-kung 鄭誠功 1624–1662, the famous Ming general and "pirate", known to contemporary Europe by his popular title "Coxinga" (國姓翁).

[37] *Jen giyang*: Chên-chiang 鎮江 in Kiangsu.

[38] *Guwa jeo*: Kua-chou 侉删 in Kiangsu.

[39] *Giyang ning fu*: Old name for modern Nanking (江寧富).

[40] *Hûng ni*: Obscure word, not found in any dictionary. Either for *hûng sere*, i.e. crackling like fire, or Chinese *hung* 掛, i.e. explosive.

[41] *Miyoociyang*: Older form for later *miyoocan*, from Chinese *niao ch'iang* 鳥鎗, i.e. a fowling piece, but used of any musket or rifle in Manchu. The form *miyoociyang* is not found in any dictionary.

jergi adaha hafan be jai jergi adaha hafan[42] *obuha. jalan halame hafan lashalarakû sirarangge nenehe songkoi.*

On the imperial seal: *hese wasimbure boobai.*

Translation

To further virtue, and to reward merit, that is the great law of the state; to perform one's accepted duty to the utmost, that is the canon for officials. The holy emperors of antiquity established the state by military authority, but ruled it by civilian virtue. I, imitating the ancients, in order to foster virtue and merit, have established military and civil [ranks for] officials. Whoever receives this diploma, should conduct himself loyally, and cherish all others benevolently; he should investigate details wisely, anticipate falsehood, and ward off insults. He should not allow himself any rest from his duties. If he can do all this, favour will reach back to his father and grandfather, and he will bequeath happiness to his sons and grandsons. He and his family will always be honoured. Respect this, and do not neglect it.

Tunggar, you were originally a *funde bošokû.* When, during your first campaign beyond Peking in the province of Shantung, you had already been on guard duty together with your general, Sira Bayara, for seven days and seven nights, you still dashed forward and beat the enemy twice. During the third siege of Chinchou, you again dashed forward with your general, Sira Bayara, and conquered three enemy camps at the Hung-chün gate. During the the fourth siege of Chinchou, on the day the small trench was dug, when the entire cavalry and infantry of Chinchou came out, took up their shields, and attacked, the imperial guards of the three banners on the left wing were unable to fight, but jumped into the trench; you, however, did not desert your post, but instead died fighting together with Asanghi. For this we have made you a *baitalabure hafan,* and let your son Jujaha inherit [the title]. Ch'ung-tê 崇德 7th year, 23rd day of the 8th month (October 5th, 1643).

Afterwards, when we had taken over the power of the Ming, on the day Shanhaikuan was entered [you, Jujaha] attacked a rebel army of 200,000, both cavalry and infantry, and vanquished them on foot together with

Edei Baturu. Later, pursuing the rebel forces, you defeated them again after overtaking them in Ching Tu Hsien, together with Edei Baturu, and for this we have added one *tuwašara hafan* to your *baitalabure hafan.* Shun-chih 3rd year, the 1st day of the 4th month (May 15th, 1646).

Having united the world, we, in imitation of the custom of the holy emperors of antiquity, and displaying the merit and virtue of Taizu Dergi Hûwangdi, performed the sacrifice on the altar of heaven. On this occasion, as we felt sorry for all the old officials who had given their strength for generations, we added another *tuwašara hafan* to your *baitalabure hafan,* and thus made you an *adaha hafan* of the third grade. This rank shall be hereditary through succeeding generations without interruption. Shun-chih 7th year, 6th day of the 3rd month (April 6th, 1650).

Later on, after you had committed an offence, we demoted you from *adaha hafan* of the third grade to *baitalabure hafan,* this rank to be held hereditarily as before. Shun-chih 7th year, 22nd day of the 3rd month (May 3rd, 1650).

After uniting the world, we, following the custom of the holy emperors of antiquity, bestowed upon our saintly mother the title of Noble, Holy, Kind, Long-Living Empress Dowager, and on that occasion added again one *tuwašara hafan* to your *baitalabure hafan.* Then, when we married the Empress, we, following the custom of the holy emperors of antiquity, added to the titles of our mother, the Noble, Holy, Kind, Long-Living Empress Dowager, the additional title of Venerable and Moderate, and on the same occasion we again promoted you to *adaha hafan* of the third grade. This shall be hereditary without interruption. Shun-chih 9th year, 1st month, 26th day (March 17th, 1652).

Afterwards, when you went on a campaign to the province of Kueichou, with the fleet following, and when the pirate Chêng Ch'êng-kung had already taken Chênchiang and Kuachou, and was about to take Chiang Ning Fu as well, you defeated the pirate's army of over seven thousand men, as they came ashore; with only half a banner you beat the enemy. Then you vanquished more than 30,000 pirates ashore with only one regiment. Finally, when the pirates arrayed 100,000 men on top of a mountain and received you with the fire of their cannon, *hûngni,* and muskets, and [an array of] shields, you defeated them with only half a banner of infantry. For all this we have promoted you from the third grade of *adaha hafan* to the second grade, the rank to be hereditary, as before. Imperial seal.

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[42] *Jai jergi adaha hafan:* See above; the second degree of this title was inheritable through five generations.

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The author would like here to express his sincere gratitude to Professor Luther Carrington Goodrich of Columbia University, New York, for having pointed out to him Franke's article.

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I did not make use of F. Amyot's dictionary, because it is only a rather indifferent and incomplete translation of the *Ch'ing-wên hui-shu*.

■ Source: Lui, Adam Yuen-chung, 'From feudalism to bureaucratic rule: The control of princes and Manchu officials, 1644–1661', in *Journal of Chinese Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 165–181.

FROM FEUDALISM TO BUREAUCRATIC RULE:
THE CONTROL OF PRINCES AND MANCHU OFFICIALS, 1644–1661

Adam Yuen-Chung Lui

Singologists hitherto have been concerned with the study of the efforts made by the Manchu authorities to deal with the conquered Chinese, how to rule and placate them, how to make use of their sophisticated and superior institutions to run the government and how to control those newly-appointed Chinese in the government.[1] Equally important, but usually ignored was government policy towards the princes, the comrades-in-arms of Nurhaci [a] and Abahai [b] who were not only challengers to the ruler, but also stumbling blocks to the process of centralization and bureaucratization. As Manchu power was extended from the forest region to the Great Plain, this process had been in operation, it reached an unprecedented degree after the Manchus had occupied Peking and set up a formal dynasty in 1644.[2]

The intention of this article is to study the policy of the rulers in controlling the princes and in making use of them militarily at the same time. In addition the differences and similarities between Dorgon [c], the regent and Shun-chih [d], the emperor, in containing the princes will be described. The reasons why these imperial policies did not completely bear fruits will also be discussed. But first of all, a general discussion of the feudal customs and behaviors which the Government attempted to put within reasonable limits is given below.

Tribal and feudal autonomy ran supreme in the days of Nurhaci. Princes and tribal chiefs were not accustomed to attending court of their overlord unless there were urgent matters to discuss. They regarded themselves as equal to one another. In the days of Nurhaci, these leaders hunted and feasted together with Nurhaci who was given more privileges and prestige mainly because he personally commanded respects from his generals, and not so much because he was their Khan. In the days of Abahai, the Emperor's prerogatives were vastly increased at the expense of his relatives, but still Abahai hunted and feasted quite freely with his brothers and princes. Princes, too, led rather loose and wayward lives; they could take any women they liked as concubines, and there was no legal or social inhibition against them marrying relatives. It was quite common for them to take the wives of prisoners and defeated enemies as their concubines. Morality such as that espoused by the Chinese Confucian scholar was not a problem to the Manchu princes at all. In short a state of feudal-tribal relationships and behaviors prevailed in the pre-conquest days.[3]

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[1] See John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, Cambridge, 1958, new edition, pp. 77–82; Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942.

[2] See Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 2nd ed., New York: American Geographical Society, 1951; Liu Chia-chü [ba], *Ch'ing-ch'ao ch'u-ch'i ti pa-ch'i ch'üan-ti* [bb], Taiwan: [bc], 1960.

Court etiquette and personal propriety were not known to the princes whose main concern was in the battlefield and whose education was possibly an understanding of the feudal and tribal rituals and customs. In the religious field, for example, they openly maintained the tribal Shamanism in which the priests could be either males or females and the prayers were centred on better herds and stronger grass. The Manchus, princes and bannermen alike, in addition, clung tenanciously to the superstitious and supernatural elements of the tribal religion. They relied on the Shaman to cure sicknesses and predict their futures. When they could not decide on any matter, the first person to contact would be their Shaman who inevitably figured large in the political and social circles of the Manchus. In the political and social world of Manchuria, the Manchu princes, had their own values, but, by and large, apart from giving unquestionable loyalty to their overlord, they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and freedom of social behavior.[4] They, for example, had a strong say on their subordinates who, under the trial-feudal setting, were subjected to their arbitrary dictates. This freedom was gradually restricted, but a major restriction did not come about until the proper setting up of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644 when due to the changes of political conditions, such action became highly necessary.

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[3] See Mo Tung-yin [bd], *Man-tsu-shih-lun ts'ung* [bc], Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she [bf], 1958, Yü Ming-chung [bg] and A-k'uei [bh], ed., *Ch'in-ting Man-chou yüan-liu k'ai* [bi], 1777, reprinted in *Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-kan* [bj], *ed. by Shen Yün-lung* [bk], *No. 131, Taiwan, Wen-hai ch'u-pan she* [bl], *1962; Man-chou chien-shih* [bm] in *Chung-kuo hsiao-shu min-tsu chien-shih ts'ung-shu* [bn]; Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü [bo], 1979. The word "feudal" actually describes a lord-vassal relationship based on land and the existence of serfs. It is not loosely used like a Chinese communist historian, to describe China before 1949.

[4] See Mo Tung-yin, *Man-tsu-shih-lun ts'ung*, pp. 175–205.

Dorgon, the regent who ruled China from 1644 to 1650, was himself a prince. Knowing very well what princes would think and could do, he tried his best to make good use of them in the battlefield and at the same time curtail their power in order to enhance his own. He had to achieve these dual goals because the wars with the pro-Ming elements were still continuing and the military leadership and capabilities of the princes were indispensable in bringing the whole of China under the rulership of the Manchus.[5] On the other hand, as a regent, his political power was not as firm as that of an emperor. Indeed, he was open to challenges from competing princes among whom were Haoge [e], the son of Abahai who had a strong claim to the Throne after Abahai died and who could not become the emperor only on account of the political and military power of Dorgon at the time, and Jirgaleng [f], the co-regent of Dorgon who also commanded the respect and services of a number of princes and officials.[6] Dorgon succeeded in causing the death of one and the political downgrading of the other, but this was not enough; he was aware that in order to place the government under his strong grip, his primary goal was to centralize power in his own hands at the expense of the princes who had hitherto been holding too much feudal power over their subordinates. What he must do was to instruct the princes that the position of regent was well above that of a prince or even an overlord. He therefore deliberately heaped upon himself titles and honors and made his position as high as that of an emperor.[7]

Elevating the position of regent was accompanied with depriving the princes of their political power. As early as 1644, he, in the name of the child emperor Shun-chih, deprived the power of princes in supervising the Six Boards thus releasing them from interfering with the civil side of the government.[8] The Council of Deliberative Princes and Officials [g] which was exclusively staffed by Manchu princes and senior officials and which assisted Dorgon in the direction of military campaigns, however, was seldom asked to deliberate on civil matters.[9]

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[5] For example, Dorgon sent Dodo to Honan and Shensi in 1644 against Li Tz'u-cheng [bp] (A.W. Hummel ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period 1644–1912*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offices, 1943–44), I, 215; Ajige was also sent there against Li (Ibid., pp. 4–5). For a general description of the pacification efforts of the Manchus, see Hsiao I-shan [bq], *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih* [br], 5 vols., Taiwan Commercial Press [bs], 2nd edition, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 285–376.

[6] See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, I, 280–81, 397–98.

[7] See Li Chieh [bt], *Ch'ing-shih* [bu], First Volume, Hong Kong: Hai-chiao ch'u-pan she [bv], 1964, pp. 180–183.

[8] *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* [bw] compiled by Man-chou ti-kuo kuo-wu yüan [bx], 4664 *chüan*, Tokyo: Okuro shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937–38. The present reference follows the photocopy of Hua-wen shu-chü [by], Taipei. (The work is hereafter cited as *Shih-lu*), Vol. I, p. 21.

In 1649 Dorgon further stated that princes and mandarins who interfered with the administrative decisions of government boards and departments or commented on the administrative performance of any Chinese officials, whether at the Capital or in the provinces, would be liable to punishment, irrespective of the truth of their statements. In addition, they were also forbidden to call upon officials, for fear of factions forming.[10]

Although a form of government had been set up as early as the days of Nurhaci, it was only the post-conquest period after 1644 that princes were subjected to bureaucratic control. The compulsion of attending court regularly was one of such control, and princes who violated this requirement would be punishable. As early as 1644, Dodo [h] and Ajige [i], the two brothers of Dorgon failed to appear in court and each was punished by a fine.[11] To pick Dodo and Ajige for punishment was to show to other princes that even the trusted brothers of the regent were punished without exception. After these cases of punishment, no violations of this nature were recorded until the last year of the Dorgon regency (1650), when a beile, Sak-pi [j] was found guilty of being absent from court and punished but not severely.[12] The latter case could be regarded as an exception, as the princes and officials seemed to have learned the lesson from the punishment (though light) of Dodo and Ajige. There might be some cases of absence, but since they were not recorded officially, they were either not politically significant or concerned with junior officials, which the government did not bother to record.

Being accustomed to their former enjoyment of equality among feudal lords, the princes found bureaucratic restrictions too much for them. They consciously or unconsciously treated the regent as one of their equals. Dorgon wanted to bring to their attention that he was well above them in power and prestige. He punished princes who failed to treat him as their superior. As early as 1644, he had his opportunity. Two senior princes, Haoge and Dodo hunted in the land earmarked as the imperial reserve

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[9] For a good discussion of the Council see Fu Tsung-mou [bz], "Chi'ing-ch'u i-cheng ti'i-chih chih yen-chiu" [ca], in *Kuo-li cheng-ch'ih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao* [cb], No. 11 (May, 1955, pp. 245–294. In this work, the Council is seen to play a minor role in civil matters during the Dorgon regency.

[10] *Tung-hua lu* [cd] ed. by Wang Hsien-ch'ien [ce] and others, (509 *chüan* in 30 *ts'e*, Taipei, 1963), Shun-chih reign, p. 90.

[11] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih reign, I, 32.

[12] Ibid., p. 556.

(or to be more exact, as the exclusive hunting ground for Dorgon); they narrowly escaped punishment only because Dorgon acting in the name of the Emperor, pardoned them.[13] This threat of punishment of the most senior princes, however, did not totally discourage the princes from committing the same offence; for in 1650, again, when Dorgon went out to hunt, other Manchu princes without permission from the regent, also took the opportunity to hunt in the same area.[14] This, of course, was a matter-of-fact occurrence in the pre-conquest days, but now was punishable.

There were other instances when princes acted in accordance with the previous customs, but were now punished because they had exceeded the limits of their power and cut back on the centralization efforts of the Emperor (or the regent). In 1646, Ajige performed an act which only an emperor could and should do. He sat under a yellow umbrella before the Palace Gate (Wumen[k]). Being only a prince but acting like an emperor, he therefore performed a pretentious act. He was punished according to law.[15] Ajige most probably committed the offence deliberately to show his dissatisfaction of the bureaucratic restrictions over him. Before 1644, under the Manchu political context, there was no identification of the yellow umbrella with imperial nonopolistic property. Perhaps, he was not aware of the Chinese interpretation of the yellow umbrella. In either case, he acted indulgently and in contempt of the Emperor or his representative, the regent. In 1647 Dodo, then the Assistant Regent, presented on his own initiative a yellow robe to the son of Wu San-kuei [l], the famous feudal lord of the Southwest. It was the Chinese custom that only the Emperor could wear or give out yellow robes. By doing so, Dodo acted as if he were the emperor. He was fined 5,000 taels by the investigation board comprising of princes and senior officials, but the fine was reduced to 2,000 by Dorgon in the name of the Emperor.[16] Possibly out of ignorance or acting in accordance with the former Manchu custom of equality among princes, the feudal lords, Dodo and Ajige, had exceeded their power and social status. They might think that as brothers of the regent and chief members of his faction, their indulgences would be overlooked. Dorgon, however, did not think likewise. To him, anyone committing crimes or breaking government regulations should be punished. He wanted to show to his officials (and to posterity) that he was an impartial ruler who rewarded and punished officials according to performances and not to persons. Indeed, he sometimes found his two brothers too wayward; he was not against sending messages of warning to them, so that they might behave themselves. But, since they were indispensable partners of the Dorgon faction, they could not be alienated. The result was the meting out of punishment which was too light to hurt, but which served the purpose of warning them.

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[13] Ibid., p. 35.

[14] Ibid., p. 575.

[15] Ibid., p. 277.

[16] *Tung-hua-lu*, Shun-chih, p. 79b.

Not only did Dorgon try to contain the princes in the political and social fields, he would also not tolerate any infringement on imperial power in any other areas. One of these areas was the feudal relations between princes and junior tribes who were accustomed to sending in tributary gifts to their immediate overlords. Now, with the setting up of the Manchu regime in Peking, these tribes presented tributes to the Emperor (or the regent) instead. Princes like Mandahai [m] were not happy with the new arrangement and voiced their dissatisfactions in statements. They were punished by Dorgon: Mandahai, for example, was fined 5,000 taels, and suspended for one year's salary.[17] The princes kept quiet after the punishment of Mandahai; they had learned the futility of making any comments, once the regent had made up his mind.

In the legal field, the Central Government after 1644 made it specifically clear that it had the sole right to punish officials. Those princes who still claimed jurisdiction over their subordinates or who protected them from imperial justice would be punished. A case in point was the sheltering of subordinates by Bolo [n], a prince of blood. When officials from the Six Boards visited his residence in 1645, possibly for investigating some offenses, his subordinates, To-k'e-hsin [o] and Hu-t'u [p], under the instruction of their master prevented them from seeing Bolo. Possibly, he resented government interference with his private affairs. No matter what the intention was, Bolo had committed an offense against the Government and for this was fined two hundred taels.[18]

Many princes were unable to follow, let alone appreciate, the addition of Confucian principles and Chinese-style bureaucratic procedure. In 1650 when one of Dorgon's wives died, the beile, Kung-a-tai [q] visited Dorgon's residence without putting on mourning clothes, a casual act during the preconquest days, but one that was prohibited under the present government. The beile in question was demoted and fined for violating a Confucian ritual obligation that the Government upheld, but that the princes

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[17] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, I, 519.

[18] Ibid., p. 456.

knew little about and none respected.[19] On Chinese New Year's even in the second year of the Shun-chih reign (1645), a palace guard admitted the wife of a prince of blood, Pai-yin-t'u [r], into the Forbidden City for pleasure and sight-seeing. Both the guard and the woman had committed offences. Dorgon did not punish the woman who obviously acted in ignorance, but he dismissed the palace guard who should have been familiar with the government regulations but still allowed the woman to break the law.[20] Possibly also due to an ignorance of the bureaucrat rules which were patterned after the former Ming system, a Manchu official, Hsi-fu [s], memorialized the Throne to seek promotion for himself. This might be tolerated in a feudal type of government, but for a full-fledged Chinese government, promotion was mainly based on performances and seniority.[21] Hsi-fu's self recommendation was regarded as a violation of government regulations. For his self-seeking, Hsi-fu was deprived of all ranks and positions and demoted to commoner's status.[22]

On the religious aspect, despite the government's official adoption of the Confucian ideology, they allowed the Manchus to practise their former tribal and feudal religion, Shamanism. However, when the superstitious elements of this religion touched the realm of politics and affected the running of the government, Dorgon would take action to stop them. One example was involved with the Shaman, Sa-hai [t], who told fortunes constantly for the deputy beile A-shan [u]. During one of these consultations, the Shaman informed his client that the wife of one of his subordinates, Ya-pa-hai [v], had had an affair with another man. Believing the Shaman and acting in accordance with feudal-tribal practice, A-shan exercised his authority as a feudal lord would have done in the past, by ordering Ya-pa-hai to divorce his wife. Ya-pa-hai, however, did not believe that his wife was disloyal to him; the wife also took action by filing in a complaint against this former feudal master, A-shan, with the Board of Punishments. An investigation panel was set up to look into the matter. A verdict against A-shan was arrived at by the panel, which recommended among other things the execution of the Shaman and the dismissal of A-shan. Also involved in the case was a number of Manchu princes and senior officials who were regular clients of the Shaman, seeking his help in curing sickness and the like. Dorgon, the regent, gave his final decision which modified the verdict of the investigation panel. A-shan was still to be dismissed, but his properties were not to be confiscated; the Shaman was not to be executed, but only to be beaten 100 strokes and forbidden to practice fortune-telling and healing.[23]

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[19] Ibid., p. 571.

[20] Ibid., p. 148.

[21] On promotion in the Ch'ing Period, see Adam Yuen-chung Lui, "The Ch'ing Civil Service: Promotions, Demotions, Transfers, Leaves, Dismissals and Retirements", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol. VIII. No. 2, 1970, pp. 333–356.

[22] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, I, 538.

Despite the Government order, Sa-hai continued to be called by Manchu princes and officials for healing sicknesses, and once was given a house by a Manchu official as a reward for his service. When the government found this out, execution was recommended for Sa-hai for his violation of the government order. The death penalty, however, was once again annulled by Dorgon.[24] Dorgon was lenient towards Sa-hai possibly because the latter was popular among princes and Manchu officials and because Shamanism was also respected by Dorgon himself. He had to take action to control the religion mainly because it cut into the administration of justice and government regulations. In 1649, possibly seeing that too many Manchus were infatuated with the superstitious side of Shamanism, he was forced to issue an edict to the effect that fortune-telling and the practice of magic should be confined to ceremonial activities but should not be used to cheat the public.[25] The edict had little effect on the Manchus and their priests. Since Shaman priests were allowed to practice magic, witchcraft, fortune-telling and the like, they were in a good position to influence people's lives and even meddle into political matters (if their clients were officials).

It was clear that the regent, Dorgon, aimed at centralization of power in his own hands. Politically, legally, economically and even religiously, the source of power should be the regent (who acted on behalf of the Emperor). The regent was head and shoulder above princes in all respects. He was more than their former feudal overlord. To Dorgon, every official was appointed, transferred or dismissed only by the Central Government of which he was the head, acting on behalf of the child emperor. There was absolutely no excuse for a prince to behave as if he were equal to the regent or the Emperor.

He picked the most influential princes (Dodo, Ajige, Haoge, Mandahai) for punishment; incidentally these princes were in a position to challenge

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[23] *Tung hua lu*, pp. 51b–52b.

[24] *Shih-lu*, Chun-chih, I, 456.

[25] Ibid., p. 523.

his power. It is also clear that the punishments meted out to these princes were light and served only as warnings to other princes and officials. After all, Dorgon relied on them to lead military campaigns and support his political power at court. It is doubtful that the princes deliberately committed offenses every time; possibly they had been so used to their former autonomous and free style of life and behavior under the feudal-tribal setting that they had great difficulty in adjusting to the Chinese bureaucratic regulations and constraints. The disregard for Chinese rituals and social proprieties, for examples, was excusable for military men not educated under the Confucian system.

On the other hand, while Dorgon strictly forbade princes from committing licentious and indulgent acts, he did not set a good example for them. He was suspected of having intimate relations with the empress dowager.[26] In 1648 he took his nephew's wife (Haoge's wife) as one of his concubines.[27] In his last years, he despatched envoys to Korea solely to look for beautiful girls to fill his harem.[28] Thus, Dorgon's call for abiding by the bureaucratic rules had but temporary effects; princes obeyed him because he held political power, but many were not convinced. When Dorgon died, some of the old tribal-feudal customs reappeared. It required the efforts of the subsequent ruler, the Shun-chih Emperor, to find ways to place princes within the bureaucratic framework.

When Dorgon died in 1650, his successor, the Shun-chih emperor, was a boy of about thirteen. Still very inexperienced in government, but, being precocious, he was quick to obtain experience and assumed full political control over the government. He was more determined than Dorgon to curtail the power and prerogatives of princes. Unlike Dorgon, Shun-chih was not an experienced warrior and was unaccustomed to the Manchu tribal and feudal heritage. As a boy, he had already moved to live in Peking as the designated emperor. In addition, he was aware of the fact that princes still clung to their former political factions. To centralize power in his own hands, he had to weaken these factions. Moreover, the young emperor was genuinely impressed with Chinese ideology and had no objection to listening to the advice of his Chinese officials, if it was sensible.[29]

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[26] See Meng Sen [cf], *Ch'ing-tai shih* [cg], Taiwan: Cheng-chung shu-chü [ch], 1973, pp. 118–19, 449–54; see also Hsü Chih-yen [ci], *Ch'ing-tai shih-yeh yeh-wen tzu-huü* [cj], Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she [ck], 1972, pp. 5–27.

[27] Meng Sen, *Ch'ing-tai shih*, p. 452.

[28] Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, I, 217; *shih-lu*, 1, 554.

Possibly out of admiration for Chinese culture [and regarding it as an effective way to control the princes,] the Emperor introduced Chinese education to young princes. Such an introduction was rightly regarded as a controversial method; for on the one hand, young princes might be made more educated and civilized, but on the other hand, they might be easily absorbed in studies and lose their military vigor. Nonetheless, in the first few years of the Shun-chih personal rule, the Emperor's priority was to educate the princes. The problem of signification had not yet arisen. A special school was set up to offer two courses of study, one in the Manchu language and translation and the other in Chinese classics and rituals. Students of the latter course were to study original Chinese works.[30] To promote Confucian virtues, the Imperial Clan Court (*Tsung-jen fu* [w]), the Manchu-controlled department which was responsible for governing the princes, was authorized to report young princes who were reputed for filial piety and generosity or chastity (for females), to the Government so that honors might be bestowed on them.[31] Thus, the Government under Shun-chih intended to use Confucianism to control young princes. The danger, however, was that if the process was continued for a long time, it might lead to young princes forgetting Manchu customs in favor of the Chinese ways of life. While the Shun-chih emperor wanted to contain the princes, he had no intention to make them completely sinicized or too soft for military engagement. After one or two years of spreading Confucian virtues and education among young princes, the problem of signification became more real; opposition from princes and senior Manchu officials also prompted Shun-chih to halt his early efforts of Confucianising young princes. From 1654 onwards, the Emperor only allowed them to read the translations of Chinese works; they were forbidden to learn Chinese.[32]

This process of Confucian education was effective in minimising the indulgent and lax customs of princes. The result became more spectacular

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[29] See Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*, I, 386–390; Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback, Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975, pp. 50–62.

[30] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, Vol, II, 815, 929.

[31] Ibid., p. 824; for further information on the *Tsung-jen fu*, see Li P'eng-nien [cl], *Ch'ing-tai chung-yang kuo-chia chi-kuan kai-shu* [cm], Heilungchiang: Jen-wen ch'u-pan she [cn], 1983, pp. 89–100.

[32] Ibid., p. 995.

when wayward princes such as Ajige and Mandahai passed away and the successors to the princedoms were youngsters who had less political power and who had been given an education by the government. Those who continued to practise former Manchu customs and autonomy were princes whose fiefs were outside the China Proper and whose political and social behaviors had not been placed under the imperial surveillance, due to the fact that Dorgon had more pressing problems to attend within the Great Wall. Now that the Shun-chih emperor had more or less controlled the princes and the civil service at large, and that the Empire was near unification, he was able to see to these princes on the peripheries of China. In 1659 two princes from Mongolia, Wu-ke-shan [x] and Ta-erh-han were scolded by the emperor for being disrespectful by failing to attend court.[33] In the same year, a prince who was the chief of a tributary tribe, A-pu-nai [y], executed his subordinate, A-chi-sa [z], without first informing the Central Government; for this he was punished.[34] Under a charge of not obeying the Emperor, and for sheltering enemies of the State, another prince whose fief was also outside China was downgraded to commoner's status.[35]

An explanation why all the three princes cited committed their offenses in 1659 seems necessary. The year saw the advance of the powerful pro-Ming forces led by Koxinga on Nanking. The Manchu regime was, for the time being, threatened. It was said that the Emperor was very worried about the outcome of the battle around Nanking.[36] This tense military and political situation prompted him to adopt a stringent attitude not only towards tributary tribes outside China, but also towards officials in China.[37]

Within the Great Wall, while the princes as a group tended to behave more discreetly and in accordance with the Government regulations, thanks to the death of the old guards such as Mandahai and the education of the younger generation of princes, the military officers remained still very much attached to their former tribal-feudal customs. The Government picked a number of them for punishment. In 1653 a Captain of the Imperial Guards, I-erh-te [aa], was impeached for privately changing guards during the absence of the Emperor and also for reducing their number without informing the Government.[38] His real intention of doing this was not officially recorded, but it is probable that he did this either because of carelessness or a lack of discipline driven by a sense of insubordination. Another Manchu, Shu-shu [ab], took the daughter of an executed mandarin, King-lin [ac], and arbitrarily married her to his own brother.[39] It had been a tribal-feudal custom to take advantage of defeated or degraded personnel. Now it was an offense to do so. Shu-shu was punished for breaking a government regulation. Another Manchu officer, T'ang-yu [ad], forced commoners to become his serfs and for this was dismissed from office.[40] Notice that the Manchu officials/officers were largely not well-educated and their adherence to former customs and habits came as no surprise. The Shun-chih emperor punished them much more severely than he had punished the princes, hoping that severe punishment would serve as a deterrent and discipline the Manchu military officers.

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[33] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, Vol. III, 1483.

[34] Ibid., p. 1496.

[35] Ibid., p. 1534.

[36] Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, I, 257.

[37] Adam Y.C. Lui, *Chinese Censors and the Alien Emperor*, (Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1978), pp. 121–122. Whereas for the year 1658, there were only two major cases of impeachments by censors, there were 11 cases in the following year.

By the 1650's while the princes within China Proper were less prone to act indulgently and irresponsibly, they and the Manchu officials were quite often punished for committing a different type of crime: corruption. Such punishment seldom occurred in the Dorgon regency (1644–1650), but as early as 1652, cases of Manchu officials and princes committing corruption had been recorded. A Manchu official K'o-nai [ae], for example, was impeached for receiving bribes.[41] The question raised is whether the Manchus were more corrupt in the 1650's than in the 1640's; and if the answer is in the negative, a further question will be: why were there no corruption charges against the Manchus during the Dorgon regency (1640's)?

The answer to the first question is a simple no. Greed and a liking for wealth is common to all ages and societies, the tribal and feudal society of the Manchus before or on the eve of the conquest was no exception. It has been mentioned that Mandahai was jealous of the regent Dorgon receiving gifts from a tributary tribe. The main difference between the two decades lies in the efforts and determination of the respective rulers in fighting against graft and dishonesty. While Dorgon closed one eye to princes and officers who acted corruptly, the young Shun-chih emperor, acting in accordance with the best of the Chinese Confucian tradition, attempted to clean his government of corruption.[42] Thus, the number of impeachment cases had little correlation with the frequency of committing crimes, but was an expression of imperial efforts to contain them. In addition, one has to bear in mind the opportunities for committing corruption. With the bureaucracy expanding in scope and function, and with the contacts between Manchu and Chinese officials inevitably more frequent, the 1650's definitely offered more chances than the 1640's for officials, Manchu and Chinese, to take in bribes and feather their own nests.

It has been seen that Dorgon's attempt to control the princes received mixed results. Through court politics and sheer power, he was able to subdue potential challengers (such as Haoge and Jirgalang). As a further step towards centralizing power in his own hands, he limited some of the feudal customs of the princes that affected his rule as the regent. He did not have great success mainly because he himself still clung to some of the old Manchu customs and was by no means a good example to his princes.

The Shun-chih emperor was more successful in containing the princes through the application of education. Unlike Dorgon, he did not practise tribal-feudal indulgences and posed officially as a Confucian emperor. In his efforts to contain the princes, Shun-chih was luckier than Dorgon; the princes had a few more years to learn to behave in the bureaucracy and the stubborn old guards had passed away. He was able to extend his efforts to supervise the military officers and those princes that stayed outside China. The princes as well as the Manchu officials also committed other type of crimes, crimes that were also committed by Chinese officials. Like their Chinese colleagues, their common shortcomings were greed and self-interest. The Shun-chih government was confronted with the problem of fighting against corruption, which was a basic and perennial problem of government that had little correlation with the Manchu feudal and tribal origin.

However, while some former laxities such as failure of attending court could be rectified without too much difficulty, other customs and beliefs lingered on well beyond the Shun-chih reign. This was, to some extent, due to the fact that they took a long time to pass away. On the other hand, it was also due to the early death of the Shun-chih emperor, a strong opponent of feudal customs and usages, and the assumption of power of Oboi and his co-regents in 1661 who were all old guards with Manchu interests in their hearts and who had been dissatisfied with the Shun-chih emperor's efforts of cutting down Manchu social and political influence. The Oboi regency, 1661–1669 was therefore a period of revival of Manchu power and customs.[43]

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[38] *Shih-lu*, Shun-chih, II, 693.

[39] Ibid., p. 940.

[40] Ibid., p. 941.

[41] Ibid., p. 740.

[42] See Adam Y.C. Lui, *Corruption in China During the Early Ch'ing Period*, 1644–1660, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979, pp. 48–65.

Witchcraft, for instance, which was less commonly practised by princes during the personal rule of Shun-chih, was again to be used by them to advance political ends. It has been stated that Yin-shih [af], the eldest son of the K'ang-hsi emperor, employed magic and witchcraft to cause the irrational actions of the heir-apparent, Yin-jeng [ag].[44] It was also said by another historican that one of the main reasons why Yin-jeng attempted to kill his father, K'ang-hsi, was his belief in the advice of an astrologer.[45] It was until the enthronement of the Yung-cheng emperor in 1723 that tight control of the princes was effected. The setting up of the *Shang-shu fang* [ah] (a permanent school within the palace precincts solely for the education of young princes) and the bureaucratization of the banners were two attempts in this direction.[46] Nonetheless, no Manchu emperors including Shun-chih and Yung-cheng were prepared to do away completely with the customs and usages of their forefathers, because by doing so their position as conquerors would be endangered. They were aware after all that racially and physically they had little difference from the conquered Chinese. It was quite deliberate on the part of the Ch'ing emperors to permit the practice of Shamanism in the private homes of the Manchus; it was also intentional to apply segregation to the two races, so that signification could be prevented as far as possible.[47] Provided that these Manchu customs and habits did not hamper the running of

the administration and the growth of imperial power, they were to stay. The efforts of Dorgon and Shun-chih were not intended to bury the past Manchu heritage, but to condition certain aspects of this heritage to the change of government from one of tribal-feudal nature to a highly-centralized bureaucratic state.

a	努爾哈赤
b	皇大極
c	多爾衮
d	順治
e	豪格
f	濟爾哈 朗
g	議政處
h	多鐸
i	阿濟格
j	薩弼
k	午門
l	吳三桂
m	滿達海
n	溥洛
o	多克新
p	胡圖
q	鞏阿岱
r	拜尹圖
s	希孚
t	薩海
u	阿山
v	雅巴海
w	宗人府
x	吳克善
y	阿布鼐
z	阿濟薩
aa	伊爾德
ab	舒書
ac	剛林
ad	唐鈺
ae	柯鼐
af	胤禔
ag	胤礽
ah	上書房
ba	劉家駒
bb	清朝 初期的八旗圈地
bc	國立台灣大學文學院
bd	莫 東寅
be	滿族史論叢
bf	人民出版社
bg	于敏中
bh	阿桂
bi	欽定清定滿洲源流考
bj	近代 中國史料叢刊
bk	沈雲龍
bl	文海出版社
bm	滿洲簡史
bn	中國少數民族簡史叢書
bo	中華書局
bp	李自成
bq	蕭一山
br	清代通史
bs	台灣商務
bt	黎傑
bu	清史
Bv	海僑出版社
Bw	大清歷朝實錄
Bx	滿洲帝國國務院
By	華文書局
Bz	傅宗懋
Ca	清初議政體制之研究
Cb	國立政 大學學報
cd	東華錄
ce	王先謙
Cf	孟森
Cg	清代史

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[43] See Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback*, pp. 64–165.

[44] Silas, H.L. Wu, *Passage to Power, K'ang-hsi and His Heir Apparent, 1661–1722*, pp. 133–34, 136; in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, I, 925, 929–930, Yin-shih is transliterated as Yin-t'i.

[45] Huang Pei, *Autocracy at Work, A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723–1733*, Indiana University Press, 1974, p. 66.

[46] Ibid., pp. 162–164; for the *Shang-shu fang*, see Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes, Image and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 117–119.

[47] See Fairbank, *The United States and China*, pp. 80–81.

ch	正中書局
ci	許指嚴
cj	清代十葉野聞自敘
ck	文海出版社
cl	李鵬年
cm	清代中央國家機關概述
cn	黑龍江人民出版社

■ Source: Menegon, Eugenio, 'Newly available Manchu documents pertaining to Sino-Western relations in the Kangxi period', in *Sino-Western Cultural Relations Journal*, No. 19 (1997), pp. 22–46.

NEWLY AVAILABLE MANCHU DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO SINO-WESTERN RELATIONS IN THE KANGXI PERIOD*

Eugenio Menegon[1]

For several years, all of the Chinese-language palace memorials of the Kangxi period (1662–1722) and Yongzheng period (1723–1735) have been widely available in two major sets of reproductions. These monumental works, compiled by the staff of the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing, include the memorials preserved in Beijing, as well as those already published in the 1970s by the Palace Museum Archives in Taipei. However, while the Taipei collections also reproduce some Manchu language materials, the Beijing ones omit them.[2] This has been an understandable choice, since the number of Manchu memorials for the Kangxi period (5,800) is almost double that of the Chinese memorials (ca. 3,000). While the Yongzheng period Manchu memorials (6,600) amount to only one-fifth of the number of Chinese memorials (33,000), there are still too many for inclusion in a single collection.[3]

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* This article was first published in *Sino-Western Cultural Relations Journal*, XIX (1997): 22–46. This republication incorporates minor corrections and additions.

[1] I would like to thank Michael Chang and David Atwill for comments on an earlier draft. Mark Elliott has been generous with his expertise in Qing and Manchu matters; Pamela Kyle Crossley has offered her insightful critique; Chu Ping-yi 祝平一 helped with the translation of some technical terminology; and Antonella Tulli has sent me her comments on Sino-Manchu names.

[2] The Beijing documentary collections I am referring to are: Zhongguo Di Yi Lishi Dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 comp., *Kangxi chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe* 康熙朝漢文硃批奏摺匯編 (A compilation of Chinese language vermilion rescripted memorials of the Kangxi period), Beijing: Dang'an Chubanshe, 1984, 8 vols. (as a matter of fact, a few Manchu language attachments to Chinese memorials have been included in this collection, see "Compilation principles," p. 8); Zhongguo Di Yi Lishi Dang'anguan comp., *Yongzheng chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian* 雍正朝漢文硃批奏摺匯編 (A compilation of Chinese language vermilion rescripted memorials of the Yongzheng period), Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1989, 40 vols. The Taipei collections, today incorporated in the Beijing ones, are: Guoli Gugong 國立故宮博物院 comp., *Gongzhong dang Kangxi chao zouzhe* 宮中檔康熙朝奏摺 (Secret palace memorials of the Kangxi period), Taipei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1976–1977, 9 vols.; and Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan comp., *Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe* 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 (Secret palace memorials of the Yongzheng period), Taipei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1977–1980, 32 vols. Volumes 8 and 9 of the Kangxi collection contain reproductions of the 740 Manchu language memorials preserved in the Palace Museum on Taiwan. This is a most fortunate fact since it allows one to check the quality of the Beijing version against the originals.

In July 1996, the Number One Historical Archives of China published a Chinese translation of all the existing Manchu memorials of the Kangxi period:

> *Kangxi chao manwen zhupi zouzhe quan yi* 康熙朝滿文硃批奏摺全譯 (A complete translation of the Manchu language secret memorials with vermilion endorsements of the Kangxi period), Zhongguo Di Yi Lishi Dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Number One Historical Archives of China) ed., Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1996. ISBN: 7-5004-1916-3.

The translation project began in 1988. A group of translators (whose names appear on the front page), under the editorial direction of Wang Xi 王熹 and the supervision of the senior members of the Manchu Archival Section, Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉 and Qu Liusheng 屈六生, spent eight years working on the 5,060 Manchu language originals kept in Beijing, as well as on the published 740 Manchu memorials preserved in Taipei.[4] The main rationale of this project was to make available to the Chinese-reading scholarly community materials that would have been otherwise available only to Manchu specialists.

Approximately 130 Manchu memorials deal with the presence of the Jesuits at the Qing court, the Tournon legation, and Qing relations with Western powers.[5] Although many of these documents are brief, they offer unique data enhancing our knowledge of the Kangxi emperor's dealings with the Jesuits, as well as of the agencies and officials who were in charge of the foreigners. One case in point is that of the official of the printing agency at the Wuying Palace, He-shi-heng 赫世亨 (Hesihen). Scholars in the past have made different identifications of this important Manchu official, who was concurrently charged with printing imperial editions,

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[3] On the Manchu holdings of Kangxi period palace memorials see Guan Xiaolian 關孝廉, "Qing Kangxi chao Manwen zhupi zouzhe chuyi 清康熙朝滿文硃批奏摺芻議 (Simple notes on the Manchu secret memorials with vermilion endorsements of the Kangxi period)," *Lishi dang'an* 53 (1994): 84–90.

[4] See Wang Xi's postface 跋, p. 1726. Only 4,297 Kangxi period memorials have been included in the collection, thus excluding greeting memorials of little historical values.

[5] Topics of interest are the Tournon legation and the Chinese Rites Controversy, Figurism and *Yijing* scholarship, history of medicine, history of mathematics and sciences, foreign commerce, diplomatic and maritime history, history of the Imperial Printing Agency and of court politics.

as well as with monitoring the Westerners.[6] Dozens of memorials by He-shi-heng are collected in this volume, and a series of memorials reporting on He-shi-heng's failing health reveal how close the emperor was to this man.

All the translations are contained in a single, thick hardbound volume (cost 480.80 yuan; 1,500 copies printed). The first 208 pages, besides a table of contents (194 pages), contain some color photographs of sample memorials (4 tables), a preface (9 pages) and a description of the compilation principles (1 page), supplying information on the translation and publication process as well as on the secret palace memorial system and the archival holdings of Manchu and Chinese memorials in Beijing. A three-page postface at the end of the volume offers useful information on published and planned Manchu documentary collections. The bulk of the volume (1,724 pages; 4,297 items) is made up of the translated texts. The quality of the paper is mediocre, but the characters are all very legible. Headings have been supplied for each memorial, briefly indicating the content of each document and its date; the same headings have also been used to compile the table of contents, which gives page reference and date for each memorial, indicating the existence and title of enclosures (附) as well. Undated memorials have been collected at the end of the volume. An asterisk attached to the heading indicates that the memorial was published by Taipei's Palace Museum in the Manchu original. The collection has been set in simplified characters, and thoroughly punctuated.

In spite of these 'modern niceties,' the translators have chosen to use Qing documentary Chinese. This has the merit of facilitating the work of researchers familiar with such language, and to supply the needed institutional vocabulary. However, any translation presents some drawbacks. "Traduttore, traditore" is the adagio used in these cases. A drawback of this collection is the lack of the Manchu original texts, making impossible to compare the translations with the originals, and to assess the reliability of the renderings. Unless one travels to Beijing and gains access to the originals, one has to trust the translations.[7]

A few problems are connected with the translation process itself. In the first place, it is impossible to know when Manchu expressions and special titles have been 'smoothed out' by the translators. Moreover, documentary Chinese is likely to hide the more informal and revealing tone of the Manchu language, less formulaic even in its official version. Wang Xi himself recognizes that "the documents abound with colloquial expressions, as well as Mongol vocabulary, and even Jurchen language." Wang commends the translators for their elegant, uniform Chinese rendering of the Manchu original, a version that—in his words—"still preserves the scope and style of Qing language."[8] This is of course a rather debatable statement, and the rendering in Chinese is a loss for linguists, as a sampling by Professor Mark Elliott shows.[9]

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[6] See for example the speculations by Antonio S. Rosso, in *Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century*, South Pasadena: Perkins and Ione, 1948, p. 157, note 23.

[7] A portion of the materials can of course be checked against the published Manchu memorials in volumes 8 and 9 of the Taipei Collection. Unfortunately, only two memorials in our list are reproduced in that collection (nos. 2188 and 3340).

Secondly—at least from what I can gauge in the limited sample I examined—the Chinese characters used for personal names (mainly for Westerners and non-Han) have been assigned arbitrarily: for example, Joachim Bouvet, whose Chinese name was 自晉, has become 博津 in most instances, and once even 白進 (no. 1858, p. 767); Fouquet is 富生哲 instead of 傅聖澤 (no. 1768, p. 736), and so on. No European names were supplied.[10] In the rendering of Manchu names, it is not clear whether Chinese characters have been newly assigned to Manchu sounds, or whether they were also used in Qing historical sources. This is an important detail, since at times names that are in practice homophonous in Manchu, actually have different characters in Chinese materials.[11]

To minimize problems of interpretation, the best solution would have been to reproduce the Manchu originals, certainly a costly enterprise. Another simpler solution could have been to give abundant alphabetical transliterations of Manchu personal names and of some unique titles or expressions, a solution that has been only sporadically employed by the translators.[12] Given possible thorny problems of identifications, it is hardly surprising that almost no annotations have been supplied by the translators. It would have been an enormous, time-consuming and even controversial job that goes beyond the aims of a documentary collection.

In spite of these limitations, this remains an extremely valuable collection which can be used as a working tool, to be supplemented by the Manchu originals kept in Beijing in case fundamental ambiguities arise. The overall quality of the translations seems to be good, and the range of materials offered is diverse (court life, ritual, scientific matters, maritime commerce, foreign policy, etc.). In the Kangxi period, Manchu was a very important bureaucratic language, as testified by the high number of memorials in that language, exceeding the number of the Chinese ones.[13]

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[8] Postface, p. 1727.

[9] Professor Elliott kindly agreed to compare the translated memorial no. 2188 with the original (see list). The memorial is by the Governor of Fujian Gioro Mamboo, and deals with maritime defense. Here are Prof. Elliott's observations: "[The memorial] is on the whole faithfully translated.... [However, at]... the beginning of the [fifth] section..., where the first sentence consists of four four-character phrases (修造戰船, 非堅不用, 限期不完, 有礙巡察), it seemed to me that the fuller phrasing of the Manchu was sacrificed for 'elegant' phrasing in Chinese that is not as clear. The Manchu says: 'afara cuwan be dasatame weilere de. akdun beki akû oci baitalaci ojorakû. bilagan i dolo weileme wacihiyarakû oci giyarime baicara de hûsun baharakû,' which I would roughly translate as 'In repairing and building warships, if they are not strong and firm, they cannot be used [lit, it will not do to use them]; if their construction cannot be completed within the deadline, [we] lack the force to patrol.' If [one]... look[s] at the Chinese, I think [one] can find this meaning is indeed there, but it is much less explicit than it was in Manchu." Personal communication, May 24, 1997.

[10] This happens also with place names. In memorial no. 3635, the Russian outpost of Selenginsk (Chu-ku-bo/bai-xing) is given as 楚庫柏姓 and not as the standard 楚庫拜興.

[11] Some hypotheses on the origins of Manchu surnames and their Chinese renderings can be found in Liu Qinghua 劉慶華, "Manzu xingshi shulüe 滿族姓氏述略 (A brief discussion of Manchu surnames)," *Minzu yanjiu* 1 (1983): 64–71. A discussion of renderings of Manchu bureaucratic titles is offered in Deng Tianhong 鄧天紅, "Tan Qingdai shiji zhong 'Manming Hanzi yinyi' wenti 談清代史籍中 '滿名漢字音譯' 問題 (On the problem of 'the phonetic translation of Manchu names into Chinese characters' as seen in Qing dynasty historical sources)," *Manyu yanjiu* 12.1 (1991): 132–135.

[12] For example, memorial no. 3212 in our list records that on KX 57.6.30, Kilian Stumpf SJ asked permission from the emperor to obtain a rare medicine kept in the palace, which apparently did not have any Manchu corresponding name. The characters supplied by the translators are 螃蟹石 *pangxie shi*, i.e. "crab stone." The translators, besides a name given in characters, have added in parenthesis the Manchu transliteration of the original loan word (*panghiyai si*). As a matter of fact, both Erich Hauer, *Handwörterbuch der Mandschu Sprache*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1952, p. 744, and Jerry Norman, *A Concise Manchu-English Lexicon*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978, p. 226, give "panghai" for crab, not "panghiyai." This might be the reason why the translators supplied the original in parenthesis, in order to offer to the reader this alternative orthography. However one would look in vain for a clear explanation of the rationale in the use of romanizations, except for a very brief mention in the "Compilation Principles" section, point 4. Moreover, only by looking at the vermilion endorsement on that same memorial, one will learn that Kangxi used another term, 石蟹 *shixie*, to identify the medicine. We are not given the Manchu Romanization in this case. It is through this second name that a tentative identification becomes possible. *Shixie* is the traditional name of a fossil crab found in Taiwan, Sichuan and the islands of the South Pacific (*Telphusa Sp.*), mainly composed of calcium carbonate, which was used in traditional medicine to treat skin diseases. The knotty point is that Stumpf stated in his request that he had found a reference to this medicine in a "Western book," not a Chinese one: one cannot but wonder, then, whether the Chinese characters supplied by the translators do indeed correspond to the "stone crab" medicine of the *Bencao gangmu*, or they are only a polite guess. On *shixie*, see Chen Guiyan 陳貴延 ed., *Bencao gangmu tongshi* 本草綱目通釋 (General explanation of Compendium of Materia Medica), Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 1992, vol. 2, p. 2003.

[13] On the importance of Manchu archival records, see, for example, Beatrice Bartlett, "Books of Revelation: The Importance of the Manchu Language Archival Record Books for

Since the missionaries were put under the control of officials using Manchu as a means of communication with their overlord, this collection fills a gap in our knowledge of what Jonathan Spence has called "Christian politics" at the Kangxi court. The service that the Beijing translators have provided to those who cannot read Manchu is truly outstanding.

I offer here a list of the memorials containing references to Sino-Western relations and the Jesuits, in hope that it will facilitate the work of researchers in our field. I follow the page and document numeration of the collection, but given the complexity of the task and the limits of space, I will not offer annotations, limiting myself to a translation of the memorials' headings. Some translations are by necessity still tentative, since the context of the document was not always known to this reviewer. The number of lines refers to the length of the whole memorial, including endorsements. The notation 硃 indicates the presence of a vermilion endorsement; routine endorsements (i.e. those that did not require further action, such as 知道了 "noted") will be quoted in full. For non-routine endorsements, the number of lines will be provided. No mention of an endorsement indicates that none was appended. The notation 原注 indicates the presence of original notes, mostly added for filing purposes with dates and routing of the memorials. Official titles have been translated according to Hucker's nomenclature. For uniformity's sake, the romanization of the Manchu names has been offered in *pinyin* as found in the Chinese translations, with hyphens connecting syllables (e.g. Man-pi), rather than given in Manchu according to Möllendorf-Norman's romanization (e.g. Hesihen for He-shi-heng; Mamboo for Man-bao). Titles of Mainland publications have been set in traditional characters. I have made an effort to include all relevant materials, but isolated and undetected references on "Western matters" might still be scattered in the collection.

Research on Ch'ing History," *Late Imperial China* 6.2 (1985): 25–36; Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn S. Rawski, "A Profile of the Manchu Language in Ch'ing History," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 53.2 (1993): 63–102; Evelyn S. Rawski, "Presidential Address. Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55.4 (1996): 829–850.

Documentary List

Doc. 31, p. 12, KX 29.3.4 [April 12, 1690]
山東巡撫佛倫奏為遵旨查明民人誣告西洋人情形摺
Shandong xunfu Fo-lun zou wei zun zhi chaming minren wugao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Governor of Shandong Fo-lun memorializes regarding the investigation of some commoners falsely accusing the Westerners, following the orders of an imperial decree]; 6 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 32, p. 12, KX 29.3.8 [April 16, 1690]
山東巡撫佛倫奏報西洋人被民無端誣告案情摺
Shandong xunfu Fo-lun zou bao Xiyangren bei min wuduan wugao an qing zhe [The Governor of Shandong Fo-lun reports on the case of the Westerners being falsely accused without reason by some commoners]; 13 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 523, p. 284, KX 42.06.14 [July 27, 1703]
康熙帝硃諭一紙
Kangxi di zhuyu yi zhi [Leaf with vermillion edict by the Kangxi Emperor]; 4 lines

Doc. 555, pp. 300–301, KX 42.11.16 [December 23, 1703]
多羅直郡王胤提奏報看護俄羅斯商人摺
Duoluo Zhi junwang Yin-ti zou bao kanhu Eluosi shangren zhe [The *Doro* Zhi Commandery Prince Yin-ti reports on (his) attending to the Russian merchants]; 33 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 561, p. 303, KX 42.11.27 [January 3, 1704]
川陝總督華顯奏謝賜醫治病摺
Chuan-Shaan zongdu Hua-xian zou xie ciyi zhibing zhe [The Governor-general of Sichuan-Shaanxi Hua-xian thanks for the bestowal of medical care]; 12 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 627, p. 331, KX 43.7.4 [August 4, 1704]
胤祉等奏報病人治愈并求醫人情形摺
Yin-zhi deng zou bao bingren zhiyu bing qiu yiren qingxing zhe [Prince Yin-zhi reports on the recovery of some sick people and on others needing medical care]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

[December 4, 1705: arrival of the Tournon Legation in Beijing]

Doc. 764, p. 380, KX 44.7.16 [September 3, 1705]
胤祉等奏報收糧陰雨情形并官員病勢摺
Yin-zhi deng zou bao shouliang yinyu qingxing bing guanyuan bingshi zhe [Prince Yinzhi and others report on crops, bad weather, and the illness of an official]; 13 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 869, p. 418, KX 45.5.24 [July 4, 1706]:
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報向洋人索取西洋藥摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng baoxiang Yangren suoqu Xiyanyao zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the medicine obtained from the Westerners]; 17 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 871, p. 4519, KX 45.5.27 [July 7, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報藥效并進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjiao He-shi-heng zou bao yaoxiao bing jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the effects of the medicine and on books presented to the throne]; 11 lines; 硃: 知道了; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 872, pp. 419–421, KX 45.5.27 [July, 7, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the Westerners], 48 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 873, p. 421, KX 45.6.1 [July 10, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨進書并賜西洋人克食摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng jin shu bing ci Xiyangren keshi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng presents books and offers digestives to the Westerners (Tournon)]; 7 1ines; 硃: 知道了; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 875, p. 421, KX 45.6.4 [July 13, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨進書并報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng jin shu bing bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng presents books and reports on the Westerners]; 12 lines; 硃: 6 lines; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 876, p. 422, KX 45.6.7 [July 16, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等奏報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and others report on the Westerners]; 14 lines; 硃: 知道; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 882, pp. 423–424, KX 45.6.13 [July 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等奏報向西洋人傳宣諭旨摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zou bao xiang Xiyangren chuanxuan yuzhi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and others report on the edicts and decrees transmitted to the Westerners]; 23 lines; 硃: 1 line; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 889, p. 426, KX 45.6.16 [July 25, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等奏報西洋人起程日期摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zou bao Xiyangren qicheng riqi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and others report on the departure date of the Westerners]; 5 lines; 硃: 知道了; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 913, pp. 434–435, KX 45.7.9 [August 16, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報詰問西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao jiewen Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the questioning of the Westerners]; 25 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 914, pp. 435–436, KX 45.7.10 [August 17, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等奏報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the Westerners]; 53 lines; 硃: 4 lines

Doc. 915, p. 436, 45.7.10 [August 17, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報看望西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao kanwang Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on his observation of the Westerners]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 916, p. 437, KX 45.7.11 [August 18, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報看望西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao kanwang Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on his observation of the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

[August 28, 1706: the Tournon Legation leaves Beijing]

Doc. 936, p. 445, KX 45.7.24 [August 31, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng presents books]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line; 源注: 1 line

Doc. 949: pp. 448–449, KX 45.8.3 [September 9, 1706]
博津疏請恕罪摺
Bo Jin [Bouvet = 白晉] shuqing shu zui zhe [Joachim Bouvet SJ asks forgivance for his offence]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

> 附: 博津致張誠信; Fu: Bo Jin zhi zhang cheng xin [Enclosure: A letter by Bouvet to Jean François Gerbillon SJ]; 11 lines; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 990, p. 462, KX 45.9.6 [October 12, 1706]
武英殿總監造赫世亨進書并報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng jin shu bing bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng presents some books and also reports on the Westerners]; 12 lines; 硃: 知道了; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 1030, p. 476, KX 45.12.9 [January 1, 1707]
武英殿總監造赫世亨報西洋人迎駕日期摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng bao Xiyangren yinjia riqi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the date of reception of the Westerners]; 4 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1058, p. 487, KX 46.2.11 [March 14, 1707]
武英殿總監造赫世亨報西洋人感謝摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng bao Xiyangren ganxie zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports the gratitude of the Westerners]; 10 lines; 硃: 知道了; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 1066, p. 490, KX 46.2.23 [March 26, 1707]
胤祉等奏報台吉還部日期并病員求醫摺
Yin-zhi deng zoubao Tai-ji huan bu riqi bing bingyuan qiu yi zhe [Prince Yin-zhi and others report on Tai-ji's date of return to the (Mongol Qorčin) tribe and on ill officials asking for doctors (ref. to ill Westerners)]; 11 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1082, p. 497, KX 46.4.1 [May 2, 1707]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等奏報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and others report on the Westerners]; 12 lines; 硃: 1 line; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 1090, pp. 500–501, KX 46.4.10 [May 11, 1707]
武英殿總監造赫世亨等請安并報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng qing an bing bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and others offer their wishes to His Imperial Majesty and report on the Westerners]; 7 lines; 硃: 1 line; 原注: 1 line

Doc. 1208, p. 544, KX 46.9.19 [October 14, 1707]
李國屏等奏報西洋人消息并赫世亨病勢摺
Li Guoping deng zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxi bing He-shi-heng bingshi zhe [Li Guoping and others memorialize reporting news about the Westerners and on the illness of He-shi-heng]; 12 lines; 硃: 知道了

> [Starting at least on KX 46.6.13 (July 12, 1707, memorial no. 1131), Li Guoping had been reporting rather often on the illness of He-shi-heng. The high number of memorials on this matter shows the closeness of He-shi-heng to the emperor.]

Doc. 1320, p. 585, KX 47.7.9 [August 24, 1708]
武英殿總監造赫世亨進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng presents books]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1323, p. 586, KX 47.7.12 [August 27, 1708]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報西洋人消息摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1333, p. 593, KX 47.7.27 [September 11, 1708]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報天球度數等情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao tianqiu dushu deng qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on the measure of the Celestial Sphere]; 7 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1336, p. 594, KX 47.8.4 (September 17, 1708]
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報博津墜馬受傷摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao Bo Jin zhuima shoushang zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng reports on Bouvet falling from horse and being wounded]; 11 lines; 硃: 4 lines

Doc. 1339, pp. 595–96, KX 47.8.10 [September 23, 1708]
赫世亨具疏自責奏事含糊并奏西洋人奏言摺
He-shi-heng jushu zize zou shi han hu bing zou Xiyangren zouyan zhe [He-shi-heng writes to censor himself for having reported on matters in a muddled way and reports on the memorials and words of the Westerners]; 11 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1402, pp. 614–615, KX 48.2.24 [March 14, 1709]
江南總督邵穆布為代進西洋人貢物摺
Jiangnan zongdu Shao-mu-bu wei daijin Xiyangren gongwu zhe [The Governor-general of Jiangnan Shao-mu-bu (memorializes) on presenting tribute articles in lieu of a Westerner]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1424, p. 621, KX 48.5.20 [June 27, 1709]
李國屏進書摺
Li Guoping jin shu zhe [Li Guoping presents books]; 4 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1433, p. 624, KX 48.6.9 [July 15, 1709]
李國屏進書并報〈佩文韻府〉已裝訂成套摺
Li Guoping jin shu bing bao "Peiwen yunfu" yi zhuangding chengtao zhe [Li Guoping presents books and reports on the completed binding of a set of the "Peiwen yunfu"]; 6 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1445, p. 629, KX 48.6.21 [July 27, 1709]
李國屏進書并報洋人安多病勢摺
Li Guoping jinshu bing bao Yangren Anduo bingshi zhe [Li Guoping presents books and reports on the illness of the Westerner Antoine Thomas SJ]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

附:大夫診治書
Fu: Dafu zhen zhi shu [Enclosure: Report of a medical visit and prescription of the Imperial Physician (for Thomas)], KX 48.6.20 [July 26, 1709]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1449, p. 631, KX 48.6.24 [July 30, 1709]
李國屏奏報西洋人安多病故摺
Li Guoping zou bao Xiyangren Anduo binggu zhe [Li Guoping reports on the death by illness of the Westerner Antoine Thomas SJ]; 8 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1455, p. 633, KX 48.7.3 [August 8, 1709]
李國屏等奏報西洋人謝恩摺
Li Guoping deng zou bao Xiyangren xie'en zhe [Li Guoping and others report the expressions of gratitude of the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1457, p. 634, KX 48.7.6 [August 11, 1709]
李國屏奏報西洋人消息并進書摺
Li Guoping zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxi bing jinshu zhe [Li Guoping reports the gratitude of the Westerners and presents books]; 7 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1507, p. 650, KX 48.9.14 [October 16, 1709]
李國屏奏報西洋人情形摺
Li Guoping zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [Li Guoping reports on the Westerners]; 6 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1589, pp. 678–79, KX 49.5.25 [June 21, 1710]
胤祉等奏報患病求醫人員摺
Yin-zhi deng zoubao huanbing qiu yi renyuan zhe [Prince Yin-zhi reports on illnesses and requests for doctors (ref. to Western physicians)]; 10 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1716, p. 720, KX 50.5.7 [June 22, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1719, p. 721, KX 50.5.10 [June 25, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 6 lines; 硃: 4 lines

Doc. 1724, p. 722, KX 50.5.13 [June 25, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索等奏報舉人替樽津造詞編句摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou bao juren ti Bo Jin zaoci bianju zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the *juren* who has written *in lieu* of Joachim Bouvet (his commentaries of the *Yijing*)]; 11 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1725, p. 723, KX 50.5.13 [June 28, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1728, pp. 723–24, KX 50.5.16 [July 1, 1711]
王道化等奏報計算太陽位置摺
Wang Daohua deng zou bao jisuan taiyang weizhi zhe [Wang Daohua and others report on the calculations of the position of the sun]; 12 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1730, p. 724, KX 50.5.19 (July 4, 1711]
王道化等奏報閔明鄂等人情形摺
Wang Daohua deng zou bao Min Ming'e [Grimaldi = 閔明我] deng ren qingxing zhe [Wang Daohua and others report on Claudio Filippo Grimaldi SJ and the others]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1731, p. 724, KX 50.5.19 [July 4, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books (by Bouvet)]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1734, p. 724, KX 50.5.22 [July 7, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books (by Bouvet)]; 4 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1738, p. 726, KX 50.5.25 [July 10, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索等奏報西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou bao Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo reports on the Westerners]; 10 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1741, p. 727, KX 50.5.28 [July 13, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1752, p. 731, KX 50.6.7 [July 22, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1755, p. 732, KX 50.6.10 [July 25, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索奏報西洋人奏言并進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo zou bao Xiyangren zouyan bing jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo reports on the memorials and words of the Westerners and presents books]; 13 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1757, p. 733, KX 50.6.10 [July 25, 1711]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏報收成分數并進貢方物摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zou bao shoucheng fen shu bing jingong fangwu zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi reports on the harvest's quantity and on the reception of tribute items]; 7 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1759, p. 733, KX 50.6.13 [July 28, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進圖書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin tushu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books and charts (by Bouvet)]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1760, p. 734, KX 50.6.16 [July 31, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jinshu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1764, p. 735, KX 50.6.19 [August 3, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索等奏看不懂洋人易經摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou kanbudong Yangren *Yijing* zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize regarding their inability to comprehend the Western (interpretation) of the *Book of Changes*]; 9 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1766, pp. 735–36, KX 50.6.22 [August 6, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索奏報西洋人消息摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo reports on the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1768, p. 736, KX 50.6.25 [August 9, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索奏報西洋人到京摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo zou bao Xiyangren dao jing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo reports on the arrival to the capital of a Westerner (Jean François Fouquet SJ)]; 13 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1773, p. 738, KX 50.7.17 [August 9, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1779, p. 741, KX 50.7.20 [September 2, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索奏報西洋人消息摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo reports on news about the Westerners]; 9 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1783, p. 742, KX 50.8.5 [September 17, 1711]
武英殿總監造和索進書摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo jin shu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo presents books]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1805, p. 749, KX 50.10.4 [November 13, 1711]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏報親臨澳門等地海防摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zou bao qinlin Aomen deng di haifang zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi reports on his personal inspection of maritime defenses at Macao and other places]; 13 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1825, p. 757, KX 50.11.25 [January 3, 1712]
理藩院奏請接待俄羅斯商人摺
Lifanyuan zouqing jiedai Eluosi shangren zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to receive the Russian merchants]; 9 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1858, p. 767, KX 51.2.14 [March 20, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏〈河圖洛書〉二篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou "He tu luo shu" er pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the treatise "He tu luo shu"—two copies]; 2 lines (reference to 白進 = Bouvet); 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1860, p. 768, KX 51.2.16 [March 22, 1712]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏聞貢進葡萄酒等摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zou wen gongjin putaojiu deng zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi reports on the tributary offer of wine etc.]; 7 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1861, p. 768, KX 51.2.17 [March 23, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏閣〈河圖洛書〉注釋三篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou wen "He tu luo shu" zhushi san pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the Annotations and Commentaries to the treatise "He tu luo shu"—three copies]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1866, p. 770, KX 51.2.20 [March 26, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏聞〈河圖洛書〉注釋三篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou wen "He tu luo shu" zhushi san pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the Annotations and Commentaries to the treatise "He tu luo shu"—three copies]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1868, p. 771, KX 51.2.23 [March 29, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏進〈河圖洛書〉二篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou jin "He tu luo shu" er pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the presentation of the treatise "He tu luo shu"—two copies]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1950, p. 797, KX 51.6.15 [July 18, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏〈錦繡萬花谷〉一部裝完摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou "Jin xiu wanhua gu" yi bu zhuangwan zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the completed binding of the "Jin xiu wanhua gu"]; 4 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1956, p. 798, KX 51.6.24 [July 27, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏聞打聽西洋人之訊情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou wen dating Xiyangren zhi xun qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the inquiries regarding news (on the arrival) of Westerners (by boat)]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 1971, p. 802, KX 51.7.7 [August 8, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏〈卸選唐詩〉底子十五偏摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou "Yuxuan Tangshi" dizi shiwu pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the rough draft of the "Yuxuan Tangshi"]; 4 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 1977, p. 804, KX 51.7.10 [August 11, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏報西洋人消息摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou bao Xiyangren xiaoxin zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 1979, p. 804, KX 51.7.12 [August 13, 1712]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏聞察看虎頭門及澳門情形摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zouwen chakan Hutoumen ji Aomen qingxing zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi memorializes on the inspection of Hutoumen and Macao]; 19 lines; 硃: 1 line

[See **Doc. 1980**, p. 805 and **Doc. 1992**, p. 808 on the 〈算法統宗〉]

Doc. 2007, p. 812, KX 51.8.4 [September 4, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏聞閔明鄂閱朱批情形摺
Wuyingdiano zongjianzao He-suo deng zouwen Min Min'e qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on Claudio Filippo Grimaldi SJ's reading of a (previous) vermilion endorsement]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2032, p. 818, KX 51.9.2 [October 1, 1712]
武英殿總監造和索等奏聞西洋人情形摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zouwen Xiyangren qingxing zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others report on the Westerners]; 17 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2052, pp. 823–24, KX 51.9.24 [October 23, 1712]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏聞進覽西洋文書摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zouwen jinlan Xiyang wenshu zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi memorializes on his receipt and reading of some Western documents and letters]; 15 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2090, p. 842, KX 52.1.10 [February 4, 1713]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏咨行西洋信函已交付帶往摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zou zixing Xiyang xinhan yi jiaofu daiwang zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi memorializes regarding the letter to the West already entrusted for delivery (to Giuseppe Provana SJ)]; 9 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2173, p. 868, KX 52.6.5 [July 26, 1713]
康熙帝諭召西洋人計算〈數表根源〉來由
Kangxi di yuzhao Xiyangren jisuan "Shubiao genyuan" laiyou [An edict by the Kangxi emperor giving notice that (he entrusted) the Westerners with the calculation of the "Shubiao genyuan"]; 5 lines

Doc. 2178, p. 869, KX 52.6.8 [July 29, 1713]
武英殿總監造和索等奏召西洋人推算〈數表根源〉來由摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zouzhao Xiyangren tuisuan "Shubiao genyuan" laiyou zhe [The Supevisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo memorializes on the summoning of the Westerners for the calculation of the "Shubiao genyuan"]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2179, pp. 869–870, 52.6.8 [July 29, 1713]
武英殿總監造和索等奏已校對〈朱子全書〉第三卷十八篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou yi jiaodui "Zhuzi quanshu" di san juan shiba pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo memorializes on the completed collation of the third juan of the "Zhuzi quanshu" 's eighteen sections]; 7 lines; 硃: 3 lines

Doc. 2180, p. 870, KX 52.6.11 [August 1, 1713]
和索等奏召西洋人吉里安稟告翻譯〈數表根源〉緣由摺
He-suo deng biao zhao Xiyangren Ji Li'an [Stumpf, 紀理安] bingao fanyi "Shubiao genyuan" yuanyou zhe [He-suo and others memorialize to give notice of the petition by the Westerner Kilian Stumpf SJ on the translation of the "Shubiao genyuan"]; 6 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2188, pp. 872–73, KX 52.6.15 [August 5, 1713]
福建巡撫滿保奏請修造戰船火器摺
Fujian xunfu Manbao zou qing xiuzao zhanchuan huoqi zhe [The Governor of Fujian Man-bao petitions for the repair and construction of warships and firearms]; 37 lines (see especially last 7 lines); 硃: 1 line

*Memorial no. 2188 is preserved in Taipei, and its Manchu text has been published in *Gongzhongdang Kangxi. . . .*, vol. 9, no. 387, pp. 322–329.

Doc. 2192, p. 878, KX 52.6.18 [August 8, 1713]
武英殿總監造和索等奏西洋人已將數表算完翻譯摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou Xiyangren yi jiang shubiao suanwan fanyi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize comunicating that the Westerners have already completed the calculation and translation of eight sections of the numerical tables]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2201, p. 881, KX 52.6.23 [August 13, 1713]
武英殿總監造和索等奏已譯〈數表問答〉八篇摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou yi yi "Shubiao wenda" ba pian zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize on the accomplishment of the translation of the "Shubiao wenda"]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2203, p. 882, KX 52.6.25 [August 15, 1713]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏進西洋人信函摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zou jin Xiyangren xinhan zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi memorializes regarding the arrival of letters from the Westerners]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2241, p. 893, KX 52.7.7 [August 27, 1713]
武英殿總監造和索等具奏〈數表問答〉及其插圖摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng juzou "Shubiao wenda" ji qi chatu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying palace He-suo and others memorialize on the "Shubiao wenda" and enclosed charts]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2307, p. 914, KX 52.11.19 [January 5, 1714]
胤祉奏進修律呂書第十四章摺
Yin-zhi zoujin suoxiu 'Lülü shu' di shisi zhang zhe [Prince Yin-zhi presents the fourteenth chapter of the 'Lülü shu']; 12 lines; 硃: 1 line [see also nos. **2321** and **2355**]

Doc. 2310, p. 915, KX 52.11.22 [January 8, 1714]
胤祉奏覽〈幾何原本〉第二本摺
Yin-zhi zoulan "Jihe yuanben" di er ben zhe [Prince Yin-zhi memorializes on the perusal of a second copy of the "Jihe yuanben"]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2322, p. 918, KX 52.11.28 [January 14, 1714]
趙昌等奏聞弗朗西亞國人郭仲川情形摺
Zhao Chang deng zouwen Fulangxiya guo ren Guo Zhongchuan [de Gollet = 郭中傳] qingxing zhe [Zhao Chang and others memorialize on the Frenchman Jean-Alexis de Gollet SJ]; 5 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2324, pp. 918–19, KX 52.12.2 [January 17, 1714]
胤祉奏呈改完之〈幾何原本〉第三卷摺
Yin-zhi zoucheng gaiwan zhi "Jihe Yuanben" di san juan zhe [Prince Yin-zhi officially presents a corrected version of the third *juan* of the "Jihe yuanben"]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2326, p. 919, 52.12.2 [January 17, 1714]
康熙帝論有關新讀數表事
Kangxi di yu youguan "Xin du shubiao" shi [An edict of the Kangxi Emperor regarding the "Xin du shubiao"]; 2 lines

Doc. 2328, p. 919, KX 52.12.5 [January 20, 1714]
武英殿總監造和索等奏照樣制新讀數表摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou zhao yang zhi "Xin du shubiao" zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize on the compilation of the "Xin du shubiao" according to the model (supplied by the emperor)]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2329, p. 920, KX 52.12.5 [January 20, 1714]
武英殿總監造和索等奏制新讀數表摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou zhi "Xin du shubiao" zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize on the compilation of the "Xin du shubiao"]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2335, p. 921, KX52.12.11 [January 26, 1714]
胤祉奏呈繕完之數表摺
Yin-zhi zoucheng shanwan zhi shubiao zhe [Prince Yin-zhi officially presents the completed mathematical tables]; 12 lines; 硃: 3 lines

Doc. 2339, p. 923, KX 52.12.14 [January 28, 1714]
胤祉奏新型大數表小數表又繕寫一部摺
Yin-zhi zou xin xing da shu biao xiao shu biao you shanxie yi bu zhe [Prince Yin-zhi memorializes on the further copying of the new format Large and Small Mathematical Tables]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2343, p. 925, KX 52.12.17 [February 1, 1714]
胤祉奏發回之新數表使用有益等情摺
Yin-zhi zou fahui zhi xin shubiao shiyong youyi deng qing zhe [Prince Yin-zhi memorializes regarding the matter of the practical advantages of the new mathematical tables as returned (by the emperor with his own comments)]; 10 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2357, p. 930, KX 53.2.5 [March 20, 1714]
武英殿總監造和索等奏修完裝入洋漆匣內數表一份摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-suo deng zou xiuwan zhuangru Yang qi xia nei shubiao yi fen zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-suo and others memorialize on the completed mathematical tabe inserted in a Western lacquered box]; 4 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2418, pp. 948–949, KX 53.6.3 [July 14, 1714]
理器院奏請俄商貿易日期展限後可否給發食物草料摺
Lifanyuan zou qing Eshang maoyi riqi zhanxian hou ke fou geifa shiwu zaoliao zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking whether it would be allowed to grant fodder and food to the Russian merchants after the expiration of the date for trade]; 27 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2437, p. 952, KX 53.6.9 [July 20, 1714]
理藩院奏請欽派送俄商返回之官員摺
Lifanyuan zou qing qin paisong Eshang fanhui zhi guanyuan zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to send an imperial envoy to accompany the returning Russian merchants]; 8 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2509, p. 980, KX 53.10.5 [November 11, 1714]
廣東巡撫滿丕奏進廣東省全圖摺
Guangdong xunfu Man-pi zoujin Guangdong sheng quantu zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Man-pi memorializes to present the complete map of Guangdong]; 7 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2635, pp. 1034–1035, KX 54.7.5 [August 14, 1714]
理藩院奏請應問俄商有關事宜摺
Lifanyuan zou qing ying wen Eshang youguan shiyi zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking which questions should be addressed to the Russian merchants on relevant matters]; 48 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2734, p. 1079, KX 55.1.9 [February 1, 1716]
閩浙總督滿保奏報外國商船劫民船并指參疏守官員摺
Min-Zhe zongdu Man-bao baozou waiguo shangchuan jie minchuan bing zhi canshu shou guanyuan zhe [The Governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang Man-bao reports on foreign commercial vessels robbing civilian vessels and on instructing and impeaching officials neglecting their defense (duties)]; 9 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2895, p. 1150, KX 55.10.18 [November 21, 1716]
理藩院奏請選派官員監督商賈與俄羅斯貿易摺
Lifanyuan zou qing xuanpai guanyuan jiandu shanggu yu Eluosi maoyi zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to select and envoy an official to superintend the merchants and the Russian trade]; 14 1ines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2912, p. 1158, KX 55.11 [January 7, 1717]
胤祉奏查看西洋人戴進賢所帶之書情形摺
Yin-zhi zou chakan Xiyangren Dai Jinxian suodai zhi shu qingxing zhe [Prince Yin-zhi memorializes on his investigation and reading of the books brought by the Westerner Ignaz Kögler SJ]; 13 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2918, p. 1160, KX 55.11.28 [January 10, 1717]
胤祉奏新來之商洋人計算平方之方法等情摺
Yin-zhi zou xinlai zhi Xiyang ren jisuan pingfang zhi fangfa deng qing zhe [Prince Yinzhi memorializes on the calculation method for square roots of the newly arrived Westerners]; 9 lines 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2919, p. 1160, KX 55.11.28 [January 10, 1717]
胤祉奏進繕西洋字之新樣數表樣子二篇等情摺
Yin-zhi zou jin shan Xiyang zi zhi xinyang shubiao yangzi er pian deng qing zhe [Prince Yin-zhi memorializes on the submission of two copies of the new mathematical tables copied out in Western characters]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 2950, p. 1170, KX 56.1.29 [March 11, 1717]
廣東巡撫法講奏為向駐澳門之西洋人傳旨摺
Guangdong xunfu Fa-hai zou wei xiang zhu Aomen zhi. Xiyangren zhuanzhi zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Fa-hai memorializes on the decree trasmitted to the Westerners residing in Macao]; 10 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 2995, p. 1185, KX 56.4.19 [May 29, 1717]
理藩院奏派圖理探送俄羅斯大夫噶爾芬回國摺
Lifanyuan zou qing pai Tu-li-shen song Eluosi dafu Ga-er-fen huiguo zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to send Tu-li-shen to accompany the Russian Grandee Thomas Garwin back to his country]; 21 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 3033, p. 1204, KX 56.6.11 [July 19, 1717]
廣東巡撫法海奏參緝捕海賊不力游擊摺
Guangdong xunfu Fa-hai zou can qibu haizei buli youji zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Fa-hai memorializes regarding the impeachment of a Brigade Commander on account of the insufficient action he took to curb sea pirates]; 11 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 3034, p. 1204, KX 56.6.11 [July 19, 1717]
廣東巡撫法海奏報虎頭門修築炮台情形摺
Guangdong xunfu Fa-hai bao Hutoumen xiuzhu baotai qingxingzhe [The Governor of Guangdong Fa-hai memorializes regarding the repair and construction of cannon batteries at Hutoumen]; 8 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 3084, pp. 1226–1227, KX 56.8.24 [September 26, 1717]
廣東巡撫法海奏獻〈西洋算法〉一書等事摺
Guangdong xunfu Fa-hai zou xian "Xiyang suanfa" yi shu deng shi zhe [The Governor of Guangdong Fa-hai memorializes regarding the presentation of the book "Western Calculation Methods"]; 6 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 3212, p. 1307, KX 57.6.30 [July 17, 1718]
李國屏奏西洋人吉利安請求賞藥摺
Li Guobing zou Xiyangren Ji Li'an qingqiu shang yao zhe [Li Guobing memorializes regarding the request of Kilian Stumpf SJ to obtain some medicine]; 7 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 3340, pp. 1367–68, KX 58.1.30 [March 20, 1719]
閩浙總督滿保奏進西洋小什物摺
Min-Zhe zongdu Man-bao zou jin Xiyang xiao shiwu zhe [The Governor General of Fujian and Zhejiang Man-bao memorializes regarding the offering of assorted Western small items]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

> * Memorial no. 3340 is preserved in Taipei, and its Manchu text has been published in *Gongzhong dang Kangxi* . . ., vol. 9, no. 644, p. 725.

Doc. 3607, pp. 1501–1502, KX 61.5.11 [June 24, 1722]
胤祐等奏為詢問暹邏國貢使情形摺
Yin-you deng zou wei xunwen Xianluo guo gongshi qingxing zhe [Prince Yin-you memorializes on the questioning of the ambassador from Siam]; 28 lines

Doc. 3635, pp. 1512, KX 61.9.8 [October 17, 1722]
理藩院奏為差人往楚庫柏姓探聽俄羅斯訊息摺
Lifanyuan zou wei chairen wang Chu-ku-bo-xing [Selenginsk =楚庫拜興] tanting Eluosi xunxi zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes on the lack of envoys who could go to Selenginsk to make inquiries on Russian news]; 18 lines

Doc. 3644, pp. 1515–1516, KX 61.11.13 [December 20, 1722]
理藩院郎中鄂賴奏報中俄交涉逋逃事宜摺
Lifanyuan langzhong E-lai zou bao Zhong-E jiaoshe butao shiyi zhe [The Director of the Court of Colonial Affairs E-lai reports on fugitives during the Sino-Russian negotiations]; 32 lines

Doc. 3872, pp. 1575–76, undated
胤祉等請安并賀又得儀徑新算法摺
Yin-zhi deng qing an bing he you de yi jing xin suanfa zhe [Prince Yin-zhi offers wishes to the emperor; on the new calculation method for obtaining diameters]; 12 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 3880, pp. 1577–1578, undated
武英殿總監造赫世亨等轉奏西洋人奏疏摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng deng zhuanzou Xiyangren zoushu zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng and the others forward the memorial presented by the Westerners (Tournon legation)]; 31 lines; 硃: 4 lines

Doc. 3882, p. 1579, undated
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏為查李起賀家人事摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou wei cha Li Qihe jiaren shi zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng memorializes on the investigation of the affair of the family members of Li Qihe]; 6 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 3885, pp. 1579–1580, undated
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報譯旨頒西洋人摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao yizhi song Xiyangren zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng memorializes on the translated decree given to the Westerners]; 5 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 3886, p. 1580, undated
武英殿總監造赫世亨奏報西洋人上告摺
Wuyingdian zongjianzao He-shi-heng zou bao Xiyangren shang gao zhe [The Supervisor-general of the Wuying Palace He-shi-heng memorializes on the petition presented by the Westerners]; 11 lines; 硃: 2 lines

Doc. 4169, p. 1675, undated
閔明鄂等奏請萬安摺
Min Ming'e deng zou qing wan'an zhe [Claudio Filippo Grimaldi SJ and others wish longevity and good health to His Imperial Majesty]; 2 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 4170, pp. 1675–1676, undated
閔明鄂吉利安奏摺譯文
Min Ming'e, Ji Li'an zou zhe yiwen [A translation of Claudio Filippo Grimaldi SJ and Kilian Stumpf SJ's memorial]; 15 lines; 硃: 3 lines

Doc. 4171, p. 1676, undated
西洋人蘇琳等奏請萬安摺
Xiyangren Su Lin deng zou qing wan'an zhe [The Westerner José Soares (=穌霖) and others wish longevity and good health to His Imperial Majesty]; 3 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 4172, p. 1676, undated
西洋人蘇琳等奏請萬安摺
Xiyangren Su Lin deng zou qing wan'an zhe [The Westerner José Soares SJ and others wish longevity and good health to His Imperial Majesty]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 4173, p. 1676, undated
西洋人蘇琳等奏請萬安摺
Xiyangren Su Lin deng zou qing wan'an zhe [The Westerner José Soares SJ and others wish longevity and good health to His Imperial Majesty]; 2 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 4174, p, 1676, undated
西洋人蘇琳等奏恭請萬安摺
Xiyangren Su Lin deng zou gongqing wan'an zhe [The Westerner José Soares SJ and others wish longevity and good health to His Imperial Majesty]; 2 line; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 4180, p. 1678, undated
理藩院奏請欽派官員護送俄羅斯商人返回摺
Lifanyuan zou qing qinpai guanyuan husong E-luo-si shangren fanhui zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking that an imperial envoy protect and accompany back the Russian merchants]; 11 lines; 硃: 1 line

Doc. 4183, p. 1679, undated
理藩院奏請接待來京貿易之俄羅斯國商人摺
Lifanyuan zou qing jiedai lai jing Eluosi guo shangren zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to take care of the Russian merchants who came to the capital to trade]; 16 lines; 硃: 知道了

Doc. 4188, p. 1681, undated
理藩院奏請行文俄羅斯嚴禁邊民越界摺
Lifanyuan zou qing xingwen Eluosi yanjin bianmin yuejie deng shi zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to send a dispatch to Russia strictly forbidding border people from crossing the frontiers]; 13 lines

Doc. 4191, p. 1682, undated
理藩院奏請派員往接俄羅斯商人摺
Lifanyuan zou qing pai yuan wangjie Eluosi shangren zhe [The Court of Colonial Affairs memorializes asking to send an official to meet the Russian merchants]; 3 lines; 硃: 1 line

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■ Source: Sneath, David, 'Beyond the willow palisade: Manchuria and the history of China's Inner Asian frontier', in *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 2003), © The Royal Society for Asian Affairs, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.tandfonline.com on behalf of The Royal Society for Asian Affairs, pp. 3–11.

BEYOND THE WILLOW PALISADE: MANCHURIA AND THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S INNER ASIAN FRONTIER

David Sneath*

As Owen Lattimore observed, the unity of Manchuria is an artificial one, generated relatively recently by the interests of foreign powers in the region, and most clearly marked by the Japanese creation of the satellite state of Manchuguo in the 1930s (Lattimore, 1940). But what is known in the West as Manchuria is more or less what the Chinese call *Dongbei*—the 'northeast.' It includes the territory of the modern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. However, in examining the history of Manchuria we must widen our view to include northern Korea about as far south as Hamhung, the Russian Primorskii Krai (maritime province) and the eastern part of what is now the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region—particularly the regions of Chefeng, Khinggan and Hulun Buir.[1]

Much of this region is a system of fluvial lowlands. In the north the region merges with the boreal forests of Siberia, in the west it is gradually transformed into the steppes of Mongolia. In the east it meets the Sea of Japan, in the south the Yellow Sea. The lowlands of Manchuria form a chain of four distinct plains surrounded by mountains and connected with each other through narrow passages. Centred around these plains are four major sub-regions that may be termed southern, central, eastern and western Manchuria (Janhunen, 1996).

The history of this region has been shaped by its geography. This is a meeting place between three types of terrain—forest, steppe and farmland. The shortest overland route between Korea and northern China runs through southern Manchuria and has given rulers of the region control of an important trade route. Manchuria has historically been divided between people speaking the Tungus languages of the eastern Siberian forests, such as the modern Ewenki, Solon and Orochen, and the Mongolic languages of the steppe. Economically there was a division between agriculture, which predominated in the south, hunting and reindeer herding in the forests, and 'nomadic' pastoralism on the steppe.

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Inner Asian Frontiers

For much of its history Manchuria was a frontier zone, rather than a clearly bounded unit. To understand the region's past we must examine it in the context of the broader history of China's Inner Asian frontiers.

Throughout the steppelands of Eurasia, powerful nomadic pastoral polities begin to appear in the historical records in the first millennium BC. These new peoples generally enter the histories of the neighbouring urban and agricultural cultures as horse-archers, feared in war, such as the Scythians of southern Russia. In China steppe nomads enter records around the fourth century BC under the generic names *Di* and *Hu*. These peoples lived in felt tents, bred horses and developed a formidable military technology—the horse-archer. Far more mobile than infantry, steppe warriors used powerful bows from horseback, and the combination of speed and firepower gave them unparalleled advantages in war. The northern frontiers of China may appear marginal and remote, but in fact throughout history these regions have been the source of enormous military power.

By the third century BC most of the steppelands to the north of China were ruled by the Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu) Empire (209BC–AD155). This empire was a formidable opponent for the early Chinese Qin and Han Dynasties (221BC–AD220). Its armies of horse-archers were so feared that the Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi united and extended a series of fortifications to form the Great Wall of China as a defence against them. Across this divide the wealth of urban and agricultural China faced the mobile might of the steppe nomads.

Indeed, this confrontation between the two giant empires of the Xiongnu in the north and the Han in the south was so important in shaping the history of China that many authors, such as Thomas Barfield, treat it as a sort of natural state. He describes the history of the region as a 'political ecology' with cycles of growth analogous to a forest that is subject to periodic forest fires. After the great trees are burnt, smaller fast-growing species colonize the land, and eventually give way to a full mixed forest again. So he claims that the "bipolar world of a unified China and a unified steppe which split the frontier between them was a stable climax state. No alternative political structure could emerge while they existed. The dual collapse of order within China and the steppe produced a highly unstable environment" (Barfield, 1989, p. 10).

In this view of history the agricultural and steppe peoples are fundamentally distinct, natural rivals, and the long line of states rooted in Manchuria become merely the small, opportunist plants of this imaginary political ecosystem: compact but self-sufficient political entities that are able to expand when the giants collapse.

But a more careful examination of the history of the region shows that this grand and general picture is a rather misleading one. This should become clearer from the following overview of the history of Manchuria and the dynasties that it produced.

The Xianbei, Bohai and the Northern Wei Dynasty

As the nomadic Xiongnu Empire reached the height of its power at the end of the third century BC under its emperor Maodun, it defeated other steppe rivals such as the groups known as the Wuhuan and the Xianbei who retreated into northern and western Manchuria. In 119BC the Chinese Han dynasty finally inflicted a decisive defeat on the Xiongnu, with the help of the Xianbei and Wuhuan, and the Xianbei in particular benefited in the aftermath, gaining territories and wealth. In the following centuries their influence spread across much of northern China. Their wealth and power is testified by the rich funeral objects found in Xianbei tombs: finely crafted luxury items, many made of gold.

After the fall of the Han dynasty AD220 northern China entered a period of political disunity. In a pattern that we see repeated over and over again, it was rulers from Manchuria that emerged to govern northern China. The Tuoba Xianbei established the Northern Wei dynasty in 386 and ruled until the sixth century, when Xianbei military commanders rebelled. A number of short-lived states emerged[2] before the Sui and Tang Dynasties in the early seventh century united much of what is present-day China.

Since the second century AD the southern part of Manchuria had been ruled by a state named Puyo, which extended into northern Korea. The culture of Puyo combined Inner Asian elements, like horse breeding and knowledge of Buddhism, with Chinese Confucianism as well as Tungus religious and economic elements. The Puyo dissolved in the fifth century and gave way to the growing power of a group of people known as the Mohe. One of these—the Sumo—became tributaries of the Tang and established the Bohai state around AD700.

There is a good deal of archaeological evidence of Bohai settlement in much of Manchuria, as far north as Khabarovsk and, although modest in size, their buildings reveal sophisticated construction in wood, metal and brick. The dwellings of commoners at this time appear very similar to traditional Tungus houses that were used until relatively recently—round houses of wood, often sunk a little way into the ground for warmth. The Bohai nobles were integrated to some extent into the Tang Empire and the bureaucracy used Chinese characters to write their own—probably Tungus—language.

The Khitans and the Liao Dynasty

In western Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia another branch of the Xianbei, the Khitan, became increasingly powerful during the Tang period. When the Tang dynasty collapsed in the early tenth century, the Khitan monarch, Yelu Abaoji, took control of Manchuria and conquered the Bohai state. In 916 he founded the Khitan Liao dynasty, named after the Liao river of southern Manchuria. The Khitans continued to expand their territory and by the early eleventh century their empire stretched from southern Siberia in the north to the Yellow Sea in the south and from the Sea of Japan in the east to Central Asia in the west.

The inscriptions that the Khitans left have never been deciphered, but they probably spoke a language related to Mongolian. Although Khitan power was originally based in the steppe, numerically the majority of their subjects were Chinese. The Liao developed a political system that set the mould for many of the dynasties that followed them. The northern steppe and Manchurian regions were administered through the Khitan nobility, and a separate southern administration was used for the Chinese and Bohai regions, which were governed by Chinese landlords as well as the Khitan aristocracy.

The administration of both structures was facilitated by the empire's multiple capitals, between which the highly mobile Khitan Liao court moved. In the north was the most important of these, the Upper Capital; in addition there were four other administrative centres—the most southerly of these was where Beijing now stands. As archaeology has revealed, the political division between Khitan and Chinese administration was reflected in the plan of the city with its separate Chinese and ruling Khitan quarters (Kessler, 1993, p. 93).

The Jurchen and the Jin Dynasty

In the early 1100s the leader of a group called the Jurchen, probably living in the forests and steppes of northern Manchuria, rebelled against his Khitan masters. His name was Aguda, and he apparently made the decision to revolt after he was required to dance for the Liao emperor's after-dinner entertainment. Whatever the real or imagined cause, the rebellion was successful. After first waging war to conquer the other Jurchen domains, in 1121 Aguda captured the Khitan capital and established a new dynasty, taking the name Jin—meaning 'gold'.

The rise of the Jin reveals another of the patterns that is repeated over and over in the history of northern China. The Khitan Liao dynasty, themselves originally a 'nomadic' steppe people, were overthrown by one of their own vassals whose power base lay further north, in the wilder forest and steppe regions.

The great Arab historian of the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), first proposed a theory of the cyclic nature of relations between nomadic and settled civilizations to explain the history of the Middle East. He saw a repeating pattern in which the towns were conquered by warriors from the desert who themselves became, with time, divided and given to luxuries. Eventually a new generation of desert warriors, unified in their hunger for the wealth of the towns, and militarily tough enough to get it, would defeat the rulers of the towns and rule them in their turn.

Something like this pattern was recognized by Inner Asian rulers themselves, and we frequently see a conscious attempt by the new conquerors to prevent their offspring from losing the martial skills of the steppe. So the Jin emperor Shizong (ruled 1161–1189) instituted a programme by which Jurchen aristocrats were compelled to leave Beijing and camp in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to practice hunting, riding and shooting. Later the great Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan is said to have been concerned that his descendants should not forget their nomadic lifestyle, and the Manchus, avid readers of the Jin literature, made strenuous efforts to retain the nomadic and martial lifestyles of their Manchurian and Mongolian subjects.

The Jin inherited the Khitan system of northern and southern administrations and multiple capitals. Beijing became the central capital but the Jin maintained a northern capital at Shangjing, as well as eastern and western ones. The Jin went further than the Khitans to introduce the Chinese administrative system of public examination as qualification for office, and became more centralized and bureaucratic than their predecessors. The Jin Empire expanded in the early twelfth century, capturing the capital of the Northern Song dynasty in 1127 and extending their realm as far south as the Huai river, further south than any of their earlier Manchurian-based empires. Despite the size and power of their state, the Jin also fell to steppe rulers who had once been their vassals. But these new invaders emerged to the west of Manchuria, from the heart of the Mongolian steppe.

The Mongol Conquests

In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries a minor nobleman named Temujin began to make his name in the tough world of military and diplomatic rivalry on the steppes. He was one of a number of nobles claiming Khanship of a relatively unimportant people known as the Mongols.

At that time the power and disobedience of a group of their steppe subjects known as the Tatar worried the Jin court. The young Temujin was persuaded, along with the Khan of the nearby Kereid people, to collaborate with the Jin army in attacking the Tatar. The allies were victorious and, with the subjects and wealth he gained from the campaign, Temujin became a powerful ruler, but he had wider ambitions. By 1206 he had conquered the other petty rulers of the steppe to form a powerful new state—the Blue Mongol. He took the title Chinggis Khan (which later came to be rendered Genghis or Jenghiz Khan in Europe).

In 1209 Chinggis attacked the Tangut state of Xixia that ruled the western part of northern China. Two years later he attacked the Jin, making alliances with many of the Khitan noble families who felt little loyalty to their Jurchen masters. In 1215 the Mongols captured the Jin capital of Yenching (Yanjing, modern Beijing). Chinggis Khan expanded westward, defeating the Kwarazmian shah who ruled most of Central Asia in 1220 and sacking Bukhara and Samarkand.

After Chinggis Khan's death in 1227 his descendants continued the Mongol expansion, creating the largest land empire in history. The Mongol empire stretched from Vietnam in the east to Hungary in the west and included China, Russia, Central Asia and most of the Middle East. Although this imperial colossus fragmented, segments of it remained as powerful states. In China Khubilai Khan founded the Yüan dynasty in 1279 and, for the first time in many centuries, unified the whole of China. The Yüan was overthrown by the native Chinese Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century, but the unity of China was more or less retained until the present day.

The Manchu and the Qing Dynasty

In Manchuria a familiar pattern began to repeat. In 1583 one Nurgachi, the ruler of a noble house known as the Chien-chou Jurchen, began to conquer and unite the other Jurchen groups. In 1616 Nurgachi was proclaimed Khan of a state known as the latter Jin, and in 1621 Nurgachi's armies captured the Ming cities of Shenyang (Mukden) and Liaoyang.

The new state quickly became a powerful rival to the Ming in the north, and to the descendants of Chinggis Khan who still ruled Mongolia to the west. When Nurgachi's son Hung Taiji succeeded him he decided to create a new identity for his subjects, forbidding the use of the term Jurchen—associated with the old Jin Empire—and introducing the term Manchu instead.

At that time Mongolia was ruled by the once-mighty descendants of Chinggis Khan. However, they had become so disunited that they began to come into the orbit of the new powers in the east and west. The last claimant of the throne of Chinggis Khan, Ligdan Khan of the Chahar, became so unpopular among these petty rulers that some, such as the lords of the Horchin and Harchin Mongols, preferred to swear fealty to Nurgachi. In 1632 the Manchus and their allies routed Ligdan Khan who died in exile two years later and, in 1635, his son submitted to the Manchu Khan and was rewarded with a diplomatic marriage to his daughter. By 1636, when Hung Taiji proclaimed himself emperor and adopted the dynastic name Qing (Ch'ing), his vassals included most of the rulers of what became Inner Mongolia, some of whom where related to him by his marriage to a Mongol princess.

In 1644, under the pressure of Manchu attacks and internal rebellions, the Ming dynasty finally collapsed and the Qing began to rapidly take control of China. To the north-east of the Gobi desert the three Khans of the Halha Mongols faced military defeat at the hands of Galdan Khan of the Western Mongols—the Oirad. They turned to the Manchus for support, swearing fealty to the Qing emperor in 1691. Over the next sixty years the Qing armies destroyed the power of the Western Mongols and returned the lands of Mongolia to nobles of Chinggis Khan's lineage. The Mongolian aristocracy enjoyed a high status under the Qing, particularly in the area of military appointments, and the Mongol and Manchu nobility frequently intermarried. The importance of the Mongolian element is demonstrated by the fact that Qing imperial architecture generally carried inscriptions in three languages—Chinese, Manchu and Mongolian. Indeed the Manchu script was based on the Mongolian one.

The Manchu emperors were great patrons and sponsors of Buddhism. Under their rule the Buddhist church expanded steadily, building temples and monasteries, and amassing herds, lands and serfs that were bequeathed by devout nobles throughout Manchuria and Mongolia. Over this period Manchuria became increasingly integrated, economically and politically, with the rest of China and the Manchu Empire.

The Manchu Qing Empire expanded to a greater extent than any of its predecessors, covering the whole of Mongolia and Tibet. It was the most extensive of the states to have ruled China except the short-lived Mongol Empire. The long rules of two emperors in particular—the Kangxi (1662–1722) and Qianlong (1736–1795)—generated political stability and a golden age for the empire. But the empire had also to contend with new threats that were entirely different from the old problems of ruling the northern frontiers.

Since the arrival of Europeans by ship in the sixteenth century the power and influence of these new barbarians had increased. By the early nineteenth century the British demand for Chinese tea had begun to generate a substantial trade deficit between China and Britain. However, British merchants found that huge profits could be made exporting opium to China and, as the numbers of addicts soared, wealth began to flow out of China. Efforts by the Qing administration to put a stop to this lucrative trade sparked the Opium Wars of 1839–1842, and the subsequent Qing defeat and humiliation at the hands of the British revealed the weakness of the empire. Gunboat diplomacy of this sort resulted in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking and other 'unequal treaties' that granted sweeping concessions to the foreign powers who had established trading communities on Chinese territory. The Taiping rebellion, in part a result of popular discontent with Qing humiliation at foreign hands, began the process that destroyed the last Chinese empire. Although they defeated the rebels, the Qing could not stand against the wind of Western-inspired change blowing from the coasts. Attempts to reform and modernize the military led to regionalism and the country came to be divided between local warlords.

The Fall of the Qing and Japanese Control of Manchuria

With the advent of industrialization and the introduction of advanced firearms, the balance of military power now turned decisively in favour of urban society, demoting the historical skills of the steppe horse-archer. The rifle and the railway provided Chinese troops greater firepower and mobility than the nomads. The political traditions and social structures that had maintained control of the Manchurian and Mongolian horsemen were now irrelevant impediments; just as were the political philosophies of multi-ethnic dynastic rule in the new age of nation-states.

The Han Chinese warlord Yuan Shikai overthrew the last Qing emperor Puyi in 1911. The warlord era of China followed, from which the Guomindang Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek emerged to formally assume power in 1928.

But China's weakness had encouraged Japanese ambition in Manchuria. Japan saw Manchuria as a rich source of raw materials and was eager to obtain territory for colonial expansion. In 1931 the Japanese occupied Manchuria, and formed the client state of Manchuguo. Puyi, the former Qing Emperor, was installed as the ruler of this new state, but in reality he remained a Japanese puppet. In 1937 the Japanese overran much of northern China, but their invasion of Soviet-backed Outer Mongolia failed in 1939 when they were defeated at the battle of Khalkiin Gol. In 1945 Japan lost Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia to the Russians as the Red Army drove them back into Korea. The Soviets handed control of both regions to the Chinese Communists—notably to Lin Biao in Manchuria and to Ulanhu in Inner Mongolia.

Ulanhu (the Chinese version of his name was Ulanfu) was an Inner Mongolian who became part of the Chinese Communist inner circle. He became the architect of the Communist Party's policy towards minority nationalities. As the strongman who had delivered Inner Mongolia to the communists he was given a large new administration by the new regime—the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, with its capital in Hohhot (Huhehot).[3] The western, Mongolian-speaking, parts of Manchuguo became part of this new Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. However, there was no equivalent leader interested in creating an autonomous administration for Manchuria. The region was divided between the three provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, as integral parts of the People's Republic of China.

Retrospect—Secrets of the Willow Palisades

The traditional view of the relationship between China and the steppes of Inner Asia portrays the nomads as predatory warlike tribes, ever hungry for the wealth of China, pressing down on its northern borders, and kept out by the massive defences of the Great Wall. But there are a number of ways in which this picture is misleading. First, it is clear that steppe rulers were often much more concerned with their neighbours in and around the steppe than with the conquest of the whole of China. Many steppe states did not seek to invade China at all, but cultivated good relations with her. Secondly, as Owen Lattimore pointed out, the Great Wall was as much a device for keeping Chinese in as keeping the barbarians out (Lattimore, 1940, p. 240). By clearly marking the boundary of Chinese settlement it prevented the flow of Chinese out—to become either liabilities of the Chinese state or effective subjects of its steppe rivals.

The Great Wall of China did not run across Manchuria. Instead, the boundary of Chinese settlement was marked by the famous Willow Palisades. These were lines of willow trees, protected by a deep ditch, and broken at intervals by garrisoned checkpoints. They ran for hundreds of miles across the landscape, separating the agricultural Chinese from the pastoral and hunting Tungus and Mongolian-speaking peoples (Lee, 1970). At first glance they might appear to be another huge defensive screen against barbarian invasion. But, in fact, the Willow Palisades were constructed not by fearful Chinese, but by Manchurian rulers themselves. The first line was planted in the last years of the reign of the Manchu Shun Zhi (Shun Chih) Emperor (1644–1661), and new lines were added in the reign of the Kangxi Emperor. They marked the internal boundaries of Chinese settlement within the Manchurian state itself, a continuation of the ancient Khitan policy of separate administration of their Chinese and northern subjects.

There has also been a tendency to think of the history of Inner Asia in terms of migrations of discrete peoples: the succession of Xianbei, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols and Manchus as great human waves that wash, one by one, into northern China to form dynasties. But this picture is also deceptive. If we look more closely we do not see vast mass migrations, but rather a succession of ruling houses and the political domains they have managed to assemble. Often the peoples they ruled have remained the same, but acquired new names with the arrival of new masters. When the Xiongnu were routed in AD105, "the northern *Shan-yü* (Xiongnu) Emperor took flight and the Xianbei moved in and occupied his land. According to the *Historical Records* (*Shi Ji*), the remainder of the Xiongnu who did not go with him still numbered over 100,000 tents and all styled themselves Xianbei" (Barfield, 1981, p. 48).

In Manchuria and eastern Mongolia there has been very little by way of strong boundaries between ethnic groups. Lifestyles and cultures mix and mingle, and people did not tend to distinguish themselves from their neighbours on the basis of national or ethnic concepts. The Tungus groups now called by separate ethnonyms—the Hezhe, Orochen and Orok—used to call themselves Nani, the name of the local tributary of the Songari river where they lived. However, as they acquired empires, the Khitan, Jurchen and Manchu rulers did generate broad ethnic-administrative categories for their subjects. Chinese were administered separately, and Khitan, Jurchen and Manchu subjects occupied different and generally superior status in the Liao, Jin and Qing empires, as did the Mongols in the Yüan.

What, then, are we to make of Barfield's 'political ecology' with its natural division between China and the steppe, and the picture of Manchuria as the home of the small opportunistic regimes.

In fact, for much of the history of northern China various states have commanded significant areas of *both* steppe and farmland—most of these arose in the Manchurian region—the Wei, Liao, Jin and mighty Manchu. Further west other states also combined both nomad and Chinese farmer—such as Tangut Xixia of the eleventh-thirteenth centuries. We tend to think of Manchuria as a borderland between Korea, China, Siberia and Mongolia; and of such remote regions as peripheral—the recipients and imitators of the 'high cultures' of the great and ancient civilizations of China and Korea. But even a brief history of the region demonstrates that the Inner Asian frontiers of China were a source of enormous power, and the location for vigorous and ancient traditions of statehood.

Manchuria is perhaps the best example of this. The land where the steppe meets forest and lowland agriculture gave rise to more dynasties of China than any other region, and produced the last and most glorious of them all—the Qing dynasty of the Manchu Empire.

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Notes

1. On the west this lowland system is bounded by the Khinggan mountains, to the north the lesser Khinggan and the Amur River, to the east the Sichote Range, and to the south the highlands of north Korea. The contemporary cities of Harbin, Qiqihar and Songari mark the inner triangle of this region.
2. The Northern Qi, Tujue, and Gaoli states, for example.
3. Originally built in 1580 by Altan Khan of the Tumet, Hohhot (Huhehot) means Blue City. By 1634 it had fallen under the power of the expanding Manchus as the Tumet threw in their lot with the Qing. The Chinese warlord and republican governments renamed the city Guihua and then Suiyuan, indicating its role pacifying the border, and Inner Mongolia was carved up between Chinese-style provinces at this time. After the victory of the Chinese Communists, however, the city got its old Mongolian name back in 1952.

■ Source: Sugiyama, Kiyohiko, 'The Ch'ing empire as a Manchu Khanate: The Structure of Rule under the Eight Banners [1640s–1720s]', in *Acta Asiatica*, No. 88 (January 2005), The Toho Gakkai, pp. 21–48.

THE CH'ING EMPIRE AS A MANCHU KHANATE: THE STRUCTURE OF RULE UNDER THE EIGHT BANNERS

Sugiyama Kiyohiko

Approximately one century after the death of Nurhaci, the founder of the Ch'ing 淸 empire, the French Jesuit Dominique Parennin wrote a letter from Peking on 20 July 1725 in which he made the following observations while describing the fate of the imperial prince Sunu (Su-nu 蘇努) and his family, who had been banished by the Yung-cheng 雍正 emperor (r. 1722–35) on account of Su-nu's Christian beliefs.[1]

> There are in addition two things that I would ask you to observe. First, that among the Servants who will follow these Princes (i.e., Sunu and his family) into exile, there are two kinds: some are indeed slaves of their household; the others are Tartars (i.e., Manchus) or Tartarized Chinese whom the Emperor gives in large or small numbers in accordance with the rank with which he honours the Princes of his Blood. These latter are the retinue of the Noble (*Regulo*), and they are generally called people of his gate. There are among them considerable Mandarins, Governors and Governors-general. Although they are not slaves like the former, they are almost equally subject to the wishes of the Noble as long as he retains his rank. After his death they pass into the service of his sons if they are honoured with the same rank. If the father happens during his lifetime to fall from his position, or if, retaining it until his death, he does not pass it on to any of his sons, this kind of Servant is placed in reserve, and they are given to some other Prince of the Blood when he is permitted to establish a household and is elevated to the same rank.

Here is described a relationship between ruler and ruled that is far removed from our images of both the Ch'ing dynasty as China's last imperial dynasty and the Eight Banners as a pyramid hierarchy headed by the emperor or khan (*han*). First, there is the fact that there existed in the Ch'ing empire a master-servant or lord-vassal relationship in which high-ranking officials, including "considerable Mandarins, Governors (*hsün-fu*

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[1] *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, Vol. 18 (1728): 37–38. For details on the downfall of Sunu, see Suzuki 2001a.

巡撫) and Governors-general (*tsung-tu* 總督)" (*des Mandarins considérables, des Vice-rois & des* Tsongtou), submitted to orders just like slaves. Secondly, the master whom they served was not the emperor alone, but the imperial nobility. In addition, this relationship was passed down through successive generations. Mention of personal connections in the political sphere at this time brings to mind the factions (*p'eng-tang* 朋黨) criticized by the Yung-cheng emperor in his *Yü-chih p'eng-tang lun* 御製朋黨論, but the relationship between ruler and ruled described above is clearly different from that to be seen in factions. Furthermore, unlike the factions criticized by the emperor, the master-servant relationship between these officials and the imperial princes was passed down with imperial sanction from father to son, and the officials are also said to have been granted to princes as subordinates by the emperor himself. Were not high-ranking officials in the capital and the provinces, as well as all bureaucrats, soldiers and commoners, supposed to obey the emperor alone in late imperial China? And what was the connection between this master-servant relationship and the well-known Eight Banners, to which all Manchus belonged during the Ch'ing? What is more, the Manchus whom Parennin observed were not those in Mukden (Shen-yang 瀋陽), but those of the eighteenth century, when Manchus had been living in Peking for more than eighty years. The above passage presents us with a picture of the Ch'ing empire that is at variance with previous images.

In this article I therefore wish to examine the distinctive features of the structure of rule under the Ch'ing as a Manchu dynasty, focusing on its first half until about the 1720s, from when Parennin's observations date. In Sections I and II, using Parennin's account as a lead, I shall consider lord-vassal relations and its order under the Eight Banners on the basis of historical sources, and in Section III I shall briefly review the state of research on the Ch'ing empire and situate the results of our investigations within this body of research. What I shall attempt in this article is to respond to the fruits of research on Ch'ing history in recent years from the standpoint of Manchu studies and research on the Eight Banners, with an emphasis on presenting historical facts and sources that prompt us to reconsider hitherto known facts and images. For this reason I shall use primarily Manchu and European sources, especially the latter, rather than Chineses-language sources.[2]

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[2] I would like to make special mention of the great help I gained from the Japanese translations by Yazawa Toshihiko 矢澤利彥 when searching through and utilizing European

Generally speaking, historical sources do not describe matters that are taken for granted in that society, and while personnel changes and the scope of official power may be recorded with respect to politics and institutions, their reasons or tendencies are rarely set out explicitly. This applies not only to Chineses-language sources, but also to Manchu-language sources. The records left by European missionaries, on the other hand, have until now tended to be used only for their concrete detail, such as descriptions of individual people or events. But sometimes, as in the case of Parennin's account, passages that may seem to lack concreteness contain valuable evidence that can fill the gaps in Manchu- and Chinese-language sources, and this article is an experiment in utilizing these sources.

I

The origins of the Ch'ing empire go back more than one hundred years before the arrival of Parennin in China. In the 1580s Nurhaci, a petty chieftain of the Chien-chou 建州 Jurchens (Nü-chen 女眞 or Nü-chih 女直 < Ma. *jušen*) launched a campaign to unite the Jurchen tribes, and by the 1610s he had united all the Jurchens. In the course of this process of unification he gave his state the name of "Manchu nation" (*manju gurun*) and organized everyone under his command into Eight Banners. In 1616 he assumed the position of khan and named his country the "Latter Chin state" (*amaga Aisin gurun/hou Chin kuo* 後金國). His son and successor Hong Taiji (r. 1626–43) became emperor in 1636 and rechristened the Latter Chin the "Great Ch'ing state" (*Daicing gurun/Ta Ch'ing kuo* 大清國). This was the origin of the Ch'ing empire that survived until 1912. When Peking fell to the rebel Li Tzu-ch'eng 李自成 in 1644, thus bringing about the fall of the Ming 明 dynasty, the Prince Regent Dorgon (To-erh-kun 多爾袞) crossed Shan-hai Pass 山海關, secured the support and cooperation of Chinese civil and military officials, and placed the infant emperor Shun-chih 順治 (r. 1643–61) on the imperial throne in Peking. So began Manchu rule of China, which was to last for more than two hundred and sixty years.

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sources. The European sources consulted in this article are all held by the Tōyō Bunko 東洋文車, and I would like to thank those who readily consented to my use of these rare works.

The Ch'ing empire was both a Manchu dynasty and China's last imperial dynasty, and while due attention has been paid to the former aspect, until the 1990s a viewpoint stressing the latter aspect generally predominated. From this latter perspective, the structure of Ch'ing rule may be said to have been understood by and large in the following manner. That is to say, the emperor was both a Manchu khan and (more importantly) a Chinese emperor who had inherited the position of the Ming emperor; he regarded himself as a Confucian monarch, appointed Chinese officials to positions of trust, and in the eighteenth century created a monarchic autocracy; and the bureaucracy was virtually a replica of the Ming institutions that it superseded, with the mere addition of some new institutions such as the Grand Council (*chün-chi-ch'u* 軍機處), Court of Colonial Dependencies (*li-fan-yüan* 理藩院), and Imperial Household Department (*nei-wu-fu* 内務府).[3] But in response to this description, two points can be noted from the vantage point of those who would attach special importance to the fact that the Ch'ing was a Manchu dynasty. First, the fact that the Ch'ing did not abolish the institutions of the Ming, but continued using them, and the question of whether or not the overall political organization of the Ch'ing empire completely took over that of the Ming are two separate issues. Secondly, while it is true that after the Manchu conquest, as a result of various reforms and acculturation, the Manchus and their government took on a different look from earlier times, this does not immediately signify their complete assimilation with Chinese institutions and culture. Although Manchus may have adopted names deriving from Chinese characters and may have come to speak fluent Chinese, whether or not the political and military systems that they set up, as well as their management principles, switched to those of China is a separate question. When Ch'ing history is reconsidered from this "Manchu-centred" perspective (Rawski 1996: 833; Elliott 2001: 28), there will quite likely emerge a picture of the Ch'ing empire that differs from the hitherto picture of early modern Chinese history or late imperial Chinese history. Let us, therefore, return to the Manchurian period prior to 1644 and consider the structure of rule under the Eight Banners, which constitute the roots of Manchuness.

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[3] See, for example, C.O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford University Press, 1985), 83–96, and S. Naquin and E.S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Yale University Press, 1987), Chap. 1, both based on the results of research up until the early 1980s.

The Eight Banners established by Nurhaci represented an organization combining military and administrative aspects, and included within it was everyone under his rule, including the imperial family, ministers, soldiers, officials, servants, and slaves; Manchus, Mongols, Chinese, and Koreans; men and women, young and old. Its basic unit was the *niru* (*niu-lu* 牛录 or *tso-ling* 佐領), usually translated as "company," which served as the source of able-bodied men for military service; several (up to more than a dozen) *niru* formed a *jalan* (*chia-la* 甲喇 or *ts'an-ling* 參領), or "regiment"; and five *jalan* made up a *gūsa* (*ku-shan* 固山), or "division." The Eight Banners thus constituted a pyramid-like hierarchical system. The eight divisions were distinguished by yellow, white, red, and blue flags which were either plain or bordered, and it is for this reason that they were called "banners." Not all of them were under the command of the khan or emperor, but belonged to banner princes, or imperial princes (*beile*) who had been enfeoffed with a banner, with the khan himself being the *beile* of the Plain and Bordered Yellow Banners (to which was added the Plain White Banner by the Shun-chih emperor after Dorgon's death, together forming the Upper Three Banners).

What, then, was the relationship between each banner prince—including the khan or emperor—and the bannermen who made up each banner? Bannermen were in Manchu usually called *gūsai niyalma*, or "people of the banners," but in contradistinction to the banner princes they were also called *jušen* or *harangga*. Originally the word *jušen*, in addition to referring to the Jurchens as opposed to the Han 漢 Chinese (*nikan*), Mongols (*monggo*), and so on, had also signified the serfs of the chieftain class such as *beile, amban*,[4] etc., but following Hong Taiji's decree issued on 3 December 1635, stating that "serfs monopolized (*salibuha jušen*) by banner princes (*gūsai beise*) are called the *jušen* of that [banner] prince," subordinates in the Eight Banners came to be called *jušen* in contrast to the *beile*.[5] In other words, there existed in the Eight Banners a relationship between master (*beile*) and servant (*jušen, harangga*) that took over and remoulded the relationship between ruler and ruled that obtained in Jurchen society.

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[4] The word *amban* originally meant 'chieftain', but under Nurhaci's régime it came to mean 'minister' or 'councillor'. In the present instance it is used in the former meaning.

[5] *Chiu Man-chou tang* 舊滿洲檔, entry for T'ien-ts'ung 天琮 9. 10. 24 (Kanda Nobuo 神田信夫 et al., trans., *Kyū Manshū tō Tensō kunen* 滿洲檔天聰九年 [Old Manchu archives: T'ien-ts'ung 9], Vol. 2 [Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1975], 324). On *jušen*, see Ishibashi (H.) 1988: 37 and 1989, 1–2, 3, 4; on *harangga*, see Tu 1987, 1994, 1998: 242–247.

That being so, how was this relationship established and what obligations and benefits did it bring? First, let us consider how it was established. In 1609 Nurhaci overthrew his younger brother Šurgaci (Shu-erh-ha-ch'i 舒爾哈齊), with whom he had shared power ever since taking up arms, and stripped him of all his powers. In the *Chiu Man-chou tang* 錄滿洲檔 this is described in the following terms.[6]

> Because his younger brother Šurgaci Beile was his only younger brother born of the same father and mother, Sure Kundulen Han (Nurhaci) allowed him to monopolize the people (*gurun*), companions (*gucu*), rescripts (*ejehe*), slaves (*aha*), and so on in the same way that he himself did.... But because his younger brother, the *beile*, was not satisfied with being looked after in this manner and made his elder brother feel resentment all the year round, his elder brother Sure Kundulen Han reproached him for his wrongdoing, saying, "Younger brother, it was not our father who allowed you to monopolize the people and companions who are your means of livelihood. They are people and companions whom I, your elder brother, gave to you."... He took away all the people, companions, and so on that he had given to his younger brother, the *beile*, and left him on his own.

Again, in his admonition of his first-born son Cuyeng (Ch'u-ying 褚英), who had for a time been entrusted with the position of regent but then fell from grace and was executed, Nurhaci declared, "To you two brothers born of the same mother, who reached manhood before your other brothers, I gave five thousand households of people (*gurun*) each, eight hundred head of livestock (*adun*) each, ten thousand taels of silver each, and eighty rescripts (*ejehe*) each."[7] The "two brothers born of the same mother" were Cuyeng and Nurhaci's second son Daišan (Tai-shan 代善), who later came to be known as Amba Beile or Prince Li 禮.

On both of these occasions people, companions, rescripts, and slaves in the one case and people, livestock, silver, and rescripts in the other were similarly listed as items to be apportioned, and it is therefore evident that these were regarded and treated as being all of the same category. What is more, the "people" and "companions" alluded to here did not refer only to a *beile*'s bondservants and slaves, but also included ministers who had formerly been independent *beile* and *amban*. It is recorded, for example, that in the case of the family of Asan (A-shan 阿山), who belonged to the Gioro (*chüeh-lo* 覺羅) clan and later became a banner commander (*gūsai ejen/ku-shan e-chen* 固山額項or *tu-t'ung* 都統), "when [Nurhaci] gave subordinates to his sons for their exclusive use, he gave them (i.e., the family of Asan) to Amba Beile."[8] Thus from the initial formation of his régime Nurhaci granted people under his command to his brothers and sons, who were *beile*, and there could be said to have been a clear-cut distinction in standing between the *beile* who received these grants and the *jušen* comprising ministers, soldiers, commoners, and slaves who were granted to the *beile*.

What duties, then, did the relationship thus established between a *beile* and his subordinates entail? The *Chiu Man-chou tang* describes a typical instance that occurred in 1617.[9]

> The minister Ilaka Baturu, who had been given to the Han's son Hong Taiji Beile, while failing to exert himself, complained that "[Hong Taiji] does not look after me. I want to return to the Han, who looked after me." The Han accordingly consulted with the princes and ministers, saying, "Although [Ilaka] was originally with me, he hardly exerted himself for me and gave no benefit, and he often caused me resentment and troubled me. [But] I did not give heed to the fact that he thus caused me resentment, and I made Ilaka a minister and gave him to my son. If you, Ilaka, without exerting yourself at all, complain without reason that we do not look after you, do you intend going back and forth between us and living in disobedience?" He [then] killed Ilaka.

Thus, when a master-servant relationship was established by "giving" (*bumbi*) subordinates to a *beile*, the *beile* had an obligation to "nurture" (*ujimbi*) his subordinates, while the subordinates were obliged to serve their master, and it was a strict relationship in which punishment, including even the death penalty, might be imposed. Neither Asan and his family nor Ilaka Baturu were slaves, and yet, even though they belonged to powerful clans and held the position of minister, they were placed in a strict master-servant relationship just like slaves.[10] The cases of Šurgaci and Cuyeng belonged to a transitional stage in the formation of the Eight

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[6] *Chiu Man-chou tang*, entry for Wan-li 萬曆 37. 3 (Vol. 1: 22–25: *Manbun rōtō*, "T'ai-tsu" 太祖 1, Vol. 1: 10–11).

[7] *Chiu Man-chou tang*, entry for Wan-li 41.3 (Vol. 1: 66; *Manbun rōtō*, "T'ai-tsu" 3, Vol. 1: 31).

[8] *Chiu Man-chou tang*, entry for T'ien-ts'ung 2. 6. 1 (Vol. 6: 2823; *Manbun rōtō*, "T'ai-tsung: T'ien-ts'ung" 太宗・天聰 10, Vol. 4: 135).

[9] *Chiu Man-chou tang*, entry for T'ien-ming 天命 2. 10 (Vol. 1: 163, 165, 342–343; *Manbun rōtō*, "T'ai-tsu" 5, Vol. 1: 78–79).

[10] On the family backgrounds of Asan and Ilaka, see *Pa-ch'i Man-chou shih-tsu t'ung-p'u* 八旗滿洲氏族通譜 (Collected genealogies of the Manchu clans of the Eight Banners) 12–13, "Irgen Gioro Clan" (repr. of Chinese version, Shen-yang: Liao-shen Shu-she 遼瀋番社, 1989: 181, 192).

Banners, but as is evident from the fact that Daišan and Hong Taiji both became banner princes, this granting of subordinates and a strict master-servant relationship were carried over under the Eight Banners system.

This leads us next to the questions of what the situation was after 1644 and how this all related to the institutions inherited from the Ming. About twenty years after the Manchu conquest, the missionary Adrien Greslon, describing the persecution of Christians that occurred throughout the country soon after the accession of the K'ang-his 康熙 emperor (r. 1661–1722) when he still had a regency, cites the following instance from Shan-tung 山東:[11]

> As the province of Shan-tung is very near Peking, they promptly had a reply and the relief that they wanted. Apart from the letter that Father Adam had written to the Governor, they had another which had a much greater influence on his spirit, for it had been written to him by his own brother, who was at the Court, and by order of one of the Princes of the Blood of the first degree (*un des premiers Princes du Sang*), under the banner of whom he was and on whom he depended entirely.... The persecution ceased with regard to the Christians as soon as the Governor received these letters.

This incident during the first half of the 1660s as reported by Greslon provides important testimony from the period falling between that covered by Manchu-language sources from the time of Nurhaci and the observations of Parennin in the early eighteenth century. It is here clearly stated that the governor of Shan-tung, who institutionally speaking ought to have been a subject of the emperor alone and to have been governing the province on his behalf, was absolutely subservient to the commands of his own banner prince. In other words, under an administrative system that had been ostensibly inherited as it was from the Ming, the master-servant relationships of the Eight Banners remained in full force. Subsequent examples of the control exercised over subordinates by sons of the K'ang-hsi emperor in the early eighteenth century are already known. There was, for instance, the case of the extortion of his subordinate Yang Lin 鑤琳, governor-general of Kuang-tung 廣東 and Kuang-his 廣西provinces, by Prince Tun 敦 of the Plain Red Banner and the case of the encroachment on state finances by the household of Prince Ch'eng 誠 of the Bordered Blue Banner.[12] While it is not impossible to interpret these incidents in the context of Chinese history as examples of official corruption or in relation

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[11] *Histoire de la Chine sous la domination des Tartares*, 83.

[12] See Hosoya 1968; 36–37; Kanda 1981: 124–125; Tu 1991a: 94–95; Suzuki 2001b.

to the specific political circumstances of the struggles surrounding the selection of K'ang-hsi's successor, they were in fact consequences of a system of rule going back to the establishment of the Eight Banners by Nurhaci.

Let us now examine the content of the account by Parennin quoted at the beginning. The first of the two kinds of servants, described as "slaves of their household" (*esclaves de leur maison*), corresponds to *aha*, usually translated as "slave," and this expression is the literal equivalent of *booi aha* ('household slave').[13] The second group, consisting of "Tartars (i.e., Manchus) or Tartarized Chinese whom the Emperor gives" (*Tartares ou Chinois Tartarisés, que l'Empereur donne*) and who, although not slaves, are similarly subservient, is none other than the subordinates of banner princes considered above.[14] According to Parennin, these subordinates were called "people of his gate" (*les gens de sa porte*), which probably corresponds to the Manchu *dukai niyalma*, meaning literally "people of the gate."[15] And it should not be necessary to point out that the "giving" (*donne*; Ma. *bumbi*) of them to "Princes of his Blood" (*les Princes de son Sang*) signifies the establishment of a master-servant relationship that had continued since the establishment of the Eight Banners. Furthermore, these master-servant relationships were established with the *niru* as their unit on the basis of the organizational principles of the Eight Banners, based as they were on the *niru*.[16]

Why, then, would a strict master-servant relationship such as this, going back to the time of Nurhaci, have continued to exist a century later? It would hardly be likely to have perdured merely as a result of demands for subservience. This point has not been properly explained even in earlier research focusing on master-servant relationships, but Greslon provides a lucid explanation of this too.[17]

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[13] See Ishibashi (H.) 1988: 1989, I: 5. 6.

[14] "Tartarized Chinese" refers to Chinese martial bannermen, and this expression also appears as "les Chinois Tartarisez" in Joachim Bouvet's biography of the K'ang-hsi emperor (*see Histoire de l'Empereur de la Chine*, 71). For a concrete example of "Tartarization," see Sugiyama 2004.

[15] The gate was symbolic of the aristocracy, and the expression *dukai niyalma* (*men-hsia chih jen* 門下之人) clearly denotes subordinates. This calls to mind the usage of *kapi* ('door, gate') in the Ottoman empire.

[16] For examples of the bestowal of *niru*, see Hosoya 1968; Anami 1980; Tu 1987, 1998; Sugiyama 1998, 2001a, 2001c, etc.

[17] *Histoire de la Chine sous la domination des Tartares*, 119.

> It is not only soldiers, but also most of the Civil and Military Mandarins and a large number of people, who are subject to these eight banners.... When a man has been once engaged, there is no way for him to withdraw. His wife, his children, and all his descendants are judged to be in perpetuity captives of the Princes under the banner of whom he has been enrolled.... Those who are engaged in this manner have two great advantages. The first is that they are assured of the Princes' protection, and for this reason there is no one who dares to offend them. The second is that they are easily elevated to official positions, and these two great advantages mean that they consider themselves fortunate to be engaged.

Thus it was not simply a strict relationship, and in return for their absolute subservience the subordinates were promised protection by their master and employment as government officials. Moreover, as is shown by the reference here to "most of the Civil and Military Mandarins" (*la pluspart des Mandarins de Lettres, & d'Armes*) and by Parennin's mention of "considerable Mandarins" (*Mandarins considérables*), the Eight Banners functioned as a source of personnel for official posts, especially those of high-ranking officials. Thus, while it is true that the Ch'ing took over the Ming bureaucracy more or less as it was, it was "hijacked," as it were, by infiltrating it through personnel appointments. Furthermore, the officials were not really at the beck and call of the emperor, and rather the banner princes, including the emperor, shared power and territory through their subordinates.

It could, however, be argued from a "China-centred" viewpoint that, since in the top official positions Manchu bannermen were paired with Han Chinese officials in a well-known dyarchical system, Han Chinese officials had not been ousted by bannermen and in actual administrative work it was not the bannermen, who were no more than men-of-arms unfamiliar with spoken and written Chinese, but rather their Chinese colleagues who held real power. But Greslon also writes as follows:[18]

> The Tartars doubled all the Positions of the Court so that in each Position there is a Tartar Mandarin and another Chinese. This was a result of the shrewdness of the Tartars who, seeing that they did not yet have the experience necessary for governing by themselves, and besides not trusting the Chinese, used this artifice. Today they are more competent in the style of Chinese Administration and are starting to take the upper hand to such a degree that [their Chinese colleagues in] these Positions hardly retain more than the name of Mandarin.

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[18] Ibid., 96.

Thus, in the Ch'ing empire, following the principles of the Eight Banners going back to the founding of the nation, according to which bannermen entered into a master-servant relationship with their banner prince, bannermen filled the posts carried over from the Ming, and this meant in terms of Manchu-Chinese relations that real ruling power shifted from the grasp of bureaucrats recruited through the civil service examinations of the former Ming into the hands of Manchu bannermen, while in terms of the Eight Banners it meant that, regardless of any jurisdictional relationships in the administrative system, these posts fell under the influence of individual banner princes.

II

As we have seen in the above, during the Ch'ing not only was the distinction between emperor and subjects important, as during the Ming, but so too was the distinction between banner prince and subordinates. Accordingly, I next wish to examine the order obtaining within the status groups of banner prince and subordinate.

Let us begin by considering the banner princes, or the imperial nobility of the Ch'ing. Originally the Manchus referred to tribal chieftains in general as *beile*, but under Nurhaci imperial princes invested with one of the Eight Banners came to be called *beile*, and after Hong Taiji's accession to the throne in 1636 there evolved a system of imperial princely ranks combining Manchu titles with Ming ranks and headed by the *hošoi cin wang* (*ho-shih ch'in-wang* 和碩親王) (see Kanda 1958 and "Hereditary Ranks of Imperial Nobility" in Table 1). In the past, research on the imperial families of China's dynasties has tended to focus on negative aspects such as their impoverishment and the increasing burden placed on state finances due to the increase in their numbers, but since the 1990s there have appeared many fresh research results on the Ch'ing imperial lineage, or Aisin Gioro clan, and Tu Chia-chi in particular has shed light on its political participation and privileges from various angles.[19]

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[19] See Tu 1987, 1994, 1998; Rawski 1998: Chap. 2. In addition, works devoted to this subject include Li Chung-ch'ing 李中清 (James Lee) and Kuo Sung-i 郭松義, eds., *Ch'ing-tai huang-tsu jen-k'ou hsing-wei yü she-hui huan-ching* 清代皇族人口行爲與社會環境 (Demographic behaviour and social environment of the Ch'ing imperial family; Peking: Pei-ching Ta-hsüeh Ch'u-pan-she 北京大學出版社, 1994); and Lai Hui-min 幗惠敏, *T'ien-huang kuei-chou* 天黄贵冑 (The Ch'ing imperial lineage: T'ai-pei: Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yüan 中央研究院, 1997).

Table 1

	Hereditary Ranks of Imperial Nobility	Hereditary Ranks of Non-imperial Nobility	Eight Banner Officers & Civilian Officials
Imperial Princes	*hošoi cin wang* (*ho-skih ch'in-wang* 和碩親王) *dorai giyūn wang* (*to-lo chün-wang* 多羅郡王) *doroi beile* (*to-lo pei-lo* 多羅貝勒) *gūsai beise* (*ku-shan kei-tzu* 固山貝子) dukes entitled to eight privileges (*ju pa-fen kung* 入八分公) [*chen-kuo kung* 鎖國公, *fu-kuo kung* 輔國公]		
1st Class	dukes not entitled to eight privileges (*pu ju pa-fen kung* 不入八分公) [*pu ju pa-fen chen-kuo kung* 不入八分鎮國公, *pu ju pa-fen fu-kuo kung* 不入八分輔國公] *chen-kuo chiang-chün* 鎮國將軍	*kung* 公 (duke) *hou* 侯 (marquis) *po* 伯 (earl) *jingkini hafan*	*tu-t'ung* 都統 (banner commander) *shang-shu* 尚書 (minister) officials of the 1st rank
2nd Class	*fu-kuo chiang chün* 輔國將軍	*ashan i hafan*	*fu-tu-t'ung* 副都統 (vice banner commander) *shih-lang* 侍郎 (vice minister), *ta-chiu-ch'ing* 大九麵 (nine greater chief ministers) officials of the 2nd rank
3rd Class	*feng-kuo chiang-chün* 奉國將軍	*adaha hafan*	*lang-chung* 郎屮 (director), *hsiao-chiu-ch'ing* 小九卿 (nine lesser chief ministers) officials of the 3rd rank
4th Class	*feng-en chiang-chün* 奉恩將軍	*baitalabure hafan*	*tso-ling* 佐領 (company commander) officials of the 4th rank

Sources: *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* (K'ang-hsi edition) 41, "Li-pu," "Ch'ang ch'ao-i" (see n. 23); *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* (Ch'ien-lung edition) 56, "Li-pu," "Ch'ao-hui" 朝會.

The first distinguishing feature of the Ch'ing imperial nobility was, as has been stressed by Tu, that they were of exceedingly high status. This is clearly evident in the elevation of their position, which was far higher than that of the non-imperial nobility, and princes of the blood of the first five degrees (the fifth degree being divided into Defender Dukes [*chen-kuo kung* 鎮國公] and Bulwark Dukes [*fu-kuo kung* 輔國公]) were all ranked above a non-imperial duke and officials of the senior first rank.[20] This distinction is found not only in various regulations, and in a letter dated 20 August 1724 Parennin testifies to it on the basis of his own experience.[21]

> Apart from these three ranks (i.e., *cin wang*, *giyūn wang* and *beile*), this same Emperor established some others which are inferior to them and which are given to other sons who are the most worthy of them. Those of the fourth degree are called *Peitsé* (i.e., *beise*), those of the fifth *Cong* (i.e., *kung* 公), and likewise with the others. This fifth degree is still above all the highest Mandarins of the Empire....
>
> The occupation of these Princes, ascending from the fifth Order to the first, is usually to attend public ceremonies, to present themselves every morning at the Palace of the Emperor, and then to withdraw to their own Palace, where they have no other care apart from managing their own family, the Mandarins, and the other Officials of which the Emperor has composed their Households.

The second distinguishing feature of imperial nobles was that their positions were linked to the Eight Banners. As is indicated by Parennin when he writes that their status is "above all the highest Mandarins of the Empire" (*au-dessus de tous les plus grands Mandarins de l'Empire*) and that they manage (*gouverner*) "the Mandarins and the other Officials of which the Emperor has composed their Households" (*les Mandarins, & les autres Officiers dont l'Empereur a composé leurs Maisons*), members of the imperial clan with the rank of duke and higher were, under the Eight Banners, not subordinates but masters as far as the exaltedness of their positions and their rights of control over their subordinates were concerned. This was expressed in terms of the eight privileges (*jakūn ubu/pa-fen* 八分), and they were clearly differentiated from those of lower ranks who were not entitled to the eight privileges (*jakūn ubu de dosimbuhakū/pu ju pa-fen* 小人八分).[22] The term *ubu/fen* 分 means "share" and the ability to partake of one's share, and there were eight because those entitled to them were divided equally among the Eight Banners. (Therefore, they do not refer to eight particular people or eight specific lineages.) If someone did not have these eight privileges, it meant that they were not a master, but a subordinate, and this distinction was made visibly apparent in ceremonies. The regulations for regular morning audiences in 1661 given in the K'ang-hsi edition of the *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* 大清會典 read as follows:[23]

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[20] Tu 1994: 137–140; 1998: 255–259.

[21] *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, Vol. 17 (1726): 7, 9–10. In the original, the word "Emperor" is given as *Taitsou* (T'ai-tsu 太祖), i.e., Nurhaci, but this is an error on Parennin's part, and it should be T'ai-tsung 太宗, i.e., Hong Taiji.

[22] Tu 1991b: 237–239; 1998: 70–80, 258–259.

> In Shun-chih 18 the following memorial was presented to the Emperor, sanctioned, and put into effect: "On days when they assemble for various ceremonies and on days when they regularly attend their office, the dukes of the eight privileges (*pa-fen kung* 八分公) and higher, beginning with the *ho-shih ch'in-wang*, are to perform their salutations at the altar, and when they have finished saluting they are to enter the palace and sit in the order of their rank. Dukes not entitled to the eight privileges (*pu ju pa-fen kung* 不入八分公) and those below are to gather by their banner, make their salutations, and sit in rows."

Table 1 shows in tabular form the regulations regarding ranking in the 1660s and 1670s on the basis of the above passage and other relevant passages. It is evident from these passages that whereas dukes of the eight privileges and higher lined up closer to the emperor by the altar and inside the palace, those of lower rank assembled in their respective banners, and they were treated as bannermen rather than banner princes. An eyewitness account tallying with the above prescriptions has been left by Greslon who, when relating the confrontation between the missionaries and Yang Kuang-hsien 楊光先 concerning European astronomy in 1665, immediately after the implementation of the above regulations, describes the scene in the following manner:[24]

> .... Here is the order of the seating of the Mandarins, who always attended this event, with their ceremonial robes, which are very sumptuous and very majestic. The Princes of the Blood, who were not always the same, but sometimes some and sometimes others, were seated at the head of the Hall on a kind of Divan or Stage; on each side there were three rows of Mandarins, who occupied the entire length of the Hall.
>
> The *Colao* (i.e., *ko-lao* 閣老) took up the first row, next came all the Mandarins of the six great Boards, then came the *Coucham* (i.e., *ku-shan* 固山), who are like the Lieutenant Generals of the Princes of the Blood and who govern in their name the militia and all the people who under their banners. Behind them were seated a number of other Mandarins of the first and second rank, each in their order. The Assembly was composed of about two hundred people. All were seated on the floor on Turkish carpets, their legs crossed one over the other, in the manner of Tartars.

As can be seen in Greslon's account and Table 1, those who were lined up in a way that clearly distinguished them from imperial nobles possessing the eight privileges and higher were subordinates consisting of dukes of the imperial lineage not entitled to the eight privileges and those below, as well as vassals belonging to other clans. The subordinates lined up according to rank, starting with those of the highest rank, and the criterion used in their ranking was not only the ranking of civilian and military posts in the Six Boards (*liu-pu* 六部), Eight Banners, and so on, but also that of titular ranks starting with dukes. Thus, just as imperial nobles were ranked according to their imperial rank, so too were subordinates ranked according to titular ranks.

Of course, a peerage system had existed in China from ancient times, but as is indicated by designations such as "hereditary officials" (*jalan sirara hafan/shih-chih* 世職 or *shih-chüeh* 世爵) and "military officers" (*coohai hafan/wu-kuan* 武官 or *wu-chüeh* 武爵), the peerage system of the Ch'ing was of a multifaceted character, and rather than having been borrowed from the Ming, it was a rank system that had evolved in its own way. Its origins lay in military ranks at the time of Nurhaci, which were linked to the Eight Banners, and ranks were accompanied by privileges such as special treatment on ceremonial occasions and stipends. After undergoing various changes, the Chinese-language equivalents of the traditional five ranks of the nobility were finally fixed in 1736 and the peerage system achieved its final form (Table 2).[25]

The rank system was called "hereditary" (as in *shih-chih* or *shih-chüeh*) because titles and privileges could be inherited, and it was called "military" (as in *wu-kuan* or *wu-chüeh*) because ranks were bestowed chiefly on account of military exploits. The criterion used in bestowing them was a sense of values that measured the degree of service rendered to the dynasty, and this was called "merit" (*gung/kung* 功), with a meritorious subject being known as a *gungge amban*. This meant that those of greater

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[23] *Ta Ch'ing hui-tien* (K'ang-hsi edition) 41, "Li-pu" 禮部, "Ch'ang ch'ao-i" 常朝儀 (repr. of Chinese version in *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an san-pien* 近代中國史料叢刊三編, Vol. 716: 1983–34).

[24] *Histoire de la Chine sous la domination des Tartares*, 153–154.

[25] See Matsuura 1984; Rawski 1998: Chap. 2; Lui 2001: 245–252; Ueda 2003.

Table 2 (cf. Matsuura 1984; Ueda 2003)

1620–1634		1634–		1664, 1647–		1736–	
		paramount ranks to 3rd degree	*kung* 公 (duke)	1st to 3rd degrees	*kung*	1st to 3rd degrees	*kung*
				1st degree +1 1st to 3rd degrees	*hou* 侯 (marquis)	1st degree + 1 1st to 3rd degrees	*hou*
				1st degree +1 1st to 3rd degrees	*po* 伯 (earl)	1st degree + 1 1st to 3rd degrees	*po*
1st to 3rd degrees	*tsung-ping-kuan* (regional commander)	1st to 3rd degrees	*amban janggin*	1st degree +1 1st to 3rd degrees	*jingkini hafan*	1st degree + 1 1st to 3rd degrees	*tzu* 子 (viscount)
1st to 3rd degrees	*fu-chiang* 副將 (regional vice commander)	1st to 3rd degrees	*meiren i janggin*	1st degree +1 1st to 3rd degrees	*ashan i hafan*	1st degree + 1 1st to 3rd degrees	*nan* 男 (baron)
1st to 3rd degrees	*ts'an-chiang* 參將 (assistant regional commander)	1st to 3rd degrees	*jalan i janggin*	1st degree +1 1st to 3rd degrees	*adaha hafan*	1st degree + 1 1st to 3rd degrees	*ch'ing-ch'e tu-wei* 塗清枝偉 (commandant of light chariots)
1st to 3rd degrees	*yu-chi* 遊擊 (brigade commander)						
	pei-yü 備禦	*nirui janggin*		*baitalabure hafan*		+ 1	*chi tu-wei* 騎都尉 (commandant of cavalry)
		hontoho nirui janggin		*tuwašara hafan*		*yün-chi-wei* 罢騎尉 (commandant of fleet-as-clouds cavalry)	

* The figure "+1" in the degrees column for 1647 and later represents 1 *yün-chi-wei* (*tuwašara hafan*).

merit, those who had submitted to the dynasty of their own accord, or those who had submitted at an early stage were rewarded with a higher rank and greater privileges than those of less merit, those who had been overcome by military might, or those who had submitted at a later stage.

In addition, there were two distinctive features in the operations of this rank system. First, there were clear-cut assessment criteria, such that a title could be passed on if the holder had died in battle but not if he had died of illness, and these criteria were treated as "points" in a distinctive numerically quantified method of assessment that calculated rewards and punishments in units called *tuwašara hafan* (*yün-chi-wei* 雲騎尉). For example, according to the regulations established in 1736, a duke of the first class, the highest rank, corresponded to 26 *tuwašara hafan*. Secondly, although the bestowal and raising or lowering of hereditary noble titles was basically dependent on an individual's achievements, merit was treated as something that accumulated through transmission from one generation to the next, and this accumulation was expressed in the addition or reduction of hereditary rank in the form of "points." This meant that those whose ancestors had possessed great merit or those whose family had served the dynasty for more generations were treated more favorably than those whose ancestors had possessed less merit or those whose family had only recently entered into the service of the dynasty. Therefore, while the system of hereditary noble titles had a centralized aspect in that they were bestowed solely by the emperor, on the other hand it also included the aspect of a vassal's "points," with which not even the emperor could meddle at will. For instance, under both the Ming and the Ch'ing, if a Chinese official committed an error or crime that merited the death penalty, it was usual for his privileges to be removed and his family to be reduced to ruin as well, but in the case of a bannerman, even if he himself were put to death, the hereditary title itself would be inherited by his sons, albeit with some sort of penalty attached.[26]

Thus hereditary ranks were not mere prestige titles, and if official ranks could be regarded as a Ming-like ranking system for ranking Chinese officials recruited through the civil service examination system (Tanii 2002), then hereditary noble titles could be described as a Manchu ranking system. Above these hereditary ranks there were those with the status of imperial nobles, who were ranked according to imperial ranks, and because, as was noted earlier, among the imperial nobility dukes not entitled to the eight privileges were of equal rank to dukes of the non-imperial nobility, the ruling stratum of the Ch'ing empire could in one respect be said to have been uniformly graded according to titular rank.

In the Ch'ing empire there thus existed not only a distinction between the emperor and all other people, carried over from the Ming, but also a clear distinction between the imperial nobility, with the emperor as *primus inter pares*, and their vassals and bondsmen. Oka Hiroki has pointed out that both princes of the Aisin Gioro clan and princes of the Mongol

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[26] For example, in the case of Hešen (He-shen 和珅), the well-known court favourite of the Ch'ien-lung 乾降 emperor, he himself was ordered to commit suicide, but his family was not punished, and while his rank was reduced, it was passed on to his son. See *Ch'ing-shih kao* 淸史稿 168, "I-teng Chung-hsiang kung"—等忠襄公 (repr. Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü 屮華畨局, 1976–77, Vol. 19: 5397–99).

Borjigid clan constituted imperial nobilities of the same category and stood at the pinnacle of all status groups, while Kataoka Kazutada has noted that in addition to these Manchu and Mongol imperial princes, the Muslim princes of East Turkistan, who were granted similar princely ranks, and the Kazakh and Khoqandi princes, who were regarded as an extension of them, were treated as Outer (*wai-fan* 外藩) princes or their equivalents. In addition, as regards the way in which these various entities were confederated, Kusunoki Yoshimichi has presented a model centred on the khan or emperor at the head of the Plain and Bordered Yellow Banners under his direct supervision, surrounded by the banner princes of the imperial clan, in turn surrounded by the Outer Mongol princes, and he argues that this setup remained in force at least until the start of the nineteenth century.[27] The structure of rule in the Ch'ing empire thus manifested in one respect as a confederation of "inner" princes of the imperial clan and "outer" princes headed by the Mongol princes, and the system of imperial ranks could be said to have represented a uniform ranking of these princes, who were of equal status insofar that they swore allegiance to the Ch'ing emperor and wielded power over their own subordinates. In this sense it could be said that it was China proper, where there was no status group of imperial princes and where non-hereditary and non-consanguineous officials recruited through the civil service examinations directly served the emperor, that possessed a completely different principle of rule, even though it goes without saying that the Chinese were overwhelmingly preponderant in terms of population and economic power.

III

How, then, can the results of our above inquiries be situated within the study of Ch'ing history, which is currently undergoing great changes? The view focusing on the fact that the rulers of the Ch'ing empire were Manchus is no longer restricted to the areas of Jurchen/Manchu history and the history of the Eight Banners, and since the 1990s, chiefly in the United States, it has gradually come to be generally accepted by many researchers.[28] A distinctive feature of this research has been that scholars

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[27] Oka 1994: 55–57; 1998: 132–136; Kataoka 1998: 241–252: Kusunoki 2000: 27–30.

[28] E.g., Rawski 1998; Crossley 1999; Elliott 2000. See also the forum in *Journal of Asian Studies* 61–1 (2002).

have employed the analytic concepts of ethnicity and identity in their approaches to the subject and have made full use of documentary materials (including many unpublished sources). Their prime concerns have been to elucidate the legitimacy of Ch'ing rule in a way that differs from earlier explanations about the adoption of Confucian orthodoxy and to clarify the ethnic identity of the Manchus in a manner differing from the earlier understanding that stressed the "Sinicization" of the Manchus, and for this reason attention has concentrated on the Manchus and Manchuness. Meanwhile in Japan, where it had been customary to treat the Ming and the Ch'ing as a single connected whole, interest has focused on differences in the administrative structure and policy trends of the Ming and the Ch'ing, and it has been proposed that the background to the state formation of the Ch'ing and its characteristics be understood within the framework of the worldwide growth of international commerce during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the formation of new emergent forces within this context.[29] These scholars would view the régime of Nurhaci and his successors as part of political and social changes that occurred on the peripheries of the East Asian world, and they detect features shared with contemporaneous frontier warlords and the maritime forces of the Cheng 鄭 family in the late Ming and also the régime that unified Japan. Whereas past research on Jurchen/Manchu history has regarded the state formation of the Manchus as an almost self-evident premise, on the basis of which it has concentrated on elucidating the formation and functions of its various internal institutions, this more recent research reconsiders the very rise of the Ch'ing as a problematic issue and situates it within contemporary movements in world history, and it offers an extremely important research perspective not only for Chinese and East Asian history, but also for Manchu-Ch'ing history.

What orientation, then, can be added to these new currents? Looking back on the research being conducted in the United States, we find that while it draws attention to the continuity before and after the Manchu conquest and to the distinctiveness of the Ch'ing, it could basically be said to have started out from an interest in early modern and modern Chinese history rather than an interest in Manchu-Ch'ing history *per se*. In addition, Japanese theories about "early modern" East Asia and "frontier society" attach particular importance to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a historical period and lay stress on the discovery of commonalities rather than differences between contemporary states and régimes in various regions. While I am not loath to acknowledge the achievements of this research, at the same time these currents in Japanese, United States, and also Chinese-language academia are limited in their ability to answer questions about the origins of Ch'ing distinctiveness or about the pedigree of its political culture. Although it is true that the state formation of the Manchus shared background factors and characteristics with states and forces that evolved in the same period, it has also been pointed out that while they grew from the same matrix, differences in the methods that were selected to organize these states and societies engraved upon each of these coexisting régimes their own distinctive qualities.[30] Where, then, is the source of these differences to be sought?

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[29] E.g., Iwai 1996; Kishimoto 1995, 1998, 2001. In addition, on trends in Manchu-Ch'ing history and related fields, see Sugiyama 2001b: 111–119.

If we now summarize the results of previous research and our present inquiry, the characteristics of the early Manchu-Ch'ing state as organized under the Eight Banners could be listed as follows: (1) The existence of a systematic hierarchy ranging from the *niru* to the banner. (2) The character of its kingship. The position of the khan or emperor was not that of a monarch wielding power over all his subjects, but was rooted rather in the notion that the imperial clan was *primus inter pares*, and it represented a form of kingship in which succession to the throne and governance always required (at least in theory) consultation with and the consent of princes of the Eight Banners. This also manifested in the form of a sharp distinction between the imperial nobility and their subordinates. (3) The principle of organization and management of people-based groups. In addition to a realistic attitude that assessed an individual's abilities and achievements regardless of birth, be he Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese, or even European, there also existed the notion that merits and demerits *vis-à-vis* the dynasty, as well as social status, did not attach only to the individual, but were accumulated by his family line. Manifestations of this were an imperial nobility and, in the case of their subordinates, a system of hereditary titles that ultimately took the form of a peerage system. This means that in one respect the state represented a confederation of powerful families headed by the imperial Aisin Gioro clan and graded according to a rank system. (4) The existence of groups of aides serving the ruler.[31] The emperor and banner princes were attended by groups of aides selected from among those under their command. These included the *hiya* (*shih-wei* 侍衞 or *hu-wei* 護衞), or Imperial Guard, whose basic duty was to provide security, the *baksi* or *bithesi* (*pi-t'ieh-shih* 筆帖式), who were clerks, and the *booi*, who were in charge of household affairs, and not only did they attend on and serve the emperor and banner princes, but, as was seen in Section I, by filling together with ordinary subordinates posts inherited from the Ming in both the capital and the provinces they gained control of strategic positions within the bureaucracy and acted at the beck and call of their own masters.

It should now be hardly necessary to point out that the characteristics of this state, which evolved in Manchuria and then swept south of the Great Wall, were not inherited from or modelled on the Ming. Nor can they all be regarded solely as Jurchen or Manchu in character or as the creation of the state founders. A pyramid hierarchy with people as its basic unit, the joint and shared rule of the state by imperial princes and their control of subjects belonging to other families by means of a master-servant system, and the balancing of a strict meritocracy with respect for blood ties and lineage—these are all nothing other than characteristics of Central Eurasian states, typified by the Činggisid Mongol empire.[32] As is symbolized by the fact that in Greslon's description of the assembly quoted earlier it is stated that "all were seated on the floor on Turkish carpets, their legs crossed one over the other, in the manner of Tartars," this state was not a dynasty of northeastern China, but a Manchu khanate situated on the eastern extremity of Central Eurasia, and it was distinguished by the fact that the characteristic features of Central Eurasian states assumed the form of the Eight Banners. That is to say, the imperial nobility was differentiated in accordance with whether or not its members were entitled to the eight privileges based on the Eight Banners, a master-servant relationship with their subordinates was established with the *niru* as its basic unit, and the role of the *kešig* (*ch'ieh-hsieh* 怯薛 or *ch'ieh-hsieh-tai* 怯薛歹) in Mongol was fulfilled by the *hiya* and *booi*.[33]

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[30] Kishimoto 1998: 70; 2001: 7.

[31] See Sugiyama 2003: 117–118, 126–129. On issues relating to *booi*, see also Ishibashi Takao, "*Booi* in the Ch'ing Dynasty," *Pien-cheng Yen-chiu-so Nien-pao* 邊政研究所年報 18 (1987): 197–207.

[32] "Central Eurasian states" refers to states which ruled over large regions and, while nomadic in their basic form, also included the Ch'ing empire of the Manchus, who were not nomads. On the characteristic features of the methods of organization employed in such states, see Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明, "Teikokushi no myakuraku" 帝國史の脈絡 (The context of imperial history), in Yamamoto Yūzō 山本有造 ed., *Teikoku no kenkyū* 帝國の研究 (Studies of empires, Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大學出版會, 2003), 67–70.

Concluding Remarks

The Ch'ing dynasty is often considered to represent the last Chinese imperial dynasty, the culmination of China's monarchic autocracy or the culmination of its civil service examination system and civil service administrative system. If this were indeed the case, then why was it that imperial princes headed by *hošoi cin wang* and ministers belonging to the Eight Banners appeared as the power holders before the missionaries of the eighteenth century and foreign diplomats in the nineteenth century? If the Ming dynasty had survived for another two centuries, or if Li Tz'u-ch'eng had managed to defend the imperial throne, or if the Ch'ing dynasty had, as is often claimed, really become a Chinese dynasty, then the holders of power seen by Westerners in the late Ch'ing would have been not the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi 慈禳 or Prince Kung 恭 (I-hsin 突訢), but either grand secretaries with a *chin-shih* 進士 degree or eunuchs.

In the above I have considered the period of more than one century up until the early eighteenth century, focusing on the principles of the management and composition of various institutions rather than on their history and functions, and I have suggested the need for a reexamination of our image of the Ch'ing empire. From this there has emerged a picture of the Manchu-Ch'ing state that differs not only from that of conventional Chinese history, as is only to be expected, but also from the view of the Manchu-Ch'ing state put forward in recent years by Ishibashi Takao (2000, etc.). In the future there is a need for still further evidentialist research on this period, and it also needs to be determined through an examination of the Ch'ien-lung 乾隆 era whether there were any changes as a result of the Yung-cheng reforms, and, if so, what these changes were.

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[33] Rawski (1998: 82–87) also draws attention to the *hiya* and *booi* in their capacity as aides. Similarities with the Mongol *kešig* are pointed out by Masui (2001: 51–54) and Sugiyama (2003: 119–129). Cf. Mitamura 1965: 210–213. The clearest picture of their circumstances is provided in an eyewitness account by Bouvet (*Histoire de l'Empereur de la Chine*, 71–72).

In conclusion, I would like to educe some general principles on the basis of the above inquiries. I consider the principle of rule in the Ch'ing empire to have resided in a hierarchy of blood-based, temporal and spatial closeness to the centre of power, that is, the emperor. By "blood-based" I refer to a grading of degrees of closeness, ranging from the consanguineous banner princes of the imperial clan to the Mongol princes related by marriage, bannermen distantly related or related by marriage, and all other people; "temporal" refers to a ranking whereby those who had submitted earlier received preferential treatment; and "spatial" refers to a ranking whereby those who served in the immediate presence of the emperor were able to win favours. This principle was understood in terms of the concept of "merit" and transformed into a system of imperial and hereditary ranks, and in instances of a particular ability or when a special favour was to be shown, this "closeness" was increased by methods such as attendance on the emperor as a *hiya* or *booi* or incorporation into a fictive family relationship through marriage or the bestowal of a name. Governance by means of palace memorials, indicative of a communicative closeness, and government by imperial princes in the late Ch'ing could also be considered to be based on these same principles. These characteristics could also be compared with the Mongol empire, where the criterion governing the treatment of various groups and individuals under the umbrella of the rulers was the notion of *huǰa'ur* (*ken-chiao* 根脚), indicating a person's relationship with the Mongol court and the great khan (*qaγan*), and one's treatment depended on the depth and length of this relationship.[34] At the same time, one is also reminded of the Tokugawa 徳川 shogunate in early modern Japan, where *daimyō* 大名 were divided in accordance with their closeness to the Tokugawa family into "related fiefs" (*shinpan* 親藩), "hereditary vassals" (*fudai* 譜代), and "outside lords" (*tozama* 外様) and were ranked by official position and family status. While it is not possible in this instance to discover any common origin or mutual influence in these institutions and characteristics, as in the case of the Mongol empire, it provides an interesting subject for comparison as an example of a military régime that established its rule at about the same time, and it could also be said to throw into still sharper relief the distinctive features of the Manchu-Ch'ing empire.[35]

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[34] On *huǰa'ur*, see Murakami Masatsugu 村上正二, *Mongoru teikokushi kenkyū* モンゴル帝國史研究 (A study of the history of the Mongol empire; Kazama Shobō 風間書房, 1993), 168–169 (first published 1951). On *ken-chiao*, see Otagi Matsuo 愛宕松男, *Otagi Matsuo Tōyō shigaku ronshū* 愛宕松男東洋史學論集 (Collected articles on the study of Oriental history by Otagi Matsuo), Vol. 4 (San'ichi Shobō 三一書房, 1998), 116–118 (first published 1943); and *Chūgokushi 3: Godai~Gen* 中國史3 五代~元 (History of China, 3: Five Dynasties to Yüan; Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, 1997), 508 (by Morita Kenji 森田憲司).

In this fashion there continued to exist within the Ch'ing empire a Manchu khanate unified by means of its own order in the form of the Eight Banners and, in the words of Meng Sen, "within China there was, namely, contained a Manchu nation, and they never intermixed for even a single day" (卽中國之中涵一滿洲國, 未嘗一日與混合也).[36] While I do not claim that this allows us to understand everything there is to know about the structure of rule in the Ch'ing empire, it could be said that our comprehension of the structure of rule under the Ch'ing is inadequate without this understanding. This understanding should, moreover, contribute not only to the study of Ch'ing history *per se*, but also to the investigation of the traditions of political culture in the world of Central Eurasia, represented by the Mongol empire, and to a contemporaneous grasp of "early modern" states in East Asia.

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[35] Cf. Kishimoto 1998, 2001, and also Kishimoto's article included in the present volume. Comparisons with the Ottoman empire have also been proposed; see Suzuki Tadashi 鈴木董, *Osuman teikoku no kenryoku to erīto* オスマン帝國の�院力とェリート (The power of the Ottoman empire and its élite; Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1993), 5; and Yoshizawa Seiichirō 吉澤誠一郎, *Aikokushugi no sōsei* 愛國主義の創成 (The creation of patriotism; Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2003), 203–212.

[36] Meng Sen 孟森, "Pa-chi'i chih-tu k'ao-shih" 八旗制度考實 (An investigation into the Eight Banners system), in *Ming-Ch'ing-shih lun-chu chi-k'an* 明淸史論著集刊 (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1959), Vol. 1: 218 (first published 1936).

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■ Source: Perdue, Peter C., 'Comparing empires: Manchu colonialism', in *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 1998), reprinted by permission of the publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd, (www.tandfonline.com) pp. 255–262.

COMPARING EMPIRES: MANCHU COLONIALISM

Peter C. Perdue

The Qing empire of China was a colonial empire that ruled over a diverse collection of peoples with separate identities and deserves comparison with other empires. This claim is more problematic than it seems. The reigning tradition of nationalist historiography, practised in both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, rejects the comparison in principle. Nationalist scholars argue that China is not like other imperialist powers, because all of its peoples were 'unified' (*tongyi*), not conquered, under the aegis of an inclusive culture-state. The modern Chinese nation-state, which inherits nearly all of the territory and peoples of the Qing, thus defines itself as a 'multinationality' state that represents the culmination of millennia of Chinese imperial history.

Traditionalist historians, who take the line taken by the Qing empire itself, also reject the validity of the comparison, to the extent that they argue that Chinese imperial domination of non-Han peoples was based not on coercion, but on cultural assimilation. From this perspective, frontier peoples willingly accepted the norms of the orthodox Confucian culture because they recognized its superiority. The Chinese empire was a universalist civilization, not an ordinary state, because it claimed legitimacy on the basis of humanist cultural foundations, not on the contingencies of military conquest or material interest. Only rebels and bandits, whose sole interest lay in creating disorder, could reject the claims to domination of the imperial state, and they deserved ruthless suppression.

Despite obvious deficiencies, these views remain influential in studies of China.[1] Nationalist historians take the essentialist view that all the basic features of the contemporary nation-state are found in the distant past without fundamental alteration. They turn a particular moment of imperial expansion—the maximal borders attained by the Qing empire in the mid-eighteenth century—into ideal boundaries defining a timeless national culture. They ignore the contradictions between imperial pretensions and the peoples under Qing subjection, and they do not take serious account of heterodox, autonomous rivals to official ideology. Likewise, traditionalists, with their assumption of easy assimilation, play down the brute facts of conquest, or the effective use of material lures to induce subject peoples to take on new cultural forms. Both place the Chinese empire beyond the reach of comparison by pointing to its unique features: the long, continuous evolution of classical culture and the imperial bureaucratic state, the large Han population facing a more sparsely populated Inner Asian frontier, and the relative isolation of China from global currents of change.

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[1] Pamela Kyle Crossley, 'Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China', *Late Imperial China*, xi (1990), 1–35.

A comparative approach points to different aspects of Chinese imperial rule, highlighting those in which it resembled other empires. Like other empires, the Chinese rulers had to maintain large military forces for domestic repression and frontier defence. They had to collect taxes from the agrarian population, ensure the obedience of local élites, and preserve social order with a minimal administrative apparatus. They had somehow to reconcile the great diversity of local practices and cultures with the bureaucratic impulse to uniformity. And they had to win over, or at least gain grudging acceptance of their rule from subject peoples who, if unconstrained by threats and promises, would have preferred much greater autonomy.

A comparative approach will help to integrate the study of China into world history. China was never completely isolated from global processes, although its links with western Eurasia were usually more tenuous than those of western Eurasia with the Middle East, Africa, or South Asia. Central Eurasian nomads introduced horse riding and the chariot into China after they brought the same crucial military technologies to the Near East. The Silk Road linked Chinese exports along the caravan route to the Roman and later empires, although it suffered frequent interruptions from upheavals in central Eurasia. Maritime contacts of China with South and South-East Asia flourished especially from the tenth to fifteenth centuries. By the sixteenth century, the global flow of New World silver connected China's economy, even if only marginally, to South America and the financial centres of Europe. In this context, the growth of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century opium-centred trade was not a great rupture. Like other early modern empires, China engaged in active trade and diplomatic relations with widely dispersed states and peoples. Jerry Bentley argues that 'processes transcending nations' should be the main


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TIBET
XINJIANG
ZUNGHARIA
Lake Balkhash
KAZAKH HORDE
Kashgar
Yarkand
ALTISHAHR
NEPAL
INDIA

Qing China: The Frontier Regions (*c.* 1800) factor determining the periodization of world history.[2] The three main processes he invokes are imperial conquest, migration of people, and cultural and commercial exchange. All these took place between China, Russia, and Mongolia in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.

The inherited tradition of comparative empire studies, as practised by certain sociologists from Max Weber to Shmuel Eisenstadt, has, however, gone down the wrong road, because these comparativists isolate their empires from history. Although any entity can be compared with any other, the most useful comparisons come from examining units that follow diverging paths from a common origin, or whose evolution is driven by common processes (for example, demographic or economic), or have extensive interactions with each other.[3] It is not profitable, for example, to erect ideal-typical models of agrarian empires, as Weber and Eisenstadt have done, and compare the Chinese empire as a timeless entity with these static models. This approach both ignores the great transformations of the Chinese empire over time and assumes that it is isolated from significant interactions with other states.

Some recent studies point in more profitable directions. Jack Goldstone's comparative examination of demographic-structural processes underlying the breakdown of early modern states discovers parallel processes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[4] He finds that England, France, Ming China, and the Ottoman Empire followed similar paths of state breakdown in this period. The three parallels he finds are, first, population pressure producing subsistence crises and agrarian unrest; second, fiscal crises producing incapacities of the state to finance international security and repress domestic dissent; and third, excess competition for élite posts among the younger generations, producing movements of dissident intellectuals. Most of Goldstone's argument focuses on England and France, and much of it was anticipated and applied more directly to Eurasia by Joseph Fletcher in a brilliant paper on integrative history in the early modern age.[5]

Finally, the concept of 'gunpowder empires' put forth in Marshall Hodgson's vast survey of the Islamic world, and summarized by William McNeill, resembles in a general way the comparative approaches mentioned above.[6] Hodgson found common structures and processes in the three great Islamic empires that emerged from the collapse of Chinggis Khan's Mongol empire from the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries: the Mughals in India, the Safavids in Iran, and the Ottomans in the Middle East. I would argue that three more empires can be added to this list: the Muscovite-Russian, the Ming-Qing, and the succession of Mongol states in central Eurasia in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

What these approaches have in common is that, first, they are limited to a particular period: they do not try to erect models removed from historical time; second, they are based closely on empirical examination of political, economic, military, and cultural institutions, not generalized from purported cultural ideals found in classical texts; and third, to some extent (McNeill more than others), they recognize the significance of interaction between empires.

The essays that follow all contribute to a comparative understanding of the Qing empire governed by these principles. Three of them analyse the relationship between central and local élites and institutions, a common subject of study for all imperial governments.

Nicola Di Cosmo focuses on the local administration of the newly conquered frontier regions by the Qing, unified by the Lifan Yuan, the court for the administration of the outer provinces, an unprecedented institution in Chinese dynastic history. In each of the outer provinces of the empire—Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia—the Manchu rulers set up different kinds of local administration, adapted to the special features of the local society. Local administration was also heavily shaped by how the expanding empire took over these regions: imperial residents and small garrisons combined with selective delegation of powers and allocation of privileges to native élites to tie the regions to the centre in a different

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[2] Jerry Bentley, 'Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History', *American Historical Review*, ci (1996), 749–70.

[3] Marc Bloch, 'Toward a Comparative History of European Societies', in *Land and Work in Medieval Europe* (New York, 1967), pp. 44–81; Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (New York, 1968); Shmuel Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1993).

[4] Jack A. Goldstone, 'East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, xxx (1988), 103–42 and *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, 1991).

[5] Joseph Fletcher, 'Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500–1800', *Journal of Turkish Studies*, ix (1985), 37–57.

[6] Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam:* III: *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago, 1974); *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, ed. Edmund Burke III (Cambridge, 1993); William H. McNeill, *The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450–1800* (Washington, 1989).

fashion from the regular bureaucratic structure of the interior. Dorothea Heuschert's study of Mongolian law codes complements Di Cosmo's essay by demonstrating the interaction of Manchu and Chinese concepts of legal order with local Mongolian cultures. Similarly, Elliot Sperling explores the ambivalent position of local élites in the frontier territories by analysing the autobiography of one Tibetan noble who played an active part in supporting Qing efforts to win legitimacy from the Tibetan Lamaist aristocracy. The Qing rulers adapted legal and bureaucratic structures, as well as personal relationships, to native customs in a sophisticated manner so as to accommodate difference within a unified empire.

Di Cosmo points to contrasts between Qing rule of the north and north-west regions and its policies towards the south-west border. The work of Jon Herman, Pat Giersch, and John Shepherd shows that Qing rulers faced similar issues of variant local administration and accommodation to native élites in Yunnan and Taiwan, but dealt with them differently, because the Manchu conquerors had no historical tradition of interaction with the south-west.[7] Although Qing policies towards the south-west are not discussed here in detail, we should keep in mind that imperial treatment of different regions varied significantly.

My essay focuses on interaction between empires. The evolving empires of central Eurasia in the early modern period shaped each other's political and military structures; they were not driven entirely by independent internal dynamics. All three shared common technologies, such as surveying and artillery, which linked them to the Jesuits, geodesists, and military technicians produced by the developments of seventeenth-century science and technology in Europe, particularly France.

Two of the essays look at symbolic and cultural configurations of empire. Emma Jinhua Teng's analyses Qing travel literature about Taiwan from a perspective influenced by recent developments in literary studies.[8] Chinese concepts of gender, expressed in accounts of Taiwan, show the mainland élite scholars using Taiwan as an arena to define their own gender identities. They used tropes of 'feminization of the male' indigenous

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[7] C. Patterson Giersch, 'China's Reluctant Subjects: The Qing Quest to Control Yunnan' (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1996); John E. Herman, 'Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System', *Journal of Asian Studies*, lvi (1997), 47–75; John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800* (Stanford, 1993).

[8] See also, Emma Jinhua Teng, 'Travel Writing and Colonial Collecting: Chinese Travel Accounts of Taiwan from the Seventeenth through Nineteenth Centuries' (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1997).

population, and eroticization of the feminine, to mark off the orthodox culture from the 'barbarian' one they perceived on the island. Much interesting comparative work on empires has focused on their use of gender categorization, and recent studies of early modern English literature have looked at the relationship of gender and power in travel writing.[9] Teng combines the two perspectives to bring imperial China within the orbit of discussions that have focused mainly on the New World.

Joanna Waley-Cohen examines the role of religious belief in Qing colonial conquest. Again, comparatively speaking, the relationship between material and religiously inspired motivations has been a constant theme in discussion of early modern European imperial conquest, whether Spanish, English, French, or Dutch. Waley-Cohen focuses on the complex relationship between the Qing state and the Tibetan Lama Buddhist institutions by looking at a specific campaign from the mid-eighteenth century in which Tibetan religious influence was particularly strong. The Qing emperors' attitudes towards Buddhism may have ranged from sceptical and manipulative to genuine personal belief, but they also had to reckon with the influence of Central Asian religious traditions on their Mongolian, Manchu, and possibly even Han Chinese soldiers. As long as shamans could invoke the terrifying 'storm magic' (*jada*) in the midst of a battle, their sources of power had to be controlled. On a higher plane, the Dalai Lama could not be allowed to claim independent access to authority outside the realm of the Qing state, so the Qing rulers made careful efforts to tighten their hold over the Tibetan Lamas through both coercive means—military invasion—and extensive monetary and symbolic rewards.

These essays mark only the beginning of a path leading to closer consideration of China in the context of the other great colonial empires. Despite the apparent differences between China and Europe, there are enough common traits to inspire further discussion. Instead of 'East is East, and West is West, and ne'er the twain shall meet', think of the Chinese proverb, 'Under Heaven all humans are kin' (*Tianxia zhi nei, ren jie xiongdi*).

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[9] Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago, 1991); Mary C. Fuller, *Voyages in Print: English Travel to America, 1576–1624* (Cambridge, 1995); *Domesticating the Empire: Languages of Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism, 1830–1962*, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda (Charlottesville, Va., forthcoming); Lora Wildenthal, 'Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire', in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler (Berkeley, forthcoming).

Later Chinese Dynasties	
Sui	581–617
Tang	618–907
Five Dynasties	907–960
Liao	916–1125
Northern Song	960–1127
Southern Song	1127–1279
Yuan	1271–1368
Ming	1368–1644
Qing	1644–1912

Manchu Khans	
Nurhaci	1583–1626
Hung Taiji	1627–1643

Qing Dynasty: Reign Titles	
Shunzhi	1645–1661
Kangxi	1662–1722
Yongzheng	1723–1735
Qianlong	1736–1795
Jiaqing	1796–1820
Daoguang	1821–1850
Xianfeng	1851–1861
Tongzhi	1862–1874
Guangxu	1875–1908
Xuantong	1909–1912

PART THREE

ETHNICITY

■ Source: Stary, Giovanni, 'The meaning of the word "Manchu": A new solution to an old problem', in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 34, Nos. 1–2 (1990), Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 109–119.

THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MANCHU": A NEW SOLUTION TO AN OLD PROBLEM*

Giovanni Stary

One of the many as yet unresolved questions of early Manchu history is that of the meaning and origin of the ethnonym "Manchu". Many scholars have dealt with this problem and many are the interpretations that have been advanced. Not one of them has been able to give a satisfactory explanation, neither from the linguistic point of view nor from the historical one.

All of these interpretations were carefully collated and discussed as early as 1626 by Erich Hauer and, for this reason, we shall limit ourselves to only a few of the more widespread ones and see why these are not easy to accept fully.[1]

1) *The Popular Interpretation*

This theory refers to the Chinese ideograms used to render this name, *"man-chu"* [1], in fact, the "Land of pearls" is indeed still spoken of.[2]

Objections

There is the obvious one that the meaning of a Manchu word should be looked for in the Manchu or, at the outside, in the Tungus, languages and not be based on ideograms that are used with exclusively phonetic criteria.

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* English version of the first Chinese publication *Man-chou chiu-ming hsin-shih*, in "Chung-yang min-tsu hsüeh-yüan hsüeh-pao", 6/1988, pp. 17–18.

[1] E. Hauer, *Das Mandschurische Kaiserhaus, sein Name, seine Herkunft und sein Stammbaum*, in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen, Ostasiatische Studien*, XXIX (1926), pp. 1–39.

[2] Du Zhuan, *The Manchurians*, in *China Tourism* 55 (Hongkong 1985), pp. 11–17.

2) *The Buddhist Interpretation*

The reference here is to a letter written by the Dalai Lama to the Manchu khan, giving him the title of Bodhisattva "Mañjušri". From the abbreviated form of this title, *"Man-chu"*, it is suggested that the name for the *Chien-chou Jurchen*, the future Manchu, developed.

Objections

This letter came to Ch'ing T'ai-tsung in 1642, while the ethnonym *"manju"* is to be found much earlier, being officially adopted as early as 1635. It therefore can not reasonably be traced back to a document known only from 1642.

3) *Erich Hauer's Interpretation*

This too has to do with the name "Mañjušri", widespread among the Mongols and the Jurchen during the Ming period. It refers to a tribal chief known by the Chinese name of Li Man-chu (?–1467).[3] He was the grandson of the first *Chien-chou wei* "administrator", Ahacu, considered to be the progenitor of the imperial clan.[4]

Objections

Li Man-chu was beheaded by the Koreans during one of their punitive raids. It is explicitly stated that, at his death, his line died out. This being the case, it is hard to accept the idea that his name was later used to designate a people. It is most probably a case of a homonym and *a posteriori* deduction.

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[3] See Chun Hae-jong, *Li Man-chu*, in L.C. Goodrich-Chaoying Fang (eds.), *Dictionary of Ming Biography 1368–1644*, vol. 1, New York – London 1976, pp. 839–841; Chiang Hsiu-sung, *Shih-lun Li Man-chu*, in *Ch'iu-shih hsüeh-k'an*, 3 (1983), pp. 94–100.

[4] See p. 9 of his paper (quoted above); see also his *Neue Nachrichten über die Vorfahren des Mandschuhauses*, in *Asia Major*, 9 (1933), pp. 612–642.

4) *V. Gorskij's Interpretation*[5]

Here, the name is traced back to a now famous passage in the *Pei-shih*, Chapter 94 (*Wu-chih*): *Ch'ü-shuai yüeh la-mo-fu man-tu*: [2] "The chiefs are called *ta-mo-fu man-tu*". In this connection, in 1778 the *Man-chou yüan-liu k'ao* points out the "similarity of pronunciation of *man-tu* and *man-chu*".[6] The phrase in the *Pei-shih* could thus be reconstructed in Man-chu with "da mafa mantu ~ man-ju", with "manju" meaning "tribal chief". Recently[7] this theory has been further affirmed by a passage from the *Cha-chung jih-lu* by the Korean Li Minhwan,[8] who was a prisoner of Nurhaci's in 1619. According to which "the chief is called *man-chu*" [3].[9]

Objections

Hauer, in connection with the pronunciation *mantu ~ manchu* had already pointed out that, "it is only in modern Peking that the ideogram "咄" is pronounced *"chu"*,[10] while, at the time of the *Pei-shih* its pronunciation was certainly *"tu"*. The *K'ang-hsi tzŭ-tien*, too, in fact has only the pronunciation *tu* or *to*.

Li Minhwan's evidence also calls our attention to the fact that in 1619 the term *manju* was already in use as an ethnonym and not as an indication of the concept of "chief". In the Manchu language, in fact, the word *manju*, with this meaning, does not exist.

Apart from all this no reason is given for the application of the word "chief" to an entire people. Li Minhwan's sentence would thus be read, "the chief is called [Khan of the] Manchu".

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[5] V. Gorskij, *O proizchoždenii rodonačal'nika nyne carstvujuščej v Kitae di-nastii Cin i imeni naroda man'ču*, in *Trudy členov rossijskoj duchovnoj missii v Pekine*, vol. 1 (1852), pp. 189–244.

[6] Chapter 5, p. 1a.

[7] Li Lin, *Kuo-ch'eng Man-tsu kung-t'ung-t'i ti hsin-li su-chih*, in *Man-tsu yen-chiu* 1 (1985), pp. 26–30.

[8] On Li Minhwan see Nicola di Cosmo, *Nuove fonti sulla formazione dello stato mancese, I parte: Il rapporto di Yi Minhwan*, in *Catai* II–III (Venezia 1982–1983), pp. 139–165.

[9] Page 10 of his diary published in 1978 by the *Liao-ning ta-hsüeh li-shi hsi*, nos. 8–9, series *Ch'ing-ch'u shih-liao ts'ung-k'an*.

[10] E. Hauer, *Das Mandschurische Kaiserhaus*. . ., p. 5 note 1; see also H.A. Giles, *A Chinese-English Dictionary*, New York 1964², vol. I, p. 1493: "Read chu² in Peking".

5) *V.I. Cincius' Interpretation*[11]

This theory is connected with the name used by many Tungus peoples when referring to the Amur, the Ussuri and the Sunggari, i.e. *Maŋgu, Maŋmu, Mangbu, Mamŋu* etc.[12] This is a word which, in some ethnic groups, has only the general meaning "river". The Manchu, then, would simply be "the people of the Amur river".[13]

Objections

It is hard to see why the *Chien-chou Jurchen* would have resorted to the name of a river, used by another people and unknown in their own language. In fact the Manchu call the Amur—*Sahaliyan ula.*

For a solution to this problem that is satisfactory to both the linguists and the historians, answers have to be found to the following questions:

1. When did the *Chien-chou Jurchen* start calling themselves "Manchu"?
2. Why did they choose this name?
3. What is its ethnological origin?
4. What does this ethnonym stand for?

To the first of these questions, there is an answer in the *Chiu Manchou tang,*[14] the most ancient Manchu sources available to date. This ethnonym appears in these for the first time in 1613 in the phrase *Nioi j'i manju gurun,*[15] i.e. "the Manchu state of the *Nü-chih* /Jurchen/Jušen. The oldest mention is from 1605 and is in a Korean report sent to the Chinese authorities in Liaotung, where the territory of Nurhaci (and not the person!) is indicated by the ideograms 万朱 which, in Korean, are pronounced *"man-chu".*[16]

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[11] See V.I. Cincius, *Sravnitel'naja fonetika tunguso-man' čžurskich jazykov*, Leningrad 1949, p. 239.

[12] See *Sravnitel'nyj slovar' tunguso-man'čžurskich jazykov*, Leningrad 1975, vol. 1, pp. 525–526; G. Doerfer, *Mongolo-Tungusica*, Wiesbaden 1985, p. 39 No. 88 (Tungusica 3).

[13] See J. Benzing, *Die tungusischen Sprachen*, Wiesbaden 1955, p. 12–13. (Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1955, No. 11, pp. 960–961.)

[14] Vols. 1–10 edited by Ch'en Chieh-hsien, Taipei 1969.

[15] See also Nobuo Kanda, *The National Name 'Manju'*, in *Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference*, Taipei 1971, pp. 152–155.

[16] Published by Huang Chang-chien, p. 468 of his paper *Man-chou-kuo kuo-hao k'ao*, in *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*, vol. XXXVII/2, Taipei 1967, pp. 459–473.

A further examination of the number of times the ethnonym *Manju* is to be found in the indices of the *Man-wen lao-tang*[17] shows that, in the period of Nurhaci (1607–1626) it crops up 7 times in 20 years, while in the period of Hong Taiji (1627–1636) it crops up more than 70 times in 10 years.

These rather eloquent data bring us to the following deduction:

1) The ethnonym "Manchu" begins to be used at the time of Nurhaci, when the *Chien-chou Jurchen* had begun to be "strong, powerful and great". Its use at that time was, however, still sporadic;
2) it takes root and is officially adopted by Hong Taiji, on the 22nd of November 1635, when the *Chien-chou Jurchen* are *already* "strong, powerful and great".[18]

Later on we shall see why it is that there is such an emphasis on the "strength", "power" and "greatness" of the Manchu.

The second consideration to be kept in mind is that the word *manju* is bound to be Tungus in origin, that is, it must be indigenous and not Chinese. First and foremost it had to be comprehensible to the Jurchen just as, at a later date, the same was necessary for the Chinese dynastic name *Ta Ch'ing.* In fact the Manchu version of this is *Daicing,* which leads us to believe that, in the early stages at least, *Ta Ch'ing* for the Manchu was *Daicing gurun,* the "Warriors' Kingdom". Any connection, then, with the Cinese *man* ("full") may be excluded.

The third point to be resolved is the etymological origin of the word. One solution is to be found in the *Jakûn gûsai manjusai mukûn hala be uheri ejehe bithe* (*Pa-ch'i man-chou shih-tsu t'ung-p'u*), where the personal name *Manju* is to be found several times.[19] The contemporary registration of the name *Manjusiri* demonstrates that "Manju" was not an abbreviation but a name in its own right.

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[17] Vols. I–VII, Tokyo 1956–1963.

[18] See *Chiu Man-chou tang*, Translated and Annotated by Kanda Nobuo, Matsumura Jun, Okada Hidehiro, vol. 2, Tokyo 1975, p. 318: "*...han hendume musai gürun i gebu daci manju...: tere be ulhirakû niyalma jušen sembi...*" (The Khan said, 'From its beginning the name of our state has been manju...; men who do not know this call it *jušen".*) This goes to show that, in 1635, not all of its subjects knew that, from its beginnings, the Manchu Khanate was called "Manchu".

[19] Manchu edition, chapter I, p. 54b; II, p. 4b–5a; XII, p. 16a; XIII, p. 22a–23a; XXVII, p. 16a. One registration only is to be found in the *Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih:* see N. Kanda – J. Matsumura – H. Okada, *Index to the Biographical Sections of Pa Ch'i T'ung Chih*, Tokyo 1965, p. 66.

Continuing our search for the actual meaning of this word / name, we do notice that there are a great many Manchu names ending with "-ju". These, however are divisible into four groups, three of which are of no use to us whatever, as we can see:

- first group: nouns formed out of numbers, e.g. *Ninju* ("sixty"), *Nadanju* ("Seventy"), where the "-ju" part stands for *juwan* ("ten").[20]
- second group: nouns where the "-ju" is a Chinese ideogram, for instance *Booju* < *Pao-chu*.
- third group: names made up of imperatives such as *Alanju* < *alanjimbi*: "come and report".

There remains a fourth group, some examples of which follow:

> *Bayanju* (< *bayan*, "rich"; Bayantai, Bayandai, Bayartu).
> *Saiju:* (< *sain*, "good"; Saindari, Saikan, Saišangga, Saimbulu).
> *Galju* (< **gal-*, "quick"; Gali, Galbi: *Galju*—"a quick and accurate archer").
> *Dalju* (< **da-*, "superior, first"; cf. *dalambi*).
> *Deju* (< **deγ-*, "to rise"; cf. *dekden* etc.)[21]

We see here names that have a basic concept and an added suffix that expresses the idea of "wished-for realisation", e.g. *Bayanju* ("that you may be rich"). In this context, *Manju* which, according to the second of our conditions has to be a Tungus word, expresses the idea that "may you be *man* < **maŋ*", that is "strong, powerful and great" (see, for example, *mandumbi* = "to become great"). We should also bear in mind that, in the Tungus languages, *ŋ* becomes *n* after dental.[22]

"Manju", then is a general Tungus word, already existing in ancient times and expressing the concept of growth, greatness, strength and power. In Manchu it is still to be seen in words like *mangga* ("strong, fierce"), *manggalambi* ("to act in a hard or vigorous manner"), *mandumbi* ("to grow up") etc.[23]

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[20] On the Manchu custom of calling people after numbers, see Chuang Chi-fa, *A Discussion of the Manchu customs of giving names after numbers*, in *Proceedings of the Sixth East Asian Altaistic Conference*, Taipei 1981, pp. 89–102; for the Chinese version of this paper see *Man-tsu-wen-hua*, No. 7 (Taipei 1982), pp. 13–19.

[21] See the etymology of the single entries in *Sravnitel'nyj slovar'*...

[22] See N. Poppe, *Vergleichende Grammatik der altaischen Sprachen*, I. Wiesbaden 1960, p. 71.

[23] See also the etymology of *manni, maŋa* etc. in *Sravnitel'nyj slovar'*..., pp. 527–530.

In this way its "adoption" in the time of Nurhaci is easy to explain since this was a time in which the *Chien-chou Jurchen* were indeed becoming "strong, powerful and fierce", in other words, *Manju*.

In this way, too, we have an explanation for the *man-tu* in the *Pei-shih*, used to indicate a powerful person—i.e. a chief. It also provides the meaning of the "Tungus" name for the Amur, a river that is "powerful" and "great".

Glossary

[1] 满珠
[2] 渠帅曰大莫弗瞒咄
[3] 一将曰满住

Postscriptum

A collation of the earliest instances of the term "manju" in the Japanese-edited *Man-wen lao-tang* (MWLT) and the *Chiu Manchou tang* (CMCT, Facsimile edition, Taipei) leads us to the following (and eloquent) postscript:

1) MWLT (I, p. 37, line 4): *nioi jy manju gurun* corresponds: CMCT (I, p. 81): [*nioiji*] *manju gurun*, where *nioiji* is a later addition (see reproduction 1). It is licit, therefore, to suppose that the term *manju* was so little-known in 1613 as to require an explanation?
2) MWLT (I, p. 37, line 8): *nioi jy manju gurun* corresponds: CMCT (I, p. 82): [*nioiji manju gurun*]: a later addition, almost illegible. (See reproduction 2.)
3) MWLT (I, p. 50, line 3 to 9): *manju-i cooha*... *manju gurun* corresponds: CMCT (I, p. 112): the same, but the whole passage turns out to be a later addition, as above. (See reproduction 3.)

Deductions

1) At it earliest appearance (1613), the term "Manju" needed added clarification (because it was a new usage?).
2) Later added occurrences of "Manju" were not accompanied by clarifications, therefore it would seem that it had entered into commoner usage.



Reproduction 1



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

Reproduction 3

■ Source: Crossley, Pamela Kyle and Rawski, Evelyn S., 'A profile of the Manchu language in Ch'ing history', in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (June 1993), Harvard-Yenching Institute, pp. 63–102.

A PROFILE OF THE MANCHU LANGUAGE IN CH'ING HISTORY

Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn S. Rawski

Manchu was the imperial language of the Ch'ing dynasty. It was the fundamental medium of communications within the imperial family, and within the court it was used for worship, ideological expression, address to the bannermen and nobility, and confidential political and military communications. From the eighteenth century on, Manchu also became a cultural emblem, a marker of Manchu identity and status, and an artifact of the universalism of the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Early Ch'ing policy required that selected civilians as well as bannermen and nobles acquire literacy in Manchu. This state interest in generalizing the function of Manchu had an impact on eighteenth-century scholarship, particularly as it affected and was affected by the "Four Treasuries" (*ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*) project. Ultimately the tradition of literati training in Manchu produced a private field of Manchu-oriented scholarship.[1]

Both as a political instrument and as a natural language, Manchu had a variety of roles to play in Ch'ing life. It also plays a variety of roles in the extant documentation available to students of Ch'ing history. Nineteenth-century Western scholars emphasized the significance of Manchu in the Ch'ing order, although after the fall of the dynasty some Ch'ing specialists questioned the necessity of acquiring literacy in the language.[2] In recent years access to Manchu materials has increased dramatically, and a reassessment of the importance of Manchu for Ch'ing research is in order. In this essay we review the functions of Manchu under the Ch'ing dynasty and how those functions are reflected in known extant documentation. We do not intend to repeat the historiographical and bibliographical work of generations of scholars. For such information we refer readers to essays on Manchu documents,[3] and to published catalogues of important holdings throughout the world.[4] We hope to provide a useful guide to

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[1] The authors wish to thank Eugene Wu, Tim Connor, Sidney Tai, and the staff of the Harvard-Yenching Library; Tony Marr, Martin Heijdra, and the staff of the Gest Oriental Library, Princeton University; Monique Cohen and the staff of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; James Cheng, of the Han Yü-shan Collection, University of California, Los Angeles; Chuang Chi-fa and the late Chiang Fu-ts'ung, of the National Palace Archives (Ku-kung po-wu-kuan), Taipei; R. Po-chia Hsia for information on the archives of the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel. For technical suggestions we are indebted to Gertraude Roth Li, Cheryl Boettcher, and Robin Kornman. Thomas G. Rawski has provided computer assistance, and Hyong-muk Lee has aided in editorial tasks. We are particularly grateful to Gertraude Roth Li and Susan Naquin for their trenchant critiques of an earlier form of this article.

Because of space constraints, we include Chinese characters only for terms and titles that would not be easily identified by *HJAS* readers. Where phrases or titles are cited in both Manchu and Chinese, Manchu precedes. We generally adhere to the Möllendorf system. However, we have adopted practices suggested by Cheryl Boettcher, who was kind enough to show us a draft of her "Standard Romanization of Manchu: A Recommendation," and we hope that these modifications will aid in consistent representation of etymology and case. Manchus and Mongols conventionally did not use a clan or lineage (*mukūn*) name during the dynasty, but because lineage names are significant to the historian, we have placed them in brackets.

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[2] For well over a century the necessity of studying Manchu for purposes of research on the Ch'ing period has been the subject of occasional hortatory pronouncements. For glimpses of the debate see Thomas Taylor Meadows's introduction to *Translations from the Manchu with the Original Texts* (Canton: S. Wells Williams, 1849); A.V. Grebenščikov, *Man'čzury: ich jazyk i pis'mennost'* (Vladivostok, 1912); Erich Hauer, "Why the Sinologue Should Study Manchu," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 61 (1930): 156–64; Erich Haenisch's introduction to his *Mandschu-Grammatik mit Lesestücken und 23 Texttafeln* (Leipzig: VEB Verlag Enzyklopädie, 1961); Beatrice S. Bartlett, "Books of Revelations: The Importance of the Manchu Language Archival Record Books for Research on Ch'ing History," *Late Imperial China* 6.2 (1986): 25–36; Hukjintai's address to the Fifth East Asian Altaistic Conference, "Manju bithe kemuni oyonggo" (now published in the *Proceedings* [Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 1980]); and the passages from the work of Joseph F. Fletcher, Jr., quoted at the end of this essay.

[3] A body of foundation literature, though now out of date, still contains important commentary and deserves acknowledgment. See particularly, Paul Georg von Möllendorf, "Essay on Manchu Literature," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 24 (1889–1890): 1–45; Berthold Laufer, "Skizze der Manjurischen Literatur," *Keleti Szemle* 8 (1908): 1–53, reprinted in Hartmut Walravens, ed., *Kleinere Schriften von Berthold Laufer* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1976); and Walter Fuchs, *Beitrage zur Mandjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur* (Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Võlkerkunde Ostasiens, 1936).

For more current work see Louis Ligeti, "A propos de l'écriture manchoue," *AOASH* 2 (1952): 235–98; Denis Sinor, *Introduction to Manchu Studies*, American Council of Learned Societies, Research and Studies in Uralic and Altaic Languages, Project no. 104 (Micro photo, 1963), Joseph F. Fletcher, Jr., "Manchu Sources," in Donald D. Leslie, Colin Mackerras and Wang Gungwu, eds., *Essays on the Sources for Chinese History* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1973), pp. 141–46; Cheryl M. Boettcher, "In Search of Manchu Bibliography" (C.A.S. thesis, University of Illinois, 1989).

[4] See for example the new catalogue of the Manchu collections in the People's Republic of China compiled by Huang Jun-hua 黄潤華 et al., *Ch'üan-kuo Man-wen tzu-liao lien-ho mu-lu* (Peking: Shu-mu ch'u-pan-she, 1992). Also suggestive is the catalogue of Manchu materials in the 1930s in the National Palace Museum archives: Li Te-ch'i 李德啓, comp., *Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan ku-kung po-wu-yüan t'u-shu-kuan Man-wen shu-chi lien-ho mu-lu* (Peiping: Ku-kung po-wu-yüan, 1933); with its aid some materials may be traced to present archives. On other collections see Walter Simon and Howard G.H. Nelson, comp., *Manchu Books in London: A Union Catalogue* (London: British Museum, 1977); Nicholas

opportunities now available for research on Chinese history and culture through the Manchu language.

The Role of Manchu in Ch'ing Political and Administrative History

Manchu has a long and complex history as a vernacular language. It has a demonstrable relationship to both its ancestral language, Jurchen, and its contemporaneous languages and dialects of Northeast Asia; it has a rich oral literature; and it has a documented connection to the political concepts and religious life of Inner Asia. Manchu's functions as a natural language should not obscure another fact, which is that documentary Manchu was a creation of the early Ch'ing state. The forerunners of the Ch'ing, particularly the Jurchens of the Chien-chou "garrisons" (*wei-so*), used Mongolian and *t'ung-wen* 同文, a form of written Chinese that imitated the grammatical order of the Jurchen language.[5] Ch'ing historical

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Poppe, Leon Hurwitz, and Hidehiro Okada, *Catalogue of the Manchu-Mongol Section of the Tōyō Bunko* (Tōyō Bunko, 1964); Martin Gimm, "Zur den mandjurischen Sammlungen der Sowjetunion, I," *TP* 54.1–3 (1963): 147–79; Jeanne-Marie Puyraimond, *Catalogue du fonds Mandchou: Bibliothèque Nationale, département des manuscrits, division des manuscrits orientaux* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1979); Giovanni Stary, *Opere Mancesi in Italia e in Vaticano* (Wiesbaden: Komissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1985); Ikegami Jirō 池上二良, "Yōroppa ni aru Manshūgo bunken ni tsuite," *TG* 45.3 (1962): 105–21; and "Yōroppa ni aru Manshūgo bunken ni tsuite (hoi)," *TG* 47.3 (1964): 144–46; for holdings in other European countries, see Joseph Fletcher's review of the Simon and Nelson catalogue in *HJAS* 41.2 (1981): 657–58. The best recent guide to studies of archival collections, and to other aspects of Manchu studies, is Giovanni Stary, *Manchu Studies: An International Bibliography* (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1990).

For collections in the United States, see Hartmut Walravens, "Vorläufige Titelliste der Mandjurica in Bibliotheken der USA," in *Zentralasiatische Studien* 10 (1976): 551–613; Matsumura Jun, "A Catalogue of the Manchu Books in the Library of Congress," *TG* 57.1–2 (1976): 230–53; Ning Chia, "The Manchu Collection in the Johns Hopkins University," *Central and Inner Asian Studies* 6 (1992): 34–43.

[5] Jurchen had a script, adapted from Kitan, that survived the downfall of the Chin dynasty and had at least some official recognition in the Yüan dynasty. In Ming times it was the official mode of communications between the Jurchen functionaries of the *wei-so* system in Liao-tung and the Chinese court. Most reconstruction of Jurchen has been done on the basis of historical materials from the *ssu-i kuan* (see below) and from some epigraphical sources. See Wilhelm Grube, *Die Sprache und Schriften der Jucen* (Leipzig: Harrasowitz, 1896); Ishida Mikinosuke 石田幹之助, "Joshin-go kenkyū no shin shiryō" (1931), reprinted in Ishida Mikinosuke, *Tōa bunkashi sōkō* (Tōyō Bunko, 1973), pp. 3–70; Daniel Kane, *The Sino-Jurchen Vocabulary of the Bureau of Interpreters*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1989); Gisaburo Kiyose, *A Study of the Jurchen Language and Script: Reconstruction and Decipherment* (Kyoto: Hōritsubunkasha, 1977), Chin Kuang-p'ing 金光平 and Chin Ch'i-ts'ung 金啓孮, *Nü-chen yü-yen wen-tzu yen-chiu* (Peking: Wen-wu, 1980), Chin Ch'i-ts'ung, *Nü-chen wen tz'u-tien* (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan-she, 1984).

memory credited to Nurgaci in 1599 the commissioning of a script, to be adapted from Mongolian, to allow Jurchen/Manchu to achieve its own documentary form.

Annalistic materials were revised and reprinted at intervals, some of which coincided with major stages in the evolution of the script. The records of the Nurgaci era were first produced in Manchu script during the reigns of Hung Taiji (1627–35; 1636–43) and revised repeatedly during the later seventeenth century. In the second Hung Taiji reign, the script was partially vocalized, using the "circles and dots" that today distinguish "New Manchu" (*tongki fuka sindaha hergen, hsin man-wen*) from "Old Manchu" (*lao man-wen*), or "script without circles or dots" (*tongki juka akū hergen*). The emergence of the Manchu script and Manchu documents accompanied the rise of the Ch'ing and formation of the state. Quite apart from the value of what is written in Manchu, the language and evolving script are organically linked to institutional development in the early Ch'ing period.

Compared with the volume of post-1644 materials, relatively few original Manchu documents of the preconquest period are extant. The best-known and perhaps most frequently utilized early Ch'ing historical source in Manchu is the collection of annals commonly known as *Mambun rōtō* (*Man-wen lao-tang*), which Japanese scholars collected from the palace archives at Shen-yang in the early 1930s.[6] These are Ch'ien-lung era revisions of the seventeenth-century documents known collectively as *Chiu Man-chou tang*. The originals, which are now in the archival collection of the National Palace Museum (*Ku-kung po-wu-yüan*) near Taipei, are available

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[6] The name given to this group of documents has varied over the years, and there have been several incomplete or complete publications of them, whether in the original, in transliterated form, or in translation. The materials were not used in the compilation of the *Ch'ing-shih kao* (1928) or earlier histories of the dynasty. The first attempt to bring them to the attention of scholars was that of [Suwan Gūwalgiya] Jinliang 金梁, the Manchu curator of the Shen-yang (Mukden) palace archives prior to the Japanese occupation of Shen-yang in 1931. See his *Man-chou lao-tang pi-lu* (Peiping: N.p., 1929) and *Man-chou pi-tang* (Peiping: N.p., 1934). Japanese curatorship (begun in the very early years of this century by Naitō Torajirō), which has gradually encouraged the use of the term *Mambun rōtō* to refer to the Shen-yang collection, produced the first extensive, systematic publication of the sources in Fujioka Katsuji 藤岡勝二, *Mambun rōtō* (Iwanami Shoten, 1939). Imanishi Shunjū 今西春秋 published running excerpts from the archives under the same title in the periodical *Shokō* 書香 in 1943 and 1944, and from 1955 to 1963 a team headed by Kanda Nobuo 神田信夫, Matsumura Jun 松村潤, and Okada Hidehiro 岡田英弘 published their series of volumes, *Mambun rōtō* (Tōyō Bunko, vols. 1–7), which provided transliteration, translation, annotation, and index to the documents in Shen-yang. Excerpts from the Shen-yang archives were republished in Chinese by Liao-ning Provincial Press in 1978.

in photo-reprint and have been utilized in research, although they are more difficult to read.[7] Early Ch'ing documents are also concentrated in the "Shen-yang Archives" (*Sheng-ching yüan-tang*), which are now incorporated into the First Historical Archives (*Ti-i li-shih tang-an kuan*) in Peking.[8] Outside these two collections, a few other sixteenth-century originals are extant. For instance, early Ch'ing edicts and other materials are in the collection of Academia Sinica in Taiwan. The manuscript revision made in the 1630s of the legal and household code of the Later Chin, *Jin gurun i hacin kooli bithe*, is listed in the "Manchu" catalogue of the First Historical Archives in Peking. Other original Manchu materials are known to be housed in archives in Japan, Russia, Mongolia, Germany, and the United States.[9]

By 1635, the production of multilingual documentation in Chinese, Manchu, and Mongolian had become a routine function of the bureaucracy, and was, in fact, the *raison d'être* of large sectors of the early state (that is, the *wen-kuan* 文館).[10] Even the temple name of Hung Taiji

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[7] The materials now in Taiwan are generally known, after the suggestion of Ch'en Chieh-hsien, as *Chiu Man-chou tang*, and consist of documents in both Old Manchu and New Manchu script; see "The Value of The Early Manchu Archives," in Ch'en Chieh-hsien and Sechin Jagchid, eds., *Proceedings of the Third East Asian Altaistic Conference* (Taipei: N.p., 1969). Unlike the Shen-yang materials, they include annals for the year 1635/1636 (with interlinear Chinese annotation); the Taiwan collection has been published as *Chiu Man-chou tang* (photoreprint, Taipei: Palace Museum, 1969), and it has been partially transliterated and translated into Chinese as *Chiu Man-chou tang i-chu* (1977, 1979), and the year 1635/1636 has been transliterated and translated by the Kanda/Matsumura/Okada team as *Chiu Man-chou tang, The Ninth Year of T'ien-ts'ung* (Tōyō Bunko, 1972–1975). On the differences in content between *Chiu Man-chou tang* and *Mambun rōtō* see Michael Weiers, "Konkordanz zum Aktenmaterial der Chiu Man-chou Tang und Man-wen lao-tang, Jahrgänge 1620–1630," in G. Stary, ed., *Miszellen zur Mandschurischen Sprache, Literatur und Geschichte im 17. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Weisbaden: Komissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), pp. 166–469. The most extensive research application of these materials thus far has been Gertraude Roth [Li]'s "The Rise of the Early Manchu State: A Portrait from Manchu Sources to 1636" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1975).

[8] For an introduction to these materials see *Sheng-ching hsing-pu yüan-tang: Ch'ing T'ai-tsung Ch'ung-te san nien chih Ch'ung-te ssu nien* 盛京刑部原檔: 清太宗崇德三年至崇德四年, comp. Chung-kuo jen-min ta-hsüeh, Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu-so, and Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan (Peking: Ch'ün-chung ch'u-pan-she, 1985), pp. 1–8.

[9] The archives of the National Palace Museum in Taiwan, for instance, contain several hundreds of uncatalogued Manchu documents, including fragments of a translation of the *Ming shih*. We are grateful to Dr. Nicola di Cosmo for a brief description of these materials and of the cataloguing in which he and the staff of the archives are engaged. See also Fletcher, "Manchu Sources," pp. 143–44.

[10] The keeping of the records on the activities of the emperor (*ch'i-chu chü*) was originally an extension of these bureaucratic structures, and got a rather fitful start under the Ch'ing. On the historical background of such record-keeping in Manchu and the status of current holdings in Taiwan, see Ch'en Chieh-hsien, "Introduction to the Manchu Text

(*genggiyen šu hūwangdi, wen huang-ti*) at least partially reflects the significance of this enterprise.[11] It is useful on one level to think of this documentation as "simultaneous" in the languages concerned (which is exactly what is suggested by the Manchu title term *kamcime*, Chinese *ho-pi* 合璧), and in many cases edicts, regulations, compendia, and some memorials were completely rendered in two or three languages with no obvious loss of information or connotation. It is a mistake, however, before examining both or all versions, to assume that any translation wholly corresponds to its original. There are instances of error, omission, and deliberate censorship in materials generated in Manchu and later rendered into Chinese. Some abridgments, such as those found in certain passages translated from the early Manchu annals into Chinese, were made by deleting what at the time were considered to be extraneous details; historians will be interested to view the most complete and original version. That Manchu-language texts were deliberately altered has been well established by previous scholars like Mo Tung-yin, who in 1958 pointed out that the shamanic context of Nurgaci's original oaths against the Ming was purposely obscured when the passages were translated into Chinese.[12] Other omissions from the Manchu documents, though perhaps not intentional, can be revealing. Beatrice Bartlett, for example, has cited the unpublished Manchu version of a rescript that reveals especially vivid threats of the Yung-cheng emperor against his brother Yin-ssu, the flavor of which can hardly be captured in the Chinese rendition.[13]

Standard written Manchu, referred to in Chinese as *Ch'ing wen* (Ch'ing writing), was the official state language. Through the Chia-ch'ing reign, banner officials, generals commanding the armies of the north and west, and Manchu officials receiving edicts written in Manchu were obliged to write their memorials to the throne in Manchu. In addition, as part of their normal procedures, some departments were required to prevent selected documents from passing to related organs of the bureaucracy, particularly the State Historical Office (*suduri i yamun, kuo-shih kuan*).[14] Manchu-language palace memorials predate the creation of the Grand Council; those for the K'ang-hsi reign have been published by the Palace Museum in Taiwan.[15] These materials, as well as the as yet unpublished 180,000 items of Manchu palace memorials, court letters, and other central government documents passing through the Grand Council that were organized into the monthly packets known as *yüeh che pao* are extremely valuable primary sources for future research.[16] Just as the first access to palace memorials enabled scholars to realize through comparison how earlier documentary collections had been "politically oriented" or "censored for political reasons,"[17] so the comparison of Manchu-language palace memorials with their Chinese counterparts can reveal the extent to which certain types of information were reserved for officials who could read Manchu.[18]

Version of the Ch'ing Emperors' Ch'i-chu-chü (Notes on the Emperors' Daily Activities)," *CAJ* 17.2–4 (1973): 111–27.

[11] For recent Chinese translations of pre-1644 Manchu documents, see *Ch'ung-te san-nien Man-wen tang-an i-pien*, trans. Chi Yung-hai 季永海 and Liu Ching-hsien 劉景憲 (Shen-yang: Liao-shen shu she, 1988), and *Sheng-ching hsing-pu yüan-tang*. On the rewriting of pre-1644 documents during the Ch'ien-lung reign, see Kuan Hsiao-lien 關孝廉, "Man-wen lao-tang' yüan-pen yu ch'ung-ch'ao-pen, pi-chiao yen-chiu," *Li-shih tang-an* 1 (1990): 115–22, 135.

[12] See "Ch'ing-ch'u Man-tsu te sa-man-chiao," in *Man-tsu shih lun-ts'ung* (1958; reprint, Peking: San-lien shu-chü, 1979), pp. 190 and 203 n. 33. Although our research affirms Mo's basic argument regarding the non-transferal of some information from Manchu records, it is important to note that Mo may have overcorrected the passage in question. He asserts that the Manchu word *tangse* (Chinese: *t'ang-tzu*) has been omitted in the Chinese narration of Nurgaci's oath. However, we do not find the word *tangse* in the Manchu annals (*Mambun rōtō*, 1:89–91). Although Mo has not documented the source for his claim here, it is possible that it comes from A-kuei 阿桂 et al., "Hen kao ch'i-t'iao shi ch'u cheng," (*Ch'ing ch'ao*) *K'ai-kuo fang-lüeh* (清朝) 開國方略, *chüan shou-shang*, 4a (reprint Taipei: Wen-hai, 1967), p. 27, where the characters *t'ang-tzu* have been supplied. There is no evidence that, in 1958, Mo was able to consult the Manchu materials himself. It appears, however, that by comparing *K'ai-kuo fang-lüeh* and *Man-chou shih-lu* Mo made a shrewd guess that, though in error on this subsidiary point, has in its basic insight been sustained by all subsequent research.

[13] See *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 26, 306 n. 30. The importance of discrepancies, omissions, and edits from Manchu to Chinese documents has also been discussed in presentations by Mark Elliott and Chuang Chi-fa for the panel "From Barefoot Ethnographers to Literati Archivists: Primary Resources for the Study of Late Imperial China," at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1992.

[14] For example, some Manchu memorials of the Board of Punishments (*hsing-pu*) are marked "write" (*ara*) or "prohibited" (*ume*) to indicate whether they would be permitted to pass to the State Historical Office. See *Sheng-ching hsing-pu yüan-tang*, pp. 2–3.

[15] *Kung-chung-tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che* 宮中檔康熙朝奏摺, comp. National Palace Museum editorial committee (Taipei: Palace Museum, 1977), vols. 8 and 9.

[16] The Grand Council *yüeh che pao* are described in Ch'u Liu-sheng 屈六生, "Ch'ing-tai chün-chi-ch'u Man-wen tang-an tsung-shu," *Li-shih tang-an* 1 (1989): 124–29 and Wu Yüan-feng 吳元豐, "Chün-chi-ch'u Man-wen yüeh che pao chi ch'i cheng-li pien-mu," *Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu* 2 (1991): 61–64.

[17] Yen-p'ing Hao and K.C. Liu, "The Importance of the Archival Palace Memorials of the Ch'ing Dynasty: The Secret Palace Memorials of the Kuang-hsü Period, 1875–1908," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 3.1 (1971): 71–94.

[18] The broad significance of these materials for Ch'ing researchers was first noted by Beatrice S. Bartlett in "Books of Revelations." Bartlett's scrutiny of the Grand Council's

One reason for the protective posture toward communications in Manchu was that Manchu functioned as a security language in military affairs through most of the dynasty. This historic function was a generalization of the use of Manchu for secret communications, which may have taken a quasi-institutional form beginning with the Dorgon regency.[19] An illustration is found in the K'ang-hsi period palace memorials concerning the years 1696 and 1697, when the K'ang-hsi emperor led his armies into Central Asia against the Jungar Mongol chieftain Galdan (d. 1697). The Manchu-language palace memorials of this period include several intelligence reports on conditions along the army's proposed route, Galdan, and Galdan's nephew Tsewangrabdan (1643–1727) that bear the Chinese notation, "Don't translate," above the Manchu language text.[20] Until the 1760s, military matters especially continued to be reported in Manchu. After 1723, the palace memorials with their appended imperial responses were copied and grouped into packets (*lu-fu tsou-che* 錄副奏摺) to be stored in the government archives; frequently those pertaining to a military campaign were separately collected into a "military affairs bundle" (*chün-wu pao*). One scholar estimates that eighty percent of the Manchu-language packets from 1724 to 1910 dealt with military matters, primarily of campaigns before 1760.[21]

Manchu was also protected because it was the language of the Aisin Gioro—the imperial lineage, or imperial "clan" (*uksun*)—and in policy remained so until the end of the dynasty.[22] The collections of Manchu palace memorials reprinted in Taiwan show the K'ang-hsi emperor's fluent Manchu script on what must have been the original text. Here, too, the notation, "Don't translate," appears above many of the Manchu-language communications between the K'ang-hsi emperor and his heir Yin-jeng during the Galdan campaign from 1696 to 1697. Although most of

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archival inventories of the Manchu documents led her to conclude that "many unique Manchu documents, never translated into Chinese, were produced in the middle and even the late Ch'ing" (p. 26).

[19] Adam Lui, "Censor, Regent and Emperor in the Early Manchu Period," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 17 (1978): 87. See also Yang Ch'i-chiao 楊啓樵, *Yung-cheng ti chi ch'i mi-che chih-tu yen-chiu* (Hongkong: San-lien shu-chü, 1981).

[20] See *Kung-chung-tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che*, vol. 8, nos. 125, 159, 160, 189, 193; vol. 9, nos. 732, 734.

[21] Ch'ü Liu-sheng, "Ch'ing-tai chün-chi-ch'u Man-wen tang-an tsung-shu," p. 125.

[22] For the early period this needs no comment, but for the role of Manchu in the education of the imperial family from the late nineteenth century through the Manchukuo period see Martin Gimm, "Marginalien zum letzten chinesischen Kaiser Pu'I und zu seiner Familie (Teil I)," in G. Stary, ed., *Miszellen zur Mandschurischen Sprache*, esp. pp. 67–98.

these communications concern matters of state, they also include homely, intimate details regarding the relations between father and son. Yin-jeng is left behind as regent in Peking; he protests enviously upon receiving his father's description of the magnificent hunts while on campaign and offers to rush out to join him. The father in turn chides Yin-jeng for forgetting his weighty responsibilities of state and counsels patience until the campaign is victoriously concluded. For his part, the emperor writes frequently because he knows his son is anxious for news. But why, he asks, has he not received replies from the Heir Apparent? He concludes, "From now on I will not write a lot."[23] The Manchu-language communications between the K'ang-hsi emperor and the Heir Apparent (Yin-jeng), which are absent from the Chinese-language archives, constitute one example of a politically sensitive subject that seems to have been deliberately removed from the purview of Chinese bureaucrats, yet was retained in its entirety in Manchu.[24]

Several kinds of Chinese-language notations appear above the Manchu-language texts in published collections of the K'ang-hsi period palace memorials.. Some state that the whole document (the memorial and imperial response) should not be translated (*ni pu-i* 擬不譯, *pu-i*); some direct that the imperial edict (but not the memorial) should be translated; and some suppress the translation of the imperial response while allowing translation of the memorial.[25] Although the significance of this kind of editorial discrimination cannot be determined without careful comparison of relevant documents, these notations are evidence that the Ch'ing rulers purposefully controlled the translation into Chinese of personally and militarily significant communications. To the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign, at least, emperors gave priority in their daily schedules to the perusal of edicts and other communications translated among Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese, so important to them was management of the transferal of information, ideas, and sentiments among languages.[26]

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[23] *Kung-chung-tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che* 8:428–33 (K'ang-hsi 35/11/14) and 8:449–53 (K'ang-hsi 35/11/21). Compare the Manchu texts with the much terser Chinese-language renderings published in *K'ang-hsi ti yü-chih wen-chi* 康熙帝御製文集 (reprint, Taipei: Hsüeh-sheng shu-chü, 1966), 2:885–972. The Manchu letters between the K'ang-hsi emperor and Yin-jeng are the subject of a recent dissertation; see Cimeddorji, "Die Briefe des K'ang-hsi-Kaisers aus den Jahren 1696–97 an den Kronprinzen Yin-ch'eng aus Mandschurischen Geheimdokumenten: ein Beitrag zum ersten Dsungarenkreig der Ch'ing 1690–1697" (University of Bonn, 1989). Our thanks to Mark Elliot for this citation.

[24] The Manchu palace memorials of K'ang-hsi are written in his own handwriting, which is distinctive and contrasts with the clerkly handwriting found in other documents; we can thus be fairly sure that these were not edited texts. In addition to the first seven volumes, *Kung-chung-tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che*, comp. National Palace Museum editorial committee (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1976), eight volumes of palace memorials with vermilion edicts have recently been compiled and published by the China First Historical Archives as *K'ang-hsi ch'ao Han-wen chu-p'i tsou-che hui-pien* (Peking: Archives Bureau, 1985). In his *Passage to Power: K'ang-hsi and His Heir Apparent, 1661–1722* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 229, Silas H.L. Wu suggests that the emperor had ordered that his "instructions" to Yin-jeng be kept in a separate file; this would explain their absence from the Chinese-language archival collections.

[25] *Kung-chung-tang K'ang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che*, vol. 8, for example, contains twenty-six documents where both the memorial and edict are not to be translated; in eighteen other documents, only the imperial response (sometimes only selected parts) is to be translated;

Through the eighteenth century, Manchu remained an indispensable tool for central sectors of the Qing bureaucracy. An explanation for this is suggested by the "inner-court" concept utilized by Beatrice Bartlett in her study of the Grand Council. Bartlett shows that this major decision-making organ originated in the small, divided, and informal committees housed in the inner court that the Yung-cheng emperor used to expand imperial power over the "outer-court" civil service. To a considerable extent, the inner court continued to be manned by members of the conquest elite, even though Yung-cheng turned against the particular Manchu and Mongol nobles who had dominated the decision-making process in his father's reign. Although one of Yung-cheng's most trusted ministers, Chang T'ing-yü (1672–1755), was Chinese, the other trusted aide was Yin-chen's brother, Prince I, and after Prince I's death, Ortai, a member of the Silin Gioro clan who belonged to the Manchu Bordered Blue Banner.[27] Chang T'ing-yü and Chu Shih (1665–1736), another unusually high-ranking Chinese official, were also educated in Manchu.[28] Bartlett notes that

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and in two other documents, only the memorial is to be translated. Vol. 9 has two memorials from the heir, Yin-jeng, to the emperor in which the memorial itself is marked "Don't translate," but the notation "Translate" appears over the emperor's reply (nos. 204, 205); another memorial from Yin-jeng has "Don't translate" over the emperor's reply (no. 210).

[26] The well-known edict of Ch'ien-lung 44 (1778) in which the emperor excoriates his officials after finding errors in their translations, has been reprinted in Chang Chung-ju 章中如 et al., *Ch'ing-tai k'ao-shih chih-tu tz'u-liao* (reprint, Taipei: Wen-hai, 1968) and Hsi Yü-fu 度裕福, comp. *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsuan* 皇朝政典類纂 (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Book Co., 1969). This edict has been repeatedly cited as indication of the emperor's wrath at poor performance in the standard languages, but our interest here is in the exercise of imperial oversight that produced the complaints.

[27] Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, Part One, esp. pp. 80–81. In a recent article based on Manchu and Chinese language archival materials, Chao Chih-ch'iang 趙志強 found that sixteen of the twenty-one persons who served on the Yung-cheng prototype of the Grand Council were Manchu and Mongol bannermen, predominantly from the upper three banners. See his "Yung-cheng ch'ao chün-chi ch'u ta-ch'en k'ao pu," *Li-shih tang-an* 3 (1991): 93–104.

[28] Chang T'ing-yü's biography is given in Arthur W. Hummel et al., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943) [hereafter *ECCP*],

Manchus still outnumbered Chinese Grand Councillors in the Ch'ien-lung reign, and the officials of the "inner court," which included the Imperial Household Department, remained predominantly Manchu to the end of the dynasty. Wherever there was a predominance of Manchu personnel, "many if not most documents... were written only in Manchu."[29] Many documents in the Imperial Household Department (*Nei-wu-fu*) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries exist in the archives only in a Manchu version.[30]

Manchu was the primary language of the leaders of the Eight Banners, who in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries expanded the empire to its largest size. Because questions of status and command turned upon hereditary claims, some of the most extensive banner documentation is in the form of genealogies written in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[31] An excellent example now in the Harvard-Yenching collection is *Hsiang huang ch'i Man-chou Niohuru shih Hung-i kung teng shih-fang chia-p'u* (which, like many Manchu documents, now has only a Chinese title).[32] This is the genealogy of the descendants of [Niohuru] Eidu (1562–1621), whose lineage dominated eight of eighteen companies in the first division in the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner.[33] In addition to the genealogies of individual descent lines in the banner nobility the Genealogical Office for the Eight Banners (*Jakūn gūsai uheri ejetun bithe*), produced under the direction of [Silin Gioro] Ortai (1680–1745), the "Collected Genealogies of the Eight Banner Manchu Clans" (*Manjusai mukūn hala be uheri ejehe bithe, Pa-ch'i Man-chou shih-tsu*

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pp. 54–56. On Chu Shih's status see Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, pp. 263, 327 n. 40, 340 n. 13; on his education in Manchu see *ECCP*, p. 188.

[29] Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, p. 224.

[30] See catalogue no. 446-5-55 at the First Historical Archives, Beijing, which includes memorials from 1727 to 1911.

[31] See Ted A. Telford, Melvin P. Thatcher, and Basil P.N. Yang, comps., *Chinese Genealogies at the Genealogical Society of Utah: An Annotated Bibliography* (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Book Co., 1983), which contains many banner genealogies (they were often duplicated in Chinese).

[32] For a description of newly acquired materials in the collection, see our "An Annotated Description of New Materials in the Harvard-Yenching Library," *China and Inner Asian Studies* (forthcoming).

[33] The Niohuru genealogy in the Fletcher collection has only four *ts'e*; it seems to differ from the three that are cited by Huang P'ei 黄培, "Ch'ing-ch'u te Man-chou kuei-tsu (1583–1795)—Niu-hu-lu-tsu," in *Lao Chen-i hsien-sheng pa-chih jung-ch'ing lun-wen chi*, comp. Lao Chen-i hsien-sheng pa-chih jung-ch'ing lun-wen chi pien-chi wei-yüan-hui (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1986), p. 633. On the creation of clan legacies through banner companies see Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*, pp. 43–45. On Eidu's legacy see also *ECCP*, p. 222.

t'ung-p'u), published in 1745 and thereafter a unified reference for banner command disputes.

Ortai also oversaw the compilation of the "General History of the Eight Banners" (*Jakūn gūsai tong jy [i sucungga wailehe] bithe, Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih [ch'u-ch'i]*) in 1739,[34] and "Regulations of the Eight Banners" (*Jakūn gūsai hacin i kooli bithe, Pa-ch'i tzu-li*), published posthumous to Ortai in 1746.[35] These compendia, and the revised "General History of the Eight Banners" (*[Han i araha] jakūn gūsai tong jy, [Ch'in-ting] Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih*) published under T'ieh-liang's direction in 1799, exist in Chinese and Manchu editions. Indispensable references for the study of banner affairs, they provide information on banner populations, finances, draft regulations, transmission of hereditary posts, and communications with the Board of War or the Grand Council. Banner administration materials can be found in the Harvard-Yenching collection[36] and in the large archival collections held in Peking, Liao-ning, and Tokyo.[37] Recent Chinese-language translations of selections from these banner archives suggest the range of subjects they cover.[38]

The power of the Ch'ing imperial lineage was intimately linked to its control of the banners. The early Ch'ing struggle between the throne and the banner princes can be traced through documents on the imperial descent group such as *Doroi akdun giyun wang ni jergi sirara ejehe* (a manuscript of which is in the Harvard-Yenching collection), the genealogy of the descendants of Nurgaci's fifteenth son Dodo (1614–49). The second-degree princedom (*giyun wang, chün-wang*) referred to in the title reflects Dodo's posthumous demotion following the disgrace of his brother Dorgon in 1651, and dates the work to a period before 1778, when his first-degree title was restored by the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Such negotiations of genealogical status were characteristic for the imperial lineage, whose members were normally exempt from the civil judicial proceedings. Imperial decisions regarding the hereditary succession or deprivation of titles continued to have considerable political import to the end of the eighteenth century, and with respect to the Aisin Gioro they are recorded in Manchu in the archives of the Imperial Clan Court (*uksun be kadalara yamun, tsung-jen fu*). The records permit us to describe with great precision the evolving relationship between the throne and the imperial princes who played important political roles throughout the dynasty.

Detailed analysis of the conquest elite based on Manchu language materials will probably renew our appreciation of the degree to which Mongol nobles participated in the Ch'ing order, and remind us of the Mongolian affinities—historical, cultural, symbolic, and consanguineal—of the Ch'ing. The Aisin Gioro conducted extensive marriage exchanges with the Mongol nobles.[39] Court relations with Mongolian noble lineages did not observe the distinction between the Mongolian Eight Banners (generally those living in the Northeast who were incorporated into the banners before the Ch'ing conquest of China) and the confederated Mongols (generally those inhabiting Mongolia and experiencing progressive suppression, conquest, or co-optation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) that other state policies enforced. Confederated Mongols like [Borjigit] Tsereng (d. 1750), the Khalkha noble who married the K'ang-hsi emperor's fourth daughter, performed exceptional military services for the dynasty in the Central Asian campaigns. Frequently, Mongols of the Eight Banners produced prominent bureaucratic lineages. A good example was the statesman [Alute] Saišangga (d. 1875), who had among his lesser achievements the compilation of the Manchu regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs. He was the father of the statesman Ch'ung-ch'i

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[34] The original title of this work was *Jakūn gūsai tung jy, Pa ch'i t'ung-chih* 八旗通志. Sixty years after its compilation it was retitled to distinguish it from its successor of 1799.

[35] For the background and fate of the eighteenth-century literature in Chinese on Manchu topics see also Pamela K. Crossley, "*Manzhou yuanliu kao* and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage," *JAS* 46.4 (1987): 761–90.

[36] The Fletcher collection includes genealogical charts for the chiefs of the Bordered Yellow Chahar Banner (*Kubuhe suwayan i Cahar gūsadei jasak obume kamcibuha hoosoon gung jasak taijisai*); an inventory of weapons for the Bordered Blue Banner (*Kubuhe lamun i ujen cooha gūsai tuwabure acara coohai agura ton i [ecegen]*); and fragments of other banner documents for the Plain White Banner, Plain Yellow Mongol Banner, and Bordered Yellow Mongol Banner.

[37] The Tōyō Bunko's collection of materials relating to the Plain Red Banner are catalogued in Poppe, Hurwitz, and Okada, *Catalogue of the Manchu-Mongol Section of the Tōyō Bunko*; for recent Chinese translations of some of these documents see *Ch'ing Yung-cheng-ch'ao hsiang-hung-ch'i tang*, trans. Liu Hou-sheng 劉厚生 (Ch'ang-ch'un: Tung-pei shih-fan ta-hsüeh, 1985) and *Yung Ch'ien liang-ch'ao hsiang-hung-ch'i tang*, trans. Kuan Chia-lu 關嘉錄 et al. (Shen-yang: Liao-ning People's Press, 1987).

[38] See, for example, *San-hsing fu-tu-t'ung ya-men Man-wen tang-an i-pien*, comp. Liao-ning sheng tang-an-kuan, Liao-ning she-hui k'o-hsüeh yüan, Li-shih yen-chiu-so, Shen-yang Ku-kung po-wu-yüan (Shen-yang: Liao-shen shu she, 1984), which presents translations of 178 archival materials from the San-hsing Deputy Lieutenant-General's office, dated 1741 to 1906.

[39] On marriage ties, see Evelyn S. Rawski, "Ch'ing Imperial Marriage and Problems of Rulership," in Rubie S. Watson and Patricia Buckley Ebrey, eds., *Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 170–203.

(1829–1900), who was himself the father of the empress of the T'ung-chih emperor.[40]

Even as the Ch'ing dynasty worked to preserve the prestige of Mongol culture and achievement with which it identified itself, it undermined the economic and political autonomy of the Mongol confederacies. The earliest, and what remained the primary, instrument for Ch'ing control of the Mongol confederacies was the Court of Colonial Affairs (literally, "the department for the governance of outlying provinces," *tulergi golo be dasara jurgan, li-fan yüan*).[41] Like other organs for the management of borders, the Court of Colonial Affairs did not use Chinese as its primary language of business. Its ancestor had been the Mongolian Bureau (*monggo yamun* [*monggo i jurgan*], *meng-ku ya-men*), which after 1638 became the Court of Colonial Affairs and expanded its jurisdiction to Turkic, Tibetan, and in some cases, Russian matters. Its president was by law a Manchu or Mongol.[42] Since this agency handled negotiations with Russia as well as with the Outer Mongol tribes, diplomatic communications and the major treaties with the Romanov empire were primarily in Manchu.[43] The "Translators' Bureaus" (*ssu-i kuan*),[44] once the main channels for ritual and tributary communications, retained a symbolic and curatorial role in the Ch'ing period. Yet even in tributary relations of the sort formerly dominated by the Translator's Bureaus, ritual communications

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[40] Ch'ung-ch'i was a *chuang-yüan* in the 1865 *chin-shih* examinations and a Ch'ing official. His biography is in *ECCP*, pp. 208–9.

[41] For recent scholarship in English see Ning Chia, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty," (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1991). On the earlier Mongolian Bureau, see Meng Lin 蒙林, "Man-wen lao-tang yü Meng-ku shih yen-chiu," *Nei Meng-ku she-hui k'o-hsüeh* 4 (1987): 85–86.

[42] The Harvard-Yenching collection includes the regulations in Manchu (as mentioned above, compiled by Saišangga) governing the Court of Colonial Affairs. For a discussion of the history of this compilation, and identification of the items in the manuscript of ca. 1756 that were omitted in the printed versions, see Chao Yün-t'ien 走雲田, "Kuan yü Ch'ien-lung ch'ao Nei-fu ch'ao pen 'Li-fan yüan tse-li'," *Hsi-pei shih ti* 2 (1988): 122–25.

[43] See also Tatiana A. Pang, "A Historical Sketch of the Study and Teaching of the Manchu Language in Russia (First part: Up to 1920)," *CAJ* 35.1–2 (1991): 123–37, and A. Liubimov, "Nekotorye man'ščursk'e dokumenty iz istorii russko-kitajskii snoshenii v XVII–m veke," in *Zapiski vostoehnogo otdeleniya imperatorskogo russleogo arkheologičeskogo obščestva* 21 (1911–1912): 65–94.

[44] Although the *ssu-i kuan* were small and politically insignificant under the Ch'ing, their symbolic significance persisted throughout the entire later imperial period. There are many studies, but for unsurpassed primary information see Paul Pelliot, "Le Sseu-yi-kouan et le Houei-t'ong-kouan" in "Le Hoja et le Sayyid Husain de l'Histoire des Ming," *TP* 38 (1948): 2–5, Appendix III:207–90, and for a more recent interpretation see Pamela K. Crossley, "Structure and Symbol in the Ming-Ch'ing Translator's Bureaus (*ssu-i kuan*)," *Central and Inner Asian Studies* 5 (1991): 38–70.

could take place in Manchu: The Harvard-Yenching materials contain a Manchu memorial from a Ryūkyūan king, who stood high among the vassals the Ch'ing dynasty had inherited from its predecessor.[45]

The potential for Manchu and Mongolian documents to alter our view of Ch'ing relations with the peoples of Inner Asia is great. Two authors working in Manchu, [Yehe Ayan Gioro] Tulišen (1667–1740) and Sungyun (1752–1835), provided seminal works on border and littoral affairs. Tulišen's *Lakcaha jecen de takūraha babe ejehe bithe, I-yü lu*, a report of his embassy to the Turguts from 1712 to 1715, is an outstanding geographical and ethnographical source of the time.[46] Sungyun, a Kharchin Mongol and official of the Court of Colonial Affairs, had written extensively on Tibet and Mongolia before turning his attention to the banner communities of Urga. His notes on banner life there, *Emu tanggū orin sakda i gisun sarkiyan*, probably first appeared in manuscript in 1791. The work is a didactic response to social problems within the garrison communities and consists of homilies and uplifting moral tales, mostly drawn from Chinese history. It is reasonable to assume that Sungyun hoped to find sponsorship for publication of the work from the Ch'ien-lung court; but either the manuscript appeared too late in the reign to garner much active attention from Hung-li, or its attempt to cast Chinese moral models in Manchu did not sit well with the court. In any case, the work was neglected by the Chia-ch'ing court and depended on private circulation. It is now a curiosity of its genre.[47]

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[45] "Liu-ch'iu wang Shang-mu," dated Ch'ien-lung 21 (1756).

[46] Tulišen's Manchu manuscript was translated and then printed simultaneously in Manchu and Chinese, in two *chüan* each, in 1723. In 1781 the work was entered into the Four Treasuries, and in 1839 an inferior private printing was completed. Imanishi Shunjū, in 1964, published a corrected and annotated version, *Kochu I-yü lu* 校注異域錄 (Tenri: Tenri daigaku oyasato kenkyūjo, 1964). The definitive modern published version of the text is now Chuang Chi-fa 莊吉發, ed., *Man Han I-yü lu hsiao-chu* (Taipei: Wen shih che ch'u-pan-she, 1983). Tulišen's work is the best representative of a series of travel writings in Manchu, which also included works by his predecessor Umuna and his successors Funingga and Bališen.

[47] The manuscript appeared with two prefaces, the last dated 1791, by Sungyun's friend Furentai, who was evidently responsible for ordering the chapters and giving the work its present form. In 1809, another of Sungyun's associates, Fugiyūn, translated the work into Chinese. *Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan* (hereafter *Emu tanggū orin*) has been well examined by modern scholars. See Inaba Iwakichi's 稲葉岩吉 "Shohon *Hyakuni rōjin goroku* oyobi sono chosha," in *Hattori sensei koki shukuga kinen rombunshū*, comp. Hattori Sensei Koki Shukuga Kinen Ronbunshū Kankokai (Fuzanbō, 1936), pp. 121–37, and Richard C. Rudolph's description and selection of passages ("*Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan*, An Unedited Manchu Manuscript," *JAOS* 60 (1940): 554–63. It has also been the subject of short works by Ura Ren'ichi and Itō Tatao, Martin Gimm, Ch'oe Hak-kun, and Kanda Nobuo, who has done three short pieces, the most extensive of which is now printed as front matter to the Chinese Materials Center edition *of Emu tanggū orin.* The

Plentiful archival opportunities for the enhancing of our view of border history remain. When the affairs of independent Mongols threatened the stability of the empire, Manchu-language documents spilled outside the Court of Colonial Affairs and into the higher decision-making bodies, as is clear from recent Chinese translations of selected materials on the Turguts from the period between 1771 and 1775.[48] Manchu-language Grand Council documents in the First Historical Archives in Peking should illuminate Ch'ing relations with the Uighurs and Tibet during the eighteenth century, and inform studies of the nineteenth-century Ch'ing administration in Sinkiang.[49]

In short, Manchu-language documents will be particularly vital for scholars seeking to analyze the Ch'ing polity at its highest level, that is, the conquest elite, consisting of the imperial clan and banner nobility. Documents in Manchu and Mongolian are also important sources for historians analyzing banner administration, the military campaigns that created China's largest territorial empire, the history of Ch'ing foreign relations with imperial Russia, Ch'ing incorporation of the Mongol tribes, and Ch'ing management of China's northern and northwestern frontiers.

Manchu Education, Primers, and Lexicons

Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese were all indispensable official languages, but it was not until the late eighteenth century that the court developed a cultural policy mandating that Manchus should express themselves in Manchu, Mongols in Mongolian, and Chinese in Chinese. In the areas not

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printed work in its entirety is now available in two editions, both of which are based upon a manuscript at the University of Chicago: *Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan* (Taipei: Chinese Materials Center, 1982) is a photoreprint without correction, transliteration, or annotation, but with an annotated introductory essay by Kanda Nobuo. *Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan, Erzählungen der 120 Alten, Beiträge zur mandschurischen Kulturgeschichte* (Wiesbaden: Komissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1983) is a correction, translation, and annotation of the work, with introduction and extensive bibliography, by Giovanni Stary. On Sungyun see also *ECCP*, pp. 691–92; Walther Heissig, "Some Notes by Sung-yün on the Administration of Tibet," *OE* 9.1 (1962): 85–89; Chi Ta-ch'ün 紀大椿, "Lun Sung-yün," *Min-tsu yen-chiu* 3 (1988): 71–79; and Giovanni Stary, *Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan*, pp. 1–2.

[48] *Man-wen T'u-erh-hu-t'e tang-an i-pien*, comp. Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsüeh yüan, Min-tsu yen-chiu-so, Min-tsu-shih yen-chiu-shih, and Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih tang-an-kuan, Man-wen pu (Peking: Min-tsu ch'u-pan-she, 1988).

[49] Ch'ü Liu-sheng, "Ch'ing-tai chün-chi-ch'u Man-wen tang-an tsung-shu," pp. 125–27.

controlled by state policy, Mongols and Manchus learned Chinese as a convenience and a necessity. This does not necessarily mean that reading and writing in Manchu was proportionately abandoned. Professional and recreational literature in Manchu continued to be created. The history of pedagogical writing with respect to Manchu is a direct window on the involvement of bannermen and civilians, intellectuals and scribes, Ch'ing subjects and foreigners, in creating and sustaining a field of Manchu literacy.

The early state was inconsistent in its requirements for formal education of bannermen. Prior to the promulgation of a comprehensive educational plan in 1687, the government encouraged bannermen to develop literacy in Chinese, and sporadically rewarded those who had skills in documentary Manchu. This plan envisioned that bannermen would be accomplished in Manchu and Chinese, military skills, and literary arts. This ideal continued to inform policy until the late eighteenth century, when the Ch'ien-lung emperor, displeased by the shallowness of banner education in both Manchu and Chinese, insisted that banner education emphasize Manchu language and military skills.[50] Particularization of banner identity thereafter led to the banner schools becoming a source for the specialized military academies, language schools, and technical institutes of the nineteenth century.[51]

The late eighteenth century should be noted as the threshold of a consolidated Manchu-Mongol "banner" identity, after which those identified as the Chinese-martial (*han-chün*) population within the banners were gradually marginalized.[52] Here again one should keep in mind that the the Mongolian cultural legacy was of central importance to the court. Manchu princes learned Mongolian from Mongol tutors in the *Shang-shu fang* 上書房, or palace school, and the court continued to educate Mongol bannermen, even as it attempted to co-opt or decapitate the traditional leadership hierarchies of the steppe. Indeed, from the eighteenth century on, the Ch'ing effort to educate bannermen in Mongolian at the banner schools and to disseminate Mongolian translations of important works in other languages stimulated the production of Mongolian grammars and dictionaries critical to the standardization of the Mongolian language.[53]

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[50] On Manchu education see Pamela K. Crossley, "Manchu Education," in Benjamin A. Elman and Alexander Woodside, eds., *Education and Society in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming); Chang Chung-ju et al., *Ch'ing-tai k'ao-shih chih-tu tz'u-liao*; Adam Yuen-chung Lui, "Syllabus of the Provincial Examination (*hsiang-shih*) under the Early Ch'ing (1644–1795)," *Modern Asian Studies* 8.3 (1974): 391–96, "The Imperial College (*Kuo-tzu-chien*) in the Early Ch'ing (1644–1795)," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 10 (1974): 147–66, and "The Education of the Manchus: China's Ruling Race (1644–1911)," *Journal of Asian & African Studies* 6.2 (1971): 125–33. On Mongolian education see Leung Man-Kam, "Mongolian Language Education and Examinations in Peking and Other Metropolitan Areas During the Manchu Dynasty in China (1644–1911)," *Canada Mongolia Review* (*Révue Canada-Mongolie*) 1.1 (1975): 29–44.

[51] See Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*, pp. 23–30, 145–50. On banner schools and their relationships to the modern institutions superseding them see Nancy Evans, "The Banner-School Background of the Canton T'ung-wen Kuan," *Papers on China*, 22A (May 1969): 89–103; Lei Fang-sheng 雷方聖, "Ching-chou ch'i-hsüeh te shih-mo chi ch'i t'e-tien," *Min-tsu yen-chiu* 3 (1984): 57–59; T'an I 覃藝, "Wan Ch'ing T'ung-wen-kuan yü chin-tai hsüeh-hsiao chiao-yü," *Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu chi* 5 (1984): 344–61.

Just as Manchu orthography was the creation of the Ch'ing state, so was the notion of a standard Manchu language. Dialectal variations were prominent among the individuals incorporated into the Manchu banners, and a good number undoubtedly felt more comfortable in Chinese or Mongolian than in Manchu. Even among those who spoke something close to the new standard, literacy was rare. Moreover, the approved lexicon changed during the Ch'ien-lung reign, when many earlier Manchu loanwords from Chinese were replaced by "purer" Manchu equivalents. The language purification was a systematic acceleration (through pedagogical publications) of a process that had been evident since the creation of the Manchu script.[54] Some colloquial changes had little political significance, but there was also a tendency to find patently Manchu words for the instruments and concepts of state. The earlier loanword for

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[52] For details see Pamela K. Crossley, "The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-martial (*hanjun*) Banners," *Late Imperial China* 10.1 (1989): 63–107.

[53] As examples one might cite the Manchu-Mongol primer, *Meng-ku hua-pen* (1761), the *Meng-ku wen-chien* (redacted from the *Ch'ing-wen chien* 清文鑑 of 1708) and, to demonstrate the persistence of this concern, the *Manju Monggo nikan ilan acangga su-i tacibure hacin-i bithe*, comp. Chiang Wei-ch'iao 蔣維喬, Ghuang Yü 莊俞, and Jung-te 榮德, preface by Hsi-liang 錫良(1909). See also Lü Ming-hui 盧明輝, "Ch'ing-tai pei-fang ko-min-tsu yü chung-yüan Han-tsu ti wen-hua chiao-liu chi ch'i kung-hsien," *Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu-chi* 6 (1988): 125.

[54] As an illustration see the 1624 passage, in Manchu, from the China First Historical Archives, Peking, Manchu archives (*Shih kung tang* no. 1, pp. 48b–49a). This passage demands a systematic translation of military ranks from borrowed Chinese terms to Manchu, and condemns as criminal all those who continued to use borrowed Chinese terms for instruments of state. For seventeenth-century changes in vocabulary see anecdotal evidence in Ch'en Chieh-hsien, "The Value of The Early Manchu Archives," esp. p. 75. The Ch'ien-lung emperor also pronounced on the proper way to transliterate Manchu and Mongol personal and place names into Chinese. He personally made suggestions on how to select Manchu designations for Chinese place names that were homophones: see T'ung Yung-kung 佟永功, "Ch'ien-lung huang-ti yü Man-yü ti-ming," *Ti-ming ts'ung-k'an* 6 (1967): 33–34.

"memorial" (*jedz*—from *che tzu* 擢子) became *bukdari*. The designation for "capital city," *ging hecen*, was replaced in later texts by the term *gemun hecen*—the "central" or "universal" city.[55] And the bureaucracy, which in its early form had been composed of "yamens" (*yamun*), was reformed into *jurgan* (from a word for line, row, pattern, rectitude, duty).[56] At the same time, Manchu terms were incorporated into common bureaucratic diction; for example, the Manchu term *hetu* ("horizontal") was the source for the Chinese term *hei-t'u* 黒圖 for memorials used to manage Shenyang affairs.[57] On one level these changes are cultural traces of the strong bureaucratic position of the Manchu elite through the early and middle Ch'ing period. On another they are emblematic of the ideological mood of the Ch'ien-lung court. The court attempted to encourage and enforce education in the purified language standard. Pedagogical materials generated under the court imprimatur also tended to undergo private reproduction and modification, sometimes keeping their titles while altering the text.[58] The originals from which home study guides were derived may be found in many archives, and the most prominent should be identified here. Of special interest is Ortai's guide to the reading of Old Manchu, *Tongki fuka akū hergen-i bithe* (1741), for those who were literate in Manchu but mystified by the unvocalized script. For readers not yet prepared for such esoteric study, the K'ang-hsi emperor's authorized glossary, published in 1708 as *Han i araha manju gisun i buleku bithe, Yü-chih Ch'ing-wen chien*, remained the model; this text was revised and much elaborated in *Han i araha nonggime toktobuha manju gisun i buleku bithe, Yü-chih tseng-ting Ch'ing-wen chien* (1772). One of the most commonly used texts was the *Cing wen ki meng bithe, Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng* (1729), attributed to Shou Ping. The *Ch'ing-wen hui-shu, Manju isabuha bithe* was completed in 1750 by Li Yen-chi. [Aisin Gioro] I-hsing's *Manju gisun be niyeceme isabuha*

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[55] The authors thank Jerry Norman for suggesting these and other examples of vocabulary changes.

[56] See also Norman, *Concise Manchu-English Lexicon* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 166, and *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui*, 10.27a.

[57] The same archive was in Manchu referred to as *heturi dangse*, meaning "ordinary or private communications." See also *Sheng-ching hsing-pu yüan-tang*, p. 1; Bartlett, "Books of Revelations," p. 31.

[58] The Harvard-Yenching collection includes many hand copies of primers and personal practice books produced by both Manchu speakers for the study of Chinese and Chinese speakers for the study of Manchu. See Matsumura, "A Catalogue of the Manchu Books in the Library of Congress," pp. 56–59 and Tatiana A. Pang, "Mandschurische Sprachführer aus der Sammlung der Leningrader Abteilung des Orientalischen Instituts der Akademie der Wissenschaften" *CAJ* 32.1/2 (1988): 73–90.

bithe (*Ch'ing-wen pu-hui*), first published in 1786, was revised and reissued by his son-in-law Fakjingge in 1802.

During the eighteenth century, Manchu, and to a lesser extent Mongolian, were skills acquired by many civilian officials and literati. All degree candidates could participate in the Manchu and Mongolian essay portions of the examinations if they made a special petition; after 1661 bannermen and a few civilians could compete for a "translator's" (*ubaliyambume, fan-i*) degree at the *chin-shih* level, and after 1722 candidates could sit for the "translator's" examinations at the *chü-jen* and *hsiu-ts'ai* levels.[59] For the Chinese-martial bannermen and bondservants of Chinese descent, of course, Manchu was regarded as a normal accomplishment. Fan Ch'eng-mo (1624–76) was an expert,[60] and Sun Wen-ch'eng (fl. 1706–28)[61] perhaps remains one of the best exemplars of the highly cultivated Chinese-martial bannerman with magisterial command of the Manchu language. Sun's education in the language may be assumed to have resembled that of his maternal relatives Li Hsu (1655–1729) and Ts'ao Yin (1658–1712).

For civilians, too, Manchu and Mongolian were desired features of professional training. Selected civilian *chin-shih* recipients were assigned to begin study of Manchu at the Hanlin Academy and were normally examined in the language three years later. In form these assignments appear to have been conscriptions, but in substance they may have been opportunities for civilians who were personally interested in Manchu or its advantages.[62] Failure to pass the comprehensive examination in Manchu after three years of study could result—as it did in 1742 for Yüan Mei (1716–98)—in expulsion from the Hanlin. In addition to those Chinese officials already mentioned there is evidence that many, if not a majority,[63] of

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[59] A small collection of original examination essays is part of the Han Yü-shan collection at UCLA. Of the numerous preparation books for the "translation" examinations, one excellent example is now at Wolfenbüttel (*Ubaliyambume simnehe timu bithe*, Herzog August Bibliothek, Codex. Guelph. 117.1 *extravagantes*); see also the essay by H.L. von Gabelentz in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgen Ländischen Gesellschaft* No. 16, pp. 184, 542–32.

[60] His collected Manchu memorials were published in 1708; a copy, titled *Tondo unenggi Fan Gung ni wen ji bithe* (*Chung-chen Fan Gung wen-chi* 忠貞范公文集) is now item 118 in the oriental manuscripts of Bibliothèque Nationale.

[61] See Chuang Chi-fa's edition of Sun's letters from the National Palace Museum, *Sun Wen-ch'eng tsou-che* 孫文成奏摺 (Taipei: Palace Museum, 1978).

[62] For anecdotal evidence see the account, based upon Yüan Mei's memoirs, in Arthur Waley, *Yüan Mei: Eighteenth Century Chinese Poet* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 23–30.

[63] See, for example, the biographies of Li Kuang-ti (1642–1718); Ch'en Meng-lei (1651–1723?), whose Manchu examination paper is preserved in the Han Yü-shan collection;

the high-ranking bureaucrats of the late seventeenth through early nineteenth centuries had at least some training in Manchu. Prominent civilian literati who became adept in Manchu or Mongolian primarily for the purposes of philological or historical inquiry included Kung Kung-hsiang (also known as Kung Ch'eng, b. 1817, a son of Kung Tzu-chen) and Liang Chi (father of Liang Shou-ming).

In the aggregate, the pedagogical materials extant in archival collections indicate several interconnected cultural changes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Prior to the early eighteenth century, court-sponsored pedagogical and lexicographical materials had tended to be designed for Manchu speakers (presumably bannermen being trained for bureaucratic service) seeking to learn Chinese. Materials for Chinese speakers of any identity seeking to learn Manchu had been produced primarily by Chinese or Chinese-martial scholars. Among the forerunners of those making outstanding contributions in the mid-eighteenth century in this critical area were Li Yen-chi and Shen Ch'i-liang, who represent a group of civilian intellectuals working intimately with Manchu.

Shen Ch'i-liang, unlike many members of the bureaucratic elite who were assigned to the Hanlin Academy, was not designated to study Manchu. He claims in the introduction to one of his works that he had a great curiosity about Manchu since he was a boy, and this curiosity alone appears to have been the driving force in his Manchu studies. The son of a colonel of the Green Standard armies who was killed fighting the forces of Cheng Ch'eng-kung (then harrowing the coasts of Fukien in attempts to resist the Ch'ing conquest of South China), Ch'i-liang underwent an apparently cursory military education and served in the armies fighting the forces of Keng Ching-chung in Fukien from 1674 to 1676. He received a dispensation to return to Peking to care for his sick and widowed mother, after which he began his higher education and his study of Manchu. Out of these studies came Shen's first known work, *Manju bithei jy nan, Ch'ing-shu chih-nan*, which, among its other virtues, includes the texts of early Manchu lesson books (*Juwan juwe uju* and *Dehi uju*) that would otherwise be extremely rare, if not lost.[64] He also completed an important revision

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Ch'ien Wei-ch'eng (1720–72); Yü Min-chung (1714–80); Yen Ch'ang-ming (1713–87); Chao I (1727–1814); and Kuo Shang-hsien (1785–1833) in *ECCP*.

[64] In "Shen Ch'i-liang and his Works on the Manchu Language" (in Ch'en Chieh-hsien and Sechin Jagchid, eds., *Proceedings of the Third East Asian Altaistic Conference*), Kanda Nobuo has noted the differences between Shen's *Juwan juwe uju* and other known editions. Kanda cites the 1670 text by Liao Lun-chi, but other texts are to be found, for instance as items 271 and 273 in the oriental manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Nationale. These are

of *Manju nikan minggan hergen i bithe, Man Han ch'ien-tse wen* that contributed to the development of a genre of pedagogical texts. His compilation of the *Dayicing gurun i yooni bithe,* (*Ta Ch'ing ch'üan-shu*) was the earliest known privately-compiled Manchu-Chinese lexicon.[65] Its order and contents anticipate the *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui*, a Kuang-hsü period text produced by the brothers [Aisin Gioro] Chih-k'uan and P'ei-k'uan, which became one of the best known reference works for modern students of Manchu and a seminal source for western lexicographers.[66]

The prefaces of the *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui* note that it subsumes two earlier works, *Ch'ing-wen hui-shu* and *Ch'ing-wen pu-hui.* The latter is by Li Yen-chi, who was possibly a bondservant, perhaps a commoner, in the private employ of Yin-ssu, Prince Lien (1681–1726). Li resided in the imperial city, very close to—perhaps on the grounds of—Yin-ssu's mansion, and records indicate that a stipend riot by bannermen in 1725 resulted in the vandalizing of both residences. We do not know when Li compiled *Manju gisun-i isabuha bithe, Ch'ing-wen hui-shu*, a dictionary that was repeatedly reproduced during the eighteenth century and is widely available in Manchu-language collections. When it was republished by Fakjingge in 1802, it was accompanied by a supplement, *Manju gisun be niyeceme isabuha bithe, Ch'ing-wen pu-hui*, by [Aisin Gioro] I-hsing. Thus in the Kuang-hsū period, after an interval of well over a century, Li Yen-chi's work on the Manchu language, having been preserved and enhanced by the Manchu aristocrat I-hsing, was married by the Manchu aristocrats Chih-k'uan and P'ei-k'uan to Shen Ch'i-liang's work on the Manchu language. By that time, the concerns of nineteenth-century Manchus had come to resemble, to some degree, those of earlier, humbler Chinese: pressed to learn written Manchu, sinophone Manchus had to rely upon the primers, lexicons, and bilingual texts produced by the generation of Shen Ch'i-liang and Li Yen-chi. This was a species of knowledge that was very intimate to the policies and ideology of the court, and its heterocultural origin was characteristic of the Ch'ing imperial process.

Europeans and Manchu Studies

Europeans received mixed signals from the court, being first welcomed as students of Manchu, then banned from study of the language. This is to be loosely connected with the maturation of Jesuit influence at the K'ang-hsi court after 1689 (the year Jesuits were licensed to begin study of Manchu) and its decay under the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Père Jean-Jacques Marie Amyot (or Amiot, 1718–94) is perhaps an exemplar of the significance of Manchu scholarship to eighteenth-century Europeans. Amyot reached China in 1750 and then lived in Peking until his death. Manchu was his primary means of communicating with the court, and he has left several important (if flawed) works for the study of eighteenth-century court culture. Among them were a rendition of the "Ode to Mukden," which will be discussed below, an untitled transcription of a shamanic prayer that Amyot heard offered during the Chin-ch'uan wars,[67] and at least two dictionaries. Amyot's work was a stimulus to later research by J-P Abel-Rémusat (1788–1832) and Heinrich-Julius von (or Henri-Jules de) Klaproth (1783–1835); thus it not only helped form the corpus of Western (including Russian) scholarship on Asia but also was an indispensable part of the process by which much European knowledge about China was filtered through the Manchu language.

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inscribed as having been produced, at unknown date, "pour Monsieur de Fourmont" by Père Jean Domenge. The latter was also the author of a fragmentary Manchu grammar, based upon liberal borrowings from the *Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng* 清文啓蒙 and Shen's own *Ch'ing-shu chih-nan* 清書指南, which by a tortuous route found its way to Bibliothèque Nationale. The title *Juwan juwe uju* was a generic title for Manchu syllabaries and derived from the first tabulary rendition of the adapted Mongolian syllabary of Dagai. It is possible that Domenge (who used the Chinese name Meng Cheng-ch'i 孟正氣) adopted the title *Juwan juwe uju* from Shen's model text or even from Shen's own work, and then recast his text to satisfy his own purposes. Alternatively, either Shen or Domenge may also have been working with a handbook, of the sort we have described above. *Dehi uju* is not known to have survived outside of Shen's rendition of the text. Shen also compiled a bilingual *Ch'ien-tzu wen* 千字文 and a very rare Manchu version of the *Pai chia hsing*, of which the only known copy is in the Harvard-Yenching collection. Two other versions of *Ch'ien-tzu wen* are: Yü-chen 尤珍, *Ch'ing-shu Ch'ien-tzu wen*, and an anonymously authored version that is now in the Vatican archives (see Stary, *Opere mancese* p. 48, item 50).

[65] See Kanda, "Shen Ch'i-liang and his Works on the Manchu Language;" Fuchs, *Beiträge zur Mandjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur*; and Imanishi, "Shinsho shinan no koto nado," *Biburiya* [*Biblia*], 7 (1956): 8–11.

[66] The *Ta Ch'ing ch'üan-shu* 大清全書 is something of an enigma. Editions of the work now extant in Europe have been studied and commented upon by Walter Fuchs, Imanishi Shunjū, and Kanda Nobuo, who suggest that it was modeled on an earlier, but lost, lexicon. Whatever its ancestry, the word order and the glosses of the *Ta Ch'ing ch'üan-shu* exactly anticipate those of the entries in *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui* 清文總彙. A manuscript of Shen's 1683 edition of *Ta Ch'ing ch'üan-shu*, now in the Gest Oriental Library, contains hand emendations that predict those of the *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui*, and we suggest that it may be either the prelude to a draft of the later work, or a home edition with hand insertions taken from the *Ch'ing-wen tsung-hui.*

[67] Item 285 in Bibliothèque Nationale, département des manuscrits, division des manuscrits orientaux, titled, "Hymne mandchou chanté à l'occasion de la conquête du Kintch'ouan."

Long before Amyot's arrival at Peking, Manchu was the primary medium between the court and the West for philosophical exchange[68] and scientific instruction. Jesuits at the Ch'ing court used Manchu to converse with the emperors. Manchu was not only used in astronomical and mathematical instruction, as has been widely recognized, but also for teaching anatomy, as indicated by a rather enigmatic text, annotated in Manchu with no Chinese translation. This text is a window both into early Chinese exposure to Western medical ideas and the quality and origins of those ideas themselves.[69] Manchu was also the linguistic medium for some diplomatic intercourse, particularly with Russia (an exchange in which Jesuits and other religious played a role).[70] For the Jesuits knowledge of Manchu opened the door to knowledge of the court's shamanic rituals, which had been well concealed from unauthorized Chinese perusal. The religious interest of the Jesuits may have contributed to increasing Ch'ien-lung court suspicion of their presence and their motives; certainly curiosity of the sort exhibited by Amyot was not welcome. Later foreigners continued to exploit the grasp that Manchu offered of official communications in China, and by the early nineteenth century Protestant missionaries began to use Manchu to proselytize among the bannermen.[71] The Chia-ch'ing emperor was alarmed that knowledge of Manchu was spreading among Europeans, and in 1805, during a series of anti-Christian proclamations, he prohibited the teaching of Manchu to foreigners. Despite the prohibition, foreigners continued to study Manchu, and now any history of the development of Western scholarship on Asia must grant that knowledge of Manchu and curatorship of Manchu materials were prominent.[72] Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Jesuits, who continually sent Manchu materials out of Peking, helped create the core of what are now the oriental manuscript collections in France and Italy. Similarly, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century traders from Britain and the German territories created their respective collections. By the early nineteenth century, the great Chinese classics had all been translated into Manchu. Most of them were available in bilingual editions, and Europeans used Manchu as a bridge for the study of classical Chinese.

The first Manchu-Latin grammar was sent to France by Père Gerbillon and printed in 1696. A grammar (*Grammaire tartare-mandchou*, 1787) and Manchu-French dictionary (*Dictionnaire tartare-mandchou français*, 1789–90), both of which may have been based on the Gerbillon work, were written by Amyot.[73] The first known Russian grammar of Manchu was Illarion Kalinivič Rossochin's translation of *Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng*, also the first foreign adaptation of the primer.[74] An unpublished but circulated Manchu-Russian lexicon was written by Feodor Baksheyev before 1787,[75] and a grammar was completed in 1804 by Anton Vladykin.[76] H. Conon de la Gabelenz [von Gabelentz] contributed *Elémens de la grammaire*

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[68] This included Jesuit missionary work. Many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works for religious instruction survive. See items 234–270 in Puyraimond, *Catalogue du fonds Mandchou*, pp. 114–27, and Stary, *Opere Mancesi in Italia e in Vaticano*, p. 16, item 2; p. 42, item 41; p. 50, item 53; p. 52, item 55; p. 53, items 56–57; p. 62, items 66–67; p. 63, items 68–69; p. 64, items 71–72. The first source of a Christian scripture in Manchu was a translation of Matteo Ricci's *T'ien-chu shih-i* (original colophon 1601), undated but possibly completed before 1689, when the tuition of Jesuits in Manchu was authorized.

[69] At least two complete copies of the work are extant, one in the National Palace Archives in Taiwan and one at Bibliothèque Nationale. The former has been published in photofacsimile by John B. de C.M. Saunders and Francis R. Lee as *The Manchu Anatomy and its Historical Origin, with Annotations and Translations* (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., 1981). On the basis of the observations of Joachim Bouvet and the internal evidence of the manuscript, the editors hypothesize that the work was prompted by the K'ang-hsi emperor's contraction of malaria in 1692 and his consequent desire for an illustrated text that would permit him to understand both the physiological mechanisms of his disease and the effects of the medication (quinine) administered by Gerbillon and Pereira. On the Western provenance of its contents see also Marie-Rose Seguy's introduction to Puyraimond, *Catalogue de fonds Mandchou*, p. 6.

[70] Prior to 1860 Russian communications were handled by the *Li-fan yüan*, in whose archives (now part of the First at Peking) rest the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, among others. Of the languages used in these redactions—Chinese, Latin, Manchu, Russian, and Mongolian—Manchu was most likely to be intelligible at both ends of the negotiations.

[71] Partial translations of New Testament passages into Manchu, some of which are associated with Protestant proselytizing via Siberia and later via the treaty ports, have been noted in Gimm, "Zur den mandjurischen Sammlungen der Sowjetunion, I." See also Boettcher, "In Search of Manchu Bibliography," pp. 74–81; Erling von Mende, "Einige Bemerkungen zu den Druckausgaben des mandjurischen Neuen Testaments," *OE* 19.1–2 (1972): 215–21; and the untitled fragment ("Abhandlung in Mandchuische Sprache") now in Wolfenbüttel (Herzog August Bibliotek. Codex Guelph 62.2 *extravagantes*). A complete new testament (*Musei ejen isus heristos-i tutabuha ice hese*)—a joint British-Russian enterprise—was not produced until 1835. Matsumura notes six copies of the S.V. Lipovcov translation (published in St. Petersburg, 1835) in the Library of Congress; see B-a12–B-a17. The same collection also includes two copies of a Lipovcov New Testament (*Ice hese*), published in Shanghai in 1929 (B-al8, B-al9).

[72] On the xylographic background to these developments see also the important discussion and documentation in Boettcher, "In Search of Manchu Bibliography," pp. 68–81.

[73] Amyot also included an abridged Manchu-French lexicon in his *Mémoires concernant l'histoire des Chinois*.

[74] Pang, "A Historical Sketch of the Study and Teaching," pp. 124–25. The date of Rossochin's translation is uncertain, but probably was before 1750.

[75] Eric Widmer, *The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission* (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Research Center, 1976), p. 165.

[76] *Man'djurskaya grammatika v pol'zu rossiiskago yunosestva socinennaia Antonom Vladykinim*, now item 277 in Bibliothèque Nationale, whose copy has an interlinear handwritten translation into German by J. Klaproth.

mandchoue in 1832, and *Mandschu-deutches Wörterbuch* in 1864. The first work in English appears to have been Thomas Taylor Meadows's chrestomathy, *Translations from the Manchu* (Canton, 1849). Like many of the Chinese pedagogical materials upon which it was patterned it has the great virtue of preserving archival materials that would otherwise be lost. In 1855 Alexander Wylie translated the popular primer *Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng* into English as *Ts'ing Wan K'e Mung*.[77]

The Manchu Language and Ch'ing Culture

Neither Shen Ch'i-liang nor Li Yen-chi occupied official positions, but they exemplified a fundamental characteristic of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literati life: familiarity with (which is not to say expertise in) Manchu. Beyond the extensive official literature in Manchu, its function as an emblem of universal imperial power made Manchu writing visually ubiquitous, as the multilingual placards and stelae found in Peking attest. Bilingual texts provide opportunities for studying not only the differences in concepts and expression between the two languages, but also the actual pronunciations of Chinese and Manchu in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since many of the glosses provide extensive phonetic clues. Above all, the archival holdings of Manchu documents attest to two truths of state and society: first is the degree to which the dynasty invested its legitimacy in the generation of a reflexive historical, genealogical, ritual, and romantic literature in Manchu; second is the degree to which a segment of the Ch'ing readership exerted itself beyond what the state required to sustain a bilingual literary milieu for its own inspiration and amusement.

Having created in the seventeenth century a literary language with no corpus, the Ch'ing court energetically sponsored the production of texts in Manchu. Though the original works are not extant, the *Hsing-pu hui-tien, Ssu-shu, San-lüeh, Meng-tzu, San-kuo chih, T'ung-chien kang-mu*, and *Ta ch'eng-ching* were probably all translated into Manchu during the Hung Taiji regime.[78] The best-known title of Hung Taiji's translation project was the *Chin-shih*, the history of the Jurchen Chin dynasty from whom Nurgaci had claimed legitimacy.[79] Later, the examination system shaped the field of emerging Manchu works. The curriculum for the Manchu and *fan-i* examinations, which were modified to cover the same territory as the civilian examinations, was comprised of the Four Books, Five Classics (*Wu ching*), Principles of Nature (*Hsing-li ching-i* 性理精義), Comprehensive Mirror ([*Tzu-chih*] *T'ung-chien*), Thirteen Classics (*Shih-san ching*), and Twenty-one Histories (*Erh-shih i shih*), all of which could be studied in either Manchu or Chinese.[80]

The ideological program calling for the translation of edifying works into Manchu created some professional specialization as well as some political debate among early Manchu literati. [Wanggiya] Asitan (d. 1683?), for instance, distinguished himself as one of the *bakši*, or literate men, of the second Hung Taiji reign. He gained the Manchu *chin-shih* in 1651 (the second time those examinations were administered), after he had actually risen to high rank in the central bureaucracy. Shortly after taking his degree he contributed Manchu translations of *Chung-yung, T'ai-kung chia-chiao*, and P'an Jung's *T'ung-chien ts'ung-lun*. In 1652 he memorialized the court against the translation of Chinese novels into Manchu, on the grounds that such literature was frivolous and subversive. It should be noted that the primary translator of novels was [Usu] Kicungge, who had just been put to death with another outstanding Manchu scholar and translator, [Suwan Gūwalgiya] Garin, because of his support for the deposed Dorgon clique.[81] Although both Nurgaci and Hung Taiji had encouraged, if not demanded, the translation of at least some Chinese fiction into Manchu, the Shun-chih court ratified Asitan's petition that Chinese fiction be suppressed. Asitan's son Hesu (1652–1718), who was later a tutor to the sons of the K'ang-hsi emperor and was himself a brilliant translator, strictly limited his labors to poetry and to ideological and edifying literature. The moment in which Kicungge and Garin were swept aside in favor of Asitan and Hesu marks the maturing Ch'ing awareness of the power of translated, modified, and adapted concepts, and the court's enduring determination to control as much as possible the intercourse between the Chinese and Manchu languages.

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[77] For historians, the difference between a chrestomathy and a primer is fundamental. Primers are composed of sentences, frequently made up, to allow students to absorb fundamentals of the language. Chrestomathies are readers that are frequently composed of authentic materials. In some cases, as in those compiled by Westerners, the documents used in chrestomathies were acquired from archives and are the only remaining traces of the materials reproduced. For an overview and preliminary bibliography of Manchu chrestomathies in particular see Hartmut Walravens, "Mandjurische Chrestomathien, Eine Bibliographische übersicht," in Michael Weiers and Giovanni Stary, eds., *Florilegia Manjurica: In Memoriam Walter Fuchs* (Wiesbaden: Komissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1982), pp. 87–105.

[78] Sun Wen-liang 孫文良 and Li Chih-t'ing 李治亭, *Ch'ing T'ai-tsung ch'üan-chuan* (Ch'ang-ch'un: Chi-lin wen-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1985), p. 310.

[79] Though Hung Taiji is well-known to have commented particularly upon the Chin history, *Aisin gurun-i suduri*, the translation was originally commissioned together with those of the Liao (*Dailiyoo gurun-i suduri*) and Yüan (*Dai Yuwan gurun-i suduri*) histories. The value of translating the histories was noted by Nurgaci, but it was Hung Taiji who appointed the translation staff—probably [Hešeri] Kife, Jamba, Cabuhai, and Wang Wen-kuei—who undertook the projects. The finished works seem to have been presented to the court in 1646.

[80] See *Ch'ing-shih kao*, p. 3101. The court had established separate offices within the Hanlin Academy for the revision, annotation, and writing of commentaries on *T'ung-chien* (*T'ung-chien kuan*), the *Hsiao-ching* (*Hsiao-ching kuan*) and all other major works in the examination curriculum. See Bartlett, "History as Mirror" p. 4, 16 n. 7.

The court's policy kept Manchu orthography and the formal Manchu corpus in some tension with Manchu's survival as a living language and the generation of informal literature in Manchu. Collections of Manchu materials unambiguously show that production and consumption were not confined to obligatory reading or limited without exception to what the state approved. Readers of Manchu sought—and when they could not acquire it, produced—recreational reading, exerting themselves to sow a Manchu or bilingual literary field of their own. The collections of this woodblock literature now extant do not always give a very clear picture of their provenance. A large number of the translations and bilingual editions either originated at or were reprinted at one of the printing establishments clustered in the general vicinity of the Lung-fu Temple, slightly to the west of the intensely commercial Tung Ssu P'ai-lou district in Peking. Many of these printing houses had links with the imperial printing enterprises, and it is impossible to disprove imperial encouragement in the genesis of this literature. But whether the selections were chosen by the printers themselves or were commissioned by prospective readers or merchants, they clearly resulted from a substantial and continuing commerce in recreational literature in Manchu that remained strong through the mid-nineteenth century. The most obvious market for these books was the small but influential class of urban bannermen who were property owners, money-lenders, businessmen, and artisans. But there is no evidence limiting the identity of the readership to bannermen, and the robustness of the literature suggests that it may have had a broader appeal, at least in Peking.

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[81] See *ECCP*, pp. 13–14; on Kicungge see *Man-chou ming ch'en chuan* 1.8a–10a; on Garin see ibid., 1.33b–35b.

Despite official censorship, "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" (*Ilan gurun-i bithe, San-kuo yen-i*) was of peculiar interest to the Ch'ing court, which conflated the folk cult of Kuan Ti with the shamanic cult of Nurgaci.[82] Historical memory at the court described Nurgaci and Hung Taiji as intense enthusiasts of the "Romance" stories, and it is probable that Hung Taiji commanded the translation of Lo Kuan-chung's novel (*San-kuo chih yen-i*) into Manchu, ostensibly to instruct his generals in military arts. The earliest known translation was completed by a team headed by Kicungge in 1650 (the year before he was executed). Later bannermen were famous for their attachment to the "Romance" cycles, and [Gūwalgiya] Eldemboo (1748–1805), who read no Chinese, credited his success against the White Lotus rebels to insights gained from "Romance" (via Lo and Kicungge). In the ensuing century, Kicungge's translation was frequently privately reproduced, sometimes as a bilingual text, and in 1769 an illustrated version was done at the imperial household settlement at La-lin.

Manchu versions of "Romance" are represented in all major Manchu archives, but they should not overshadow other novels that are known to have been translated and widely circulated: Lo's "Water Margin" (*Sui hū bithe, Shui-hu chuan*); "Golden Lotus" (*Gin ping mei bithe, Chin-p'ing mei*), bilingual editions of which date from 1708; the bilingual version of Wang Che-fu's *Manju nikan Si siang ki, Hsi-hsiang chi*, published in 1710; *Ciyoo liyan ju-i bithe, Ch'iao-lien chu*; and Jakdan's 1848 translation of P'u Sung-ling's *Sonjofi ubaliyambuha Liyoo jai jy i bithe, Liao chai chih i.*

In addition to translations from Chinese, Manchu literature consisted of some original prose works and poetry, including eulogies, folk songs, and ballads, many having a rhyme scheme and alliteration that Giovanni Stary has pronounced "typical of the poetry of many Altaic peoples."[83] These literary forms in part evolved from traditional Jurchen/Manchu oral literature, which was not well documented before the end of the nineteenth century.[84] Poems alternating Manchu and Chinese lines, as in the *tzu-ti* genre, testify to the profound and extensive Manchu impact on Peking's popular performing arts.[85] Although the court repeatedly promulgated regulations against the participation of bannermen in either street or more formal theater, it is well known that the regulations were disregarded not only by banner commoners, but also by noblemen and imperial clansmen, some of whom dissipated their fortunes by supporting theatrical troupes and commissioning entertainments. What is often overlooked in this famous tradition, however, is that the theater provided an environment for the continued nurturing of Manchu in the folk arts.

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[82] Mo Tung-yin, "Ch'ing-ch'u Man-tsu te sa-man-chiao," pp. 46–47. On the related Nurgaci legends among Manchus that continued to circulate into the twentieth century, see Meng Hui-ying 孟慧英, *Man-tsu min-chien wen-hua lun-chi* (Shen-yang: Chi-lin jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1990), pp. 16–35.

[83] Giovanni Stary, "A New Subdivision of Manchu Literature: Some Proposals," *CAJ* 31.3–4 (1987): 289. For related comments see "L'Ode di Mukden' dell'imperatore Ch'ien-lung: Nuovi spunti per un analisi della tecnica versificatoria mancese," *Cina* 17 (1981): 235–51.

[84] See introduction to Margaret Nowak and Stephen Durrant, *The Tale of the Nišan Shamaness* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); Chuang Chi-fa 莊吉發, *Nišan*

The Ch'ing court used the officially sanctioned taste for poetics and romance to glorify the regional origins of the dynasty. There are two outstanding products of this policy. The first, of the K'ang-hsi era, *Pi-shu shan-chuang* (*Alin i tokso de halhūn be jailaha gi bithe*) and its illustrated edition, *Pi-shu shan-chuang t'u-ying*, celebrated the scenes of the summer palace in Jehol, the high plateau outside the Great Wall, where the emperor, accompanied by as many as twelve thousand courtiers and banner troops, spent four to five months each year hunting, drilling the troops in martial arts, and feting Mongol nobles.[86] The poem and its illustrations were the result of collaboration among the emperor, civilian and bannerman scribes and poets, draftsmen and artists, and Ripa, who engraved the copper plates.

The second great work was the Ch'ien-lung emperor's "Ode to Mukden" (*Sheng-ching fu, Mukden i fujurun bithe*). The "Ode" had complex origins and an equally complex role in the construction of a Ch'ien-lung ideological facade, and its importance can only be suggested here. It may have been inspired by travelogues and territorial disputes of the K'ang-hsi era, and it certainly owed a debt to the folklore-envy of Hung Taiji's statebuilding.[87] When completed, the poem was transcribed in thirty-two "fancy" or "imaginary" scripts (*fukjingge hergen, chüan-wen* 篆文), for the express purpose of placing Manchu among the classic cultural institutions of the world.[88] It is unclear how many complete *fukjingge hergen* copies of the original (beyond the seven that would have been required for the imperial repositories) were produced. The Gest Oriental Library has a complete fancy-script edition in original covers. The Bibliothèque Nationale has a complete and well-examined edition, but the covers have been replaced by blue silk and have tags written in P. Amyot's hand translating the names for the scripts.

This alliance of ideology and literature was also manifested in the monumentalism of Ch'ing literary expression, particularly in the eighteenth century. Like the Mongolian great-khans, the Ch'ien-lung emperor ruled a universal realm that had no external boundaries but was internally marked by distinctions of history, culture, and status. Architectural facades, stelae, and printed pages were a continuous surface for the production of universalistic figures. Polylingual lexicographical, liturgical, or literary compilations constituted a monumental expression of the emperor's vision. For instance, the *Wu-t'i Ch'ing-wen chien*[89] produced under the Ch'ien-lung emperor is better understood as monumental literature than as a lexicographical aid. It was a simultaneous gloss in five languages—Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese, Tibetan, and Uigur—whose single-word entries do little to instruct in the nuances of the languages concerned but much to serve the ideological interests of the court. *Yü-chih Man Han Meng-ku Hsi-fan ho-pi ta-tsang ch'üan-chou* (*Han-i araha manju nikan monggo tanggūt hergen-i kamciha amba g'anjur nomun-i uheri tarni, Qaghan-u bicigsen manju kitad mongghol tubed kele qabsurughsan būkūli ganjur-un tarni*) falls into the same category. It is a massive four-language (Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian, and Tibetan) simultaneous text of *dharani* (magical incantations) from the Kanjur (Tibetan Buddhist canon), cumbersome to use and of little practical application apart from displaying the supernatural

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saman i bithe (Taipei: Wen shih che ch'u-pan-she, 1977); Kuan Te-tung 關德棟 and Chou Chung-ming 周中明, *Tzu-ti shu ts'ung-ch'ao* (Shanghai: Shang-hai ku chi ch'u-pan-she, 1984); Wu-ping-an 烏丙安 [Ubingga] et al., comps., *Man-tsu min-chien ku-shih hsüan* (Shanghai: Shang-hai wen-i ch'u-pan-she, 1983).

[85] See Kuan Te-tung and Chou Chung-ming, *Tzu-ti shu ts'ung-ch'ao*, esp. pp. 1–18; a popularized article on the subject is Ho Hai 賀海, "Pa-ch'i tzu-ti te hsing-jung yü 'huang-tu' Pei-ching," *Yen-tu* 6 (1986): 36–37. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, pp. 82–86, 251 nn. 18–21.

[86] Meng Chao-chen 孟兆禎 *Pi-shu shan-chuang yüan-lin i-shu* 避暑山庄園林藝術 (Peking: Tzu-chin ch'eng ch'u-pan-she, 1985); the annual treks to Jehol began in the 1680s and continued until 1821. The name Pi-shu shan-chuang was given to the retreat by K'ang-hsi in 1708.

[87] For further discussion see Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in the Transformations of Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming). On the background to the "Ode" see Crossley, "An Introduction to the Qing Foundation Myth," *Late Imperial China* 6.2 (1985): 13–24; Etō Toshio 衛藤利夫, *Manshū bunka shi jō no ichi shinwa* (Tokyo: N.p., 1934), and *Dattan* 韃靼 (Asahi Shinbunsha, 1938). On the literary character of the "Ode" see G. Stary, "L'Ode di Mukden.'"

[88] [*Yü-chih*] *Sheng-ching fu, chüan* 1, p. 1b, [*Han i araha*] *Mukden i fujurun bithe, fiyelen* 1, p. 2a. Père Amyot, who was resident in China at the time of the Ode's publication, presented a very free translation of it to the French public in 1770. J.H. von Klaproth published another translation in 1828 in his *Chrestomathie Mandchou* (with a preface excoriating the Amyot work). Neither edition translated the imperial foreword.

[89] A photoreprint of the Ch'ien-lung period original was published by Min-tsu ch'u-panshe, Peking, 1957.

dominion of the Ch'ing court. These apparently literary works are better understood as visual monuments to imperial universalism.[90]

The court's eclectic religious patronage also reflected Manchu claims to imperial universalism. Although they fulfilled their Confucian ritual roles by sacrificing at the state altars of Heaven, Earth, and the Temple of the Ancestors, the rulers were also attached to the shamanic traditions of the Northeast. The Ch'ien-lung emperor took this religious tradition so seriously that he gave its survival as one of the main reasons for insisting that nobles and bannermen assiduously study Manchu, in order to understand the shamanic invocations.[91] Indeed, the Manchu edition of the *[Hesei toktobuha] Manjusai wecere metere kooli bithe, Man-chou chi-shen chi-t'ien tien-li*[92] commissioned by the Ch'ien-lung emperor, has more detailed illustrations and explanations than the Chinese edition, which suggests the concern of the court for correct performance in the Manchu.[93]

From the time of Nurgaci, Manchu rulers had simultaneously embraced Tibetan Buddhism and appropriated its political models.[94] In view of the widespread conversion of the Mongols to Lamaism in the seventeenth century, imperial patronage made political good sense, but there is also evidence (some of it in Tibetan-language materials) that the K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng, and, especially, Ch'ien-lung emperors practiced Tibetan Buddhist devotions.[95] Tibetan Buddhism was enshrined in various temples

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[90] On the production of a Manchu-language Kanjur, see *Ch'in-ting t'ung-wen yün-t'ung* 欽定同文韻統. For commentary on extant editions of the *Kanjur* in Manchu see Boettcher, "In Search of Manchu Bibliography," pp. 53–56. On the discovery of the rare Manchu Kanjur, see Charles R. Bawden, "A Volume of the Kanjur in Manchu Translation in the Library of the Wellcome Institute," *Zentral-Asiatische Studien* 14.2 (1980): 65–84.

[91] *Man-chou chi-shen chi-t'ien tien-li* 滿洲祭神祭天典禮, 1.1a–b. See also Crossley, "Manzhou yuanliu kao," pp. 779–80.

[92] For a well-known French translation, see Charles Joseph de Harlez, "La religion des Tartares orientaux, comparée à la religion des anciens Chinois, d'après les textes indigènes, avec le rituel tartare de l'emperor K'ien-Long," in Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, Brussels, *Mémoires couronnés et autres mémoires*, vol. 40 (Brussels, 1887), pp. 61–172. For recent scholarship based on the Chinese edition see Angela Rose Zito, "Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance: Ritual Writing in Eighteenth Century China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989).

[93] In addition see Murata Jirō 村田治郎, "Shin-nei-ko no saiki (Shin koshitsu syamanizumu sono san)," *Manmō* 16.3 (1935): 61.

[94] See particularly Samuel Martin Grupper, "The Manchu Imperial Cult of the Early Ch'ing Dynasty: Texts and Studies on the Tantric Sanctuary of Mahakala at Mukden" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1980); David Farquhar, "Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch'ing Empire," *HJAS* 38 (1978): 5–34.

[95] The K'ang-hsi emperor's interest in Lamaism is cited by Walther Heissig, *The Religions of Mongolia*, trans. Geoffrey Samuel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 33; Heissig states that the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung emperors continued personal

closely linked with the imperial family. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the most prominent of these temples, the *Yung-ho kung*, housed several hundred Tibetan, Mongol, and Manchu monks and served as a teaching center of the Yellow Hat sect.[96]

The Ch'ing conquests in Central Asia intensified the cultural exchange among China, Tibet, and the societies of the steppe. The K'ang-hsi emperor had the Tibetan Buddhist canon (Kanjur) rendered into Mongolian and distributed "throughout Mongolia"; under the Ch'ien-lung emperor the commentaries to the Kanjur were translated into Mongolian.[97] The heightened interaction between Mongolia and Tibet stimulated not only translations but original commentaries on Tibetan scriptures by Mongol scholars. Peking was a major center for production of religious literature in Mongolian; a total of 554 extant works printed there (cited by Walther Heissig) constitutes a rich corpus of materials for future research.[98]

Given that Manchu was significant in the creation of an imperial literary edifice, and considering the autonomous development of literati interest in Manchu and Mongolian as philological and anthropological knowledge, some well-known features of Ch'ing culture can be re-examined in a new light. Perhaps most obvious is the possibility of reinterpreting the "Four Treasuries." In the imperial view, the intellectual technologies behind the Four Treasuries projects—foremost evidential research (*k'ao-cheng*)—were useful not only for elucidating the autochthonous cultural origins of the Ch'ing in the Northeast and confirming the historical legitimacy of the dynasty in China, but also for eliminating the ethnological authority of previous dynasties.[99] Manchu, Mongolian, and *k'ao-cheng* were important instruments in the Four Treasuries compilation process. Using philological

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devotions. On Ch'ien-lung's relationship with his religious teacher, see the biography of Rol pa'i rdo rje, the second lCang Skya (in Chinese: Chang-chia) Khutukhtu, recently translated from Tibetan into Chinese: *Chang-chia kuo-shih Jo-pito-chi chuan*, trans. Ch'en Ch'ing-ying 陳慶英 and Ma Lien-lung 馬連龍 (Peking: Min-tsu ch'u-pan she, 1988); also Samuel M. Grupper, "Manchu Patronage and Tibetan Buddhism During the First Half of the Ch'ing Dynasty: A Review Article," *The Journal of the Tibet Society* 4 (1984): 47–75.

[96] Wei K'ai-pi 魏開肇, *Yung-ho kung man-lu* (Honan: People's Press, 1985).

[97] Heissig, *The Religions of Mongolia*, pp. 32–33 describes the Manchu patronage of Tibetan Buddhist activities among the Mongols.

[98] Walther Heissig, *Die Pekinger Lamaistischen Blockdrucke in Mongolischer Sprache* (Wiesbaden: Komissionsverlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1954). On Mongol contributions to the Tibetan Buddhist literature, see Lü Ming-hui, "Ch'ing-tai pei-fang ko-min yü chung-yüan Han-tsu te wen-hua chiao-liu chi ch'i kung-hsien," pp. 122–40.

[99] On the background to the development of a private scholarship of historical geography, onomastics, and comparative linguistics in the nineteenth century see Crossley, "Manzhou yuanliu kao."

studies to revise the histories of the Liao, Chin, and Yüan dynasties—a project that was undertaken in the 1770s and 1780s—was an indispensable part of the Four Treasuries program.[100] Manchu was used to compile and correct the *kuo-yü chieh* 國語解 of the Chin history, and for unknown reasons Solon (Evenk), which was very close to Manchu, was used to correct the *kuo-yü chieh* of the Liao history; and Mongolian was used to revise the Yüan history.[101] The literary activities of the Ch'ien-lung era, which were highlighted by the Four Treasuries project, included major compilations that institutionalized Manchu cultural identity and history. The cumulative, and evidently intended, effect was to eradicate the Ming dynasty's curatorial authority over the histories of Northeastern dynasties in China.

Many of the Manchu works commissioned in the early years of the Ch'ien-lung reign were *bodogon i bithe, fang-lüeh,* reports on military campaigns that were recast as history (often by those whose actions they described) and then institutionalized as literary works in the Four Treasuries.[102] In this way, military bureaucrats such as [Janggiya] A-kuei (1717–97), [Fuca] Fu-k'ang-an (d. 1796), [Fuca] Fu-heng (d. 1770), and others became "literary" men, figureheads of the Four Treasuries project. This not only permitted the rulers to exert close control over the development of a contemporaneous political narrative, but also allowed them to establish decisive authority over the past. It was the emperor's express wish that these works, signifying the history and culture of the Manchus and Mongols and the rectitude of their role in China, should be made classic by their incorporation into the Four Treasuries. The court's agenda for the Four Treasuries project thus went beyond a "literary inquisition," or, as scholars have more recently suggested, a curatorial enterprise: the Four Treasuries compilation also attempted to provide a symbolic pedigree for the imperial culture. The goals of this agenda were in no way mutually

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[100] On *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* see R. Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987). Although Guy did not discuss the role of Manchu literature in the Four Treasuries process, he did give extensive consideration to the possible integration of language standardization, historical revision, and literary curatorship in the maturation of the Ch'ing imperial institution. See particularly pp. 30–31.

[101] See commentary on the works in Yang Li-ch'eng 楊立成, *Ssu-k'u mu-lüeh* (reprint, Taipei: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1969).

[102] On the Office of Military Archives, which produced these histories, see Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers*, pp. 225–28 and Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries*, pp. 31, 218 n. 65.

exclusive. But only by an overview of the imperial literatures represented in the eighteenth century may a more complete understanding of court motivations be approached.

Conclusion

We have presented a contradiction in the status of Manchu under the Ch'ing. On the one hand, Manchu was significant as a language that, being protected from public scrutiny, could be used in critical sectors of the bureaucracy and ritual organs and carefully controlled by the state. On the other hand, Manchu was significant in having a cultural role as a surviving folk form and as a literary language that generated interest beyond what was demanded by the state and in consequence frequently outgrew state control. The contradiction can be resolved by surveying the different functions of Manchu and periodizing those functions.

Manchu had an official life of administrative utility, which is represented not only in official historical compilations but also in court-sponsored pedagogical, historical, genealogical, and administrative materials. The use of Manchu as a security language, well developed by the early K'ang-hsi reign, dissipated after the dismantling, in the 1860s, of regulations requiring banner officers to master the written standard. Because Manchu was the imperial language, elementary errors and misunderstandings concerning the rise of the Ch'ing and the nature of the dynasty can and have been corrected by scholars with access to Manchu documents. Whether it be matters as simple as the origins of the (false) attribution of "Abahai" as the personal name of the second Manchu ruler Hung Taiji,[103] or more complex misunderstandings concerning the political character of the Ch'ing state, documents such as those we have discussed present researchers with abundant data to reinterpret this last conquest dynasty. Ch'ing historians who study the regime's foreign relations, politics, military organization, decision-making processes, and the imperial court will find that Manchu-language documents provide information and insights unavailable in the Chinese record.[104]

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[103] The mistaken appellation in Erich Hauer's translation of the *K'ai-kuo fang-lüeh* was noted by Gertraude Roth [Li] in "The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1616–1636," in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., eds., *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 7. For a note on the introduction of "Abahai" into English-language scholarship in Herbert Giles, *China and the Manchus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), see Giovanni Stary, "The Manchu Emperor 'Abahai': Analysis of an Historiographic Mistake," *CAJ* 28.3–4 (1984): 296–99, originally published in *Cina* 18 (1982): 157–62.

Manchu also played an important symbolic role for the Qing court. It was used to bolster the identity of the ruling house and to superimpose that image upon the culturally diverse empire created in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The special interest of the Ch'ien-lung emperor in the ideological and religious powers of the language helped to stimulate transformation of the banner educational system and massive publication of standardizing literature. The ideological manipulation of Manchu by the state is a topic that, in its own right, deserves further research and analysis.

Manchu had also an unofficial role in oral literature and polyglot vernacularism, demonstrated by its survival in the garrison communities—which were vastly disparate in cultural and economic development—and in the folk culture of Peking to the end of the dynasty. The sources for this research contain evidence of a genuine folk culture, distinct from and often in tension with state policy. Not only does this popular urban culture need further elucidation, but its relationship to the more formalized literature represented in the commercial productions discussed above needs to be examined.

Finally, Manchu was in the nineteenth century, and even now continues to be, a fount of information for private scholarship on philology, religion, and historical geography. From the late eighteenth century, Manchu enjoyed an emblematic status, and consequently its symbolic ubiquity—if not its actual function as a vital language—won literati recognition during the late Ch'ien-lung, Chia-ch'ing, and Tao-kuang reigns. The development of a private scholarly interest in Manchu literature and language may have roughly coincided with the government's gradual loss of control, through the Tao-kuang reign, over publication and republication; this is the era, for instance, of the publication and distribution (by Manchu noblemen and their collaborators) of the *Tung-hua lu*, a work which had been banned by the Ch'ien-lung court,[105] and also the era of unauthorized reprintings of materials commissioned for or brought under the curatorship of the

Four Treasuries. The participants in this Manchu-oriented scholarly stratum were international, including not only bannermen, but also civilian literati and Westerners. Much of the work produced by these nineteenth-century writers remains fundamental to ongoing research on Ch'ing history and culture.

We remind readers of the late Joseph Fletcher's injunction to China scholars in 1981: "A Ch'ing scholar who wants to do first-class work in the archives must, from now on, learn Manchu and routinely compare the Manchu and Chinese sources for their topics of research."[106] Improved access to Manchu archives, especially in China, means that the relevance of the language to any particular category of research is not as predictable as it was once assumed to be. We look forward to the fresh perspectives new scholarship utilizing these archival resources will produce.

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[104] Beatrice Bartlett's pathbreaking study of the evolution of the Grand Council, *Monarchs and Ministers*, is a recent example. Professor Bartlett has noted that her acquaintance with Manchu proved "essential" to her research (p. xiii).

[105] For further comment, though only on circumstantial evidence, see Fu Kuei-chiu 傅貴九, "*Tung-hua lu* tso-che hsin-cheng," *LSYC* 5 (1984): 168–70.

[106] See Fletcher's review in *HJAS* 41.2 (1981): 655–56.

■ Source: Wang, Zhong-han, 'The question of the place where the Manchu ancestors originated', in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 35, Nos. 3–4 (1991), Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 279–301.

THE QUESTION OF THE PLACE WHERE THE MANCHU ANCESTORS ORIGINATED[1]

Wang Zhong-han

For a long time the scholars at home and abroad have published many books and articles of good quality on the question of where the place of origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, the Qing rulers is.[2] They have inquired into this question deeply and carefully. Although there is no certain conclusion yet, everybody can see those fruitful results. The late famous Japanese scholar Wada Sei wrote an essay in the 1930s entitled *Shinso hasshō no chiiki ni tsuite* ("The region where the Qing ancestors originated").[3] He considered that the remote forefather of Qing was the Odoli wanhu (*tümen* in Mongolian) of late Yuan, who moved from the area of San-xing (close to today's Yi-lan county in Heilongjiang province) by the River Song-hua to the riverbank of Dou-man jiang or Tu-men jiang (at the border of North Korea). Later they reached the region north of the River Ya-lu after passing through many places. Without discussing the historical events of late Yuan, Wada Sei cited as proof, clearly, thoroughly examined and appropriately illustrated, the place where Qing Tai-zu Nurgaci's father and grandfather lived. I shall now try to present some views on the question, which had been raised but is as yet short of illustrations, where the abode of the Manchu ancestor Zhao-zu Meng-te-mu

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[1] This essay was written to celebrate the eightieth birthday of Professor Tan Ji-long (Qi-xiang), the famous historical-geographer who teaches at Fu-tan University in Shanghai. It was originally completed in Dec. 1988. I am grateful to the Japanese scholars Nobuo Kanda, Jun Matsumura and Hidehiro Okada, who have made many valuable suggestions after my lecture at Toyo Bunko in Nov. 1989.

[2] Zhang Bing-lin, *Qing jian-guo bie-ji* (QJGBJ, "Another record on the founding of the Qing dynasty"); see also Naitō Torajirō, *Shinchō kaikokuchō no shiryō* ("Historical material of the period when the Qing founded a state") and Tanabe Raizo, *Shinchō hasshōchi no densetsu* ("The legend of the region where the Qing dynasty originated", in *Mammō*, 7:1) in 1920s; Meng Sen, *"Qing shizu Bukuli Xiongshun kao", Ming Qing shi lunzhe jikan, xuben* ("A study of Bukuri Yongšon, the founder of the Qing dynasty; Continuation of the collection of the works on the history of the Ming and Qing dynasties"), the Japanese scholar Iwamoto Kazuo *Qingchao de xingqi ji qi chuanshuo* ("The arising of the Qing dynasty and its legend"), in *Lishi gonglun*, No. 36 in 1930s, and so on.

[3] *Ikeushi hakushi kanreki kinen tōyōshi ronsō.*

(Mengke Temur), was producing a patchwork article for the sake of asking advice from experts and scholars.

I. *The Legend of the Origin of the Manchu Ancestors*

In the successive works compiled by Qing officials, such as *Huang-Qing kai-guo fang-lue, Man-zhou yuan-liu kao, Ba-qi tong-zhi* and *Ba-qi Man-zhou shi-zu tong-pu*, all the authors thought the legend of the origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, based on *Qing-tai-zu Gao-huang-di shir-lu* (GHDSL),[4] or *Qing-tair-zu Wu-huang-di Nu-er-ha-qi shi-lu* (WHDSL).[5] Such an opinion was held for a long time without an objection until recently the Japanese expert of Qing history, Matsumura Jun, wrote an English essay "On the Founding Legend of the Ch'ing Dynasty".[6] In his opinion, admittedly GHDSL of the Qian-long edition was revised many times and completed late, even the WHDSL which has come down to us was not finished by Chong-de 1 (1636), either, but in the period of Shun-zhi (1644–1661). *Man-zhou shir-lu* (MZSL)[7] was accomplished later (Qian-long period), but its records are clear and reliable. The remained eight book version MZSL, written in Manchu and Mongolian as well as Chinese, was filed at the beginning of *Da-Qing li-chao shi-lu* (DQLCSL)[8] published by the puppet Manzhouguo in 1930s.

Relating the legend of the origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, MZSL which was completed in the Qian-long period, made the purpose and main theme clear from the very beginning. The transliteration of Manchu is as follows:

> golmin šanggiyan alin den juwe tanggū ba, šurdeme minggan ba, tere alin i ninggu de tamun i gebungge omo bi, šurdeme jakūnju ba, tere alin ci tucikengge yalu, hūntung, aihu sere ilan giyang, yalu giyang alin i julergici tucifi wasihun eyefi, liyoodung ni julergi mederi de dosikabi, hūntung giyang alin i amargici tucifi amasi eyefi, amargi mederi de dosikabi, aihu bira wesihun eyefi, dergi mederi de dosikabi…
>
> manju gurun i da, golmin šanggiyan alin i šun dekdere ergi bukūri gebungge alin, bulhūri gebungge omoci tucike, tere bukūri alin i dade bisire bulhūri omo de abkai sargan jui enggulen, jenggulen, fekulen ilan nofi ebišeme jifi muke ci tucifi etuku etuki sere de, fiyanggū sargan jui etukui dele enduri saksaha i sindaha fulgiyan tubihe be bahafi, na de sindaci hairame angga de asufi etuku eture de, asuka tubihe bilha de šuwe dosifi, gaitai andande beye de ofi,…fekulen tereci uthai haha jui banjiha, abka i fulinggai banjibuha jui ofi uthai gisurembi, goidaha akū ambakan oho manggi, eme hendume, jui simbe abka facuhun gurun be dasame banjikini seme banjibuhabi, si genefi facuhun gurun be dasame toktobume banji seme hendufi, abka i fulinggai banjibuha turgun be giyan giyan i tacibufi, weihu bufi, ere bira be wasime gene sefi, eme uthai abka de wesike, tereci tere jui weihu de tefi eyen be dahame wasime genehei, muke juwere dogon de isinafi dalin de akūnafi, burha be bukdafi, suiha be sujafi mulan arafi mulan i dele tefi bisire de tere fonde tere bai ilan halai niyalma gurun de ejen ojoro be temšenume inenggi dari becendume afandume bisirede,…tere jui ini emei tacibuha gisun i songkoi alame, bi abkai enduri bihe, bukūri alin i dade bisire bulhūri omo de abkai sargan jui,…abkai han suweni facuhun be safi gurun be toktobukini seme…mini eme abkai sargan jui, gebu fekulen, mini hala abka ci wasika aisin gioro, gebu bukūri yongšon seme alaha manggi, geren gemu ferguweme ere jui be yafahan gamara jui waka seme, juwe niyalmai gala be ishunde joolame jafafi galai dele tebufi boo de gamafi, ilan halai niyalma acafi hebdeme, muse gurun de ejen ojoro be temšerengge nakaki, ere jui be tukiyefi musei gurun de beile obufi beri gege be sargan buki seme gisurefi, uthai beri gebungge sargan jui be sargan bufi gurun de beile obuha, bukūri yongšon šanggiyan alin i šun dekdere ergi omohoi gebungge bigan i odoli gebungge hecen de tefi facuhun be toktobufi gurun i gebu be manju sehe tere manju gurun i da mafa inu…
>
> tereci ududu jalan oho manggi, amala banjire juse omosi gurun irgen be jobobure jakade gurun irgen gemu ubašafi ninggun biya de tehe odoli hecen be kafi afafi bukūri yongšon i uksun mukūn be suntebume wara de, bukūri yongšon i enen fanca gebungge jui tucifi sehun bigan be burulame genere be, batai coohai niyalma amcara de, emu enduri saksaha deyeme jifi, tere fanca gebungge jui ujui dele doha, amcara coohai niyalma gūnime niyalma de geli saksaha dombio, mukdehen aise seme hendume gemu amasi bederehe, tereci fanca guwefi tucike tutto ofi manju gurun i amaga jalan i juse omosi gemu saksaha be mafa seme warakū bihe…
>
> fancai amaga jalan i omolo dudu mentemu erdemungge banjifi ini nendehe mafari be waha kimungge niyalmai juse omosi dehi niyalma be ini mafai tehe omohoi bigan i odoli hecen ci šun tuhere ergi de emu minggan sunja tanggū bai dube de suksuhu bira, hūlan hada, hetu ala gebungge ba de jalidame gajifi dulin be ini mafari kimun bata seme waha, dulin be jafafi ini ahūn deo i boigon be jolime gaifi sindafi unggihe, tereci dudu mentemu tere hulan hada hetu ala i ba de uthai tehe.[9]

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[4] KHDSL, *Da-Qing li-chao shi-lu* (DQLCSL, Tokyo), vol. 121.

[5] WHDSL, ed. by Beiping Gu-gung-bo-wu-yuan, in four books version, 1932.

[6] The version in Japanese is in Oct. 1972; as for the English version, see *Acta Asiatica*, No. 53, pp. 1–42, The Toho Gakkai, 1988.

[7] Imanishi Shunjū, *Manwa taiyaku Manshū jitsuroku* ("The veritable records of Manchu of the bilingual text in Manchu and Japanese"). Latin letters are used as transliteration of Manchu. Ed. by Ri-Man-wen-hua-xie-hui, Feb. 1938.

[8] DQLCSL vol. 1.

[9] Comparing two versions of MZSL, the bilingual text and that in DQLCSL, we notice that Huntong *giyan* in the former one should be Huntung *giyang*, *-g* lost; *wei fu* should be *weihu* (small boat). Both quotations in *Ya-zhou-shi lun-wen-ji* (YZSLWJ, "collection of

Translation:

> Mount Chang-bai is 200 *li* in height and 1,000 *li* in circumference, and at its summit there is a lake called Tamun measuring 80 *li* in circumference. There are three rivers descending from that mountain: Ya-lu *jiang*, Hun-tong *jiang* [i.e. Song-hua *jiang*], and Ai-hu *he* [Dou-man *jiang*]. River Ya-lu starts from the south side of the mountain and flows westward down into the sea south of Liao-dong [the Yellow Sea], River Hun-tong [the upper reaches of Song-hua] starts from the north side on the mountain and flows northward into the northern sea [the Sea of Okhotsk], and River Ai-hu runs eastward into the eastern sea [the Japan Sea]...
>
> The Manchu state originated from a lake called Bulhūri beside the mountain called Bukūri to the east of Mount Changbai. Three heavenly maidens, Enggulen, Jenggulen, and Fekulen, came to bathe in Lake Bulhūri at the foot of Mount Bukūri. When the three maidens came out of the water and were about to dress themselves, the youngest sister found a red fruit left on her clothes by a sacred magpie. She took it in her hand and thinking that it would be improper to place it on the ground, she put it in her mouth while dressing. The fruit, however, went straight down her throat and, becoming pregnant, she could not fly back to heaven...
>
> Fekulen soon afterward gave birth to a boy. Since the baby had been born by Heaven's decree, he could speak immediately after his birth and grew up rapidly. When he had grown to a certain extent, his mother said to him, "My dear son, Heaven gave birth to you in order to make you rule the countries which are in a chaotic state. Go to those countries and govern them." She told her son in detail how he had been born by heaven's decree, and after having given him a small boat and instructed him to go down a certain river, she returned to Heaven. The boy got on the boat and went down the river, drifting with the current. When he reached a place at the riverside where people drew water, he landed on the bank, and breaking some branches of a willow tree and cutting herbs and spreading them out for a seat, he sat down. At that time the members of three different clans in that region where fighting with one another every day to gain ascendancy... The child told the people what his mother had told him about his birth: "I was a god in Heaven. When three heavenly maidens, Enggulen, Jenggulen, and Fekulen, were bathing at Lake Bulhūri at the foot of Mount Bukūri, the Lord of Heaven, seeing that your country is in turmoil, transformed himself into a red fruit, ... and I was born. My mother's name is Fekulen, my family name is Heavenly descendant Aisin (gold) Gioro (family name), and my personal name is Bukūri Yongšon." The people were deeply impressed, and feeling that this boy should not be walking, two of them locked their arms to form a palanquin and took him back, letting him sit on it. Thereupon, the members of the three clans gathered to consult with one another, and said, "Let us stop trying to become the ruler. Let us have this child as our ruler and give Beri *Gege* to him as his queen consort and put him on the throne. Bukūri Yongšon stayed at a fortress called Odoli in a field named Omohoi east of Mount Bai-shan, and based there he pacified rebels and subsequently named the country Manchu. It was this child that became the founder of the Manchu state.
>
> Several generations later the descendants of Bukūri Yongšon tyrannized over the people and as a result the latter totally rose in revolt. And, besieging the castle of Odoli, tried to kill every descendant of Bukūri Yongšon. At that time a boy named Fanca, who was one of Bukūri Yongšon's offspring, escaped from the castle and run away across the fields. When the enemy soldiers tried to pursue him, a sacred magpie flew down and perched on the boy's head. The soldiers pursuing him all went back, saying, "How could a magpie perch on man's body? It must be a withered tree." Thus Fanca escaped safely. Because of this Fanca's descendants in the Manchu state never kill magpies, honoring them as their ancestor... Dudu Mentemu, Fanca's grandson, was a man of virtue and talent by birth. He enticed forty descendants of his sworn enemy who had killed his ancestors to Hetu Ala (*hetu*, to lie across; *ala*, hill) at the foot of Mount Hūlan Hada by the Suksuhu River 1,500 *li* west of Odoli castle in the field of Omohoi, and killed half of them as sworn enemies of his ancestors. Then, capturing the other half, he spared their lives by sending them to his brother's families to be ransomed. Thereafter Dudu Mentemu settled at Hetu Ala.[10]

From the above-mentioned legend of the three heavenly maidens related to the ancestors of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, we learn that there were three clans in the city of Odoli. It is generally accepted that Odoli is at Yi-lan (*ilan* in Manchu, "three") county, formerly, called San-xing which is by the First Song-hua River in nowadays Heilong-jiang province. The proof is what is now "Long-fei yu-tian ge" (LFYTG),[11] in which it is said, "The three cities, Wo-duo-li, Huo-er-a, and Tuo-wen, are called Yi-lan-dou-man, meaning three *tümen*." Both Wo-duo-li and E-duo-li are the Chinese characters for the Manchu word *Odoli*. This place is at Ma-da-tun on the bank of River Mu-dan in today's Yi-lan county of Heilongjiang province;[12] Huo-er-a or Hu-er-ha are from the Manchu word *Hurha*, which is River Mu-tan; Tuo-wen, or Tao-wen is River Tang-wang; Yi-lan-dou-man, *ilan tumen* in Manchu, is San-xing, a short form of the Chinese word for "three

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essays on Asian history") are the same as the former. But *dube de* is falsely translated as *sen ni*; the English translation as "at the foot" in YZSLWJ is right.

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[10] E-mo-hui E-duo-li in MZSL and Ao-mo-hui Aoduo in WHDSL are the *Omohoi odoli* of different transliterations of homophones. Such is the case that Bu-ku-li Yong-shun in MZSL and Bu-ku-li Ying-xiong in WHDSL are both from *Bukuri Yongšon*.

[11] LFYTG written by the Korean Chuan Ti (*Zheng-lin zhi-jian xu-ben*), vol. 7, pp. 21–22.

[12] Tan Qi-xiang, etc. (ed.): *Zhong-guo li-shi di-tu-ji shi-wen hui-bian. Dong-bei juan*, Beijing, 1988, p. 205.

ten-thousand household". They are all in Yi-lan county, in accordance with San-xing in MZSL. In MZSL it is also mentioned that when Bukūri Yongšon, the son of the youngest heavenly maiden Fekulen, grew up, he followed his mother's instruction and taking a small boat, went down to the city of Odoli now in Yi-lan county. The river he went along, north to Mount Chang-Bai, should be River Mu-dan. The location of Mount Chang-bai and the city of Odoli mentioned in the story, agree with each other. Hence it should be certain that the place where the Manchu ancestors originated from is at Mount Chang-bai.

There are two questions here however. The first is the lineage of the Aisin Gioro clan. In the Qing documents in Manchu, Chinese and Korean, the ancestors of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu is traced back from Qing-tai-zu Nurgaci's father and forefathers: the first is Bukūri Yongšon, the second Fanca, the third Hui-hou, the fourth Dudu Mentemu, i.e. Mengke Temur (Zhao-zu), the fifth Chong-shan (Chu-yan), the sixth Tuo-luo or the seventh Fu-man, the eighth Jue-chan-an [Giocangga], (Jiao-chang by the Ming people), the ninth Ta-ke-shi [Taksi], (Ta-shi by Ming), the tenth Nurgaci (Nu-er-ha-chi by Ming, Lao-yi-ke-chi by the Koreans).[13] According to the official or private records by the Koreans, if we still take Mentemu (Mengke Temur) as the forth, the first and the Second are missing, the third Hun-hou, the forth Mengke Temur and Fanca, who was Mengke Temur's brother born of another mother, the fifth Dong-shan (Tong-cang or Chong-shan), the sixth and thereafter the same as what has been mentioned above.[14] Yet according to the legend in MZSL and WHDSL, Bukūri Yongšon is Shi-zu (the earliest ancestor) of Manchu; it is better to say he is the first ancestor of the Aisin Gioro clan, Shi-zu or the Founder. Nurgaci's descendants honor Mentemu as Zhao-zu which also means the earliest ancestor. How can one nationality come from two first ancestors? Moreover, according to MZSL, Fanca, the descendant of the founder of Manchu Bukūri Yongšon, became the grandfather of Mentemu; while in the Korean records, Fanca was in the same generation as Mengke Temur, the latter's step-brother. Of all ages, it is no surprise to see people of different generations with the same name, but the lineage recorded here is out of order; probably the former generation and the latter are transposed

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[13] Wang Zhong-han ed. *Chao-xian Li-chao shi-lu zhong de Nü-zhen shi-liao xuan-bien*, Shen-yang, 1979, pp. 247–251.

[14] Meng Sen, "He ge ji-zai suo xiang zhi Qing shi-xi", also "Qing-shi-lu suo xiang zhi shi-xi", in *Ming-Qing-shi jiang-yi*, II. Beijing, 1981, p. 371, p. 372.

because of various sources of legends. It is hard to reach any unanimity for the real lineage.

The second question is where the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu originated from. It is known that in MZSL and WHDSL there are two passages referring to this question: 1) Odoli (city name) of Omohoi (place name) is southeast of Mount Chang-bai; 2) Hetu Ala is more than 1,500 *li* west of Odoli.[15] Therefore the Odoli castle in MZSL is supposed to be southeast of Mount Chang-bai. Yet as mentioned above, the Odoli castle is at Ma-datun by the bank of River Mu-dan in Yi-lan county of present-day Heilongjiang province northwest of Mount Chang-bai, that is to say, one Odoli castle with two opposite locations to Mount Chang-bai. Similarly, it is said that Hetu Ala is 1,500 *li* west of the Odoli castle; the old castle of Hetu Ala at present-day Xin-bin county in Liaoning province, is several hundred *li* southeast of the Odoli castle in Yi-lan county, which is in the opposite direction to the record in MZSL. The late Qing scholar Wang Xian-qian even changed *xi* (west) into *si* (four), then, Hetu Ala became more than 4,500 *li* from Odoli.[16] In such a remote area, be it east or west, north or south, how can we find a definite spot?

II. Mzsl, Whdsl *and* Jiu Man-zhou Dang

The archives of Tian-cong 7–9 (three volumes together, one each year), which were originally missing in *Man-wen lao-dang* (MWLD) compiled in Qian-long 40s (1776–1785), were found in the remaining documents of Nei-ge da-ku in the autumn of 1935. They could make up the loss in *Man-wen yuan-dang*.[17] In August 1969, Taipei Gu-gong bo-wu-yuan for the first time published *Jiu Man-zhou dang* (JMCD), in which we can find the originally missing archives of those three years. In recent years the famous Japanese scholars Nobuo Kanda, Jun Matsumura and Hidehiro Okada have transliterated the volume of Tian-cong 9 and translated it into Japanese (in two volumes), one among the Toyo Bunko Collection.[18] Based on the Japanese edition, Guan Jia-lu, Tong Yonggong and others have restored the transliterated text to the Manchu scripture and published it together with the Chinese translation entitled *Tian-cong jiu-nian dang* (TCJND).[19] In Matsumura Jun's article "On the Founding Legend of the Ch'ing Dynasty", one quotation from the materials of the 6th of the 5th month of Tian-cong 9 (1635) is as follows:

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[15] MZSL 1/10, 19b–20; WHDSL 1/1ab.

[16] *Dong-hua xu-lu*, Shanghai, 1899. 1:1. This sentence is left out in Jiang Liang-qi *Dong-hua-lu* (Beijing, 1980, p. 1). Is it possible that this cannot be a proof?

[17] Altogether there are 5,377 pages in 10 volumes, among which a few pages are missing.

[18] Two volumes, the 18th of *Toko Bunko Collection*, 1975.

> ice ninggün de, sahaliyan ulai ergi hurga gurun de cooha genehe ambasa ceni dahabufi gajiha ambasa, sain niyalma be kan de acabure dori…
>
> tere mudan i cooha de dahabufi gajiha muksike gebungge niyalma alame, mini mafa ama jalan halame bukuri alin i dade bulhori omode banjiha. meni bade bithe dangse aku. julgei banjiha be ulan i gisureme jihengge tere bulhori omode abkai ilan sargan jui enggulen, jenggülen, fekülen ebiseme jifi enduri saqsaha benjihe fulgiyan tubihe be fiyanggu sargan jui fekülen bahafi anggade asufi bilga de dosifi beye de ofi bukuri yongson be banjiha. terei huncihin manju gürun inu. tere bulhori omo surdeme tanggu ba. helung giyang ci emu tanggu orin gusin ba bi. minde juwe jui banjiha manggi, tere bulhori omoci gürime genefi sahaliyan ulai narhun gebungge bade tehe bihe seme alalia. tere dain de yabuha giing be tuwame ilgafi ambasa be wesimbuhengge.[20]
>
> (On the sixth day… the imperial audience granted to the high-ranking vassals who had participated in the expedition to the Hurha kingdom in the region along the Sahaliyan Ula [River Amur] and to the leaders and civilians who had submitted and been brought to the capital. The Han made his appearance at the Grand Hall… some two thousand people who had submited and had been brought by the vassals, prostrated themselves and were given audience… A person called Muksike who had submitted during the expedition and been brought to the capital narrated as follows: "My ancestors had for generations lived by Lake Bulhori at the foot of Mount Bukuri. Though there are no records, an old legend tells that when three heavenly maidens, Enggulen, Jenggulen, and Fekulen, came to that lake to bathe, Fekulen, the youngest sister, found a red fruit brought by a sacred magpie. The legend further says that when she tried to hold it in her mouth, it happened to drop into her throat, and becoming pregnant, she gave birth to Bokori Yongson. His descendants are the Manchus. Lake Bulhori measures a hundred *li* in circumference and is one hundred and twenty or thirty *li* distant from the Amur. After I begot two sons I moved from Lake Bulhori and have been living at Narhun by Sahaliyan Ula [the Amur].)[21]

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[19] Tianjin, 1987. One among *Tian-jin shao-shu-min-zu gu-ji cong-shu.* Also Li Lin *Han yi Man-wen jiu-dang*, Liaoning, 1979.

[20] In *Jiu Man-zhou dang* (JMZD) (vol. 9, pp. 4240–4242) there are three *bokori;* in the Japanese translation two *bokori* but the other *bukuri;* in *Lun-wen-ji* they are all *bukuri.* It seems is right be *bokori.*

[21] The names for the three heavenly maidens in Chinese: En-gu-lun, Zheng-gu-lun and Fo-ku-lun, have been accepted through common practice, but in the two new Chinese translations, except Fo-ku-lun, the other two are changed into En-ku-lun, Zhe-ku-lun or Zeng-gu-lun, which seems unnecessary.

The names of the three heavenly maidens, Mount Bokori and Lake Bulhori in the above-quoted text are the same as those in MZSL and WHDSL. According to Matsumura Jun's study, it is reasonable to suggest the story of the three heavenly maidens narrated by Muksike in the archives of Tian-cong 9 is the source of the three heavenly maidens' legend in MZSL completed in Qian-long; the target of the campaign made by Qing Tai-zong Huang-tai-ji (Hong Taiji) was the Hurha tribe, located about one hundred *li* southeast and north towards River Amur (Hei-long jiang), that is the place which is called "Jiang-dong liu-shi-si tun (the sixty-four villages east of the River)" at a later time; another proof is in the *Shengjing Jilin Heilongjiang deng-chu biao-zhu zhan-ji yu-tu* (the popular name *Shir-san-bai*, SSP) of the Qian-long reign, which was based on *Huang-yu chuan-lan-tu* of Kang-xi. In volume 14 "Heilungjiang jiang-jun jing-nei shan-chuan", it reads, "Mount Bo-ke-li is seventy-five *li* south to the city; Lake Bo-he-li is sixty *li* south to the city." Hence, if we only consider the corresponding Chinese phonetics, it is reasonable to say that Mount Bo-ke-li which is south of the old Heilungjiang city and Lake Bo-he-li which is southeast to the city respectively refer to Mount Bukūri and Lake Bulhūri in MZSL and WHDSL. In this way it is proved that the name of the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, Bukūri Yongšon, came from Mount Bukūri. It goes without saying that Matsumura Jun thinks the place of origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu is not around Mount Chang-bai in the east of Jilin province, but in the region of Blagoveshchensk (Hai-lan-pao) in the Amur county of the USSR, north to the Amur River.[22] However, according to Hong Taiji's letter to the King of Korea, dated the 14th of the 9th month, Tian-cong 7 (1633), Hong Taiji referred to himself as a descendant of Da-Jin of the Jurchen and stated, "Please select someone who is well versed in history and send him to me. I will explain in detail my family pedigree to him."[23] From this, Matsumura Jun says modestly and prudently that it is also possible to consider that MZSL and WHDSL contained a founding legend showing the family of Tai-zu and Tai-zong originated from Mount Chang-bai and descended from the Jurchen of the Jin dynasty.

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[22] In *Jian-ming Qing-shi* ed. by Dai Yi (Beijing, 1980, vol. 1, p. 31) it is also said, "Manchu came from Jian-zhou Nu-zhen, whose direct ancestors lived at the north riverbank of Heilong-jiang." This conclusion is based on the records of Tian-cong 8 (1634) and the Japanese translation of TCJND, and accord with the opinion of Professor Matsumura.

[23] This letter can be found in "Ming Qing dang-an yu Qing-dai kai-guo shi-liao" by Li Guang-tao as well as in WHDSL (DQLCSL vol. 15, p. 21); the latter seems to be retouched.

III. *The Pedigree of the Aisin Gioro Family*

As mentioned above, it seems hard to unify the records of the pedigree of the Aisin Gioro family from different sources, which are disordered and inverted. In fact, this has been a long-standing and difficult problem. In the early 1920s, Zhang Tai-yan (Bing-lin) pointed out, "As for the deeds of the ancestors of the Qing dynasty, because of lacking materials, the descendants are unable to keep them in mind; even the genealogy cannot be so clear." And, "The story of the red fruit illustrates that it is unreasonable to say they are the offspring of Jin; the story of Fan-cha and Dong-shan tells that they lived at Hetu Ala for a long time." Also, "To check the stories of Manchu with the books written by the Ming people, if we only use those with some alterations made during the Qing dynasty as evidences rather than the original edition, then we still cannot figure out what was actually going on." At last, "Compiling the book *Qing-shi si pu, Qing-shi-guan xie-xiu* Tang Bang-zhi considered the name of Manchu came from Li Man-zhu; as for the two generations: Chong-shan and Xi-bao-qi-pian-gu who were not in the list with other rulers and not included in the ancestors' tombs, he repeated the previous error and using the corresponding phonetics, falsely made the elder brother or uncle as the founder of the Qing dynasty. What he said is not truthful."[24] Zhang Tai-yan thought the reason why the lineage of the Aisin Gioro family was in confusion was that the Manchus had no script with which to write it down and leave it to their descendants, therefore the basic evidence lacked; the documents written by the Ming people had spread from place to place, especially after the Qing rulers revised them and made some alterations and it became impossible to make the lineage clear. On the one hand, Zhang Tai-yan did not agree with the opinion that the name of Manchu came from a person's name, Li Man-zhu, which was a suggestion made by Tang Bang-zhi only based on the correspondent Chinese words. On the other hand, he disagreed with the saying that the founder of the Aisin Gioro family was Mentemu (Mengke Temur).

The compiler of *Qing-shi gao* made a comment in "A-ha-chu Wang Gao zhuan". It reads, "Some people said that the name of Mengke Temur is similar to that of Zhao-zu [Mentemu]. The same as sons and grandsons. However, only the youngest son Fan-cha got a chance to escape when the ancestors of the Manchus met trouble. They did not get revenge for several generations until Zhao-zu. How could we say that was a revenge while Mengke Temur was killed by barbarians? If we think Fan-cha was Fanca, then Fanca was Mengke Temur's brother, not several generations younger. The Qing people narrated their own genealogy, yet the Ming people got it from letters. The meaning of *Chun-qiu* is that a name follows the person who is supposed to have it. Without the original records such as *Yuan mi-shi* (The secrete history of Yuan), we cannot assume it by ourselves. During the reigns of Long-qing and Wan-li there was no name similar to Xing-zu [Fu-man] among the Jian-zhou chiefs. When Tai-zu's troops arose, the Ming people only mentioned Jing-zu [Jiao-chang by Ming; Jue-chang-an (Giocangga) by Qing] and Xian-zu [Ta-shi by Ming; Take-shi (Taksi) by Qing], not a word to say they were the offspring of Dong-shan."[25] He pointed out that the founder of the Aisin Gioro family Zhao-zu Mentemu was not Mengke Temur; Fan-cha was not Fanca, either. Among the Jian-zhou chiefs during late Ming there was no such a name as Fu-man who was Xing-zu. So it came to the conclusion that it was impossible to assume the genealogy of the founder of the Aisin Gioro family when there is no generalogical record as a base.

According to the historical documents, on the 1st of the 10th month of *ren-zi* (1612) Qing Tai-zu Nurgaci once reprimanded Ula *beile* Bu-zhan-tai [Bujantai], "Our Aisin Gioro clan comes from Heaven... For many generations we have been respected widely and never been dishonored by others. Even though you do not know the events a hundred generations ago, how could you do not know the events which took place in these recent ten generations?"[26] The events of several generations mentioned here, of course, mean those which took place during the time of Nurgaci's father Taksi and his grandfather Giocangga, two or three generations of the previous several decades. That is for sure, because there are clear accounts made by the people of Ming and Qing. As for the events of a hundred generations, or two to three thousand years ago, even though it is hard to make them clear, it is possible to know those which took place during the late ten generations, or about three hundred years ago. Twenty years after Nurgaci's reprimand, his successor Qing Tai-zong Hong Taiji wrote a letter to the King of Korea, saying, "Some people do not consider Wa-er-ke and us belonging to the same country. There are scholars well versed in history in your country. Please select one from them and send him to me.

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[24] "Xu (preface)", QJGBJ pp. 1–2b.

[25] *Qing-shi gao* (Beijing, 1977), vol. 30, p. 9128.

[26] GHDSL 4/4.

I will explain to him in detail my family pedigree and send him back."[27] According to this, and the above-mentioned letter which Hong Taiji gave to the Korean king, we know that there was a genealogy preserved during the time of Hong Taiji, otherwise, how could Hong Taiji have the confidence to repeat such conclusive words?

The famous scholar of the late Qing, Wei Mo-shen (Yuan) considered that Nurgaci was born in Ming Jia-jing 38 (1559). From that time, "trace back to Zhao-zu [Mentemu], that was the time of Zheng-tong and Jing-tai of Ming (1436–1456). From Zhao-zu, trace back to Shi-zu [Bukūri Yongšon], it should be close to the end of Liao and Jin." It is made clear in the notes that the founder was given birth by the heavenly maiden. After several generations the descendants met with trouble. Again after several generations Zhao-zu was born. Altogether it was around ten generations. Tai-zu reprimanded Ula *Beile* Bujantai... (see above). This is the proof to illustrate that these events did not take place a long time ago."[28] It tells us if we trace back ten generations from Nurgaci to Bukūri Yongšon, the time was supposed to be the end of the Yuan dynasty or the beginning of the Ming, not the end of the Liao and the Jin. Such an account is accord with the figure of nearly ten generations, also the base on which Meng Xin-shi (Sen) wrote *Qing shi-xi* (The genealogy of Qing).[29]

I agree with the suggestion that the Aisin Gioro family's Shi-zu Bukūri Yongšon (Mengke Temur) and Zhao-zu Mentemu were the same person.[30] This is not only because that the pronunciation of Mengke Temur is similar to that of Mentemu, but also because the accounts of the time correspond.

As we know, the legend about the three heavenly maidens recorded in MZSL and WHDSL is full of mysterious color, however, it reveals some facts that happened in the earliest time when Manchu began to become a nationality. Definitely we cannot believe every person or event in the legend of the three heavenly maidens was true. But we should admit that the figures, the place and the time which were told in the legend as the origin of Manchu were in accord with the historical facts. About the place, we shall discuss later. Here we are talking about the questions of the time and the figures.

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[27] See note 22.

[28] *Sheng-wu-ji* (Beijing, 1984) vol. 1, p. 2.

[29] See note 13.

[30] Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, 1943), vol. 1, p. 595.

First, the time. As Nurgaci said himself: the Aisin Gioro clan came from Heaven, only about ten generations ago. Based on the explanation in *Shuo-wen* that "The period of one generation is thirty years", ten generations are three hundred years, that is, about the time of the turn of Yuan and Ming. If we trace back three hundred years from 1612 when Nurgaci reprimanded Bujan-tai, it was 1312, Huang-ching 1 of Yuan Wu-zong which was in the late Yuan, not in the early Yuan as what Wei Yuan said "the end of Liao and Jin". Let's see another proof. Of the five *jun-min wan-hu fu* (prefect of civilian and military ten-thousand household) which were set up along both the north and south banks of the First Sung-hua River at the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, only three were left by the end of Yuan. LFYTG mentioned "Yi-lan dou-man (ilan tumen)" and Mengke Temur was one of the three; the time is also in accordance. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to say that the founder of the Manchu Aisin Gioro family Bukuri Yongson was born and grew up during the turn of Yuan and Ming.

Secondly, the figures. Now that Nurgaci said that his Aisin Gioro family came from Heaven, that means Aisin Gioro was a new family of Jurchen which had not existed in previous times, obviously it does not come from the Wan-yan clan of the Jin royal family; yet the heavenly maiden's son Bukūri Yongšon claimed his name Aisin (gold, *chin*) Gioro (family name), so it is certain that he was one of the descent of Jurchen of the Jin dynasty.[31] If Mengke Temur (originally Jia-wen as family name, Chinese name Guan-tong or Tong), who appeared in the history of the mid Hong-wu reign of Ming instead of the late Yuan, was appointed as the chief of the Odoli *tumen*, it is also in accordance with what Nurgaci said with "about ten generations". According to the historical documents, Mengke Temur died in *Xuan-de* 7 of Ming (1433), but the date of his birth is unknown. Supposing he died in his sixties, then, he was born in *Hong-wu* 5 of Ming (1734). Moreover, it says in *Gao-li shi* (The Korean history), "On *geng-zi* of the 3rd month of Tai-zu 4 [*Hong-wu* 25 of Ming, 1392], the chiefs of the tribes of Odoli and Ulangha were all granted the titles of rank as *wan-hu* (*tumen*, ten thousand household), *gian-hu* (thousand household) or *bai-hu* (hundred household).[32] It revealed that Mengke Temur was granted as the chief of the Odoli *wan-hu* by the Ming court before he moved to

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[31] It says in *Li-chao shi-lu*, the Odoli people claimed, "The great Jin was our forefather." The Koreans also thought, "Odoli is one branch of the great Jin descent." Although the Aisin Gioro clan is not the direct descendant of the Wan-yan family of Jin, it is one branch of the Jin lineage. See Tung Wan-ts'ang, p. 347.

[32] Cheng Lin-chi, *Gao-li shi* (Korean, 1958), vol. 1, p. 695.

Korea, so the Korean king also granted him the rank of *wan-hu*, and the approximate date when Mengke Temur was granted as *wan-hu* by Ming was Hong-wu 10s when he was fifteen or sixteen years old."[33] It goes without saying that "about ten generations" is not an exact figure; it does not matter several years earlier or later. Hence, the only possibility for Bukūri Yongšon, who was the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, is Mengke Temur (Mentemu) whose name is in the historical documents, because in the legend of the three heavenly maidens, Bukūri Yongšon was born in the area around Mount Bukūri during the turn of Yuan and Ming.

The above analysis has proved that the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu Bukūri Yongšon recorded in MZSL and WHDSL is the person called Mengke Temur, or Qing Zhao-zu Mentemu, of the Odoli *wan-hu*, or as the *du-zhi-hui-shi* of Jian-zhou zuo-wei. These two persons are actually one and the same. We cannot say that there was any Shi-zu besides Zhao-zu. Bukūri Yongšon was the figure of the fairy tale of Mengke Temur (Mentemu).[34] If we assume Mengke Temur as the first generation, Fanca was in the same generation because he was the brother of the same father but of another mother; in MZSL and WHDSL it is mentioned that after several generations a boy called Fanca, who was one of the descendants of the founder Bukuri Yongson, fled from trouble. Fanca would be Fan-cha, which is accord with the fact recorded in the historical documents that Fan-cha and his nephew Dong-shan luckily averted a disaster when his brother Mengke Temur and all other family members were killed by Yang Mu-dawu who was the Qi-xing (seven clan) barbarian.[35] The historical facts are basically the same, although the genealogy was obviously disordered. It is not necessary to impose a uniformity.

Now the genealogy is arranged as follow: the first generation was the founder Bukūri Yongšon, or Mengke Temur (Mentemu); the second was Dong-shan (Chong-shan) who was the *du-zhi-hui-shi* of Jian-zhou Zuo-wei. The third was Xi-bao-qi-pian-gu (Shi-bao-qi), the third son of Chong-shan. The fourth was Dutu Fuman. The fifth, sixth and seventh were missing.

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[33] In *Yong-le* 3 of Ming (1405) Mengke Temur said, "We have served Korea for more than twenty years." (cf. Wang Zhong-han, p. 5). More than twenty years before 1405 was about 1382–1383.

[34] Pu-k'u-li Yung-shun, or Pu-k'u-li Ying-hsiung, is Bukūri Yongšon in Manchu. *bukūri* (*bokori*) is "mountain", which might refer to Mt. Chang-bai; also there is a possibility that *yongšon* was an abbreviated form of *yungkebi* and *šun*, i.e. "full of sun-light", which probably means "born in the east".

[35] Wang Zhong-han, p. 71.

The eighth was Jue-chang-an. The ninth was Ta-ke-shi. And Nurgaci was the tenth. There are some proofs for seeing Mengke Temur, his son Dong Shan and grandson Shi-bao-qi were three generations; Nurgaci, his father Ta-ke-shi and grandfather Jue-chang-an are three generations, altogether six generations.[36] If the fourth generation Fuman is not wrong, there must be something missing in the fifth, the sixth or the seventh; otherwise, from the fourth there must be something wrong. During the period of Zheng-tong and Jia-jing there should be four generations, about 120 years, from the year 1442 when Dong-shan became the chief of Jian-zhou Zuo-wei until the year 1559 when Nurgaci was born.[37] The names of these chiefs are not found yet; some contents are lost, probably there is no evidence. Anyway, the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu Bukuri Yongson was Mengke Temur (Mentemu), the first *du-zhi-hui-shi* of Jian-zhou Zuo-wei set up during the turn of Yuan and Ming, who is not the sixth but the tenth great-grandfather of Nurgaci.[38]

IV. *The Question of the Place Where the Ancestors of Manchu Originated*

About the three questions which are the time, the figures and the place reflected from the legend related to the origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu, the first two have been discussed; now the writer tries to give some suggestions and proofs to the question of the place where the ancestors of Manchu originated.

As mentioned above, it is with good grounds to say that the place of Manchu origin is the north bank of River Amur where there are Mount Bukūri and Lake Bulhori mentioned in the legend of the three heavenly maidens by Muksike. However, there is no denying the assumption that the place of Manchu origin is around Mount Chang-bai, if the Aisin Gioro clan was another branch of the Jurchen descent. To find the historical facts, we need to go into minute details.

For example, there are clear records of the location, height and circumference about Mount Chang-bai both in MZSL and WHDSL, but not even a word in TCJND. If it is true that the legend of the three heavenly maidens in MZSL was based on TCJND, then there was no Mount Chang-bai originally, but was added by the compilers of MZSL. Although MZSL was accomplished late, the wide-spread legend was not easy to be fabricated, because a person with a discerning eye would not be cheated when the speaker was still alive. Hence, I believe that the compilers of MZSL had another base which was more accurate and detailed than TCJND. Otherwise, there must be something missing in Muksike's speech in TCJND, or he did not talk in full knowledge.

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[36] Dong Wan-cang, *Dong-bei-shi gang-yao* (The outline of the history of the North-east, Harbin, 1987), p. 400.

[37] Nurgaci was born in Jia-jing 38 of Ming (1559), in the period of his grandfather Jue-chang-an and his father Ta-ke-shi; before that there were 120 years, four generation, which needs research.

[38] Meng Sen considered Mentemu as the sixth grandfather (*Ming Qing shi lun-zhu ji-kan xu-bian* p. 69).

Now let's look at the people of the Hurha tribe. It is known that during the early Qing there were three tribes of Hurha: Hei-long-jiang Hurha, Dong-hai Hurha and Mu-dan-jiang Hurha. It is clear that the name of Hurha is from River Hu-han of the Tang period. Hu-han and Hurha, as names, came from the phonetics with different Chinese characters. River Hu-han is today's Mu-dan-jiang.[39] In the beginning of TCJND, it reads, "*sahaliyan ulai ergi hurga gurun de cooha genehe ambasa* (leading the troops towards the direction of Sahaliyan to conquer those chiefs of Hurha tribes)". But in *Qing-tai-zong Wen-huang-di shi-lu* it says, "to conquer the chiefs of the Hei-long-jiang Hurha tribe". The chiefs here refer to Ba-qi-lan and Sa-mu-shi-ke.[40] Generally, it is proper to translate *sahaliyan ula* as Hei-long-jiang; but WHDSL is not as clear and accurate as TCJND if we consider the whole context. First, in the material of TCJND, *sahaliyan ula* appeared twice, and Hei-long-jiang once; in WHDSL, all as Hei-long-jiang. If Sahaliyan ula is Hei-long-jiang, usually people would use the same name in the same material.[41] Secondly, in TCJND there is an important word *ergi* (towards, in the direction of), but in WHDSL *ergi* is not translated, then the sentence becomes to "conquer the Hei-long-jiang Hurha tribe". Thus, the role of the Manchu adverb *ergi* turns to the genitive *ni*, which should not be confused.

Another example, on *kui-si* of the 4th month, Tian-cong 9, that is, one month earlier than they went to conquer Hurha, Ba-qi-lan, Sa-mu-shi-ke and others went to conquer Warka,[42] which was at the river valley of Wu-su-li-jiang.

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[39] Tan Qi-xiang, p. 129.

[40] WHDSL 23/23, 29.

[41] Meng Sen, "Sahaliyan fei Hei-long-jiang kao", *Ming Qing shi lun-zhu ji-kan* (Beijing, 1984, the 3rd ed.) vol. 2, pp. 380–385.

[42] WHDSL 23/7b.

It seems impossible for Ba-qi-lan and Su-mu-shi-ke to rush back and fourth hundreds of *li* between Wu-su-li-jiang and Hei-long-jiang within twenty days under inconvenient conditions for transportation at that time, not to mention they needed to go further across Hei-long-jiang. If our estimation is not wrong, Hurha tribe should be around Mu-dan-jiang, because Mu-dan-jiang is not far from Wu-su-li-jiang and it is not hard to go back and forth. Moreover, to conquer Hurha one needs to go northwards on the way from Shenyang to Hei-long-jiang. There must be some people of the Hei-long-jiang Hurha tribe near Hei-long-jiang, too, but this is another question which is not discussed here.

As mentioned above, in SSP about one hundred and twenty to thirty *li* north of Hei-lung-chiang there are Mount Bo-ko-li and Lake Bo-he-li, which seems to confirm Mount Bukūri and Lake Bolkuri. However, if we check SSP, Bo-er-he-li emo (*omo*, Manchu word, "lake") is east of Sa-ha-lianwu-la he-tun (*hoton*, "castle" or "city") as well as east of Ai-hui he-tun (the old Hei-lung-chiang city);[43] Bo-ke-li bi-la is east of Bo-ke-li a-lin (*alin*, "mount") and southeast of Sa-ha-lian wu-la clan,[44] which is south of Hei-long-jiang. The mount is south of Jiang and the lake is north of Jiang; such description about location seems not to be in accord with that in TCJND. In my opinion Mount Chang-bai is an important factor. If we cannot ignore the assumption that the legend of the three heavenly maidens in MZSL might be based on another source rather than in TCJND with some alternations, why is it impossible that there are Mount Bukūri and Lake Bolkuri around Mount Chang-bai?[45] Jing-po-hu is northeast of Mount Chang-bai, and the direction and circumferences are close to what is described in MZSL and WHDSL. If Jing-po-hu is Bolholi, then it is possible that *bukuri* is another form for *bohori*, which means "earth". This word could be translated into *tu-shan* (earth mountain), and refer to Mount Chang-bai. Mount Chang-bai, the source where Lake Jing-po comes from, is, precisely, Mount Bukuri.[46]

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[43] *Liu-bai dong-yi* (East 1 of the 6th row, SSP).

[44] *Qi-bai dong-yi* (East 1 of the 7th row, SSP). There are no Bo-er-he-li wo-mo and Bo-ke-li a-lin in Tu Ji, *Hei-long-jiang yu-tu* (appendix of *Liao-hai cong-shu*) map 33.

[45] Recently Dong Wan-cang suggests that *bolkuri* is similar to *bulekuri*; the latter is from *bulekumbi*, and *-ri* is a suffix of a place name. *buleku* means mirror; *bulekuri* could be translated as the mirror lake, Jing-hu or Jing-po in Chinese, that is today's Jing-po-hu (see Tung Wan-cang, pp. 345–346). However, it seems unreasonable because the fabricated word *bulekuri* is not in the Manchu grammar.

[46] During the summer of 1982, Li Zhi-ting and others went to Mount Cang-bai for a historical investigation and wrote an article titled "Yi-fu zhuang-li de li-shi hua-juan Chang-bai-shan di-qu Ming Qing shi-ji kao-cha", (*Xue-shu yan-jiu cong-kan*, 1984, No. 1). In his

As mentioned above, Odoli is at Ma-da-tun at the bank of Mu-dan-jiang in today's Yi-lan county of Heilongjiang province, which is northwest of Mount Chang-bai. However, Odoli of recorded in MZSL or WHDSL is southeast of Mount Chang-bai. Such contradiction comes to a difficult question. If we do not consider the time, place and conditions, this question could be solved. It is a historical fact that by the turn of Jin and Yuan, Odoli of the three *tümen* in LFYTG is within the border of today's Yi-lan county; but by the turn of Yuan and Ming, the clan of Mengke Temur moved from place to place and later settled down around A-mu-he (or Wo-mu-he) of Ham Kieng Do at the northeast border of Korea in Hung-wu 15–16 (1382–1383).[47]

Furthermore, the clan of Mengke Temur moved to the place called Odoli (Wu-du-li by the Koreans) within the territory of Korea, and Odoli became the title of this clan and called this by the Koreans and by themselves. Odoli in MZSH and WHDSL just refers to the Odoli people who moved from Wo-duo-lian in Yi-lan to the northeast border of Korea, so following this fact, Odoli had to be moved from northwest to southeast, then it became in accord with the record in MZSL and WHTDSL. Another point needed to pay attention to is the place name E-mo-hui (Ao-mo-hui) where the city Odoli located mentioned in MZSL and WHDSL, as illustrated by the Japanese scholar Naitō Torajirō a long time ago, is the Wo-mu-he (A-mu-he) of Hui-ning, at the northeast border of Korea. Both the pronunciation and the location are in accord with each other. This is further strong evidence why MZSL and WHDSL say Odoli city is southeast of Mount Chang-bai. Now we might return to the above-mentioned question of where the location of Hetu Ala is. Now that Odoli is at the northeast border of Korea and to the southeast of Mount Chang-bai, it is true that Hetu Ala, as mentioned in MZSL and WHDSL, is more than 1,500 *li* west of Odoli.

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opinion, the lake where the heavenly maidens bathed is not Da-men at the top of Mount Chang-bai but Yuan-chi which is several tens of *li* east of Mount Chang-bai. The "red fruits" which grow around Yuan-chi also can be considered a factor for this legend. But according to the legend of the three heavenly maidens told by Muksike in TCJND, Li confirms that the homeland of the forefathers of Jurchen (Manchu) is along the River north to Hei-long-jiang (Ai-hui) City. At last he says, the founder of the Qing dynasty originated from the area between Mount Chang-bai and River Hei-long. According to the source and course, the homeland of the founder of the Manchu is at Hei-long-jiang, yet Mount Bukūri and Lake Bolhuri were removed intact to Yuan-chi east of Mount Chang-bai. This is an organic combination of the two homelands of the clan and the nation. It sounds reasonable.

[47] Dong Wan-cang says in Hong-wu 10s of Ming, Mengke Temur settled down at A-mu He (or Wu-yin-hui, today's Hui-ning), around the area of Han Kieng Seng of Kieng Wuen Bu at the border of Korea. It is similar to my suggestion.

The last question is about San-xing. San-xing in MZSL and WHDSL is an abbreviation for the three *tumen* set up at the turn of Yuan and Ming in today's Yi-lan county of Heilongjiang province. Now that the clan of Mengke Temur moved south-eastwards to the northeast border of Korea, and Mengke Temur was also granted the Odoli *tumen* by the Korean court, which could not refer to the original three Odoli *tümen*. Of the three *tümen*, only one left. Then, how should we explain San-xing? It is true that not three *tümen* were granted after Mengke Temur moved, but the connotations of San-xing were different by then. In MZSL and WHDSL "San-xing" was mentioned once and "San-xing ren" twice. If we check the original MZSL text, "San-xing ren" was *ilan halai niyalma*; "San-xing" is *ilan halai niyalma gurun*, which should be translated as "San-xing de ren (the people of San-hsing)" or "San-xing ren guo (the country of the San-xing people)"; it is not the case that San-xing is the abbreviation for *ilan tumen* (in Yi-lan county), meaning "three *tümen*". In history there were "Nü-zhen san-shi-xing bu-luo (the tribes of the thirty clans of Jurchen)"[48] east of Mount Chang-bai at the turn of Chin and Yuan, and San-xing, Wu-xing (five clans), Qi-xing and so on during the turn of Yuan and Ming in the Korean documents. For example, all the family members of Mengke Temur were killed by Qi-xing barbarians. So, the San-xing people or the San-xing tribe recorded in MZSL and WHDSL were not in the same connotation as the three *tümen* prefect set up at the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, but a reflection to show the change and development within the Jurchen at the northeast border of Korea during the turn of Yuan and Ming.

To sum up from the above analysis, it is not hard to see that the place of origin of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu is the area that has Mount Chang-bai as the center. Before the Mengke Temur clan, one branch of the Jurchen's descendants, had moved to the northeast border of Korea at the turn of Jin and Yuan, the ancestor of Mengke Temur was Odoli *tümen* which was one of the three *tümen* in the territory of today's Yi-lan county of Heilongjiang province. Later Mengke Temur was appointed as *du-zhi-hui-shi* of Jian-zhou Zuo-wei by the Ming court. His ancestors lived in Yi-lan for generations; after he moved to the northeast border of Korea, he was appointed as Odoli *tumen* by the Korean court and settled down at Odoli around A-mu-he (Wo-mu-he). The Mengke Temur clan called itself, and was called by others, Odoli, and was one branch of the east Jurchen. Obviously, the location of A-mu-he (Wo-mu-he) and Wu-du-li (Wo-duo-li) in Ham Kieng Do at the northeast border of Korea is in accord with that of Wo-mo-hui and Wo-duo-li in MZSL and WHDSL, so is the location of Hetu Ala of Xin-bin in Liaoning province. Moreover, if we could prove Jing-po-hu (bulekuri) is Lake Bulkuri and Mount Chang-bai is Mount Bukūri, it seems reasonable to say the place of origin of the founder of the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchu is not at the north riverbank of Hei-long-jiang but around Mount Chang-bai.[49]

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[48] *jia-chen*, the 2nd month of Xian-zong 3, see Cheng Lin-chi, p. 55.

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[49] In the summer of 1984 I went to the Northeast on a tour of investigation and wrote an article "Dong-bei kao-cha ji" (*Li-shi di-li* 1987, No. 5). We visited Ai-hui town of Hei-he city. When we asked if there were any legend about the place of Manchu origin, even those few old Manchu people over seventy knew nothing related to the north riverbank. If only because they gave all historical facts except those about their own origin which happened too early to remember, it is difficult to say the place of origin of Manchu is at the north riverbank of Hei-long-jiang.

■ Source: Campbell, Cameron; Lee, James Z.; Elliott, Mark, 'Identity construction and reconstruction: Naming and Manchu ethnicity in north-east China, 1749–1909', in *Historical Methods*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 2002), Routledge Informa Ltd, pp. 101–115.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION: NAMING AND MANCHU ETHNICITY IN NORTHEAST CHINA, 1749–1909

Cameron Campbell, James Z. Lee and Mark Elliott

Abstract

The authors reconstruct processes of ethnic identification among residents of rural northeast China from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth through an analysis of naming behavior. They apply discrete-time event-history techniques to individual life histories compiled from longitudinal, nominative household-register data from state farms in what is now Liaoning Province to identify the individual and household circumstances associated with the adaptation of Han or Manchu names, focusing on the role of heredity and status. Ethnic identification in late imperial northeast China was potentially fluid. Many residents were descended from migrants from Shandong who became hereditary tenants on state land administered by a system of Manchu government known as the Eight Banners. As banner people, or *qiren*, these residents could legitimately claim to be Manchu. As descendants of Shandong migrants, they could also claim to be Han. They could express their choice of ethnic identity through their choice of names not just for their children but also for themselves. Names not only express ethnic self-identification, but their registration by state authorities in the analyzed data also implies official recognition and legitimacy. The authors' results demonstrate that ethnic identity was not hereditary but subject to individual and family choice.

Ethnicity in terms of legal identity typically presumes heredity. In the West, this relationship was reinforced by the spread of population registration during the nineteenth century. In China, the definition and maintenance of ethnic boundaries by population registration has a far longer history.[1] Nevertheless, in spite of the long history of ethnic registration and the importance of heredity in determining legal ethnic identity, ethnic self-identity is surprisingly fluid in China, with a large role for individual choice and agency. In this study of Manchu ethnicity in northeast China, the authors explore one manifestation of such fluidity and complexity: naming practices. Not only do names express ethnic self-identification, but their registration by state authorities also implies official recognition and legitimacy.

Although the Manchus are one of the largest and most prominent ethnic groups in China today—they established the last imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644–1911)—their ethnic origins and ethnic identity are complex.[2] This is especially true in northeast China, their original home. In their efforts to garrison China proper in the mid-seventeenth century, the Manchus virtually vacated the northeast and recruited Han Chinese from north China—in particular, Shandong Province—to settle northeast China—in particular, Liaoning Province—in their stead.[3] These settlers were registered as hereditary royal peasants,[4] organized according to the Manchu system of civil and military administration known as the Eight Banners. The settlers' names, therefore, reflect competing ethnic identities. As banner people, or *qiren*, they could think of themselves as Manchu. As descendants of migrants from China proper, and as Han banner people, or *hanjun*, they could also identify themselves as Han.[5]

Such identities were supposed to be mutually exclusive. The Qing government self-consciously constructed the state as a multiethnic empire and sought to maintain the integrity of ethnic groups. The government had a vested interest in doing so. Like the current Chinese state, virtually all historic Chinese dynasties granted minority peoples and polities a variety of privileges and protections that distinguished them from the Han majority.[6] This distinction was especially true for the Manchu Qing state. As members and descendants of a conquest minority, the Qing provided banner populations and the Manchu banners, in particular, with numerous subsidies and subventions. Whereas Manchu identity is no longer as privileged, even today almost one century since the demise of the Qing, between one-tenth and one-fifth of the 40 million people in Liaoning claim to be "Manchus" in spite of their Shandong origins. Given such competing ethnic heritages, it is unclear to what extent and in what circumstances they consider or represent themselves as Han or Manchu.

In this article, we analyze one measure of historical ethnic identity,[7] the personal given names of some 50,000 adult male royal peasants who lived in Liaoning under the jurisdiction of the imperial household agency, or *neiwufu*, from 1749 to 1909.[8] Our article is divided into five sections: naming customs in China and in our population in particular; the nature and limitations of our naming data; the methods used for analysis; descriptive results on temporal and spatial patterns; and the results of a multivariate analysis of the heritability and associated characteristics of Manchu naming. Our results confirm not only that Manchu ethnicity in late imperial Liaoning was highly fluid but also that, at least for this population, many factors other than heredity were important in determining individual ethnicity.

Naming Customs in China and Liaoning

In China, as elsewhere, names are a common signifier of ethnic identity.[9] This is particularly true for Manchus because their names are easily recognizable and distinct from Han names.[10] Moreover, as many Chinese, especially males, change their given name several times during their lifetime, given names are a convenient means to express any changes in self-identification. Parents normally give their children diminutive names (*naiming*). Men typically assume more dignified names on adulthood, often changing these names to match changes in their personal circumstances and outlook. In late imperial Liaoning, some royal peasants changed their nominative languages, moving back and forth from Han to Manchu, or Manchu to Han, according to individual preference and local circumstance.

In this article, we reconstruct processes of ethnic identification among a population of royal peasants through an analysis of such naming behavior, focusing on the choice between Han and Manchu names. We address several specific questions. First, we analyze the long-term trends in Manchu naming and consider trends in both its prevalence and incidence. We examine trends in the propensity of men to switch from Han to Manchu names and vice versa and the association of these trends with developments at the macro level—in particular, the waning fortunes of the Qing dynasty itself.

To assess the relative importance of heredity and other factors in determining ethnicity, we apply logistic regression to identify the individual and household circumstances associated with the adoption of Han or Manchu names. We assess the degree to which such identity was inherited by examining how the possession of a Manchu name by a father or other male kin influenced the chances of having a Manchu name. We also examine whether such categorical variables as birth order, household headship, or possession of an official title influenced the chances of giving a child a Manchu name or changing to a Manchu name as an adult. A high degree of identity inheritance and an absence of association with these categorical variables would indicate a conception of ethnic identity similar to that in the West (i.e., based on ancestry), whereas a low degree of inheritance and a strong association with such categorical variables would indicate a conception of ethnicity driven by institutional and other affiliations.

We carry out a separate analysis for each of the three processes that together determined the prevalence of Manchu names among adult males. We first examine the determinants of having a Manchu name on entering adulthood and then make use of discrete-time event-history techniques to examine the determinants of adult men with a Han name changing to a Manchu name. We conclude with a discrete-time event-history analysis of the determinants of adult men with a Manchu name switching to a Han name. In each case, we make extensive use of predicted probabilities to facilitate the interpretation of the results and focus on the roles of each of the three processes in sustaining the prevalence of Manchu names over time, accounting for changes in that prevalence.

Data

The data we use are derived from the Household and Population Registers of the Eight Banner Han Army (*Han-jun baqi rending hukou ce*). These household registers were compiled on a triennial basis for a number of Han banner populations in northeast China and certain other locations from the early eighteenth century until 1909. Relying heavily on the registers for civilian and military administration of these populations, the Qing accordingly devised a system of internal crosschecks to ensure consistency and accuracy. First, they assigned every person in the banner population to a residential household (*linghu*), registering them on a household certificate (*menpai*). They then organized households into clans (*zu*) and compiled annually updated clan genealogies (*zupu*). Finally, every three years they compared these genealogies and household certificates with the previous household register to compile a new register. They deleted and added people who had exited or entered in the previous three years and updated the ages, relationships, and official titles of those people who remained as well as any changes in their given names. In other words, each register completely superseded its predecessor.

The banner registers provide far more comprehensive and accurate demographic and sociological data than the household registers and lineage genealogies common elsewhere in China (Harrell 1987; Jiang 1993; Skinner 1987; Telford 1990) because the northeast, which was the Qing homeland, was under special state jurisdiction, distinct from the provincial administration elsewhere. Regimentation of the population actually began as early as 1625, when the Manchus made Shenyang their capital and incorporated the surrounding communities into the banner system (Ding 1992; Elliott 2001). By 1752, with the establishment of the General Office of the Three Banner Commandry, the population was not only registered in remarkable precision and detail, but migration was also strictly controlled, not just between northeast China and China proper but between communities within northeast China as well. Government control over the population was tighter than in almost any other part of China (Tong and Guan 1994, 1999). Indeed, individuals who departed from the area without permission were actually identified in the registers as "escapees" (*taoding*). As a result, the Eight Banner household registers are the most extensive and detailed records of a rural Chinese population in the late imperial period (Lee and Campbell 1997, 223–37).

For each person in the target population, the registers record at three-year intervals the following information in order of appearance:

1. Relationship to their household head
2. Name(s) and name changes[11]
3. Adult banner status
4. Age
5. Animal birth year
6. Lunar birth month, birthday, and birth hour
7. Marriage, death, or emigration, if any during the intercensal period
8. Physical disabilities, if any and if the person is an adult male
9. Name of their household group head
10. Banner affiliation
11. Village of residence

Individuals are listed one to a column in order of their relationship to the head, with his children and grandchildren listed first, followed by coresident siblings and their descendants, and uncles, aunts, and cousins. Wives are always listed immediately after their husbands, unless they are superseded by a coresident widowed mother-in-law.

In addition to such social demographic data, the registers also record all official titles. There are altogether five types of official titles: banner, civil service, examination, honorary, and household group leader. The first three categories are formal governmental offices and often included a salary and other perquisites. The fourth category comprises honorary titles, which are typically purchased and indicate personal wealth or personal access to wealth. The fifth category, household group leader (*zuzhang*), is by far the most common and refers to the lowest level of local banner administration.

The registers are further distinguished by the possibilities for record linkage across time and between kin. Individuals can be followed very easily from one register to the next because they appear in almost the same order in successive registers. In spite of the frequent name changes, we can link these individuals because each register after a name change notes the previous name as well as the new name. Accordingly, it is relatively straightforward to reconstruct life histories and generate variables describing such past characteristics as whether an individual had previously held a title. More important, perhaps, when we compare observations for the same individual in successive registers, we can construct outcome measures indicating whether particular events took place in a particular time interval.

The extensive detail on household relationships, meanwhile, allows for reconstruction of genealogies and identification of kin living in the same or different households. Our basic procedure is to chain together the links between fathers and sons to identify grandfathers, great-grandfathers, and more distant male ancestors. Many men who appear in the later registers, for example, can have their ancestry traced back six or seven generations. Once we have constructed genealogies, it is a straightforward matter of data processing to identify brothers, cousins, first cousins, second cousins, and other kin and measure their characteristics, regardless of whether they are in the same household. It should be noted that at present we can do this only for patrilineal kin, not matrilineal kin, because we are unable to trace the wives recorded in the registers back to their natal households.

The data we analyze here are a subset from a sample of registers we have compiled that describe more than 100,000 individuals who lived in 20 separately registered populations in Liaoning Province from the mid-eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. In this particular analysis, we restrict our analysis to nine populations of regular bannermen (*zhengshen qiren*) under what were called the Three Banner Commandry (*san zuoling xia*), in particular, the 150,000 adult male observations.[12] We exclude four departmental privy purse, or *guangchusi*, populations responsible for such specialized production as honey, cotton, and fish as they were administered separately and so behaved differently (Ding, Guo, Lee, and Campbell 2002).[13] Table 1 contains a list of these populations and identifies the total number of available male observations after they reached age 21 *sui*.[14]

Deciding which names were Manchu was labor intensive. We first generated a database of all male given names with several thousand entries and identified those that were definitely Manchu and those that might be Manchu.[15] Table 2 contains a list of the 30 most common possible Manchu given names with both the Han Chinese syllabaries and their possible Manchu equivalents. Names such as *yilibu* and *akedun* are definitely Manchu. Others are ambiguous, as many Manchu children's names are similar to Han children's names. We resolved such ambiguities for the moment by excluding children from our analysis, but other ambiguities remain.[16]

Table 1. Observations of Adult Males Aged 21–70 *sui* and Percentage with Manchu Names, by State Population

State population	No. of observations	% with Manchu name
Gaizhou	14,702	0.88
Chengnei	9,487	7.68
Feicheng Yimiancheng	23,613	1.73
Gaizhou Manhan	15,764	2.29
Dadianzi	22,026	1.08
Guosantun	12,310	4.70
Bakeshu	14,225	2.30
Daxingtun	28,294	1.28
Changzhaizi	13,249	2.07
Total	153,670	2.22

Note: Men who also had a surname recorded were *not* considered to have a Manchu name.

Method

To measure the influence of individual and family characteristics on the likelihood of having a Manchu name, we make use of logistic regression (Long 1997).[17]

$$\log[p/(1-p)] = \beta_0 + \mathbf{b}\mathbf{X} \qquad (1)$$

Equation (1) summarizes the basic model. The logistic transform of the probability p of an outcome of interest is expressed as a linear function of a set of right-hand side variables $\mathbf{X}$ that measure individual and family characteristics. Estimated coefficients $\mathbf{b}$ measure the strength of the association between these variables and the log-odds of the outcome of interest. A positive coefficient indicates that higher values of the associated right-hand variable of interest are associated with increased chances of the outcome. A negative coefficient indicates an inverse association. A coefficient close to zero suggests a lack of association. Tests of statistical significance help indicate whether differences between estimated coefficients and zero are large enough to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship and that the observed coefficient might be the result of random variation in the data.

Table 2. Thirty Most Common Possible Manchu Given Names: Adult Males Aged 21–70 *sui*

Name	%	Cumulative %
dingzhu [Dingju]	8.01	8.01
baozhu [Booju]	3.96	11.97
fuhai [Fuhai]	1.65	13.62
guanyinbao [Guwanyinboo]	1.60	15.22
fubao [Fuboo]	1.42	16.64
xier	1.36	18.00
mingde [Mingde]	1.24	19.24
changtai [Cangtai]	1.18	20.42
xizhu [Siju]	1.15	21.57
yongtai [Yongtai]	1.09	22.67
changbao [Cangboo]	0.92	23.58
guanbao [Guwanboo]	0.89	24.47
baerhu [Barhu]	0.80	25.27
yilibu [Ilibu]	0.77	26.03
baotai [Bootai]	0.71	26.74
zhongshenbao [Jung nboo]	0.68	27.42
bahana [Bahana]	0.65	28.07
fusenbu [Fusenbu]	0.65	28.72
guoxinga [Gosingga]	0.62	29.34
qingtai [Cingtai]	0.59	29.93
aishenbao [Ai nboo]	0.56	30.50
tasiha [Tasiha]	0.56	31.06
maizhu [Maiju]	0.50	31.56
zaoshenbao [Dzoo nboo]	0.50	32.06
fulinga [Fulingga]	0.47	32.54
bayantai [Bayantai]	0.47	33.01
bayanga [Bayangga]	0.47	33.48
yindebu [Indebu]	0.47	33.95
akedun [Akdun]	0.47	34.43
eerhe [Orho]	0.44	34.87

Note: The first name in the far left column is the pinyin transcription of the Chinese characters used in the register to transliterate a given Manchu name. The name in square brackets is the Möllendorf transcription of this putative Manchu name.

We carried out separate analyses for each of the three processes that affected the prevalence of Manchu names. Table 3 contains a summary of the numbers of observations included in each analysis and presents the means and standard deviations of the variables. First, we analyzed the determinants of having a Manchu name when first observed as an adult. We made use of the first available observations of males after they reached age 21 *sui*. We excluded first observations of males who were already aged 31 *sui* or over to ensure that we only considered males who reached adulthood in the time period covered by the registers. The dependent variable in the analysis was an indicator of whether the male had a Manchu name. Second, we analyzed the determinants of switching from a non-Manchu name to a Manchu name between the current register and the next. We restricted the analysis to observations of men aged 21–70 *sui* with non-Manchu names for whom the observation three years hence was also available. Finally, we analyzed the determinants of switching from a Manchu name to a non-Manchu name. We restricted the analysis to men aged 21–70 *sui* who currently had a Manchu name for whom the observation three years hence was also available.

Table 3. Summary of Observations of Variables Included in the Analyses

	Analysis					
	Manchu name at first observation as adult		Name change: Han to Manchu		Name change: Manchu to Han	
Variable	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Dependent variable	0.026		0.001		0.088	0.284
Manchu names						
Father (ever)	0.019		0.022		0.080	
No. of brothers	0.025	0.168	0.016	0.131	0.194	0.533
No. of cousins	0.029	0.198	0.018	0.150	0.133	0.531
No. of second cousins	0.021	0.160	0.013	0.127	0.048	0.320
Official titles						
Self	0.027		0.042		0.197	
Father	0.056		0.030		0.098	
No. of brothers	0.037	0.260	0.041	0.242	0.125	0.384
No. of cousins	0.038	0.267	0.036	0.241	0.147	0.510
No. of second cousins with official titles	0.027	0.237	0.021	0.189	0.050	0.298
N	21,836		80,793		1,950	

Note: Analyses also included controls for state population, missing identification for father, and missing identification for grandfather. Analyses of name change also included indicator variables for 10-year age group. To save space, we do not present the means and standard deviations of the relevant indicator variables here.

We tested hypotheses about the importance of heredity in accounting for the prevalence of Manchu names by including right-hand side variables describing whether kin of particular types already had Manchu names. We considered father-to-son transmission with an indicator of whether the father was ever observed with a Manchu name while the index individual was alive. The existence of father-to-son transmission would be revealed by a large positive coefficient for this variable. We also considered the possibility of diffusion of Manchu naming practices among kin by measuring numbers of brothers, cousins, and second cousins who had Manchu names. For these count variables, we included kin regardless of whether they currently resided with the index individual.[18]

We examined the role of institutional affiliation by including variables measuring the possession of official titles by self or kin. To see whether men adjusted the ethnicity of their names according to their own institutional affiliation, we included an indicator of whether the index individual currently had an official title. We used an indicator of possession of a title by the father to examine whether the index individual's ethnicity reflected his father's institutional affiliation. We used counts of the numbers of other kin with official titles to investigate whether effects of institutional affiliation diffused within families.

We also included additional controls to account for effects of compositional differences. All analyses included controls for state population, missing identification for the father, and missing identification for the grandfather. We included the controls for state population to account for the variation apparent in table 1 in the prevalence of Manchu names. We included indicators for missing identifications for the father and grandfather because it was not possible to identify kin other than brothers for the small number of affected males; thus the measures of kin characteristics were all zero for them. We controlled for age in the analysis of switching to account for systematic variation over the life course in the propensity to switch from Han to Manchu or vice versa.

For each analysis, we present results from four models. In each case, the first model only considered the effects of the father's having a Manchu name. In other words, it considered only the possibility of father-son transmission. The second model allowed for effects of other male kin having Manchu names. The third model added effects of own and father's official titles. The final model added effects for the official titles of other male kin. For the most part, we discuss only the results from the final models. We included the earlier models mainly to evaluate whether apparent effects of the father or self simply reflect general characteristics of the families to which men belong. If an effect of the father's name is attributable to a tendency for certain families to have a predilection for Manchu names, for example, addition of variables for the names of other kin should attenuate the effect of the father's name. Similarly, if the apparent effect of own or father's title reflects a general tendency for higher-status families to have Manchu names, addition of controls for the titles of more distant kin should attenuate the effects of own or father's title.

To facilitate interpretation, we calculated predicted probabilities. Whereas coefficients measure *relative* differences in the chances of an outcome, comparison of predicted probabilities yields insight into absolute differences. Large coefficients sometimes translate into trivial absolute changes in the chances of an outcome because the baseline probability is very low to begin with, whereas small coefficients sometimes imply large absolute changes because the baseline probability of the outcome is high. For the analysis of name at first observation, the predicted probabilities reflect the chances of having a Manchu name at first appearance as an adult, conditional upon having a specified set of characteristics. For the analysis of switching from Han to Manchu, or Manchu to Han, we combined age-specific probabilities of changing within the next three years to estimate the chances of switching between ages 21 and 69, again conditional upon having a specific set of characteristics.

We also used predicted probabilities to reconstruct the sources of men with Manchu names. Specifically, we worked out the proportions of particular individual or family characteristics for men who either are given or take a Manchu name. We did this by applying the predicted probabilities to the observations in the data and by working out the fraction of the total number of men with Manchu names we would expect to be accounted for by men with a specific set of characteristics. Although we could have done this directly from the data without making use of predicted probabilities, here we prepared for future analyses in which we will examine how inflows would change under different scenarios for the effects of individual and family characteristics.

Descriptive Results

In this section, we review the age, spatial, and temporal patterns of name changes to provide some context for the later discussion of multivariate results. We first consider geographic patterns in the prevalence of Manchu names and then turn to time trends. We demonstrate that there was considerable variation over time in the prevalence of Manchu names and the incidence of ethnic name changes. We conclude with a review of age patterns.

We begin by highlighting several distinguishing characteristics of Manchu naming patterns among the royal peasants. First, the proportion of Manchu names was never very high. At most, one in every 25 adult men had an officially registered Manchu name. Second, whereas very few—generally one to two per thousand—of adult Han men took a Manchu name over a three-year period, approximately one-fifth of adult men with Manchu names over the same period changed to a Han name. Third, over one-seventh, almost 15 percent, of those people who did change to an ethnic name switched back. Ethnic naming, in other words, was unusually fluid by contemporary standards: although people may have changed their name to reinforce their stated ethnicity, few did this more than once, and almost no one returned to his original name.

Manchu naming, moreover, followed a clear spatial pattern. Men who lived in or near Shenyang, the provincial capital and original Qing capital, were more likely to identify themselves with a Manchu name. Table 1 shows the percentages of observations of males in each registered population with a Manchu name. Almost 7.7 percent of adult men from Chengnei, that is, Shenyang itself, had a Manchu name. Of the men in Guosantun, a village nearby, 4.7 percent had a Manchu name. By comparison, only a slight percentage of the men in the other populations that were between 100 and 300 kilometers away from Shenyang had Manchu names. Even in Gaizhou Manhan, a population whose name specifically designates it as partially Manchu, only 2.2 percent of adult men took Manchu names.

The prevalence of Manchu names changed over time. According to figure 1, Manchu names became increasingly common until the 1820s, peaking at 4 percent, and then became less common. The apparent rise in popularity before the 1820s should be interpreted with caution because the registers available from before the 1790s tended to cover royal peasants living in the areas where Manchu names were less common. The steady decline in popularity after the 1820s, by contrast, was real. It corresponds to the decline in the fortunes of the Qing dynasty that took place during the nineteenth century and may reflect the decreasing desirability of a Manchu affiliation. In the multivariate analysis, we sought additional insight into this trend by examining the processes, including inheritance and name switching, that governed the prevalence of Manchu names.

Changes over time in the rates at which men switched from Manchu to Han or Han to Manchu are consistent with the time trends in figure 1



Figure 1. Proportion of Men Aged 21–70 *sui* with Manchu Names, by Year.



Figure 2. Proportion of Men Switching from Manchu to Han Names within Three Years, by Year.

and may partially account for them. Figure 2 shows the proportion of men with Manchu names who switched to Han names within the next three years, and figure 3 shows the proportion of men with Han names who switched to Manchu. According to figure 2, the proportion of men with Manchu names switching to Han names declined from one-quarter in the late eighteenth century to one-tenth in the 1820s, remained stable until the 1860s, and then began climbing again. According to figure 3, the proportion of men with Han names who switched to Manchu names fluctuated around two per thousand until the 1820s and then declined to less than one per thousand in the mid-nineteenth century.

By contrast, the prevalence of Manchu names hardly varied by age, especially after age 30. Figure 4 shows the proportion of men at each age with a Manchu name. The numbers declined from almost 3 percent in the early twenties to 2 percent by the early thirties, after which they remain roughly the same. The relatively high proportion for men in their twenties reflects the tendency of some to retain Manchu-sounding diminutives into their early twenties and only adapt unmistakably Han names afterward.

As a result, the proportion of men who change their names—especially those who changed from Manchu to Han names—has a much sharper age profile. Figures 5 and 6 show age-specific probabilities of switching from Manchu to Han names and Han to Manchu names, respectively. Whereas nearly 20 percent of men in their twenties who had Manchu names changed to Han names within three years, less than 10 percent of men in their forties and fifties did so. This finding is consistent with the idea that some men in their twenties who appeared to have Manchu names had actually continued to use Manchu-sounding *naiming* into early adulthood, discarding them soon afterward.

Multivariate Results

Individual and family characteristics all affected the chances of a man's having a Manchu name when he first appeared as an adult. Table 4 shows multivariate results on the prevalence of Manchu names among men making their first appearance as adults. The results for model 4 indicate that, all things being equal, if the index male's father had ever held a Manchu name, he himself was 1.76 ($e^{0.568}$) times more likely to have a Manchu name. The existence of brothers, cousins, or second cousins with Manchu names also raised the chances of having a Manchu name. For example, a man with two second cousins with Manchu names was himself



Figure 3. Proportion of Men Switching from Han to Manchu Names within Three Years, by Year.



Figure 4. Proportion of Men with Manchu Names, by Age.



Figure 5. Proportion of Men Switching from Manchu to Han Names within Three Years, by Age.



Figure 6. Proportion of Men Switching from Han to Manchu Names within Three Years, by Age.

Table 4. Logistic Regression of Having a Manchu Name at First Observation as Adult (N = 21,836)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*
Year	−0.008	.00	−0.008	.00	−0.008	.00	−0.007	.00
Manchu names								
Father (ever)	0.752	.00	0.656	.00	0.561	.00	0.568	.01
No. of brothers			1.541	.00	1.504	.00	1.524	.00
No. of cousins			0.682	.00	0.650	.00	0.633	.00
No. of second cousins			0.559	.00	0.558	.00	0.579	.00
Official titles								
Self					0.645	.00	0.726	.00
Father					0.189	.20	0.240	.13
No. of brothers							−0.226	.14
No. of cousins							0.054	.68
No. of second cousins							−0.061	.72
Constant	−4.408		−4.535		−4.565		−4.570	

Note: Analysis was restricted to first observations of males aged 21–30 *sui*. Models also included controls for state population, missing identification for father, and missing identification for grandfather. To save space, we do not present them here.

3.18 ($e^{2*0.519}$) times more likely to have a Manchu name. Possession of an official title, meanwhile, had an effect as strong as that of having a father with a Manchu name. Men with official titles were 2.07 ($e^{0.726}$) times more likely to have a Manchu name.

Heredity was important in both a narrow and a broad sense. Heredity in the strictest sense, father-son transmission, is very apparent in table 4. The persistence of the strong effect of a father's name even when the numbers of other kin with Manchu names are held constant indicates that it was not driven by a tendency for entire families to be of one ethnicity or the other. Had the effect of a father's name reflected uniformity within families, the addition of these controls would have diluted the effect of a father's name.

Correlations within families are nevertheless apparent in table 4. Holding a father's ethnicity constant, having male kin with Manchu names raised the probability that the index individual would also have a Manchu name. Because the results in table 4 are from an analysis of prevalence, not incidence, they do not indicate whether this association reflects a tendency for adult men to change their ethnicity to match that of their kin or a correlation between related men in the chances of having a Han or Manchu name before adulthood. In the analysis of switching, we tested for the existence of intragenerational diffusion by examining whether the existence of male kin with Manchu names raises the chances of changing from a non-Manchu to a Manchu name.

Institutional affiliation was also important. The strong effect of official title even when the ethnicity of other male kin was held constant indicates that regardless of family background, men's expressed ethnicity was affected by whether they had an affiliation with one of the official hierarchies. In particular, the persistence of the effect after the ethnicity of other kin is controlled for rules out the possibility that it can be attributed to a tendency for the men who acquire official titles to be recruited from families that have taken on Manchu names. In the analysis of switching, of course, we examined whether there was evidence that men actually adjusted their ethnicity to reflect their possession of an official title.

Although heredity and institutional affiliation *affected* ethnicity, they did not *determine* it. Only a small fraction of the men at higher risk of having a Manchu name actually had one. Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of having a Manchu name at first appearance under a variety of different scenarios. According to the results, even though having a father with a Manchu name doubled the chances that the index male would have a Manchu name, less than 7 percent of the men whose fathers had Manchu names had Manchu names themselves. Similarly, even though according to table 4 the presence of a brother with a Manchu name almost quadrupled the chances that a male would have a Manchu name, only 13.7 percent of men whose brothers had a Manchu name would be expected to have a Manchu name. Results for men with official titles were similar.

One clear implication of these results is that heredity alone was not sufficient to sustain the population of males with Manchu names. For example, if the only source of men with Manchu names was father-son transmission, the probabilities in table 5 imply that the prevalence of Manchu names among men just reaching adulthood would fall by an order of magnitude every generation. Indeed, because the downward trend in the prevalence of Manchu names appears to have been much slower, there has to have been a source of men with Manchu names other than heredity.

Table 5. Predicted Probabilities of Having a Manchu Name When First Observed

Variable					
Father ever had Manchu name	Own official title	No. of brothers with Manchu name	No. of cousins with Manchu name	No. of second cousins with Manchu name	%
0	0	0	0	0	3.33
0	0	0	0	1	5.79
0	0	0	1	0	6.09
0	0	0	1	1	10.38
0	0	1	0	0	13.65
0	0	1	0	1	22.00
0	0	1	1	0	22.94
0	0	1	1	1	34.70
0	1	0	0	0	6.64
0	1	0	0	1	11.27
0	1	0	1	0	11.82
0	1	0	1	1	19.31
0	1	1	0	0	24.62
0	1	1	0	1	36.83
0	1	1	1	0	38.09
0	1	1	1	1	52.34
1	0	0	0	0	5.73
1	0	0	0	1	9.79
1	0	0	1	0	10.27
1	0	0	1	1	16.97
1	0	1	0	0	21.81
1	0	1	0	1	33.24
1	0	1	1	0	34.44
1	0	1	1	1	48.40
1	1	0	0	0	11.16
1	1	0	0	1	18.32
1	1	0	1	0	19.14
1	1	0	1	1	29.70
1	1	1	0	0	36.58
1	1	1	0	1	50.72
1	1	1	1	0	52.06
1	1	1	1	1	65.97

Note: Predictions were carried out on the basis of results in table 4, assuming males were in Bakeshu in 1800.

Table 6. Characteristics of Adult Males Having a Manchu Name When First Observed

No. of predictors observed	Characteristic	%
0		66.8
1	Official title	3.9
	Father ever observed with Manchu name	3.1
	At least one brother with Manchu name	8.5
	At least one cousin with Manchu name	6.0
	At least one second cousin with Manchu name	3.2
Subtotal		24.7
> 1		8.5
Total		100.0

Calculations of inflows confirm that most men who had Manchu names at their first appearance were, in fact, "new." Table 6 presents the distribution of men who first appear with Manchu names according to both their individual and family (male kin) characteristics. According to table 6, two-thirds of the men who had a Manchu name when they first appeared as adults had neither an official title nor any close kin with a Manchu name. The remaining men had at least one male relative with a Manchu name, or else had an official title. The predominance of "new" Manchus, of course, is accounted for by the fact that the low probability of having a Manchu name for such men in table 5 is applied to a very large base. Most of the men in the population have no kin with Manchu names and do not hold official titles.

Certain individual and family characteristics also influenced the chances that an adult male would switch from a Han name to a Manchu name between the current register and the next. Table 7 presents the multivariate results. Brothers appear to have been especially important. According to these results, every brother with a Manchu name multiplied the chances of switching by 2.57 ($e^{0.947}$). Possession of an official title was even more important. Men with official titles were 3.74 ($e^{1.32}$) times more likely to switch than men without them. The characteristics of other kin appear to have been relatively unimportant.

The importance of an official title confirms that some men adjusted their expressed ethnicity according to their institutional affiliation. Whereas the results on prevalence in table 4 could not rule out the possibility that the association between title and name reflected a higher likelihood of men with Manchu names to acquire titles, the results on incidence in table 7 do. Current possession of an official title clearly influences the future propensity to switch from a Han to a Manchu name. Possession of a title by a second cousin also may have had some influence, but the effect was not statistically significant by conventional standards. In future work, of course, we will return, by means of a detailed analysis, to the question of whether men with Manchu names are more likely to obtain official titles.

The apparent effects of a brother's name, meanwhile, confirms that ethnicity could diffuse among members of the same generation. The analysis of prevalence in table 4 could not distinguish clusters of brothers starting out their adult lives with Manchu names from brothers who changed their names as adults. The results in table 7, in contrast, indicate that brothers could switch from Han to Manchu as adults in response to the presence of a brother who already had a Manchu name.

Once again, whereas individual and family characteristics may have affected the propensity to switch from Han to Manchu, they did not determine it. Table 8 shows predicted probabilities of changing to a Manchu name by age 69 *sui* under different scenarios, conditional on having a Han name at age 21 *sui*. According to the results, only a tiny fraction of men who began their adult lives with Han names would switch to Manchu names. Because the baseline chances of switching were so low, even the men who were at relatively high risk because they possessed a title or had a brother with a Manchu name were still likely to reach old age retaining a Han name.

Because men with no apparent risk factors accounted for most of the population, they still accounted for most of those who switched from Han to Manchu. Their predominance again reflects the effects of applying a low rate to a very large base population. Table 9 shows distributions of the characteristics of the men who adopt Manchu names as adults, on the basis of the application of the predicted probabilities to the observations in the data. Slightly more than three-quarters of the men who switched from Han to Manchu names as adults did not have an official title, a brother with a Manchu name, or a second cousin with a title. Of the remainder, a plurality, 10 percent, had an official title.

Individual and family characteristics played an important role in determining whether men would retain a Manchu name. Table 10 shows the relevant multivariate results. According to these results, men with Manchu names whose fathers had held a Manchu name were substantially less likely to switch to a Han name between the current register and the next. Indeed, their chances of switching were roughly one-quarter ($e^{-1.332}$) those

Table 7. Logistic Regression of Switching from Han to Manchu Names: Adult Males Aged 21–70 *sui* (N = 80,793)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*
Year	−0.010	0.03	−0.009	0.04	−0.009	0.05	−0.009	0.05
Manchu names								
Father (ever)	0.038	0.96	0.065	0.93	−0.040	0.96	−0.100	0.89
No. of brothers			1.065	0.00	0.963	0.01	0.947	0.01
No. of cousins			0.146	0.80	0.082	0.89	0.111	0.86
No. of second cousins			0.076	0.94	0.024	0.98	−0.142	0.88
Official titles								
Self					1.343	0.00	1.320	0.00
Father					−1.046	0.16	−1.119	0.15
No. of brothers							0.076	0.84
No. of cousins							−0.051	0.91
No. of second cousins							0.553	0.09
Constant	−6.665		−6.709		−6.680		−6.700	

Note: Analysis was restricted to observations of males aged 21–70 *sui* with non-Manchu names. To be included, an observation three years hence also had to be available. Models also included controls for age, state population, missing identification for father, and missing identification for grandfather. To save space, we do not present them here.

Table 8. Predicted Probabilities of Switching from Han to Manchu Names: Adult Males Aged 21–69 *sui*

Official title	No. of brothers with Manchu name	No. of second cousins with official title	%
0	0	0	0.21
0	0	1	0.36
0	1	0	0.53
0	1	1	0.93
0	2	0	1.37
0	2	1	2.37
1	0	0	0.77
1	0	1	1.34
1	1	0	1.98
1	1	1	3.42
1	2	0	5.03
1	2	1	8.57

Note: Predictions were carried out on the basis of results from table 7, assuming males were in Bakeshu in 1800.

of men whose fathers had not held a Manchu name. Men whose cousins had Manchu names were also substantially less likely to switch to Han names, as were men with an official title.

Heredity and institutional affiliation not only affected whether a man would retain a Manchu name, they practically determined it. Table 11

Table 9. Characteristics of Adult Males Switching from Han to Manchu Names

No. of predictors observed	Characteristic	%
0		76.5
1	Official title	10.0
	At least one brother with Manchu name	4.8
	At least one second cousin with Manchu name	4.5
Subtotal		19.3
> 1		4.2
Total		100.0

Table 10. Logistic Regression of Switching from Manchu to non-Manchu Names: Adult Males Aged 21–70 *sui* (N = 1,950)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*	Coeff.	*p*
Year	−0.002	0.60	−0.003	0.40	−0.004	0.22	−0.004	0.24
Manchu names								
Father (ever)	−1.342	0.03	−1.502	0.03	−1.373	0.04	−1.332	0.04
No. of brothers			−0.150	0.50	−0.100	0.64	−0.088	0.68
No. of cousins			−0.987	0.05	−0.846	0.09	−0.870	0.10
No. of second cousins			0.407	0.25	0.500	0.18	0.768	0.07
Official titles								
Self					−1.370	0.00	−1.332	0.00
Father					−0.046	0.89	−0.011	0.97
No. of brothers							−0.192	0.60
No. of cousins							−0.018	0.95
No. of second cousins							−0.545	0.25
Constant	−1.309		−1.228		−1.249		−1.253	

Note: Analysis was restricted to observations of males aged 21–70 *sui* with Manchu names. To be included, an observation three years hence also had to be available. Models also included controls for age, state population, missing identification for father, and missing identification for grandfather. To save space, we do not present them here.

Table 11. Predicted Probabilities of Switching from Manchu to Han Names: Adult Males Aged 21–69 *sui*

Father ever observed with Manchu name	Official title	No. of cousins with Manchu name	%
0	0	0	82.12
0	0	1	52.49
0	0	2	27.10
0	1	0	37.71
0	1	1	18.13
0	1	2	8.07
1	0	0	37.71
1	0	1	18.13
1	0	2	8.06
1	1	0	11.87
1	1	1	5.17
1	1	2	2.20

Note: Predictions were carried out on the basis of results from table 10, assuming males were in Bakeshu in 1800.

shows the percentages of men predicted to convert to a non-Manchu name by age 69 *sui*, conditional on having a Manchu name at age 21. The differences in the chances of switching are substantial. Four-fifths of the men who had neither an official title nor a father with a Manchu name would convert to a non-Manchu name by the time they reached old age. By contrast, only one-third of the men whose fathers had held a Manchu name would convert to a non-Manchu name over the course of their lives. If a man had an official title as well as kin with Manchu names, there was only a very small chance that he would switch.

Summary and Conclusion

This analysis of Manchu identity among the royal peasants of Liaoning contributes to our understanding of ethnicity in late imperial China, in general, and Manchu identity in Liaoning, in particular. As we have seen, the ethnic antecedents of these people are complex. Han in terms of their heredity, they were also Manchu in terms of their registration. However, there are few identifiable measures of Manchu ethnicity beyond their population registration. Whereas "Manchu" families may also have identified themselves by characteristic dress, ritual customs, and folk or shamanistic religious beliefs, little historical evidence of such behavior has managed to survive the century since the demise of the Qing, especially the last 50 years of self-conscious revolution and destruction of "feudal" culture.

Fortunately, records of individual names exist in triennial household registers. These names provide us at least one concrete measure of historical ethnicity, a measure that required both the act of individual volition to change one's name and the act of official recognition to record this name change in the Household and Population Registers of the Eight Banner system. These data, moreover, lend themselves to quantitative analysis and permit examination of some of the other factors that may have influenced the decision to assume a Manchu name.

This preliminary analysis of the three naming processes that interacted to determine the prevalence of Manchu names—parental choice and individual decisions to change names from Han to Manchu or Manchu to Han—demonstrates the fluidity of ethnicity among the royal peasants of Liaoning. Many if not most of the men with Manchu names appear to have had them not because of their family background but for idiosyncratic reasons. Most men who had Manchu names at first appearance, or who later switched from a Han to a Manchu name, did not have any other male kin with Manchu names or with any other specific connection to the Manchu state. Although expressed ethnicity was hardly independent of individual and family characteristics, their role was much more complex than in the West, where ethnic identification was strictly heritable. Two types of heredity were especially important: in addition to Western-style father-son transmission, there was diffusion of ethnicity among members of the same generation. At the same time, institutional affiliation mattered: possession of an official title increased the preference for a Manchu name.

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Notes

A previous version of this article was presented at the Measurement Issues in the Study of Race and Ethnicity session of the Population Association of America meeting in Washington, D.C., March 2001. We are grateful to the audience for their comments and suggestions. Please note that this is a work in progress and subject to substantial revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome. Please do not cite or disseminate before verifying with one of the authors that you have the latest version.

1. In a forthcoming paper, Lee and Wang discuss the late imperial Chinese legal system and jurisdictions of ethnic population registration and the broader implications of such a classification system.

2. The People's Republic of China recognizes 56 mutually exclusive ethnic peoples, 5 "autonomous" ethnic provinces, and 124 "autonomous" ethnic counties. According to the 1990 national census of the People's Republic of China, 8 percent of the national population of 1.13 billion were non-Han, including in descending order: 15.5 million Zhuang, 9.8 million Manchus (10.9 million in 2000), 8.6 million Muslims, 7.4 million Miao, 7.2 million Uighur, 6.6 million Yi, 5.7 million Tujia, 4.8 million Mongols, and 4.6 million Tibetans (Yao and Yin 1994, 118). It is important to note that these non-Han proportions have doubled during the last 50 years because of the combination of differential fertility and increased ethnic registration.

3. See Ge (1997) for a broad overview of these general migration processes, Ding (1992) and Elliott (2001) for a description of the Manchu garrison of China proper, and Ding, Guo, Lee, and Campbell (2002) for a detailed description of the Qing recruitment and settlement of Liaoning, in particular.

4. By royal peasant, we mean the "regular" bannermen, or *zhengshen qiren*, who were organized under the imperial household agency. They should not be confused with royal serfs (*baoyi*), who were a different form of dependent population, or noble peasants or serfs who served other Qing nobility.

5. Although the Eight Banners were divided into three separate populations—Han, Manchu, and Mongol—most Chinese commonly used (and still use) banner membership as the principal criterion for Manchu identity. This was less true, however, for the Qing state, whose response to the rising numbers of bannermen and banner entitlements was increasingly to restrict Manchu identity to the Manchu banners (Elliott 2001).

6. Despite considerable interest in the history of Chinese ethnicity, there are as yet no magisterial overviews. See, however, the various essays in three recent edited collections: Brown (1996); Crossley, Siu, and Sutton (forthcoming); and Harrell (1995).

7. Whereas such historical studies of naming are still uncommon in Chinese history, that is not the case in U.S. history. Gunnar Thorvaldsen's (1998) study of naming from the 1920 census for Minnesota, which uses names as an index of assimilation among various ethnic groups, is a particularly able recent example. See, too, the articles and references in a special issue of *The History of the Family* vol. 4, no. 3, edited by Frans van Poppel and Daniel Scott Smith, which is dedicated to the study of naming practices. See also Lieberson and Bell (1992).

8. Unfortunately, we cannot do a similar analysis of adult females because our data do not include their personal name, merely the family name of their father. The given names recorded for daughters, meanwhile, are almost all birth-order appellations, such as *erniu* (second daughter).

9. Although in this article we focus on personal names, see Ebrey (1996) for a discussion of surnames and ethnicity.

10. Manchu names are easily recognizable even if they are written in Han Chinese rather than Manchu—which has a totally different writing system—because Manchu names have more syllables and distinct sounds.

11. These registers were written in Han Chinese. Manchu names are therefore approximated by strings of homophonic Han Chinese characters.

12. We only include these nine populations because we still have to "clean" the name field of the other populations to distinguish surnames properly from given names and to identify any possible new Manchu names. Both tasks are very time consuming because they need to be done manually.

13. The numbers of observations actually used in each analysis are often smaller than the total in table 1 because most of our analyses required us to restrict the number of records under observation. Descriptive results on the percentages of males with Manchu names by state farm, year, and age, for example, were restricted to men who were alive and resident in our population throughout the intercensal period.

14. *Sui* refers to the number of calendar years lived rather than the number of years of life. Children are therefore 1 *sui* at birth and show a one-year increment with each new year.

15. Ding Yizhuang began this work, and Mark Elliott did most of the labor.

16. Because Manchu names usually do not include surnames, we treat all entries that include surnames (i.e., names that begin with a character commonly considered to be a surname) as non-Manchu.

17. Given that the outcome variable is dichotomous, not continuous, logistic regression is more appropriate than ordinary least squares regression.

18. We experimented with counting coresident and noncoresident kin separately and found that it made no difference to the results. We also experimented with alternative approaches to measuring the characteristics of kin networks, including using the proportions of kin with titles or Manchu names, as well as controlling for total numbers of different types of kin when using the count variables. Again the results were the same.

■ Source: Sebes, Joseph S., 'A description of the tartars (Manchus) by the Jesuit Gabriel de Magalhaes in 1647 when he first encountered them at the time of their conquest of China', in *Manchu Studies Newsletter*, 4 (1981–82), Indiana University, pp. 3–14.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE TARTARS (MANCHUS) BY THE JESUIT GABRIEL DE MAGALHÃES IN 1647 WHEN HE FIRST ENCOUNTERED THEM AT THE TIME OF THEIR CONQUEST OF CHINA

Joseph S. Sebes, S.J.

Introduction

This description of the Manchus is taken from the "Narrative of the loss and destruction of the Province and Christianity of Szechwan and of all the things that happened to the Fathers Luis Bulhio [Buglio] and Gabriel de Magalhães in their captivity" written "For the Visitator of the Province of Japan and China" by Gabriel de Magalhaes, S.J. and dated Peking, May 18, 1649. The original Portuguese text, never before published, is preserved in the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus ARSI *Jap-Sin.* 127 ff. 1–35. The description of the Tartars is found on ff. 25v–26v.

Father Gabriel de Magalhães and Father Buglio were missionaries in Szechwan Province when, in 1644, the rebel Chang Hsien-chung's troops entered the Province and the capital Cheng-tu and made the two Jesuits mandarins. Since the fallen Ming Dynasty had had Western advisers he, too, as a pretender to the Dragon Throne, should have them. Thus, the two Jesuits remained with him, in constant fear because of the atrocities he committed, until he was killed by the Manchus on January 3, 1647.

It is in connection with the killing of Chang Hsien-chung that Magalhães gives his description. He continues that description with the narrative of events until the two missionaries are taken into Manchu captivity on February 20, 1648, in Peking. The translation follows:

"Among the small and insignificant kingdoms which surround China, to the east and north there are those nations which the Chinese call *Tum ta*[1] and *Peta*,[2] Northern Tartars and Eastern Tartars. To the west lie the vast and sprawling territories which the Chinese call Sita,[3] Western Tartars, who seem to be related to those whose country stretches as far [west] as the borders of Prussia and Transylvania in the kingdom of Poland, since their customs are similar.[4]

They do not live in cities or fixed settlements, but always in camps, changing their dwellings (which are tents) when they change location, which they do whenever they need grass for their camels, horses, cattle and the huge herds of goats and sheep which for them take the place of agriculture, even the name of which is unknown to them.

Their daily nourishment consists of all sorts of meat. Besides horsemeat they like best the meat of mules and donkeys. Of these things they never tire, even though it is neither cooked well nor roasted, because they eat it rare and with the blood dripping. Nor is it very clean because they cook the meat in plain water together with the intestines which they usually do not wash but running their hands over them lightly wring them out. Later on when they find that these inner parts of the meat [which has been conserved] have to be cleaned, especially the interleaf of the stomach or the entrails, the more important personalities among them do this by scratching them with the tip of their knives and then rubbing the scratched parts against their boots or clothes. The ordinary people take a chunk and without any other spices dip it in salt-water and eat it. The most delicious piece for them is the raw liver just extracted from the animal while it is still warm.

Their dresses are made of furs of animals. The higher persons among them use the furs of cougars, tigers, foxes and of a certain rat whose fur is of great value [sable]. The ordinary people make their dresses from sheepskins both for winter and summer. On their heads they wear, in winter time, a low cap lined with fur similar to the old Portuguese "liberty caps" even though their style is different. The brims they line two or three fingers wide with the finest furs of certain animals or rat-like animals which are very similar (if I remember correctly) to those which in Brazil they call saki monkeys, and which in Portugal they use to make gloves or fur muffs for the hands. The top of the cap is finished off and covered with a red tassle similar to those of the Doctors of Law in Coimbra. Their summer caps are made of woven straw mats. They have the form of our pans or plates but are hollower and deeper. The tassle is the same, but when it rains they replace it with the tail of an ox painted red which when seen for the first time causes much laughter and, in the Chinese, fear. They shave their heads but on the nape they leave a long mop of hair braided. Some of them, especially the higher placed ones, during the winter when on account of the cold they let their hair grow longer, in order to let their heads breathe, some leave a shaved crown as big as a large coin, others as large as the crown [tonsure] of our deacons or priests. Their dresses reach their ankles with the collar cut off in the manner of the Turks, except for some of them who during the winter wear it short or in its place wear furs of animals that we mentioned above. The sleeves are long and close-fitting. They wear waistbands from which hangs on each side a towel which reaches the ground, folded in three or four folds, each fold two or three fingers wide, with which they wipe the grease off their faces, knives and hands when they eat meat; because, unlike the Chinese, they use neither spoons nor forks. Thus the darker color and the greater greasiness [of these towels] denotes the importance and wealth of its owner. All of them also carry, hanging from their belt, a knife which they use for every purpose. With this, nobles and ordinary people alike cut the meat they eat, shave their heads, cut the hoofs of the horses, make their bows and arrows, as well as all other things they use. Beyond these things there hangs from their belt a leather pouch in which they carry a piece of steel to strike fire with, a stone, bait and wick so that at anytime they can light a fire to smoke tobacco, which they also carry in the pouch or pouches hanging from their belts. The boots of the rich are made of leather of camels or horses, which in Portugal they call "giol-heira," with the only difference being that the soles are sometimes three fingers thicker. The footwear of the poor, which is the national footwear, consists of two strips of leather made of sheepskin crossed and stitched together in such a crude and rudimentary manner that they look like the foot of an elephant. They do not use chairs, as do the Chinese, but sit on the floor. They also lack the cleanliness of the Japanese. Because in their persons [bodies], houses and manners they are the sum-total of all squalor and emit such a dreadful stench that they are insufferable. They are capable of great exertion, and if necessary, they can go for two or three days without eating. They have an alphabet but no learned persons. In general they are without guile and of an easy-going nature. Nevertheless they are crude, barbarous and without any kind of science, arts or polity.

Their letters and much more their language are easy to learn because they do not have the high and low [tones] of the Chinese, nor aorist [inflection of a verb] and the other cases of Europe. There are in theory five but in reality six vowels: a, e, i, o, u, ü. The consonants are the same as ours. However, they cannot distinguish them from the vowels and constantly mix them up. They teach the children the consonants joined together in syllables, thus making twelve chapters [combinations]; e.g., pa, pe, pi, po, pu, pü. In connecting them into speech they do not observe our rule of order, but change the vowels and consonants with little dots before and after them, thus changing the vowels into consonants, the consonants into other consonants, or even make them aspirated or guttural. They write from top to bottom like the Chinese, and from left to right as we do and not from right to left as the Moors or the Chinese do. Every twig which has a tip at its end they use as a pen and every little tablet is paper.

In war they have courage and die. They use swords, bows and arrows without any other kind of armament. On horseback they are lords of the field, and when they ride or gallop (no one can match their artistry) they are most adroit, while on foot they are inert. They are eminent archers and shoot the arrow with such fury that it passes through the body of a man. They fight without order, design or strategy as a mob and in utter confusion. They are great hunters as well with birds for which purpose they train large numbers of hawks and falcons, as from the camps and mountains shooting down with arrows, while riding on horseback, not only tigers, bears, wolves, wild boars and other large animals, but even rabbits and wild chickens (chestnut-capped antthrushes) as we have seen everyday during our trip from Szechwan to Peking.

They worship in pagodas as the Chinese do but are more devout than the Chinese. They are extremely devoted to their bonzes, whom they also call lama or lamba as they do in the kingdoms of Tibet and Uzange.[5] One cannot fail to note the great diversity of customs among people who live so close to each other; the Chinese (except for the Europeans) being the most civilized in the world, while these Tartars, except for the Kaffirs [South African Bantu-speaking people], are the most barbarous.

These are the Tartars of the west and the north. The eastern Tartars, given the contact they have had with the former, have the same customs, but since they subjugated the Chinese they have become more civilized, but in their natural state they were much more barbaric and rustic. Their original country lies to the north of the kingdom of Korea and to the east of China. Their home district is smaller than the province of Beyra or Alemtejo [in Portugal], mountainous and infertile, without wheat or rice but with much corn or maize which in Portugal they call corn of the Kaffir's. They have no cities or settlements but only straw-thatched huts, two here and three there. They do not have the camels and other animals in the abundance that the Western Tartars have them and live exclusively and consequently poorly and miserably from hunting and fishing. They have no religion, since they do not adore nor know any divinity. They have no alphabet of their own, and the one they now use they borrowed from the Western Tartars. They had no king, and it is only forty years ago that a man of spirit rose among them and started to give them leadership.[6] And he did this with such success that he imposed his rule on many territories of the Tartars of the west and north, who now all obey him.[7]

Later on they conquered the Chinese of Liao-tung[8] which is part of the province of Shantung, and about sixteen years ago they conquered the kingdom of Korea.[9] After they took Liao-tung, which has very good and fertile soil which produces rice and all the other supplies, they made it the base of their operations and their leader, called captain til that time, assumed the title of king[10] and started making war and regularly raided China.[11] Finally in the year 1644 they were invited, as we mentioned above, by a Chinese military commander,[12] an infamous traitor of country and nation, and made themselves lords of the Court of Peking and other provinces, destroying and killing the armies and the leaders of the rebels [who had overthrown the Ming Dynasty]. This was a great victory for these barbarians and a greater pity for such a flourishing empire and such a civilized nation [like China] to come under their [Tartars'] power and under their barbarous customs. It was at this time that the Tartars heard that in the province of Szechwan, the infamous tyrant[13] had himself proclaimed king, and consequently dispatched against him a prince, older brother[14] of the boy[15] who at present is the king of China, Korea and Tartary. The reasons why his father left the kingdom to him and not to his oldest brother,[16] which is the usual procedure, are uncertain and cannot be determined. Some say that they drew lots and that fortune smiled at the boy. Others maintain that, since the mother of the oldest one was a Western Tartar woman and the mother of the younger one a Chinese woman from Liaotung, the kingdom was left to him to gain the goodwill of the Chinese. Still others say that the oldest one was of a savage, harsh and cruel disposition. But this reason is not only frivolous, as are the others, but false as we found out by experience, because he was so benign and affable not only toward his own people but even towards the Chinese, that he was loved by all. Thus, in my opinion, the reason was the love and affection which the father had towards the boy, doing what his father had done to him, leaving the kingdom to the fourth,[17] while the first three and the others were still alive. Of these others the first, third, fifth, eighth, ninth and tenth are alive to this day. The dead king entrusted the education of his young son to his ninth brother as well as the task of expanding the kingdom.[18] It is this one who now rules the kingdom,[19] until the boy reaches the age of twelve and gains the prudence to do it himself. With the prince who was the general of the army[20] there were two other princes, his brothers and the king's brothers who served as his captains and aides. The army that he led in this enterprise [to defeat the Szechwan rebel Chang Hsien-chung] was not a very potent one, since it numbered less than four thousand mounted men, because they do not use infantry. He was so fortunate that with more reason than Caesar he could say: Veni, vidi, vici [I came, I saw, I conquered], because they surprised the tyrant with such suddeness, that he was dead and his armies scattered and fleeing before they knew who defeated and dispersed them.[21] Had it not been for this it seems impossible that the Tartar could have been victorious because of the disparity between the two sides: the Tartars being so small in number while the tyrant had many horses which he could alternate, and stores of supplies, while the Tartars, having ridden for three days without eating, were dying of hunger and their horses tired without having others; the tyrant possessed artillery and his men were courageous and fearless, good archers, adept with the lance and musket of which they had many, and most of all they were so resolved that they were more like tigers and lions than Chinese, something the tyrant demanded of them by constantly saying that he will kill them with such cruelty if they would survive, that they had lost the desire to live. However, God, in his justice, wanted to punish the malice of this tyrant and teach those who rule to use reason in their government and not tyrannical whims. After this we returned to our camp."

Notes

1. Tung-ta. See Sebes, Joseph, S.J., *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): The Diary of Thomas Pereira, S.J.*, (Rome, 1961), pp. 305–312: Appendix I, map.
2. Pei-ta. See Sebes, Op. cit.
3. Hsi-ta. It must be noted that the early Jesuit reports call both the Mongols and Manchus, Tartars, and lump them together under this generic name.
4. Magalhães' geographic knowledge is sketchy. As to the relationship between the peoples whose country stretches as far as the boundaries of Transylvania, see Sebes, Op. cit.
5. Hou Tsang, or Western Tibet, during the Ming Dynasty.
6. Nurhaxi or Nurhaci. See Hummel, Arther, *Eminent Chinese of* the *Ching Period* (*1664–1912*), (Washington, D.C.), Volume I, pp. 594–599.
7. For a discussion of factors in the ascendancy and rise to power of the Manchus, see Sebes, Op. cit.
8. The Manchus succeeded in securing control over Liao-tung in 1621–1624. This was achieved by a mixed process of conquest and alliance, in which the enlistment of Chinese troops, resulting in the formation of the Chinese banners, fortified the basis of Manchu power that helped the Manchus in their conquest of China. The importance of the Liao-tung Chinese in this alliance can be judged from the role of Wu San-kuei who, after negotiations, admitted the Manchus into China in order to destroy the rebel uprisers and usurpers Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsien-chung. Wu San-kuei was a native of Liao-tung. Considering his rank and importance he must have had both personal interests in Manchuria and personal connections with the Manchurian Chinese already serving with the Manchus.

9. 1638. See Hummel, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 2.
10. February 17, 1616. See Hummerl, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 597.
11. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 597.
12. Wu San-kuei. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 877–888.
13. Chang Hsien-chung. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 37–38.
14. Haoge. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 280–281.
15. Shun-chih or Fu-lin. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 255–259.
16. Haoge. See note 14.
17. Abahai. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 1–3. Abahai actually was the eighth son of Nurhaci. But, when, in 1616, Nurhaxi reorganized his government, three of his sons and one of his nephews, known together as the Four Senior Beile (Prince of the Blood), were ordered to assist him. They were in order of seniority, Daisan (2nd son), Amin (nephew, son of Surhaxi, younger brother of Nurhaxi), Manggultai (5th son of Nurhaxi) and Abahai (8th son). Thus what Magalhães refers to is his position as the fourth Beile, and not as the fourth son. The reason for Fu-lin's (his mother, by the way, was the Empress Hsiao-chuang, daughter of a Mongolian prince who was a secondary consort at the time of Fu-lin's birth) choice was the result of a compromise among various Court factions, some of whom had supported Haoge (see note 14) and others Dorgon (Hummel, Op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 215–219). Even after the decision was made some conspirators tried to persuade Dorgon to rule, but they were apprehended and executed. The antagonism between Haoge and Dorgon continued even after Fu-lin ascended the throne (October 8, 1643) and ultimately led to Haoge's demise. Magalhães describes this as follows:

> Already before they [the Manchus] became rulers of China, because of a disagreement he had with the Prince regent [Dorgon], he had been arrested by him in Liaotung and was set free only when they entered this empire. Thus returning from the Szechwan undertaking he was not met by a welcoming party sent by the Prince regent nor were other courtesies extended to him customary on such occasions, especially in view of the fact that he returned as a victor having defeated and killed an enemy greatly feared by his own nation. Thus, cooly received and not admitted to the royal presence for fifteen days, when he was finally summoned the Prince regent reprimanded him and reproved his action in the presence of the young king. Exasperated by this treatment he [Haoge] uttered some harsh words and ripping off his hat he threw it on the floor angrily. Then he left the royal palace and returned to his own where ministers and soldiers were already awaiting him to arrest him and after having been deprived and stripped him of all dignities and possessions to incarcerate him for life. He, disguising his true feelings, said placidly that he understood the situation and ordered the royal ministers who had come to take him to go outside saying that he wanted to change his dress. They went outside and when after a prolonged period of waiting he did not appear they entered forcibly and found that the poor Prince had hanged himself with a piece of silk on a beam. He was already dead. Two of his three wives had also hanged themselves. [The third one was taken by the Prince regent as his own consort.] A sorry event! A miserable fate! His death was very much felt and talked about by all the Tartars as well as by the Chinese. As for the uncle, the Prince regent, he showed more wrath than zeal or justice and showed more cruelty towards his nephew dead than when he was alive. Without pomp and ceremony, as is usually done only with common people, but not with those of royal blood, he had the body cremated and the ashes buried in order to relegate to eternal oblivion the man who for his glorious victories and other illustrious deeds was worthy of a statue to remember him forever. But then one must not be surprised because this is the ordinary prize with which the world rewards those who serve it. (*Jap.-Sin. 127.* ff. 35r–35v.)

18. This statement of Magalhães is erroneous and self-contradictory because when Abahai died in 1643, and his ninth son, Fu-lin, was proclaimed emperor at the age of six,

Dorgon, the fourteenth son of Nurhaxi and Jirgalang, sixth son of Surhaxi (younger brother of Nurhaxi) became the regents. Dorgon soon eliminated Jirgalang. During the first seven years of Fu-lin's reign (reign title Shun-chih) the government was directed by Dorgon who had supreme power and was called "Regent Uncle", a title altered in 1645 to "Imperial Regent Uncle," changed again, in late 1648 (or early 1645), to "Imperial Father Regent." And it is unthinkable that anyone else's influence would have been permitted to prevail over the young Emperor unless it was Gose, the sixth son of Abahai, who had no political, but literary inclinations. See Hummel, Op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 215–219 and 1–3.

19. Hummel, Op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 215–219.

20. Haoge. See above note 14.

21. This scene is worthwhile describing because it is by an eyewitness and is at variance with other narratives of the event, e.g., Hummel, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 280 (who relies on Chinese sources) and Parsons, James B., *Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Period*, (Arizona, 1970), p. 184. Magalhães describes it as follows:

> On the 3rd of January 1647, we went to his [Chang Hsien-chung] residence [at Hsi-chung, Szechwan] to see what was going on because at that time, more than ever, we were afraid that something untoward was about to happen since, as I already stated, the tyrant was in a bad mood and the Ko-lao [Grand Secretary] solicitous and vigilant about us. At that moment the lookout who had been placed on a high mountain unexpectedly sent word that four men on horseback were descending towards the valley below. The tyrant called the messengers' names and asked where these horsemen could be coming from. He almost had the soldiers who brought the news killed. After they left he continued beating and abusing those around him. About half an hour later, he had handed over to those vile and infamous individuals (around him) the wife of one of his old and great captains who had escaped the previous day when, suddenly, the Tartars appeared in front of the tent. And without knowing that they were Tartars, since they had no distinguishing marks, he, on horseback with only a small spear in his hand, accompanied by seven or eight soldiers, also unarmed, went outside and had hardly seen the Tartars when one of them shot an arrow into his left side which passed through his entrails and pierced his cruel and devilish heart; he fell to the ground dead. Everybody who could fled. Our guards fled too and so did we.

This and the description of Haoge's death differ from other sources.

■ Source: Elliott, Mark C., 'Manchus as ethnographic subject in the Qing', in Joseph W. Esherick, Wen-hsin Yeh; Madeleine Zelin (eds), *Empire, Nation, and Beyond: Chinese history in late imperial and modern times—A Festschrift in honor of Frederic Wakeman*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, Copyright © 2006 by the regents of the University of California, reproduced by permission, pp. 17–37.

MANCHUS AS ETHNOGRAPHIC SUBJECT IN THE QING

Mark C. Elliott

As all students of late imperial China are aware, writing anything about the Manchus during the Qing was a dangerous business. The simple reason for this was that the Qing imperial court suffered from a deep and abiding insecurity about its ethnic origins and was forever on the lookout for what it considered treasonous—that is to say, anti-Manchu—attitudes. This was especially true when such attitudes somehow found their way into public discourse, where they might poison people's minds by playing on lingering doubts that the Qing was not quite a legitimate dynasty and that they really *were* alien usurpers undeserving of the Mandate of Heaven. Thus from the Shunzhi reign on, the Manchu political elite, often assisted by Han Chinese eager to win favor from above, prosecuted scores of suspected cases of sedition (Wakeman 1985). Many of these cases are subsumed under the rubric of a Qing "literary inquisition" (An and Zhang 1990: 102–44), of which the unfortunate fate of Dai Mingshi is an outstanding example (Durand 1993). Other cases focused more on what was inscribed on the body, not on paper (Kuhn 1990). Either sort of affair could result in extremely unpleasant consequences for those involved.

Given these risks, one might reasonably expect that the only writing on Manchu history and customs done in the Qing was that officially sponsored and approved by the dynasty itself. There is indeed a fair amount of such literature, including the *General History of the Eight Banners* (*Baqi tongzhi/Jakūn gūsai tungjy-i bithe*, 1739), the *Comprehensive Genealogy of the Eight Banner Manchu Clans* (*Baqi Manzhou shizu tongpu/Jakūn gūsai manjusai hala be uheri ejehe bithe*, 1745), the *Rituals for Manchu Sacrifices to Ancestral Spirits and Heaven* (*Manzhou jishen jitian dianli/Manjusai wecere metere kooli bithe*, 1781), and the *Investigations of the Origins of the Manchus* (*Manzhou yuanliu kao/Manjusai da sekiyen-i kimcin*, 1783), to name only the best known of such works. As studies of the last-named item make clear, much care was taken by the editors of this and all writing on the Manchus to ensure the presentation of an orderly and respectable image (Crossley 1987). This same scrutiny was applied as well to items not meant for wider circulation, such as the *Manchu Veritable Records* (*Manzhou shilu/Manju-i yargiyan kooli*, 1781), of which only three copies were made, or the *History of the Foundation of the Qing Empire* (*Huang Qing kaiguo fanglüe / Daicing gurun-i fukjin doro neihe bodogon-i bithe*, 1786). Both of these provide heavily edited and embellished accounts of the Manchus' rise to power in the early seventeenth century.

No doubt because of the high level of official interest in the subject, unauthorized discussions of Manchu history were slow to appear during the Qing. Korean records of preconquest Manchu politics and society, such as Son Ya-hae's *Shenyang riji*, Shin Chung-il's *Jianzhou jicheng tuji*, or Yi Min-hwan's *Jianzhou wenjian lu*, were unknown at the time. The numerous late Ming accounts of the northeast frontier, discussions of court policy toward the Jurchens, and unofficial histories in the *yeshi* tradition dwelling on the sensitive period of the Ming-Qing transition, which often emphasized the violence and cruelty of the conquerors, were the object of vigorous suppression by the Manchus beginning in the Kangxi reign (Xie 1981: 173–79; Guo and Lin 1990). Even if the authors of offensive works were no longer living, anyone found to own volumes that slandered the Manchus, even merely by discussing their preconquest past, was liable to receive harsh punishment. As a result, the Qing conquest and the rise of the Manchus were topics that were off-limits to private historians through to the end of the Qianlong reign (Guy 1987).

However, despite the court monopoly on the writing of formal Manchu history, there is no shortage of writing about Manchu history, personalities, institutions, and customs in Qing-period *biji*, that is, "jottings" or "memoir" writing. For reasons discussed below, *bijii* do not seem to have incurred the court's suspicion in the same way that *yeshi* did, and they circulated widely in both manuscript and printed form. From the frequency with which one encounters information about Manchus in *biji*, it seems that the Chinese reading public was in fact quite interested in the Manchus and in what made the Manchus different from themselves. This interest grew exponentially in the nineteenth century, when antiquarian-minded literati were free for the first time to turn their attention to the history of the dynasty under which they lived. By investigating a variety of Qing *biji*, this essay seeks to answer a few preliminary questions: What could people say about the Manchus in these books, and which *biji* were liable to contain this information? When were they published? How do we assess the information on the Manchus that emerges from them and what images dominate?

The biji *Genre*

Before taking a look at writing on the Manchus in pre-1900 *biji*, something first should be said about *biji* generally. The authors of Qing *biji* continued a tradition that dated back to at least the Six Dynasties period (222–589 CE), or even earlier, depending on how one wishes to define the genre. To try to make sense of the tremendous variety of *biji*, scholars have come up with different categorization schemes. One authority offers a complex taxonomy of eleven types, including those describing official institutions, those describing random historical events and personalities, those with a mainly literary focus, travel memoirs, those relating stories of the supernatural and the strange, and *biji* with a primarily didactic or moral emphasis (Zhang 1986: 1–2). Xie Guozhen for his part divides Ming and Qing *biji* into ten sorts, also according to content (Xie 1981: 4–6). The *Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature* reduces this to a simpler tripartite formula of historical, literary, and philological *biji* (Nienhauser 1986: 651; see also Liu 1980: 3), which I will employ here. Because *biji* that touch on Manchu-related issues come almost exclusively from the category of historical *biji*, I will focus my remarks on this type alone.

However one chooses to classify them, one thing all agree on is that *biji* represent a decidedly more casual form of writing than that found in history or other genres. The authors of *biji* do not seem to have intended them to be the objects of careful scholarly study. Entries are usually short and conversational in nature. Little or no attempt is made to link one with the next or to provide substantiation for any reports, many of which are implicitly or explicitly acknowledged to be rumor (*men*). The randomness and informality of *biji* writing is proclaimed in their very titles: "Guangyang's random notes," "Casual conversations by the north side of the pond," "Collection of talks from walking in the garden," "Further essays in search of hearsay." Depending on content, one imagines *biji* as the Qing equivalent of the "Talk of the Town" section of the *New Yorker*, the "Historical Notes" column of an alumni magazine, or Ripley's *Believe It or Not*, something to glance at over a cup of tea or leaf through before going to bed. Authors wrote them in their spare time, gathering up fragments of information on this and that collected in reading over the years, recollecting things heard on the side and remnants of conversations otherwise long forgotten. In short, we might say that *biji* were written in large part just for fun. As the Qing scholar and *Siku quanshu* editor Ji Xiaolan wrote in the preface to one of his own *biji*, "Only when one is writing random notes can one manage to relax" (cited in Liu 1980: 9).

That said, for the historian, *biji* are by no means simply a frivolous source. As anyone who has read them knows, one of the charms of *biji* is that one never knows what one will find. On one page there's something about the examination system, and on the next something on rice strains in Guangdong; turn the page again and there's a story about a virtuous official in the Kangxi reign, with details not covered in formal dynastic sources. Any given entry might hold the telltale clue to a larger problem, the final bit of biographical information one was hoping to find, or a fascinating anecdote, good for an article or at least a footnote. Yet this same charming unpredictability is also the *biji's* curse. Since one never knows what one might find, one also never knows where to look for something specific. Hunting for a particular piece of information in a *biji* is like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. So until we have *biji* in machine-readable format, the only way to find out what secrets they hold is to read them the old-fashioned way and take notes for future use.

Useful biji *for Manchu History*

As already mentioned, historical *biji* turn out to be a surprisingly valuable source of information about Manchu institutions and customs. Below is a list of the *biji* I have found most useful in my own research (Elliott 2001) (full references to editions used may be found in the list of references; asterisk = printed during the Qing).

Tan Qian, *Beiyou lu.* ca. 1660. 9 *juan.*
Liu Xianting, *Guangyang zaji.* ca. 1695. 5 *juan.*
Wang Shizhen, *Chibei outan.* 1700.* 29 *juan.*
Wu Changyuan, *Chenyuan shilüe.* 1788.* 16 *juan.*
Zhao-lian (Jooliyan), *Xiaoting zalu/ xulu.* 1814–26.* 10 + 5 *juan.*
Fa-shi-shan (Faššan), Taolu zalu. 1817.* 6 *juan.*
Zhao Yi, *Yanpu zaji.* 1829.* 6 *juan.*
Ying-he, *Enfutang biji.* 1837.* 2 *juan.*
Liang Zhangju, *Langji congtan/ xutan/ santan.* 1846–1857.* 11 + 8 + 6 *juan.*
Yu Zhengxie. *Guisi cungao.* 1847.* 15 + 1 *juan.*
Wang Qingyun, *Shiqu yuji.* ca. 1850.* 6 *juan.*
Fu-ge, *Tingyu congtan.* ca. 1860. 12 *juan.*
Fang Junshi, *Jiaoxuan suilu/ xulu.* 1872, 1891.* 12 + 2 *juan.*
Chen Kangqi, *Langqian jiwen chubi/ erbi/ sanbi/ sibi.* 1880–86.* 14 + 16 + 12 + 11 *juan.*
Yao Yuanzhi, *Zhuyeting zaji.* 1893.* 8 *juan.*
Wu Zhenyu, *Yangjizhai conglu.* 1896.* 26 *juan.*
Ji-chang, *Xingsuzhai zaji* 1901.* 2 *juan.*

Zhen-jun, *Tianzhi ouwen.* 1903.* 10 *juan.*
Xu Ke, *Qingbai leichao.* ca. 1917. 48 *ce.*

Information on the Manchus—what I will call here "Manjuriana"—in the above nineteen *biji* falls into three main categories. The first is institutional, including descriptions of the Eight Banner system, the banner garrisons, rules governing Manchu access to government positions, special examinations for Manchu and other bannermen, and so on. The second is folkloristic, consisting of remarks on Manchu customs, religion, and language. A third general type of information is biographical, including anecdotes on emperors and well-known officials. To arrive at a better sense of the way the Manchus are depicted in these *biji*, let me describe the first two of these different categories.

Qing biji *on Manchu Institutions*

The first category, institutional information, is by far the most plentiful. The very beginning of one of the earliest Qing *biji*, Liu Xianting's *Guangyang zaji*, contains an extensive outline of the administrative structure of the Eight Banners, from banner chiefs to company captains. The details of grain and silver salaries for officers and soldiers are also provided (Liu 1957: 1:1–4). The Eight Banners are also discussed in an even earlier *biji*, *Beiyou lu*, by the Ming official Tan Qian. Both Liu and Tan devote space to the geographical placement of the banners in Beijing, Tan noting specifically that all the Han except those who had been taken in under the banners were removed from the city (Tan 1960: 347). Tan takes pains to put things into a historical perspective, noting that the banner system was similar to a Khitan organizational scheme (though he makes no argument that the Qing consciously patterned their own system after the Liao). His predilection for tracing parallels with the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties is revealed also in his description of Manchu court costume (350–52) and in his brief remarks on the Manchu treatment of Han Chinese commoners:

> The old custom of the Khitan was to use all the Han people they got as servants (*pu*) and concubines (*qie*). This was especially common among the officials.... Giving an ox or a horse could compensate for the murder of a Han person. No one was executed for it. But by the time the Xiao family [joined the Khitan], more and more Han followers lived in the north, where they lived together with the Khitan and Bohai people in You[zhou] and Ji[zhou]. Then killing a Han was the same crime as killing a person. Looking at things today, it seems there is not much difference. (Tan 1960: 415)

Tan wrote *Beiyou lu* after a three-year stay in Beijing in the middle 1650s. These and other comments and usages in the book (such as his habit of calling the Manchus "Man-ren" instead of the more usual "Manzhou" or "Manzhou-ren") must have raised some eyebrows, which may explain why the book is one of the few *biji* in the above list never to have been published in the Qing. Unlike *Guangyang zaji*, which was also never printed but which exists in almost twenty extant manuscripts, Tan's incautious style may have limited the circulation of *Beiyou lu*, though it did not appear to land the work on any list of banned books.

Even more detailed information on the Qing occupation of Beijing is available from the late eighteenth-century *biji*, *Chenyuan shilüe*, by Wu Changyuan. This is essentially a historical guide to Qianlong-era Beijing, complete with maps. Strictly speaking, we might consider this *biji* as having a semiofficial sanction, since it is patterned extensively on the better-known description of the capital in *Rixia jiuwen kao*, a work commissioned by the Qianlong emperor. In *Chenyuan shilüe* we find the same information as elsewhere on the location of the Eight Banners in a protective cordon around the imperial city, but in addition, the descriptions of each quarter of the city carry precise information as to which streets form the borders between banner quarters and how those quarters were divided between Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese (Hanjun) divisions. This information corroborates what we learn from contemporary maps of the city, namely, that the Manchu banners were placed in closest proximity to the imperial city, with Chinese banners occupying the perimeter farthest removed from the palace. Wu also provides the street locations of all banner offices within Beijing (Wu 1981: *juan* 5–8).

The participation of bannermen in the examination system was a subject of significant curiosity. in *Chibei outan*, Wang Shizhen, a celebrated Qing scholar and official, notes the changing position of the Shunzhi and Kangxi courts on allowing bannermen to sit for examination degrees, paying special attention to when Manchus and Mongols were allowed to take the exams in Manchu and when in Chinese, and to the fact that Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese bannermen did not compete directly against Han Chinese in the exams until the metropolitan exam. Even then, bannermen were given a handicap, since, as Wang points out, there was a quota of four *jinshi* from among Manchu and Mongol test takers, and two *jinshi* from among Hanjun test takers (Wang 1982: 2, 82, 85). More details on Manchus and the examination system are found in *Shiqu yuji*, which pays special attention to the translation examinations, and in *Langqian jiwen chubi*, *Yangjizhai conglu*, and *Tingyu congtan*.

Fu-ge, the author of the last-named Xianfeng-era *biji*, seems to have had an especially keen interest in the bannerman examination experience. Although he himself evidently did not hold any degree, he was a product of the banner system, a member of a company of the Bordered Yellow Banner registered under the Imperial Household Department—a status similar to that enjoyed by the Kangxi emperor's trusted servant Cao Yin—and his notes also contain extensive observations about banner institutions from an insider's perspective. *Juan* 4 of *Tingyu congtan* provides a history of the examination system in general; in explaining its fate under the Qing, Fu-ge devotes a separate section to the ups and downs of exams for the Eight Banners, remarking that court policy wavered because of fears that bannermen would be negatively influenced, but that by 1690 the Kangxi emperor gave final approval to Manchu test taking. An exhaustive rundown of exam givers and takers from the beginning of the dynasty through the Daoguang reign in *juan* 9 is sprinkled with notes on successful Manchu candidates, vicissitudes in the rules affecting Manchu and other bannermen, and so on; in *juan* 11 the author makes the important point that Manchus and Mongols did not need to have examination degrees in order to be appointed to official positions; they only had to be "capable" (Chinese bannerman, on the other hand, were supposed to have degrees if the positions they were being appointed to were technically reserved for Han Chinese). And in a final observation in *juan* 12, Fu-ge returns to the theme of the privileges enjoyed by bannermen in the exams, writing:

> All of us in the Eight Banners thus did not have to labor endlessly over precise wording, to pattern our writing after formal styles, or to struggle in poverty for success the hard way; but as a basic requirement it was necessary to be thoroughly familiar with the histories and the Han classics and to know enough about different schools of philosophy to be able to debate. Beyond this, one had to get some experience and be accustomed to institutional practices. Only then did one have a chance of employment [as an official]. In short, it was possible not to opt for the examinations, but it was not possible not to read one's poetry and history. (Fuge 1984: 249–50)

Abundant information on Manchu institutions is found in *Xiaoting zalu*. Space does not permit a listing of every relevant entry in this famous *biji*, written in the early nineteenth century by a Manchu imperial noble, Zhaolian, the erstwhile Li Prince, who traced his ancestry to Nurhaci's third son, Daišan. The main institutional themes already raised all find mention in *Xiaoting zalu*, along with information on the declining status of the Hanjun banners, accounts of the different banner garrisons, Manchu schools, scholars, and scribes (*bithesi*, or, in Chinese, *bi-tie-shi*) the imperial lineage, the location of princely mansions in Beijing, and so on.

Xiaoting zalu contains descriptions of different types of sacrifice, too, with one very interesting entry on the obscure Manchu institution of the *tangzi*. The *tangzi*, called *tangse* in Manchu, was the site of official sacrifices to *abka*, the Manchu Heaven. Situated just to the southwest of the imperial city, this was the Manchu parallel to Tiantan, although since sacrifices to ancestors were also made here, Zhao-lian finds a closer parallel in the ancient Chinese *mingtang*. The main sacrificial hall, housing the spirits of the emperor's ancestors, was at the center of a complex of buildings that included separate pavilions for sacrifices by imperial sons, princes, and other nobles. To its south was a circular hall for sacrifices to heaven. Before all these sacrificial pavilions were stone plinths to hold spirit poles (Manchu *soma*). Zhao-lian, who must have been to this place several times, even tells us that in the southeast corner of the complex was the Ascending-Spirits Hall, where offerings were made to the spirit of the Ming general Deng Zilong, a sworn ally of Nurhaci. On New Year's Day, the emperor proceeded to the *tangse* together with the members of the imperial nobility, princes, dukes, and Manchu high officials of rank 1A and B to make ritual offerings of meat, cakes, and liquor to heaven and the spirits of ancestors enshrined there. Zhao-lian fills us in that these offerings were in fact brought from Kunning gong, the center of shamanic ritual within the palace. Further celebrations were held at the *tangse* on a regular basis, but the only other time the emperor visited the place was for the impressive military rituals held at the inauguration and completion of major campaigns (Zhao-lian 1980: 231–32).

Qing biji *on Manchu Customs*

Along with Manchu institutions, another popular subject for *biji* authors was Manchu customs. Religious rituals, rites of passage, food, clothing, miscellaneous folklore, and so on—all these are described to readers fascinated either by the Manchu "Other" in their midst or, as in the case of readers from the Eight Banners, by the revelation of details of customs supposedly their own. It is writing in this area that I think legitimately allows us to speak of the Manchus as the subject of something like an "ethnographic" interest. Laura Hostetler has shown that there was abroad in the Qing a real curiosity in the depiction of strange peoples, arguing that in China, as in early modern Europe, such an interest in ethnography was linked to a burgeoning imperial (or colonial) consciousness (Hostetler 2001). While in the main her evidence for this rests in pictorial albums of the Miao and other southwest peoples, at least one of the textual sources she considers, Tian Rucheng's *Yanjiao jiwen* (1560), can be considered a *biji*, allowing us to include *biji* as one of the areas in which this ethnographic spirit was manifested. One should note, of course, that the aim of the ethnographies that Hostetler examines is in many respects quite different from that to be found in the descriptions that follow. Yet they share some similarities, in that both have the goal of imparting a universalized knowledge and authority (often linguistically based) to their accounts of the practices and behavior of an internal Other. I will return to the problem of ethnography below.

For nineteenth-century authors, one of the most commonly discussed of such practices was Manchu religious ritual. Zhao-lian provides accounts of Manchu shamanic rituals (called in Chinese *tiaoshen, juan* 9, and *Xulu, juan* 3), animal sacrifices (*Xulu, juan* 1) as well as of the Qianlong emperor's interest in Tibetan Buddhism, his relationship with 1Cang-skya Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje, a.k.a. the Janggiya khutuktu (*juan* 10), and his monumental commission of a Manchu translation of the Tripitaka (*Xulu, juan* 1) (more on this is also found in *Tingyu congtan, juan* 7). *Zhuyeting zaji*, by Yao Yuanzhi, a Jiaqing-era *jinshi* and one-time grand secretary, is better known for the information it has on the White Lotus uprising (which Yao helped suppress), but it also has a lengthy and detailed explanation of shamanic ritual. Yao remarks that this was universally practiced among Manchus, and it seems he got his information from Manchu acquaintances. Both Yao and Zhao-lian repeat a curious story about a specific offering called "Wanli mama," made during the ceremony to the spirit of the mother of the Wanli emperor. According to Yao, this was because in her lifetime she had urged reconciliation between the Ming and the Qing (Yao 1982: 60). Zhao-lian's explanation is roughly similar (Zhao-lian 1980: 476).

Better information on shamanic practice is found in *Tingyu congtan*, altogether one of the richest sources of Manjuriana. Fu-ge lists the different types of food used in the sacrifice, which he says are made to distant ancestors, not the nearest three generations of ancestors (with the clear implication that this "norm" is Chinese practice). These include white liquor, sticky-rice cakes, buckwheat cake, chestnut rice, and a lamb or suckling pig. He gives details on the wooden shrine that hung on the western wall of Manchu homes where a scroll depicting Guandi, Guanyin, and the earth god was kept; these deities were introduced by Jurchen emissaries to the Ming court, who returned with them. Fu-ge remarks that no one has dared change them, so offerings are made to them as well as to clan ancestors. As for the spirit pole on which offerings were hung, he describes it as being in the shape of a long spear—a reminder, some say, of the days when military campaigns were common and people used real spears in the field to raise offerings to heaven (Fu-ge 1984: 7–8, 129–30). From *Tingyu congtan* we also learn that while the Manchus burned incense at these ceremonies, they burned not stick incense but an aromatic grass called "Tartar fragrance," which gave off a delicate scent (Fu-ge 1984: 138).

Writing in *Langqian jiwen sibi*, Chen Kangqi also offers a detailed narration of Manchu sacrifices. His information comes from Lin-qing's *Hongxue yinyuan tuji* (another, more literary, *biji*, first published in 1849), where a very elaborate procedure lasting two days is described. On the first day, after offerings of food have been made before the spirit pole, paper money has been burned, and incense lit, wine is poured into a pig's ear to kill the pig, which is then slaughtered. After a complex evening ritual involving the snuffing of candles and hanging of shrouds, the mistress of the house divides the meat to be eaten. More is consumed the next day after an early-morning sacrifice to heaven. From his "Eight Banner friends," however, Chen confides that only great families still follow this ritual; ordinary folks, "having gradually been influenced by Chinese ways" (*jian ran Hua feng*), do things much more simply (Chen 1990: 97–98).

Curiously, Chen reports that shamanic incantations are absent from this ritual, whereas Wu Zhenyu, author of the late nineteenth-century *Yangjizhai conglu*, provides a fair amount of information on the use of mystical language in the ceremony, reporting that it began and ended with the chant *o-lo-lo* and that the prayers themselves contain the words

> a-hun-nian-xi. an-tai[chun]-a-ya-la. mu-li-mu-li-ha-na. dan-dai-hun.
> na-er-hun-xuan-chu. en-du-li-seng-gu. bai-man-zhang-jing. na-dan-yan-hu-li.
> en-du-meng-e-le. ka-tun-nuo-yan.

Obviously, this is nonsense in Chinese, but enough is recognizable here (en-du-li = *enduri*, "spirit," na-dan = *nadan*, "seven") to confirm that we are indeed looking at Manchu. Wu explains that *dan-dai-hun* refers to "seven stars" (a puzzle, as this would be *nadan usiha* in Manchu) and that *ka-tun nuo-yan* is a Mongolian spirit. The rest, he claims, is "unknown." Indeed, it looks like gibberish, even in Manchu. However, we find a similar passage in a text recorded among the incantations used for sacrifices to heaven by Manchu shamans in republican Beiping (the italicized parts correspond to the text above):

> a pu ka qi wa shi ka *a hun ni nian shi.* shun qi tu qi ke xi lin nian
> shi. nian shi en du li. *an chun a ya la mu li mu li ha. na dan dai hun*
> *na la hun guang chu. en du seng wu. bai men zhan yin. na dan wei hu*
> *li. en du meng mu lu. ka tun nuo yin.*

Parsing for Manchu words, we get (in Möllendorff transcription this time):

> abka ci wasika ahūn i niyansi. šun ci tucike siren niyansi. niyansi
> enduri. ancun ayara. muri muriha. nadan daihun narhūn hiyancu.
> enduri senggu. baiman janggin. nadan weihuri. endu monggolo.
> katun noyan.

While the meaning here is elusive, it is clear enough that the fragment reproduced by Wu in *Yangjizhai conglu* is from a call to various female spirits, *niyansi* (from the Chinese *niangzi*), which begins, "Elder *niyansi* descended from heaven! Bright *niyansi* born of the sun! *Niyansi* spirits!" The rest of the text is too mangled to decipher easily (many shamans were illiterate and had little idea of the meaning of the words they were chanting), but we can identify the names of more spirits, including, indeed, some in Mongolian (Mitamura 1965: 381–99).

Wu—who was well versed in the history and workings of the banner system too, to judge from the first few chapters of his book—recounts other bits of related information, noting that Han Chinese officials were not allowed to be present at shamanic rituals and that Manchus were not supposed to reveal their details (even though Fu-ge, Zhao-lian, and Lin-qing had already been published by that time, as had the codified *Rituals for Manchu Sacrifices*, which he himself cites). He also provides information on the rituals at Kunning gong, but Zhao-lian, who probably took part in them, may be more reliable. What Zhao-lian says is definitely more surprising. He relates that on the second day of the year, the emperor, princes, high officials, and board presidents, together with Mongol princes, assembled to partake of the meat left over from the previous day's sacrifices. The emperor awaited their arrival in the room, sitting facing north, *not* south, as was usual. The guests arrived in their finery, bowed once to the spirit hall on the west, then once in front of the emperor, before sitting down on mats on the floor facing south toward the emperor. Officers in charge of the sacrifice then brought in the offerings on silver plates, while the plates the emperor would use were brought in by officials on their knees. The emperor would then make cuts of the shoulder meat to be distributed to the present company; following Manchu custom, these would be eaten in slices. Tea (which the Manchus drank with milk) would be served once the meal was over, and the entire thing would be brought to a conclusion by a final bow to the emperor; the guests would then wait to depart until the emperor had left for the palace (Zhao-lian 1980: 377).

In addition to shamanism and Manchu religious practices, weddings and funerals are also the subject of limited comment. Entries on these rituals are found in *Beiyou lu, Chibei outan, Tingyu congtan,* and *Xiaoting zalu. Beiyou lu* describes only imperial weddings and funerals, though there is also a short reference to the Manchu practice of cremation, still common in the early Qing (Tan 1960: 357, 359–60, 412–13); interestingly, Wu Zhenyu says cremation was still being observed by Manchus in the late 1800s (Wu 1985: 272), *Chibei outan* contains a one-line notice on the old custom of following-in-death of Manchu servants (Wang 1982: 24). In *Tingyu congtan* we learn that when a death occurs in a banner (i.e., Manchu) family, a long brocade pennant is hung outside the front gate, on the left if the deceased is a male, on the right if a female. Fu-ge calls this a *danzhao* and assigns it an ancient pedigree, likening it to the flags flown in Chinese funeral processions up until the fifth century CE. Comments on the shorter mourning observed by Manchus (a hundred days instead of twenty-seven months) arise in *Yangjizhai conglu* and elsewhere (Wu 1985: 34).

Information on food and clothing is scarce, though we get a sense of the importance of meat in the Manchu diet from the descriptions of sacrificial foods. Tan Qian, in *Beiyou lu*, again takes a historical slant by prefacing his remarks on sumptuary changes under the Qing by first describing similar policies under the Liao, when, unlike the Manchus, the Khitan opted for Chinese dress. For Manchu women, he notes the narrow sleeves and floor-sweeping lengths of their gowns and their habit of fixing ornaments in their hair, which, he says, is a superior fashion to that worn by "Western barbarian" (*xiyi*) women (Tan 1960: 351–52). *Tingyu congtan* underscores the point that banner women do not bind their feet and comments also on their hair ornaments (Fu-ge 1984: 156, 148). Eating is most extensively discussed in *juan* 24 of *Yangjizhai conglu*, where the emperor's habits, representing general Manchu preferences, are outlined. We might note here quickly that beef was eschewed on the palace menu in favor of game, and cream went not only into tea but also into biscuits and cookies that were distributed several times a year, including on the imperial birthday (even though Manchus did not originally celebrate birthdays, or so we read in *Beiyou lu*) (Wu 1985: 358–60; Tan 1960: 354).

Miscellaneous notices of interest worth mentioning concern the Manchu style of greeting, according to which Manchu men did not bow to each other, but raised the right hand and enfolded it with the left, while women let the right hand drop low in greeting (Tan 1960: 352); the Manchu custom of holding the right side in greater esteem than the left, supposedly going back to Han practice (Liu 1957: 247–48; Zhao-lian 1980: 40); and the Manchu art of finger painting (Zhao-lian 1980: 169). How many of us knew that the Kangxi emperor neither smoke nor drank? (Chen 1984: 614). That Wu Sangui had four Manchu wives? (Liu 1957: 141). That the Manchus so loved music that the army led by Fiyanggū against Galdan included a master *qin* player? Or that the Qianlong emperor threw banquets in the throne room of the Baohe dian at which bannermen danced an interpretation of deer hunting and songs were sung in Manchu glorifying the deeds of the Qing? (Wu 1985: 176, 377).

Qing biji *on the Manchu Language*

A subcategory of ethnographic observation on the Manchus concerns language. Like shamanism, the Manchu language seems to have exercised a particular fascination for *biji* authors and their audiences. By providing so much information, authors were satisfying a curiosity about a language that in many different ways had insinuated itself into the Chinese vocabulary in the Qing (and, in a parallel way, into the vocabulary of the Qing historian) and yet remained a mystery. What to make of terms such as *niu-lu, zhang-jing,* or *bi-tie-shi*? How is Manchu written, anyway?

Wu Zhenyu gives a reasonably accurate history of the creation of the Manchu language under Nurhaci in *juan* 21 of *Yangjizhai conglu*, while Zhao-lian is more interested in the place of Manchu in official use and in its popularity, referring specifically to the Manchu translations of *Xixiang ji* and *Jinping mei* (Zhao-lian 1980: 205, 306, 397). Notes on the use of Manchu in the bureaucracy are found also in *Beiyou lu*, Ying-he's *Enfutang biji*, in *Zhuyeting zaji, Chibei outan,* and *Jiaoxuan suilu.* The latter's author, Fang Junshi, a *juren* of 1856, served in official positions for many years in the capital. He offers a comprehensive description of the language, especially the use of the system of twelve root sounds used to organize Manchu dictionaries. Apparently also familiar with Mongolian, Fang adds that he frequently used to discuss Manchu translations of the classics with his colleagues (Fang 1995: 3). Chen Kangqi was another devotee of Manchu, which he says he tried once to learn on his own, but forgot most of what he once knew. Still, he gives a long word list that concludes with an admonition to scholars anxious to learn Western languages not to neglect the national language of the dynasty (Chen 1984: 732–34). Learning Manchu was easier for Chinese taken into Manchu families, as Liu Xianting points out in *Guangyang zaji*. Yet he writes that even Han who spoke it like natives found their Chinese accents coming back as they advanced in years (Liu 1957: 32).

Related to interest in the Manchu language was a pronounced interest in Manchu names, which no doubt struck people as differing so greatly from Han Chinese names. *Tingyu congtan*, for instance, has a separate notice on the Manchu use of so-called number names. It was common in the Qing for Manchus to bear names such as Qi-shi-wu (Cisinu in Manchu), meaning "seventy-five," Ba-shi-si (Bašisy in Manchu), "eighty-four," and so on. Fuge explains that children were named for the ages of their grandparents had when they were born, as a way of wishing them longevity (Fu-ge 1984: 220). Basing himself on the *Comprehensive Genealogy of the Eight Banner Manchu Clans*, Wu Zhenyu notes that there are 233 common Manchu surnames and 340 uncommon ones, along with Mongol, Korean, and Chinese surnames. Elsewhere in *Yangjizhai conglu* (though it has to do with naming animals, not people), Wu remarks that nine elephants presented to the court in the Xianfeng reign were all given Manchu names (Wu 1985: 3, 290), which we know parallels the Manchu custom of naming dogs and horses. This interest in names did not exclude the very name "Manchu," which is the subject of entries in *Langqian jiwen chubi* and *Yangjizhai conglu*. In the former, Chen Kangqi notes that many Manchus sign their names with the geographic marker *changbai* ("long white," for the Long White Mountains), but that this is not as elegant, in his opinion, as using the old name for the Manchus and writing *jushen*, "Jurchen" (Chen 1984: 95). Wu Zhenyu passes along the story that the name Manchu comes from Manjusri, and points out that despite the presence of the geographical character *zhou* in *Manzhou*, this is in fact an ethnonym, not a toponym (Wu 1985: 296).

The Manchus as Ethnographic Subject

This selective review amply illustrates the point that Qing *biji* contain a wealth of information on Manchu institutions, historical personalities, folklore, and language. Further examples could easily be produced, especially if one were to include Xu Ke's encyclopedic *Qingbai leichao*, compiled in the early Republic and published in 1917. Because it appeared after the fall of the Qing, I have chosen to exclude it from this discussion, even though much of the ethnographic information there pertains to the Qing. But this important work deserves at least one comment concerning the presentation of material on the Manchus, which is that the Eight Banners is treated as a geographic designation, and banner practices are described alongside those of the Miao, Tibetans, Taiwanese, Cantonese, and Sichuanese. At this point—that is, in the immediate post-Qing period—it is clear not only that the categories of "Manchu" and "bannerman" have become interchangeable but also that Manchus have firmly entered the same epistemological realm as that inhabited by other non-Han members of the empire they used to rule. That the information in *Qingbai leichao* does not look so different from that in nineteenth-century *biji* shows how thin the line separating the two was.

Granting that *biji* hold rich rewards for the historian patient enough to sift through them, the question arises How do we interpret the ethnographic data so mined? What do we do with this apparently random trivia? It is not just that by their very nature *biji* do not offer much in-depth coverage. The incompleteness of the informal glimpses they provide us are supplemented easily enough today by other information from official Qing publications, the archives, and other sources. The problem I have in mind is the one mentioned at the outset, namely, that in the Qing, people were not free to write what they wanted to about the Manchus. Whatever was said or written about them publicly was uttered within a confining discourse wherein Qing legitimacy was potentially always perceived as being under threat. The result is that any information regarding the Manchus that was published in the Qing must be considered "suspect," at least in the sense that it should be compared to other information that was left unsaid, unwritten, or unpublished, in order to determine what, if any, influence the possibility of unpleasant repercussions from the authorities had upon an author's choices. For this reason, however plentiful the information on the Manchus in Qing *biji*, one can hardly conclude that its use is unproblematic. Inasmuch as *biji* ethnographers weighed carefully what they said, we, as historians, must act carefully when reading these sources. To sort out some of these issues, I would like to conclude with some brief thoughts on this interpretive problem and the associated question of the Manchus as the subject of broad ethnographic interest in the Qing.

It is typically held that history and ethnography are very distinct sorts of endeavors, that historians interpret pasts and that ethnographers interpret cultures. In this vein, Talal Asad has likened the contrast in approach as one in which "the historian is *given* a text and the ethnographer has to *construct* one," that the historian works with texts that "are a primary datum in relation to which the social contexts must be reconstructed," whereas the anthropologist must reconstruct the "cultural significance" of things said within a given social situation (Asad 1986: 144). While there is certainly something to this, I think Asad oversimplifies the relationship between the historian and the text. No text, even if it may be considered a primary datum, can be approached outside the social context in which it was created. Before proceeding to an analysis of its content, the historian must always spend some time first playing the ethnographer, reconstructing the process through which the text was produced. Only then is he or she in a position to properly evaluate the text and the information it holds. Thus it would seem that, as John and Jean Comaroff have written, it is best not to exaggerate the differences between history and ethnography, particularly not when it comes to the anthropology of empire, when ideology and hegemony are so much at stake. Though their concerns are with the English in South Africa, what they say about "locating fragments" seems to apply well to the concerns I have expressed above with regard to the Manchus in China:

> A historical ethnography, then, must begin by constructing its own archive. It cannot content itself with established canons of documentary evidence, because these are themselves part of the culture—as much the subject as the means of inquiry. As anthropologists, therefore, we must work both in and outside the official record, both with and beyond the guardians of memory in the societies we study. In order to reconstruct the annals of a cultural imagination, moreover, we have to operate with a working theory not merely of the social world, but also of the role of inscriptions of various kinds in the making of ideology and argument. For only then can we situate individual expressions and signifying practices within a wider field of representation. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 34)

Substituting "historians" for "anthropologists" in the preceding passage, I believe we arrive at a good approximation of the problem facing the historian of the Manchu Qing. Let me offer an illustration by examining what is said (and unsaid) about the Manchus in these *biji* by asking what image of the Manchus would emerge if these were our sole source of information. I think it would be a strange image indeed. For one thing, the only *biji* that actually dares narrate the early history of the Manchus and their origins in the Northeast in any detail is *Tingyu congtan.* Of course, this book appeared after Wei Yuan's *Shengwu ji* (first published 1831). Amounting to an announcement that early Manchu history was now a safe topic, the appearance of *Shengwu ji* may well have served as a source for much of what Fu-ge wrote. Still, apart from *Beiyou lu,* which was never printed in the Qing, references to the Manchus' non-Chinese roots are few. Even the normally adventurous *Yangjizhai conglu* avoids this subject in its discussion of the formation of the banner system. One might be forgiven for thinking the Manchus were some ancient proto-Chinese "tribe" brought miraculously forward from an earlier age. As we have seen, many references to Manchu customs, religious rites in particular, are contextualized as being similar to "ancient rituals," meaning older Chinese practices—as though the Manchus had acquired their entire cultural vocabulary from China, and their practices, though sometimes at variance with current customs among the Han, were actually "orthodox" when seen from a telescopic perspective that went back two millennia.

Yet if at first glance it appears that Qing *biji* portray the Manchus as somehow "essentially" Chinese, a second reading reveals significant dissonances in such a picture, the most obvious being the many comments on Manchu language. This is where we need to reimagine the Qing cultural context. A couple of things stand out. One is that even though many Manchus had ceased to speak the language by the time the majority of these *biji* were written, this did not prevent them from identifying with, and being identified with, a language that was totally distinct from Chinese, It is well known that the Qianlong emperor did his best to raise language to the level of cultural icon, and usually this effort is dismissed as a failure. But the degree of attention to Manchu language and vocabulary in the *biji,* especially by Han authors, bespeaks both a deep curiosity about Manchu and the attribution of the language as a meaningful ethnic marker. Apart from this, their preoccupation with words and names—not surprising, given the importance of the written word in the Chinese tradition—allows us to see in a very literal sense how difficult it could be to come to terms with the underlying foreignness of the Manchus. Faced with a Manchu shamanic prayer, rather than translate its (admittedly obscure) meaning, Wu Zhenyu opts instead to emphasize its strangeness by phonetically reproducing the text he has found in Chinese characters. The message to the reader is almost subversive: Who are these Manchus? What are they saying?

For these reasons I would argue that Qing *biji,* while a fruitful source for historical work on the Manchus, need to be read as ethnographic texts. When we read them so, not only do we become more sensitive to silences and omissions, but we also gain a more complete understanding, not just of the Manchus but also of the consciousness of elite Qing society in general. For as these examples show, below their smooth antiquarian surface, *biji* harbor a valuable subtext of commentary on contemporary society and politics. Bannermen authors used *biji* as a way to recall the glory of their ancestors' deeds and to reassert their separate identity within the realm.

Han Chinese authors recorded in *biji* an image of their imperial masters as acculturated Others, heirs to a history and culture that was at once familiar and strange. None of this was patently offensive—one assumes that self-censorship was widely practiced in the Qing—but some of it was, at a minimum, exoticizing. They were able to do this because they operated below the radar screen of official censorship. *Biji*, as mentioned, were regarded as "History Lite." Lacking the epistemological authority of History (*shi*) properly conceived, the scholarly merit of jottings literature was deemed to be not very high in the first place, and so such books were not seen even as worth suppressing. For the historian, this has to be regarded as a rare lucky break.

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■ Source: Bischoff, Friedrich A., 'On the Chinese version of some Manchu imperial titles', in *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. 51, Nos. 1–2, (1998) pp. 55–61.

ON THE CHINESE VERSION OF SOME MANCHU IMPERIAL TITLES

Friedrich A. Bischoff

Hinweis auf den Nachteil, welcher der Sinologie daraus erwächst, daß nur sehr wenige von uns Sinologen sich heute in die glückliche Lage bemühen, Mandschurisch zu können. Exempel: die in der Korrespondenz mit dem Jebtsun Damba Hutukhtu verwendete kaiserliche Titulatur. Gegenüberstellung der traditionell-chinesischen kaiserlichen Verfassung und der mandschurischen. Hiebei fällt auf, daß letztere den Titel "Himmelssohn" nicht kennt—anscheinend—u.z. trotz Wahrnehmung der mit ihm verbundenen Funktionen und Charismen. Zur Veranschaulichung: eingehende Analyse der Ehrentitel des Nurhaci aus dem Jahre 1616, und derer des Abahai aus dem Jahre 1636. Versuch einer Erklärung.

When a non-Manchurist attacks a Manchu problem, it certainly calls for a word of apology and perhaps also for a word of explanation.

My Word of Apology

For a long time already, but, more recently, *zu gegebenem Anlaß*. I was bothered by the obvious inadequacy of some renderings into Western languages: in particular, those Manchus of the dynasty Daicing / T'ai^{4} Ts'ing^{1} 大清 were certainly not Chinese Emperors: they were Manchu Emperors; nor were they Emperors of China: China was part of their empire. And I also would hesitate to call their government a Chinese government, since it was headed and dominated by Manchus and used Manchu as its official language. As for the relations with the non-Chinese nations that were attached to the dynasty by various links—family, alliance, student-teacher relation, or any sort of vassalage—they were, as it seems, emphatically Manchu, as no Chinese was ever appointed as an Amban, nor, quite generally, to serve in the Li^{2} fan^{2} yüan^{4} 釐蕃院 as it is quite normally referred to in Western scholarship: the more correct reference would rather be in Manchu, *tulergi golo be dasara yamun* = *"Außen-Provinzen (acc.) verwaltender Yamen"*.[1] Hence it was my feeling that a more thorough distinction ought to be made between what could be called Chinese and what clearly ought to be called Manchu.

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[1] This original Manchu designation appears to be shunned by Western authors: I found it mentioned nowhere; only during the convention it was kindly indicated to me by my

My Word of Explanation

My optimism concerning an easy attainment of a clearer distinction was shattered recently. Lecturing on the history of the *Jebtsun Damba Hutukhtu*'s I noticed that the Emperor refers to his grandfather and to his father as *qaγan ebüge ecige* and *qaγan ecige*;

– that he himself is referred to as the *boγdo qaγan*;

– and that, when appointing the *boγdo gegen*, he starts his diploma with the words: *tengri yin boshuγ-iyar caγ-yi ejelegsen qo̩ngdi yin jarliγ*. "Words of the *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4} 皇帝 who, by mandate of Heaven, holds dominion over time."[2] Now, what are the problems?

Problem 1: Why is the author of the diploma styled as a *qo̩ngdi / huang*^{2} *ti*^{4}?

Problem 2: Why in Chinese? Evidently *qo̩ngdi / huang*^{2} *ti*^{4} is but the equivalent of *boγdo qaγan*—when on the other hand the "mandate of Heaven", in Chinese 天命 *t'ien*^{1} *ming*^{4} is rendered in translation *tengri yin boshuγ*.

Problem 3: What title is *caγ-yi ejelegsen*? According to *Sumatiratna* it equals the Tibetan *dus-kyi dbang-po* (p. 1006 c; absent from the *Mahâvyutpatti*); and thus appears to correspond to Chinese *shih*^{2} *chün*^{1} or *shih*^{2} *chu*^{3} 時君, or 時主 but these are not titles: just expressions applying to a leisurely lifestyle (*Morohashi*, 5. 13890. 128 and 221).

If now a guess is allowed, I would interpret this "lord of time" as referring to the paramount function of the Son-of-Heaven *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3} 天子, that consists in issuing the calendar; besides, securing by means of appropriate rituals a proper change of the seasons. Well, but if allusion is made to such cosmic powers, why is the proper title. Son-of-Heaven, not quoted?

Searching for solutions, I referred myself to the *Huang Ts'ing k'ai kuo fang lüeh* 皇清開國方略 (trad. Erich Hauer), a work of top-class propaganda—*so richtig Edelpropaganda!*—in which K'ien-lung shows us how he wants history to be interpreted. And there I found that, indeed, the

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esteemed colleague, Professor Dr. Stary. Its rendering as "Court of Colonial Affairs", as done by Jerry Norman, *Manchu-English Dictionary*, Taipei 1967, p. 402a, is one of those intellectual short-circuits against which serious scholarship ought to react.

[2] Pozdneyev, A., *Mongolia & the Mongols*, Bloomington 1971. I, pp. 216, 217, 218, 375 respectively.

title *t'ien*^{1}*-tzi*^{3} was not used: wherever I would have expected to find this title, it was not mentioned. Only once did I find this title mentioned, namely in the mouth of a Chinese, a spurious Ming official, and referring to the Ming emperor.[3] Now, if the T'ai Ts'ing dynasty did not use the title *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3}, this would mean that they had not adopted the Chinese imperial constitution at all.

The Chinese Imperial Constitution

Given its importance for subsequent dynasties, we may consider the T'ang system of imperial titles as the classical one. It also presents the advantage of being well defined and accessible, as it is outlined in the *T'ang hui yao* 唐會要.[4]

According to this system, Heaven confers its mandate *t'ien*^{1} *ming*^{4} to a person which, by this very fact, is endowed with two titles:

§ he is "Son-of-Heaven" 天子 *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3};

§ and he is *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4} 皇帝, which we may translate as "August-Sovereign".

To each of these two titles corresponds a function, namely:

§ as Son-of-Heaven he rules over the Universe *t'ien*^{1} *hia*^{4} 天下 "underneath the sky/Heaven",

§ as August-Sovereign he governs the *chung*^{1} *kuo*$^{2.5}$ 中國 "the Realm of the Middle".

Now, this *chung*^{1} *kuo*$^{2.5}$ which, in Chinese terminology, comprises "the 9 Provinces" of Yü-the-Great, and which we may call adequately "China proper", this *chung*^{1} *kuo*$^{2.5}$ takes the name of the ruling dynasty. Hence, in the days of the T'ang dynasty, it was called the T'ang (and for the Japanese this remained the name of China to the present day); and in order to distinguish the dynasty from its territory, the dynasty was prefixed with the honorific *ta/t'ai* 大, hence:

§ *ta*^{4}*/t'ai*^{4} *T'ang*^{2} = the T'ang dynasty;

§ *T'ang*^{2} = the Realm of the Middle as governed by the *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4}, the August-Sovereigns of that dynasty.

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[3] *Loco*, p. 55: the trivial event of Nurhaci refusing to honor the customary honey tribute, thus starting the hostilites which by and by led to the conquest of China.

[4] Cf. F.A. Bischoff, L'empereur de Chine, essai sur sa situation juridique, selon le point de vue de la dynastie des T'ang, *Collectanea mongolica = Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Rintchen, Asiatische Forschungen* Band 17. pp. 21–28.

Whereas—at least at T'ang times—the *t'ien*^{1} *hia*^{4}, the Universe, was a rather fictitious thing, and the function of the *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3} mainly of a ritual, religious order; the T'ang, meaning "the Realm of the Middle", and the ruling *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4} acted like what we may call a normal sovereign country, and a normal sovereign ruler: able to sign international treaties, and to define State boundaries—as done for instance, in 783, with the King of Tibet (whatever his titles were) when the *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4}, as a sovereign, concluded with another sovereign a peace treaty and defined a boundary line between two independant countries... a thing that would have been impossible for the *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3}: logically, for, as the cosmic ruler, the *t'ien*^{1}*-tzî*^{3} can only dictate his will, approve or disapprove of a fact; but he cannot negotiate alliances or sign treaties with any other ruler on a basis of equality.

The Manchu Imperial Constitution

First, all the huge empire the Manchus had conquered, the entire realm, was called in Chinese 大清國 *T'ai*^{4} *Ts'ing*^{1} *kuo*$^{2\text{-}5}$, *"the Land of the Extremely pure one's"* and China proper (the so called "Nine Provinces"), was called *chung*^{1} *kuo*$^{2\text{-}5}$ "the Middle Kingdom".

Now, it is noteworthy that the *T'ang hui yao* does not say a word on Heaven's choice. Nurhaci, on the contrary, is reported time and again (one would say, constantly) to point to his virtue, meaning to his moral integrity, by which he pleased Heaven. And for that, Heaven gave him success, military and political success; and we are left to understand that success was for Nurhaci and his imperial descendants the obvious sign for his having obtained the Heavenly mandate. Success, now precisely: Heavenly granted success, is presented as the only source of legitimacy of power. One could have expected Chinggis khan to show up in this context; but, as far as I could see, he is mentioned nowhere;[5] nor is any mentioning made of the Tungus Kin dynasty—which is really odd since for 20 years, from 1616 till 1636, Nurhaci had taken it as his dynastic antecedent, before Abahai resorted to that ingenious pun of Daicing / T'ai Ts'ing: "the Dynasty of warriors" to flatter Manchus and Mongols; of "the Extremely Pure ones" to please the Chinese (p. 608, n. 5). And let us note a further infraction to the Chinese tradition: As opposed to all the other dynasties, T'ang, Sung, Yüan, Ming, the Manchu Dynasty is properly called T'ai Ts'ing, namely Daicing—and not just Ts'ing. And the dynasty owes its fortune to Heaven alone, to Heaven rewarding the moral value of Nurhaci: There are no antecedents, no inheritance, and Fairy Fekulen pregnant with eating the red berry which a magpie had dropped into her lap, I would interpret this legend as an effort to discourage any burdensome claim that could arise from former vassalage, perhaps, or from unwelcome consanguinity. The fact that other dynasties had claimed similar ancestries (in the east and—incidentally—in the west as well) makes the method politically all the more acceptable.[6]

The obtention of the Heavenly Mandate brings us to the year 1616 and the exaltation of Nurhaci (p. 58). At that occasion Nurhaci acknowleged reception of the Heavenly Mandate by proclaiming his dynasty's first reign title: 天命 *t'ien*^{1} *ming*^{4} (this period lasting from 1616 till Nurhaci's death 1626). This move is absolutely unique in Chinese imperial history; but precisely: Nurhaci was Manchu, not Chinese! At the same time he accepted the oath of allegiance of the boyars and magnate of the Manchus and of the Mongols, and the honorific title *fu*$^{2.5}$ *yü*$^{4.5}$ *lieh*$^{4.5}$*-kuo*$^{2.5}$ *ying*^{1}*-ming*^{2} *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4} 覆育。列國。英明。皇帝.

Now, I sorrily ignore the original Manchu and/or Mongolian versions of this title, but its Chinese form is most interesting:

§ Nurhaci is *a huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4}, whatever that may be: leave it out for the moment!

§ This *huang*^{2}*-ti*^{4} is said to be endowed with a *ying*^{1}*-ming*^{2}, literally a "flower vision": it is properly "the little boy (Latin: *pupus*) to be seen in the *pupilla*"; and to be endowed with a *pupus* is sign of transcendental intelligence (*Morohashi*, 9. 30808. 170). But moreover, as a very obvious graphic pun, it also means "to terminate the Ming" dynasty (read 英 as 央 *yang^{1}*).

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[5] A footnote to Prof. Sagaster's and my article on the *Zaubersiegel* of Chinggis khan (*Gedanke und Wirkung, Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Nikolaus Poppe*, Wiesbaden 1989, pp. 38ff):

The *Huang Ts'ing k'ai kuo fang lüeh* (pp. 383–384, 390) gives us still one more, but no less fantastic, version of the seal's invention and identity: This seal had been, from Han times on, handed down from dynasty to dynasty, until it came into the possession of Yüan. After 1368, when the Ming had driven the Yüan back to Mongolia, the seal got lost in Mongolia for a period of 200 years at the end of which it was miraculously invented by a goat. Finally it became part of the booty taken (AD 1635) from Ligdan Khan. Its obtainment was interpreted as tracing the line of succession of imperial dynasties from the Yüan directly to the Daicing, while bypassing the Ming dynasty; it was valued as a divine portent heralding the imperial proclamation of 1636 at Mukden. Oddly enough, the seal's inscription shows the object as being one of the 25 ordinary seals of the imperial chancelry—hence, nothing special, it would seem! Notice that according to this version the seal did never belong to Chinggis Khan, has nothing to do with him.

[6] *Loco*, p. 1; cf. Käthe Uray-Kőhalmi, Vom Sippenkult bis zum Staatskult, *Islamkundliche Untersuchungen*, vol. 185, 1994, p. 322.

§ This *huang^{2}-ti^{4}* with a *pupus* in the eye (and about to terminate the rule of the Ming dynasty) is said to cause *fu$^{2\cdot5}$* and *yü$^{4\cdot5}$*, namely the fecund "covering" done by Heaven, and "the uterine developing of the foetus" done by the Earth. The binome is taken from the *Li ki* 禮記 (trad. Couvreur, II. p. 83–84): the passage enumerates the blessings of natural fecundity elicited by the action of a "Great man" *ta^{4} jen^{2}* 大人 who governs by means of "ritual and music", *li^{3}* and *yo$^{4.5}$* 禮樂: a sign, obviously, that the heavenly mandate had been granted.

§ All right. But the great man who, by Heavenly Mandate elicits general prosperity, he is at present the *huang^{2}-ti^{4}* only of a "principalty", of a *lieh$^{4\cdot5}$-kuo$^{2\cdot5}$*: another *Li ki* quotation (t. C., I. p. 95). Now, *a lieh$^{4\cdot5}$-kuo$^{2\cdot5}$* literally "a well ordered realm", is governed by a *t'ai^{4} fu^{1}* 大夫, by a "chieftain" (not even by a king) and—most important!—a *lieh$^{4\cdot5}$-kuo$^{2\cdot5}$* is not part of the realm of the Son-of-Heaven *t'ien^{1}-tzî^{3} chih kuo$^{2\cdot5}$* 天子之國. However, a Son-of-Heaven does exist, is still in existence, but the *lieh$^{4\cdot5}$-kuo$^{2\cdot5}$* is not part of his realm.

It's really amazing how accurately, how realistically Nurhaci's position of 1616 is defined by these *Li ki* quotations! And by the same token it is also obvious that the title *huang^{2}-ti^{4}* means presently something totally different from what it had meant in the *T'ang hui yao* (namely the sovereign Head of State of the *chung^{1} kuo$^{2\cdot5}$*): in 1616 *Huang^{2}-ti^{4}* had become a Manchu-Mongol title, namely *boqdo qaγan*, designating a mighty overlord endowed with Heaven's blessing. And now it is interesting to observe that this "Overlord with the pupus" in his eyes proves unable to negotiate treaties and conclude alliances. When the boyars of the Qalqa Mongols ask for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and mutual defence, Nurhaci does not receive them in person: he puts five Manchu magnates in charge of meeting their Qalqa homologues and of performing with them the appropriate ceremonies (pp. 93–94).

If we now compare Nurhaci's title of 1616 with that of Abahai, 20 years later, of the imperial proclamation of 1636, the change of tone is obvious. The title reads *k'uan^{1}-wen^{1} jen^{2}-sheng^{4} huang^{2}-ti^{4}* 寬温。仁聖。皇帝 [18].

§ In this title *k'uan^{1}-wen^{1}* has replaced *fu$^{2\cdot5}$ yü$^{4\cdot5}$; jen^{2}-sheng^{4}* has replaced *ying^{1}-ming^{2}*; and the *lieh$^{4\cdot5}$-kuo$^{2\cdot5}$* was dropped altogether, quite logically so.

§ Now Abahai is said to be no longer endowed with a *pupus*, token of superior intelligence, he is at present endowed with "gentleness and wisdom", quoted from the *Li ki* (*t.* C., II. p. 355). It says: "*In the imperial hall of audiences he rules with gentleness and wisdom*". Who? In the *Li ki* it is the Son-of-Heaven. This is indeed the great passage that defines the Son-of-Heaven: "*The Son-of-Heaven constitutes with Heaven and Earth a society of three; he unites his action to that of Heaven and Earth and extends his blessings to all beings... within the four seas.*" &c. Notice: the universalistic, the cosmic prerogatives of the *T'ien-tzî* are claimed without the title being mentioned.

§ As for *k'uan^{1}-wen^{1}*, "magnanimity and mildness", they are part of Conficius' own charisma, one more quotation from the *Li ki* (*t.* C., II. p. 474), and presented there as prerequisite for governing "under Heaven": once again the prerogative of the Son-of-Heaven is claimed without the title being mentioned.

Note this interesting detail of protocol: Abahai's attribute *of jen^{2}-sheng^{4}*, by eliciting cosmic blessings, resumes, but on a higher level, the cosmic blessings elicited by *fu$^{2\cdot5}$-yü$^{4\cdot5}$*, the attribute of Nurhaci; and both *fu$^{2\cdot5}$* and *yü$^{4\cdot5}$* are mentioned (though separately, not in combination) in the paragraph that precedes the mentioning of *k'uan^{1}-wen^{1}*: expression of the deference of Abahai for his father, the great Nurhaci.

Not only the imperial attributes of "gentleness and wisdom" and of "mildness and magnanimity", also the presentation and worshiping of the 8 Imperial seals (the same number as of the *T'ang hui yao*) characterizes the ceremony of 1634 as a proclamation of the universal Empire. This, or a similar, ceremony will not be repeated in 1644 when Fu-lin enters Yenking.[7] The ceremony then performed is simply a "setting up of the

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[7] Fulin * announcing to Heaven and Earth the "setting up of the tripods" at Yenking ° and the incipient invasion of China proper:

"*Since presently the luck of the Ming has come to a close, since robbers and rebels are flying out like swarms of bees* (a most Manchurian image! see above note 3), *and people perish in misery, and the Realm of the Middle has no lord...*" he is now setting out to conquer it "*...so that the Realm of the Middle be pacified.*"

Notice: the Realm of the Middle (= China proper): not the Universe *t'ien hia*! the word is not used.

*) This son of Abahai was precocious: he ascends the throne in 1643 at the age of 5/6; fathers the future emperor K'ang hsi at the age 13/14; dies in 1661 aged of 23. K'ang hsi ascends the throne at the age of 10. Meaning: for those crucial 30 years of the conquest of China proper, there was the regency of uncles. What an admirable family discipline!

°) Yen^{1} ching^{1} 燕京 was the name of the Yüan Capital: "the Capital city in/of Yen" (yen^{4}, "the swallow"; yen^{1}, a geographical name). It was re-named 北京 Po$^{4.5}$ ching^{1}, "Northern Capital", by the Ming when they chose it as their Residence. It is not quite clear, but it appears likely: in the official Manchu terminology the city kept its name Yen ching throughout the Ming Dynasty. Anyway, by act of Fulin's proclamation it became the "Northern Capital", this time of the 大清國 T' ai^{4} Ts'ing^{1} kuo$^{2-5}$—while Mukden, "the tripods" meaning, the designation of a new imperial residence (*Tso chuan*, t. Legge, pp. 292–293).

Let me close my discussion of the Chinese version of Manchu imperial titles by quoting K'ang Hsi's own words at the beginning of his *Huang Ts'ing k'ai kuo fang lüeh* (p. XXIII): "*All the dynasties that have governed the Realm of the Middle have risen up front a position of subject. Only the Yüan who originated in the Northern Desert, and the T'ai Ts'ing who originated at the shores of the Eastern Sea, have never been related to the Realm of the Middle. Although we did occasionally accept some titles of the Ming, these titles were—all things considered—but ornaments appended to the name, and nothing else.*"

Here we may find the answer to why the title of Son-of-Heaven could not be accepted: it would have made the Manchu and Mongol forefathers subject of the previous Sons-of-Heaven. No: in the opinion of the Manchu dynasty, its universalist claim rests solely upon success and the personal prestige of the Emperors—the *huang*^{2}-*ti*^{4} or *boγdo qaγan*—or however one wishes to call them.

But why the diplomas of appointment of the *Jebcundamba Qutuktu*'s were using the Chinese form, I still do not know.

Flourishing Capital" in Manchu, was named in Chinese 盛京 Sheng^{4} ching^{1}, the "Flourishing" or "the Main Capital".

■ Source: Elliott, Mark C., 'Bannerman and Townsman: Ethnic tension in nineteenth-century Jiangnan', in *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (June 1990), © 1990 by the Society for Qing Studies, reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 36–74.

BANNERMAN AND TOWNSMAN: ETHNIC TENSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JIANGNAN*

Mark Elliott

Introduction

Anyone lucky enough on the morning of July 21, 1842, to escape the twenty-foot high, four-mile long walls surrounding the city of Zhenjiang would have beheld a depressing spectacle: the fall of the city to foreign invaders. Standing on a hill, looking northward across the city toward the Yangzi, he might have decried the masts of more than seventy British ships anchored in a thick nest on the river, or perhaps have noticed the strange shapes of the four armored steamships that, contrary to expectations, had successfully penetrated the treacherous lower stretches of China's main waterway. Might have seen this, indeed, except that his view most likely would have been screened by the black clouds of smoke swirling up from one, then two, then three of the city's five gates, as fire spread to the guard-towers atop them. His ears dinned by the report of rifle and musket fire and the roar of cannon and rockets, he would scarcely have heard the sounds of panic as townsmen, including his own relatives and friends, screamed to be allowed to leave the city, whose gates had been held shut since the week before by order of the commander of the Zhenjiang banner garrison. Yet above even this tumult, he could not have missed the sound of the three explosions that shook the ground when British miners blew up the western gate; and he could only watch as hundreds of red-coated soldiers overran the city. By now it would be midday, and the sun, already extremely hot earlier in the morning, would have been burning directly overhead, forcing him to seek the shade. An hour or so later, however, the sound of gunfire off in the distance would draw him back to witness a last, desperate street skirmish between bannermen and British troops. The defenders were soon overpowered, ending all hopes of saving the city, and the observer, now a refugee, would have had no choice but to set off and seek haven in the countryside.[1] Had he remained inside the city, he would have witnessed even more terrible scenes, particularly in the garrison compound where the bannermen and their dependents resided. Within its walled confines, men cut the throats of their wives and children before falling upon their swords or rushing off to meet the enemy and death. One after another, entire families jumped down wells, took poison, or hanged themselves, rather than face defeat and disgrace.[2]

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* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Manchu Studies (*Manzokushi kenkyûkai*) at Meiji University, Tokyo, in November 1988. For their criticism and suggestions regarding the manuscript at various stages, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Pamela Crossley, Nicola Di Cosmo, John Fincher, Linda Grove, David Keightley, Okada Hidehiro, R. Bin Wong, and my advisor, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., as well as the anonymous referees of *Late Imperial China*; I have also received valuable help from Professor Gene Irschick of the University of California, Berkeley. Discussions with Hosoya Yoshio, Ishibashi Takao, Kanda Nobuo, Matsumura Jun, and Nakami Tatsuo, all of the Tôyô Bunko Seminar on Manchu Studies, and with Chuang Chi-fa of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, have been very stimulating. Research for this article was carried out with the generous support of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Japanese Ministry of Education (Monbushô), and with the cooperation of, in Japan, the staffs of the Tôyô Bunko, the Seikadô Bunko, and the libraries of the Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and the East Asia Research Institute of the University of Tokyo; in Taiwan, the National Palace Museum Archives and the National Central Library; and in the United States, the Library of Congress. To them my grateful appreciation.

The fall of Zhenjiang was significant most obviously because it meant the Opium War was nearing an end. Though the Qing empire finally put together a respectable defense,[3] the garrison troops ended up surrendering the city just the same after only half a day's fighting, leaving an even more vital spot—Nanjing, forty-five miles upriver—vulnerable to attack. While prior to the Zhenjiang drama the court had been determined to resist the foreigners no matter the cost, after this disaster, further such thoughts

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[1] This "observer's" account draws on Zhu Shiyun, *Caojian riji* (Diary from the Grass Room) (1852): reprinted in *Yapian zhamheng* (*YPZZ*) (The Opium War), 6 vols., Qi Sihe et al., eds. Shanghai, 1954, 3:75–92. Zhu's memoir is the basis for Part IV of Arthur Waley, *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*, 1958.

[2] W.D. Bernard and W.H. Hall, *Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis*, Second ed. London, 1845, 384, 430–431; John Ouchterlony, *The Chinese War: An Account of all the Operations of the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty of Nanking*. London, 1844: 390, 395–398.

[3] The British, who in the entire course of their "China campaign" had met with virtually no serious organized resistance, were full of praise for the bravery and fighting ability of the enemy at Zhenjiang. The banner troops defending the walls, observed one of the British, kept up a "steady and well-directed fire," offering a "cool and determined," "inch-by-inch" resistance. He concluded further that if among the enemy there had been any acquaintance with modern weapons and military science, the taking of the city would have been nearly impossible. Ouchterlony, 367–373, 401–403.

Zhenjiang and the Jingkou Garrison


Gate to City
Gate to City
Training Grounds for Banner Soldiers
Gate to City
Gate to Garrison Compound
Gate to Garrison Compound
Jingkou Banner Garrison (walled compound)
Gate to Garrison Compound
Gate to Garrison Compound
Headquarters of Garrison General
Training Grounds for Banner Soldiers
Zhenjiang (Chinese Walled City)
Gate to City
Gate to Garrison Compound
Gate to Garrison Compound
Gate to Garrison Compound
Gate to City

Source: *Dantuxian zhi, juan* a:6b–7a (1877).

became unrealistic. One might well say that the Treaty of Nanjing, the first of the "unequal treaties," was decided by the loss of Zhenjiang, and it is in this context, as one chapter of the Opium War, that the fall of Zhenjiang has typically been portrayed.

In the present study we approach the events at Zhenjiang from a different angle. Locating the city within the Qing provincial Eight Banner garrison network, we use memoirs, official records, and archival materials to anatomize the situation that developed *inside the city* during the period immediately preceding the British attack. We follow the Manchu garrison commander's hunt for traitors and the terror of mass arrests, which led to the collapse of civil authority, the implementation of martial law, and, ultimately, to the total deterioration of relations between the people of the city (who were Han Chinese) and the soldiers of the banner garrison (who were not). The aims here are three: first, by examining both the history of the Zhenjiang garrison as well as the events and personalities of 1842, we endeavor to explore local-level relations between bannermen and Han Chinese at various points during the Qing period, a relationship about which we know little, but which stands out as one particularly "Qing" element of the late imperial social landscape. This, plus a survey of the unusual historiography concerning the city's fall, will, it is hoped, shed light on the status of urban banner garrisons as well as on the problem of ethnic tension in the Qing, a problem, as I attempt to show, which persisted throughout the dynasty. Finally, the paper seeks to question traditional concepts of ethnicity and assimilation and to propose new ways of addressing these problems during the Qing. As the ruling dynasty was forever sensitive about its image, materials on some of these issues are scarce. Secondary literature on the garrisons, furthermore, is virtually nonexistent.[4] If this essay raises more questions than it manages to answer, it will at least have pointed to an approach to Qing history that, despite many successes at writing the history of China from a Chinese perspective, has still largely eluded Western historians: Qing history from a "Qing" perspective.

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[4] Pamela Kyle Crossley's *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton 1990), offers much insight into this subject and the subject of the Eight Banners generally. I am grateful to Professor Crossley for the opportunity to examine parts of her manuscript as I revised the present article.

Tacking Down the Corners: Zhenjiang and the Jingkou Garrison

Martial prowess was without question a central strength of the early Manchu (Jurched) nation, and until the mid-nineteenth century remained one of the outstanding characteristics of Qing rule. One of the pillars of this strength was of course the Eight Banners (*baqi; jakûn gûsa*), the military/civil bureaucracy unique to the Qing, which formally governed nearly all aspects of life for the Manchus, Mongols, and *Hanjun* enrolled in its lists.[5] Originally intended as the basis for an efficient mounted corps, after the Qing conquest of China, the Eight Banners served to protect the emperor and the capital, defend the Manchu homeland, and to provide the dynasty with a military presence in the provinces through the maintenance of garrisons (*zhufang ying; seremseme tehe ba, tebunehe ba*)[6] at numerous strategic locations. Though at first a temporary measure,[7] the garrison system gradually acquired *de facto* permanent status, and by the middle 1700s banner garrisons had been established at eighteen cities around the provinces. The largest garrisons, averaging a force of 2770 men, were in Jiangnan, along the southeast coast, and at Xi'an. Those in the capital region, where they provided an outer defensive perimeter, were numerous but relatively small, at only 150 soldiers each.[8] Besides functioning as a ready military force in case of unrest in some far corner of the empire,[9] the bannermen assigned to duty in the garrisons represented central authority at the regional and local levels: "Sending Manchu soldiers to garrison provincial cities was originally intended to awe and pacify those areas," explains one 1744 edict in retrospect.[10] As the Eight Banners was the kind of idiosyncratic organization particular to "dynasties of conquest," the garrisons could symbolize the dynasty in a way that the civil bureaucracy could not. The garrisons thus played a special role in the consolidation of the conquest.

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[5] There exists a vast literature on the Eight Banner system in Chinese and Japanese. Two basic works are Meng Sen, "Baqi zhidu kaoshi" (1936) and Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchô zenshi no kenkyû* (1965). In English the most complete treatment is in Wu Wei-p'ing, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners" (1969). See also Pamela Crossley, *Orphan Warriors* (1990); Frederic Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise* (1985); and the first chapter of Jonathan Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor* (1966).

[6] Manchu terminology here is taken from *Hesei toktubuha jakûn gûsai kooli hacin-i bithe* (Statutes and Precedents of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained) 12 *juan* Laiboo et al., eds. (1769).

[7] Im 1981: 12–13, 66.

[8] *Qinding Da Qing huidian* (*DQHD*) (Collected Institutes of the Qing), 100 *juan* (1764): *juan* 96. Location and size varied, but the major posts were at Chengdu, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Jingzhou, Nanjing, Qingzhou, Suiyuan, Xi'an, Zhapu, and Zhenjiang. Overall, in the intramural garrisons, there were roughly 60,000 bannermen, or more than half of the total 107,000 bannermen stationed at all garrison locations across the empire (Sutô 1940: 196–197). The rest of the banner forces, numbering slightly over 100,000, were quartered in Beijing.

[9] Zhaolian, *Xiaoting zalu* (Miscellaneous Notes from the Whistling Bamboo Pavilion) (1880): 10, "Zhufang." Banner garrison troops were often on campaign during the Shunzhi and Kangxi reigns.

A banner garrison was first established at Zhenjiang in 1655 in response to the need to strengthen defenses against Ming loyalist forces. This location was protected by the shallow, shoal-filled passage of the lower Yangzi, yet it was still conveniently close to the river mouth and the sea. The founding edict reads in part,

> As Jingkou is a vital place . . . you must keep the soldiers and horses in good order and enforce strict discipline. You are to apprehend any pirates and lead your troops to vigorously exterminate and guard against [them]. . . . If the governor requests soldiers, you must decide how to aid in putting [the pirates] down.[11]

The commander of the garrison was titled "General who Pacifies the Seas" (*zhenhai dajiangjun*), an indication of the garrison's maritime orientation. He was assisted by two garrison lieutenant generals (*fudutong; meiren i janggin*), who shared responsibility for the two troop divisions posted to the garrison, each consisting of fifteen hundred Han-martial bannermen (*Hanjun*; in Manchu, *ujen cooha*, "heavy troops," so called because of their artillery expertise). While it is not explicit why *Hanjun* were selected for assignment to Zhenjiang, it appears to have been usual policy in the early Qing to use Han-martial as garrison troops, especially for locations in the southern reaches of the empire.[12]

Since the Warring States period, military encampments had been fixed at Zhenjiang, and the city had figured as a strategic keypoint from the Sui through the Ming, becoming a link in the Ming *weisuo* system.[13] Qing policy makers undoubtedly appreciated its strategic importance since only ten years earlier, in June 1645, Qing armies had, by capturing Zhenjiang, forced the capitulation of Nanjing and the flight of the Prince of Fu, the Ming claimant.[14] The consternation at court must have been great indeed when, in the summer of 1659, troops under Zheng Chenggong overthrew the Jingkou garrison[15] and came very close to taking Nanjing itself before they were repulsed by a combined defense of Eight Banner and Green Standard Army soldiers.[16] Though it failed this first crucial test of strength, the Jingkou garrison was quickly reestablished; its quarters, originally outside the city (on the site of the former Ming commandery training grounds), transferred to within the city walls.[17]

The presence of bannermen within the city after 1659 fulfilled a primary purpose of the garrison system, the reinforcement of Qing political and social control on the local level. This task was one of the biggest challenges facing the early Qing government, especially in Jiangnan, the most prosperous area of the realm. Moreover, Zhenjiang, because of its location at the intersection of the Grand Canal and the Yangzi, played a vital role in the Jiangnan economy. Sometimes metonomized as the "throat" between north and south, the city oversaw shipments of tax grain to the capital; numerous warehouses and wharves lined the banks of both river and canal, and an army of boatmen earned their living piloting craft across the river on up to Yangzhou. Control of the city thus meant a great deal. Fortuitously for the new dynasty, taking over Chinese cities and managing Han populations was nothing new: by the time Zhenjiang banner troops moved into the city from the suburbs, "Manchus"[18] and Han

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[10] "Huangchao bingzhi" (Military Monographs of the Dynasty), National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei (n.d.): ch. 3, "*xunlianmen, junting.*"

[11] *Shizu shilu* (*SZSL*): *Da Qing lichao shilu* (*DQSL*) (The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty), Shizu (Shunzhi) reign (Fengtian [Shenyang]): 1937; reprinted Taipei: Huawen, 1963: 91:15a. No details were given on how the soldiers were supposed to quell piracy from horseback.

[12] *SZSL* 127:15b. The garrisons at Fuzhou and Guangzhou were also manned by *Hanjun*. Manchu and Mongol bannermen were mostly reserved for duty in the capital area and the Northeast, though they did help fill the Hangzhou and Nanjing garrisons. This policy may have been linked to the reliance of the Shunzhi emperor on Han-martial bannermen to staff high provincial offices (Wakeman 1985: 1020–1021). On the *Hanjun* see note 25 below.

[13] *Zhenjiangfu zhi* (*ZJFZ*) (Gazetteer of Zhenjiang Prefecture), 55 *juan*, Zhu Lin et al., eds. (1750): 16:8a, 19b–20a.

[14] Wakeman 1985:570.

[15] In official documents, "Zhenjiang" generally referred to the city as the seat of civilian government, while "Jingkou" was reserved as the name of the military camp within the city.

[16] *SZSL* 127:11a–13b; Luo 1984: 9.

[17] *SZSL* 127:17a; *ZJFZ* 16:26a–b.

[18] In Qing history, the label "Manchu" has long been used loosely to include all who participated as part of Qing military forces in the conquest of the Ming empire. However, as Wakeman points out, after 1631 "one can no longer speak of a war strictly between Chinese and Manchus"; properly speaking, the struggle became one between the "military elite of the northeastern frontier and the Ming court" (Wakeman 1985: 196). The use of the term "Manchu" to denote those who entered Shanhaiguan on May 27, 1644 is therefore misleading. It is furthermore unsatisfactory in that it equates "Manchu" (*Manzhou; Manju*) and "bannerman" (*qiren; gûsai niyalma*). A more accurate use of "Manchu" would restrict its

Chinese had been living together for several decades. One of the lessons of this not-always-happy experience was that the two groups got along best when they kept their distance,[19] and the banner garrisons incorporated this principle in their arrangement. In the case of Zhenjiang, Han-martial troops assumed exclusive occupation of the southwest quarter of town, expelling the Chinese from this part of the city and seizing their homes. They then built a wall, creating an enclosed area that was off limits to Han (Figure 1),[20] much as the Inner City at Beijing was forbidden to Chinese living in the Outer City to the south. Similar occupation of large sections of Nanjing, Hangzhou, Xi'an, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou (though no wall was built here) loomed as tangible reminders of the strength of the new dynasty.

The edict establishing the Jingkou garrison cautioned that, "as before, strictly restrain the troops. They must not behave improperly or steal citizens' belongings. Also, they are not to interfere with or cause damage to agriculture on the pretext of pasturing [their horses]. You must make the soldiery and the populace get along peaceably and avoid bringing hardship to the locality."[21] In issuing such commands, court policymakers clearly anticipated friction between garrison and city. Shi Tingzhu, the first garrison general at Jingkou and the man to whom the above orders were addressed, won the popular eponym "Buddha Shi" because he forbade his men (then still living outside the city walls) to ride their mounts into the city and warned them against disturbing shops or civilians.[22] That

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application only to those bannermen who could trace their ancestry to clans belonging to one of the Jurched tribes inhabiting the Northeast in the Ming, the vast majority of whom were naturally enrolled in the Manchu Eight Banners. This in distinction to bannermen in the Mongol or Han-martial Eight Banners primarily, and Solon, Daghur, Sibe, Korean, and Russian bannermen secondarily. On these classifications, see also Crossley 1990:16ff; I do not accept her view that *qiren* is a late nineteenth-century neologism developed to cover anyone of any banner affiliation (1990: 176). The term is amply attested in earlier (eighteenth century) materials as a general appellation for those in the banners.

[19] Kitamura 1949; Ishibashi 1961; and Roth 1979.

[20] *ZJFZ* 16:26a–b; 27:1b. A less common alternative to this *modus operand* was to build a separate Manchu suburb beyond the walls of the Han city, as was done at Qingzhou in Shan-dong.

[21] *SZSL* 91:15b.

[22] *ZJFZ* 34:33b. Shi (1599–1661), like all garrison generals at Jingkou for the next one hundred years, was a Han-martial bannerman. Despite a Chinese last name, Shi was actually a Manchu of the Gûwalgiya clan, having joined Nurhaci in 1622. He was named commander of one of the two Chinese military detachments formed in 1637, the precusors of the *Hanjun* (*Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao* (Annual Tables of Qing Period Officiais), 4 vols., Qian Shipu, ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980): 2224–2289; *Qingshi liezhuan* (*QSLZ*) (Qing History Biographies), 80 *juan* (Beiping: 1928, reprinted Taipei: 1966): 5:35b; Hummel 1943–1944: 797.

the relationship between the garrison and the city was uneasy from the outset is revealed also by the following passage:

> When large numbers of soldiers were first stationed in Jingkou, the people (*min*) were not accustomed to them. There were some among the country folk who were wrongly harmed by the soldiers and horses of the garrison. The people were scared witless. [Gao] Laifeng investigated their [the soldiers'] wrongdoings and reported them in detail to the garrison general, who put them aside and failed to pursue them. On another occasion [Gao] uncovered a case where people were fraudulently using the seal of the garrison general. He exposed their crime [but] they were released.[23]

No doubt such problems were due in large part simply to differences in military and civilian status such as one might find in any city with a resident military force. At the same time, one must recall that, for bannermen, their military status was intimately tied to their ethnic status. This aspect of garrison-town relations became apparent, for example, when troops of the *Manchu* Eight Banners were ordered temporarily to take over the Zhenjiang garrison in 1659. A Han Chinese official touring the area memorialized that this was not desirable because the population stood in great fear of the "habitual fierceness and cruelty" of Manchu troops, who tended, he said, to be "uncontrollable."[24] The civilian population could hardly have been expected to forget the ethnic differences between themselves and the Qing bannermen, no matter their banner affiliation. The reverse being equally true, it is safe to say that bannerman-civilian relations in the early Qing were marked by definite ethnic overtones, though for *Hanjun* of diminishing proportions over time.[25]

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[23] *ZJFZ* 34:34a.

[24] *SZSL* 129:5a–6b. The emperor responded in a blistering rescript, "What is all this talk about the 'fierceness and cruelty' of Manchu soldiers? What is this talk about their unruliness? What country is Ma Tengsheng [the memorialist] from, anyway?" Ma was removed from office shortly thereafter—light punishment, in view of his offensive remarks (*SZSL* 132:10a–b).

[25] The ethnic status of the *Hanjun* is a thorny question. Created in 1639–1642 along the same pattern as the Manchu and Mongol Eight Banners, the ranks of the *Hanjun* Eight Banners were composed mostly (the instance of Shi Tingzhu stands as a notable exception) of ethnic Han who had submitted to or been conquered by the Manchus. As many of the former had emigrated very early to Liaodong, it is impossible to draw strict lines between them and Manchus; Wakeman has applied to them the term "frontiersmen" (Wakeman 1985: 41–46). For the Qing period, probably the most appropriate conception of *Hanjun* is as an ethno-military category distinct from *Han* (*nikan*), but of a status inferior to either Manchu or Mongol bannermen. I have chosen the literal English translation "Han-martial" over "Han bannerman," which implies that they were simply Han who happened to be bannermen, and over "Chinese-martial," which I believe muddles the sense of ethnic difference. Their particular ethnic identity appears to have survived to the end

If Zhenjiang had grown accustomed to the presence of Han-martial bannermen, and they to Zhenjiang, the entire process needed repeating after 1760. The fundamental change in the composition of the Jingkou garrison which took place in that year meant a renewal of the ethnic issue. In what might be considered a third refounding, all 3,000 Han-martial bannermen were replaced by 1,800 Mongol bannermen from the Jiangning garrison at Nanjing.[26] Simultaneously, the post of garrison general was eliminated and the Jingkou garrison subordinated to Jiangning. Hereafter, the commander of the banner troops at Jingkou, now exclusively Mongol in composition,[27] was a garrison lieutenant general assigned from the all-Manchu Jiangning garrison.[28]

This restructuring was part of a general mid-eighteenth century policy shift, when Han-martial bannermen at many garrison locations were replaced with Manchus and Mongols. Between 1754 and 1763 over 7,000 *Hanjun* were discharged from Zhenjiang, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou, and were replaced by about 4,500 Mongol and Manchu bannermen.[29] In 1778, 1,500 *Hanjun* at the Xi'an garrison were also expelled from banner rolls, transferred to the Green Standard forces, and 1,000 Manchu bannermen sent from the capital to take their places;[30] an unknown number of *Hanjun* from the garrison at Suiyuan met a similar fate.[31] Certainly, the expulsion of the Han-martial was intended to help relieve the worsening livelihood of the greatly expanded Manchu and Mongol banner population by transferring jobs to these banners.[32] At the same time, it is quite possible that Han bannermen were no longer believed to be adequate representatives of dynastic interests. The fact that, of the *Hanjun* eliminated from the Jingkou garrison, one-third chose to become civilian residents of Zhenjiang[33] suggests that many *Hanjun* garrison soldiers, who were prone to falling into the "soft" ways of Chinese society, identified closely with the locality. This would have been detrimental to Qing local control, and the substitution of Mongol or Manchu companies emerged as the preferred solution. The change in the ethnic identity of the garrison may have helped preserve its sense of separateness—though nothing in the record permits confirmation or rejection of this hypothesis—because, as the garrison's disastrous fall in 1842 would reveal, ethnic differences remained quite clear two generations later.

The British Are Coming!

The concatenation of greed, ignorance, and stubborness that led to the outbreak of war between England and China in the summer of 1840 is too well-known to warrant full rehearsal here.[34] Having succeeded for a time in parrying British economic and military threats, by the first half of 1842 the Qing court faced dismal prospects. Ningbo had been occupied by the British since October of the previous year, and an attempt to free the city in March had failed to dislodge them. The English left on their own in May, only to overwhelm the garrison at Zhapu, a mere seventy miles from Hangzhou, shortly afterwards. In mid-June, the commercial centers of Shanghai and Wusong fell virtually without resistance. The picture grew bleaker still in early July when a British force of seventy-five ships and ten thousand men rendezvoused at the mouth of the Yangzi and began sailing up the river. Two years earlier a fleet had been sent up the coast, attacking strategic locations as it moved northward, until the

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of the dynasty: a 1912 tract refers to the Han-martial as a "people (*minzu*) with no place to return to," looked down on by other bannermen and treated by the Han as outsiders (Yang Dunyi, *Manyi huaxia shimo ji* (Complete Account of the Turmoil Wrought by the Manchu Barbarians), 8 + 4 sections (Shanghai: 1912): sec. 8:69b–70a). The vicissitudes befalling the Han-martial banners are detailed in an excellent article by Pamela Crossley, "The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-martial Banners" (*Late Imperial China* 10.1, June 1989), where she offers a different translation for *Hanjun.*

[26] *Gaozong shilu (GZSL)*: *DQSL*, Gaozong (Qianlong) reign: 680:19a–20b; *Jingkou baqi zhi* (*JKBQZ*) (Gazetteer of the Jingkou Eight Banners), 2 *juan*, Zhong Rui, Chun Yuan et al., eds. (1879): 1:1b–2b.

[27] It is worth noting that ethnic Manchus could belong to the Mongol banners; Mongols could sometimes also be enrolled in the more prestigious Manchu banners. Among officers there was professional mobility between banners, regardless of individual affiliation.

[28] *Dantuxian zhi* (*DTXZ*) (Gazetteer of Dantu County), 60 + 4 *juan*, Shen Baozhen, Lu Yaodou et al., eds. (1877): 20:11b.

[29] *GZSL* 680:19b–20b: *JKBQZ* 1:1b–2b; *Hangzhou baqi zhufangying zhilue* (Draft Gazetteer of the Hangzhou Eight Banner Garrison), 25 *Juan*, Zhang Dachang et al., eds. (1894): 15:14b; *Baqi tongzhi* (Gazetteer of the Eight Banners), 250 *juan*, Ortai et al., eds. (1739): 28:17a; *Qinding baqi tongzhi* (Gazetteer of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained), 352 *juan*, Tiebao et al., eds. (1799): 35:26a–b. 44b: *GZSL* 673:6b–7a; *Huangchao wenxian tongkao* (Documentary Encyclopedia of Imperial Institutions), 300 *juan* (1786): 186:1a–b, 3a; *Zhuyue baqi zhi* (Gazetteer of the Guangzhou Eight Banners), 24 *juan*, Changshan, ed. (1879): 1:7b–10a, 16:4b.

[30] Chen and Fu 1981: 30.

[31] Sutô 182–183; Kanda 1948: 285.

[32] Ura 1930–31: 405; Kanda:285; and Ma 1985: 31.

[33] *GZSL* 680:20a.

[34] The reader is referred to the accounts in Fay 1975 and Graham 1978, upon which this summary relies.

mission reached Tianjin, where it created a panic but failed to force terms. This time the British were going for an arterial stranglehold: the expedition was to cut the Grand Canal, suppress traffic on the lower Yangzi, and, if need be, take Nanjing. All of this to force the Qing government to pay an indemnity for the opium which Commissioner Lin Zexu had destroyed, to grant freer terms of trade, and to cede Hong Kong. The only thing standing between the British and Nanjing, second city of the empire, was the banner garrison at Jingkou under the command of Garrison Lieutenant General Hailing.

Born into the Manchu Bordered White Banner, Hailing (1780?–1842), of the Gorolo clan, had been named to the post at Jingkou in January 1841, having arrived at the Jiangning garrison three months before.[35] His early career appears ordinary enough, though he achieved some distinction during campaigns in 1813–1814 to suppress the Tianlijiao insurgency. He served in various minor garrisons, rising steadily in rank until 1835, when he was demoted for having become "addicted to the easy life" and neglecting his duties. Evidently mending his ways, he attained the prestigious rank of garrison lieutenant general in 1840. He was first commissioned to the Xi'an garrison, but for reasons unknown this order was changed one month later and he was sent to Jiangning. Given that troubles on the coast had already begun by this time, Hailing's appointment to Jingkou signified the court's trust in him not to let the barbarians break the "lock" of the Yangzi.[36]

The city which Hailing was charged with protecting was among the richest in Jiangnan.[37] One of the British called Zhenjiang the "prettiest Chinese town" he had yet seen: "The houses were all well kept, and the interior of many magnificent; the streets well-paved and clean; and open grassy spaces and gardens gave a grace and airiness not usually met with in walled cities." He reported further that every house in the "Manchu quarter"[38] had flowers planted around it, a curious thing, given that fires and looting had reduced the town to rubble by the time the British arrived on the scene.[39] The remark by another British observer, that those who fled left behind many valuables—"silks and satins lay about in such profusion that the only difficulty was to choose among them"[40]—also attests to the city's affluence.

As defender of Zhenjiang, Hailing took his responsibilities seriously, displaying concern for the foreign menace in an early memorial from Jingkou. He outlined plans to intensify training for the roughly 1,200 men and officers under his command, vowing at the same time to exterminate all traitors.[41] In autumn 1841, noting the large number of alien ships near the coast and anticipating a possible foreign advance up the Yangzi, Hailing requested funds to repair the city walls. When in September the English captured Dinghai, he was exceedingly alarmed, "prevented from sleeping and eating for several days and nights." He decided to ask for 4,000 reinforcements from the Northeast, Zhili, and Shandong. Such troops, he said, were one hundred times more valuable than soldiers from the south, a revealing comment on the differences that existed between bannermen.[42] Furthermore, he planned to increase the size of the two "naval" installations at Shuishan and Guazhou under the jurisdiction of the Jingkou garrison.[43] In another report to the throne in March 1842, Hailing expressed fears over the safety of rice shipments up the Grand Canal, a point which does not appear to have been raised by anyone else until the English were only a few miles from the city.[44] In the same memorial he warned that although the river was difficult to navigate because of sand banks, a prevailing southeast wind meant that when the tide came in the waters rose considerably—so high that it was not possible to guarantee that British ships could not penetrate as far upriver as Zhenjiang.[45] While the emperor seems to have concurred in the need to plan ahead,[46] and especially in the need to guard against traitors, i.e., *hanjian*, who provided food and information to the British,[47] little material support actually came through. Only 400 men were eventually transferred to Jingkou—Manchu bannermen from the Qingzhou garrison in Shandong—one-tenth the number Hailing estimated he needed.[48] Later accusations that Hailing was a "stupid, silly person,"[49] do not seem borne out by the foresight and attention to detail evidenced in these memorials. That defenses at Zhenjiang proved inadequate was as much the fault of those in the central military bureaucracy as it was of those in the local banner command.[50]

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[35] "Zhuanbao" (ZB) (Biographic Packets), National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei (n.d.): no. 1878–1; *Qingshi gao* (*QSG*) (Draft History of the Qing), 529 *juan*, Zhao Erxun et al., eds. (1928); reprinted Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977): 372:11531; *QSLZ* 38:54b–55b. The biographic packet contains no information prior to 1810. I am guessing that Hailing was thirty by the time he attained the rank of lieutenant (*xiaoqixiao*) in that year.

[36] *Chouban yiwu shimo* (*CBYWSM*) (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs), Daoguang reign (Beiping; 1929–30; reprinted Taipei: Wenhai, 1970–71): 55:6b; *Xuanzong shilu* (*XZSL*): *DQSL*, Xuanzong (Daoguang) reign: 374:15a.

[37] Wei Yuan, "Daoguang yangsao zhengfu ji" (The Conquest by Foreign Ships During the Daoguang Reign), 2 *juan* (1876; in *YPZZ* 6:137–167): 162; Yang Qi, *Chu weicheng ji* (Getting Out of the Beleaguered City) (Colophon dated 1891; in *YPZZ* 3:41–52):42.

[38] This or, more commonly, "Tartar city," were the terms applied by the English to all Eight Banner garrisons. As already noted, the garrison force at Zhenjiang was drawn from the Mongol banners; the total population counted 9,000 men, women, and children (*JKBQZ* 1:2b).

[39] Granville G. Loch. *The Closing Events of the Campaign in China: The Operations in the Yang-tze Kiang and the Treaty of Nanking.* London, 1843:108.

[40] Bernard and Hall: 431.

[41] *CBYWSM* 24:21b–22b.

[42] "Gongzhongdang" (GZD(DG)) (Secret Palace Memorials), Daoguang reign, National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei: no. 4073 (18 October 1841). For a shortened version of this memorial and the imperial reply, see *CBYWSM* 35:20b–22a.

[43] They proved useless in the resistance. The outpost at Shuishan, fifty *li* downriver from Zhenjiang, had been established in 1726 and was manned by Chinese Green Standard (*lüying*) soldiers. As the British slowly neared, the men at the station reportedly begged Hailing for ammunition but were turned down; when the British actually appeared, they fled at the first cannonade, leaving the narrow river passage undefended (*DTXZ* 20:12b–13a; Chen Qingnian, "Daoguang Yingjian po Zhenjiang ji" (The Taking of Zhenjiang by English Warships in the Daoguang Period), *Hengshan xiangren leigao* (1897; published 1920), *juan* 5:4a.

Preparations, such as they were, were complete by the time British ships reached Shuishan on July 12. With Jingkou's Mongol bannermen and the Manchu bannermen from Shandong, Hailing had 1,600 soldiers within the city. 1,000 Green Standard soldiers from Sichuan under Provincial Commander-in-chief Qishen were camped outside the walls (now in good shape), and 1,000 further reinforcements led by Hubei Commander-in-chief Liu Yunxiao were a day's march from the city. But as the foreign ships continued upriver unhindered, it was suddenly feared that defenses were too thin: by July 14, the phrase "urgent crisis" (*weiji*) began to be applied to the situation.[51] Eleventh-hour memorials were dispatched to try to secure more troops, but "all around were heard the songs of Chu." Cannon emplacements along the river were abandoned. Strings of fireboats assembled at great effort could not be effectively maneuvered, burning dramatically but harmlessly.[52] Hailing received orders to lead his men out of the city and engage the British the moment they came ashore; instead

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[44] *CBYWSM* 43:32a; 55:2b–3b.

[45] *CBYWSM* 43:31b.

[46] *CBYWSM* 35:23b.

[47] *XZSL* 348:27a–28b; 357:18a–b; 359:14a–b; 360:2a–b; 369:26a–b; 371:7a; 372:8a–9a; 373:16b–17a; *CBYWSM* 40:36b–37a.

[48] *XZSL* 372:35b–36a.

[49] Wei: 162.

[50] Crossley makes much the same point concerning the defeat at Zhapu (1990: 117–118).

[51] *CBYWSM* 54:37a–38b.

[52] Zhu: 77.

he remained safe within its walls. Indeed, as Governor-general Niujian and Jiangning Garrison General Dejubu realized, there was very little else for Hailing to do but wait for the enemy to come to him and to hope that his ammunition held out.[53]

When the first ships reconnoitered Zhenjiang on July 16, not a shot was fired on them. Perplexed, the British concluded that Qing troops had withdrawn.[54] Three days later the entire fleet had collected opposite the city, which "appeared to have been entirely deserted; not a living creature was to be seen on the walls or buildings; no flags were flying... no guns were seen... no smoke rising from the houses."[55] Since there was no activity on the shore there was no one to impress for information and no way to ascertain whether even here, at this crucial juncture of the river, they would be suffered to pass without a fight. One of the British present wrote of something "ominous" about the silence in which they waited.[56] They stayed on the far side of the swollen river, out of reach of the occasional fire directed their way (the army had not left after all), and planned to occupy the city by force on the morning of July 21. Though no resistance was expected, as the *Chinese Repository* reported events later, "on the whole, perhaps, the scenes of this day, July 21st, 1842, were more remarkable than those of any other day since the war began."[57]

Hailing Takes Charge

The situation inside the city offered a powerful contrast to the apparent lack of activity observed by the British. If the Chinese accounts are at all to be believed—and there is sufficient independent corroboration between texts to trust their general veracity[58]—pandemonium prevailed. Rumors of the approaching foreign ships and news of the occupation of Wusong and Shanghai had produced, not surprisingly, widespread fear among the people; even more unsettling was the discovery that the citizens of Yangzhou had bought off the British, leaving Zhenjiang as the remaining natural target.[59] Toward the end of June, intending perhaps to provide the well-to-do an opportunity to move their wealth to a safer place, Hailing ordered the most prosperous families to leave town.[60] In early July, he ordered all bannermen, including those posted at artillery fortifications near the eastern docks, to move inside the city. From this time on, bannermen were not to set foot outside the walls.[61] Such a step meant that the coast would be left undefended and that public order in the suburbs would slowly deteriorate. It also announced Hailing's basic strategy: sit tight and hold the fort.

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[53] *CBYWSM* 54:43b.

[54] Bernard and Hall: 421.

[55] Ouchterlony: 337.

[56] Ouchterlony: 348.

[57] *Chinese Repository* (Hong Kong) XI.9 (September 1842): 519.

[58] Later nineteenth-century chroniclers of the Opium War, Liang Tingnan, Wei Yuan, and Chen Qingnian, also used these accounts. While this is certainly no guarantee of complete accuracy, it does vouch for authenticity.

The inherently passive character of such a defense, called by some (possibly cynically) the "Iron Lock Scheme" (*tiesuo zhi ji*),[62] hardly instilled confidence in the populace. For many, remaining in the city meant certain disaster if the garrison fell, while flight held at least the hope of survival. Daily, more and more people decided to leave while the leaving was good, even at the risk of being robbed by bandit gangs prowling the roads leading from the city. Some paid exorbitant rates to boatmen to ferry them upriver where they might stay with relatives in the countryside, while others, anxious to avoid river pirates, tried to escape in flimsy leaking craft they had purchased for small fortunes.[63] Nor were ordinary residents the only ones afraid. The district magistrate, prefect, and circuit intendant all moved their families out as well. The garrison commander himself apparently had already taken the precaution of sending his wife, concubine, and children to live in a nearby town as soon as the alarming news of the June 18 massacre of Manchu troops at Zhapu had reached him.[64] By July 14, about half the the population of Zhenjiang had fled. Nonetheless, the streets were impassable the next day as even more people continued to escape.[65]

Apart from the threat posed by the nearing foreign warships there was significantly more behind the Zhenjiang exodus: this was the standing order given to all bannermen to ferret out *hanjian*. The policy had taken force on July 9. On that day, Hailing ordered his men to disperse across the city and arrest all suspected traitors. Their powers thus expanded, bannermen began "picking people off the street, calling them *hanjian*... throwing them into jail and putting them in chains. No appeals were allowed."[66] Banner soldiers took the opportunity to loot as they patrolled, the allure of rewards for the capture of spies leading as well to other indiscriminate crimes: "Whenever women or children saw banner soldiers, they became frightened and tried to run away. The soldiers chased and killed them, then reported their 'achievements' to the commander to collect their rewards;"[67] the funds for these bounties came from the prefectoral treasury, now under Hailing's control.[68] One witness recorded his escape down a narrow alley from a group of Manchu and circuit intendant all moved their families out as well. The garrison commander himself apparently had already taken the precaution of sending his wife, concubine, and children to live in a nearby town as soon as the alarming news of the June 18 massacre of Manchu troops at Zhapu had reached him.[69] By July 14, about half the the population of Zhenjiang had fled. Nonetheless, the streets were impassable the next day for the people trying to escape.[70]

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[59] Fa Zhirui, *Jingkou fencheng lu* (Record of the Collapse of the City of Jingkou), (1843; in *YPZZ* 3:53–74): 61.

[60] Zhu: 75

[61] Zhu: 75; Yang: 41.

[62] Fa: 54.

[63] Fa: 54–57; Zhu: 75.

[64] Yang: 41; Zhu: 75.

[65] Fa: 60; Yang: 42.

[66] Zhu: 75.

[67] Zhu: 75; Fa: 64.

[68] *CBYWSM* 55:20a.

[69] Yang: 41; Zhu: 75.

[70] Fa: 60; Yang: 42.

[71] Zhu: 75.

[72] Zhu: 75; Fa: 64.

[73] *CBYWSM* 55:20a.

Mongol youths, all armed with knives or swords, stalking the streets.[74] The torture in the public square of seventy detainees and the execution there of thirteen suspected *hanjian* on July 16 made amply clear to the Han population the deadly serious intent of the garrison commander. The following day bannermen received new orders to redouble their efforts. Anybody caught on the streets at night, anyone who spoke with a nonlocal accent, was liable to arrest; merchants from other towns, laborers, monks and priests, servants, beggars, any "unfamiliar face," risked prison or even summary execution if he was so unfortunate as to be questioned on the street by a garrison soldier.[75] The bodies of *hanjian* were "scattered like beggars" around the entrance to the garrison—"faces stiff, legs and feet chapped and black, they lay prone on the left side of the street, their bodies ripped open."[76]

To make matters worse, the same day (July 9) that Hailing began the wholesale arrest of traitors, he cut the time the city gates were to be kept open from twelve to eight hours. The economic and psychological effects of such a move were devastating. Earlier in the year, when hours first became somewhat irregular and the gates would close before dark, slight fear began to spread;[77] the result now was panic. Why this should be so is soon apparent if one considers that, like highways, railroad stations and airports in modern cities, gates functioned as the main conduits for human and commercial traffic in and out of Chinese cities. Closing the gates early or at unpredictable hours destabilized economic activity both regionally—merchants from other places found themselves unable to make transactions and were stranded outside the walls—and locally, since it killed business in the commercial areas near the entrances to the city. Moreover, since the opening and closing of the gates generally occurred at fixed hours, to change those hours was tantamount, in an age that did not know the wristwatch, to tampering with time itself. It also made leaving the city problematic. One account, describing the scene of the morning of July 15, is particularly vivid:

> Those fleeing from the city were as numerous as ants. [As] my home is outside the walls, crowds of people stopped to rest temporarily by my residence. Their boxes, baskets, and bags covered the ground completely. All were waiting for their families to finish coming out, and then they would take a boat or a cart and leave. Suddenly the gates were closing. Some who had just emerged went back in again, and some wanted to get out but couldn't. Others there were, of whose family members only one or two had gotten out—the rest of the family was still inside the walls. They looked at each other, sighing pathetically, unable to utter a sound.[78]

One may wonder if no one opposed this latter-day Draco. At least one did. When the arrests began and the jails filled up, the district magistrate, Qian Yangui, refused to go along with Hailing's demand that all *hanjian* be quickly tried and punished. Instead, he declared innocent and released nearly all of those placed in his custody. Hailing responded by accusing Qian of being a traitor himself, and threw him out of the city.[79] A few days later Hailing sent his men to Qian's residence to arrest his seven remaining assistants, and the magistrate's attempted return on July 17 was blocked by banner soldiers guarding the gates.[80] The prefect and only other ranking civil official, Xianglin, was related to Hailing by marriage (his sister was betrothed to Hailing's son) and dared not stand up to the garrison commander.[81] It was he who had permitted the prefectural purse to fall into Hailing's hands,[82] and any requests to leave which he allowed required the approval of Hailing.[83] A brief visit on July 13 by Governor-general Niujian failed to change the configuration of power. The city was in the hands of the Manchu, Hailing.

Strangers Within the Gate

On July 15, one day before the public execution of the suspected traitors, the gates were opened for the last time, from 7 to 9 in the morning. Food was growing scarce, and most of what was available was requisitioned or confiscated to supply the garrison's needs.[84] Arrests continued, though banditry went on almost unchecked. It was no longer a matter of controlling *hanjian*, or of confidence in the garrison's ability to defend the town against a foreign attack: the very policies being pursued by the garrison

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[74] Fa: 64.

[75] Zhu: 77–78; Yang: 42.

[76] Fa: 64.

[77] Fa: 55.

[78] Zhu: 77.

[79] *CBYWSM* 55:20b; Fa: 65; Yang: 42; Bei Qingqiao, "Duoduo yir" (Chanting Alas! Alas!) (1914; in *YPZZ* 3:175–235): 216–217.

[80] Fa: 65; Zhu: 78.

[81] *CBYWSM* 61:5; Fa: 63; Yang: 42.

[82] *XZSL* 375:32a.

[83] Fa: 63.

[84] Yang: 49: Zhu: 77.

commander in the name of making Zhenjiang safe threatened the well-being of the remaining population: "The common people (*baixing*)... were strictly forbidden to leave. If the city was lost, they would fall to the sword; if it didn't, they would die of starvation."[85]

In the absence of any comprehensive statement from Hailing we cannot be entirely sure what drove an apparently competent, intelligent officer to such extreme measures. Possibly he was becoming psychologically unstable; at the very least we can be certain he was fearful. His troops were few, and his previous military experience had been confined to suppressing poorly-armed inland uprisings—now he confronted a plainly superior waterborne force. Given the circumstances, it is not so surprising he should have panicked. Beyond this, to understand more precisely what was happening in Zhenjiang, we might consider in more detail the problem of *hanjian* in the Opium War in general. As it first emerged in Guangzhou, the discovery of widespread treachery served handily to explain the court's failure to stop the barbarians. By believing that without the help of quislings the foreigners would never have advanced as far as they did, reassurance grew that the English were not so powerful after all.[86] Blame for defeat could then be thrown on those who treated regularly with foreigners, especially merchants, who were mistrusted by both gentry and officials. At a later stage in the war, however, Jiangnan regional biases had produced a slightly different amalgam of the same attitudes. Suspicion fell not only on merchants, but on Cantonese as a group (and here the definition of "Cantonese" ought probably be interpreted loosely to mean anyone from southeast China).[87]

"Traitor fever" in Jiangnan was distinctive also in that it began *before* the British arrived on the scene. Unlike Guangzhou, where it was largely retributive, in Zhenjiang the hunt for *hanjian* was preventive in intent. "The barbarians," it had been observed, "never leave their ships, and the *hanjian* never leave the barbarians."[88] If he could prevent Han spies from getting near the foreigners, Hailing could prevent food, fresh water, and above all, intelligence, from reaching the enemy. This plan, had it been coupled with aggressive shelling from the river's shores, doubtless would have been effective in halting or at least slowing British progress.[89] However, suppressing traitors alone—not that all those being arrested in Zhenjiang were actually traitors, of course—was plainly insufficient. Why, then, such emphasis on this strategy? In a slip (*pian*) enclosed with one memorial, Hailing wrote that the main thing to fear from *hanjian*, besides their selling food to the foreigners, was their going into hiding to await the hour of attack, when they would emerge and aid the enemy's side (*fu wei nei ying*). Explaining that he had already ordered an inspection using the *bao-jia* lists, he went on to report that to keep spies out of the city, the soldiers at the city gates were instructed to be on the lookout for "unfamiliar and suspicious people." Lastly, he was sending bannermen to make "careful, thorough searches everywhere."[90]

It is apparent from this account that Hailing was concerned not only with people leaving the city, but also with potential enemy collaborators entering. In this regard, the official reports on the fall of the Zhapu garrison acquire particular significance: they said that when the British attacked there, traitors rose *within the city* to join them, firing rockets upon the Manchu bannermen, causing them to disperse.[91] The massacre of the Zhapu garrison, we know, weighed heavily on Hailing's mind. Apart from offering a preview of the probable fate awaiting him and his men, one surmises that the reported turning of the city against the garrison at Zhapu reminded Hailing of his status as a Manchu soldier in a Chinese city, stirring in him fear of a massacre at Zhenjiang. He resolved to prevent this by making impossible the formation of any similar conspiracy against the Jingkou garrison. Ironically, by terrorizing the population as he did, he ended up setting the garrison against the town, intensifying the very sort of divisiveness he was hoping to forestall.

This was a confrontation on two levels: military versus civilian (*junmin*), and bannerman versus townsman (*qiren-shimin*), both divisions expressing an opposition between superior and inferior in the power structure. Where they differ is that in the first opposition, emphasis was on the bearing of arms, while in the second, recalling our earlier characterization of garrison-city relations, it was on ethnic status. One might question whether this characterization still applied to the situation nearly two hundred years after the founding of the garrison, and sixty years after the transfer of Mongol bannermen to Jingkou. If it did, then where the security of bannermen was affected, the divisiveness represented by acts of Han Chinese collaborators and informants should have been interpreted to some degree as an expression of enmity toward the "strangers" living in the garrisons. And indeed, in the testimony of eyewitnesses we find just this: "The mutterings of the *hanjian* toward the barbarian bandits were wrongly taken by the garrison lieutenant general to be [intended] against the Manchus and Mongols."[92] Ethnic bias had prevailed also among Manchu officials in Guangzhou, who were convinced that "thousands of Chinese were potential, if not actual, collaborators."[93] Yet there were mitigating circumstances at Guangzhou: *hanjian* were thought to have become so because extended intercourse with foreigners had brought about their "spiritual degeneracy."[94] At Zhenjiang there were no foreigners, so the problem could not be framed in these terms. Instead, the issue of *hanjian* assumed dimensions that were less ethical, more ethnic: "traitors" were traitors because they would betray the garrison and deliver Manchu and Mongol bannermen up for slaughter. Whereas in Guangzhou the ethnic situation was only potentially explosive, in Zhenjiang, where Hailing not only believed, but acted in the conviction that a cabal against *qiren* was afoot, the lid blew off.

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[85] Yang: 46.

[86] Wakeman 1966: 48–51 ff.

[87] *CBYWSM* 24:22a; *XZSL* 374:2a. It may have been assumed that all Cantonese were merchants. Alternatively, because Guangzhou nationally had been the one point of continuous contact with foreigners, Guangzhou natives may have been judged guilty of collusion with the enemy merely by virtue of their birthplace.

[88] *XZSL* 363:18b.

[89] The British complained that absence of local informants hindered their artillery placement; as a result, during the battle a landing party trying to move some guns into better position was driven back with casualties by Qing fire (Ouchterlony: 382–385).

[90] GZD(DG) no. 5952 (sent 8 July 1842).

[91] *XZSL* 371:6b.

Apart from his own sharpened sensitivities, Hailing's obsession with *hanjian*, leading him to intimidate, imprison, starve, even murder Zhenjiang's non-banner inhabitants, greatly heightened the sense of ethnic separateness among the Chinese of Zhenjiang, who came to feel that the Manchu commander had it in for them: "The city was shut and the markets were closed as well; the hungry had no place to buy rice, not even any place to get *bobo*.[95] People suspected that the garrison commander would not stop until he had killed all the Han."[96] While it is not clear how many people shared this quasi-genocidal fear, the above writer was not alone in his perception of the confrontation. On July 25, a report filed five days earlier by Changzhen Circuit Intendant Zhou Xu reached the capital in a memorial from Dejubu:

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[92] Yang: 42 "*hanjian* dui yifei yan fudutong wu yiwei dui Manzhou Menggu yan..."

[93] Wakeman 1966: 48.

[94] Wakeman 1966: 50.

[95] A kind of Manchu pastry (*efen*) made from bean flour, here meaning probably *mantou*.

[96] Yang: 42–43.

> The locality is in [a state of] emergency. Protecting the city is urgent, but the city should guard the people, and cruel measures are inappropriate. Zhenjiang has been closed since the eighth day of the month [July 15], and people's hearts are apprehensive... from the walls the soldiers have fired cannon and guns upon the commoners, calling them *hanjian*, ignoring the pleas of the innocent. Every day people are arrested and scores are punished on the spot (*lishi zhengfa*). There are many false accusations. Han within the city are not permitted to walk on the streets, nor in the evenings to walk in the areas near the outside of the city wall. The defamatory [remarks] flying on the streets are unbelievably shocking.[97]

The impunity with which bannermen treated the people tended also to exacerbate ethnic tension. Before the city was closed, Chinese who wanted to leave were deprived of their possessions as they made their way through the forest of soldiers lining the approaches to the gates. Their women were insulted. Some were further humiliated by being forced to stoop or crawl as they walked past bannermen who held their swords low above the heads of those processing between them: "Anyone who lifted his head slightly received a cut."[98] The morning of the British attack, even as the battle for the city was being fought, a group of soldiers removed the earthen rampart and opened the gates at the south end of town to allow their parents, wives, and children to escape while there was still time. Seeing that the bannermen were, by this action, admitting defeat, hundreds of Han residents gathered behind them and waited their turn to leave. But when they tried to follow, "the banner soldiers threatened them mortally with guns and sharp swords, saying, 'How should you people think of getting out this way?'."[99] When the city did fall, there were reports of Chinese residences stormed by bannermen desperate for refuge, who killed anyone still at home and tried to hide;[100] in other cases, the Chinese cursed them and chased them away.[101] The Chinese soldiers assigned to help protect Zhenjiang were maltreated, too, having to scrounge for food—a few days before the battle one witness saw mounted troops gnawing on raw eggplant—because the markets were closed and the garrison provided no rations. Another reported seeing a large group of soldiers approach the walls one night, complaining loudly of the lack of food: "They threatened to fire on and attack the city, abduct Hailing and eat him alive, and otherwise insulted him in a thousand ways."[102]

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[97] *CBYWSM* 55:20a–b; *XZSL* 375:31b–32a, in abridged form.

[98] Yang: 42.

[99] Fa: 68.

[100] *CBYWSM* 56:21b, 61:4b; Fa: 68.

[101] Yang: 43.

On the eve of the British attack, then, Zhenjiang had split into two camps, bannerman and Han. Martial law prevailed:[103] watches ceased to be beat,[104] the gates remained closed twenty-four hours a day, and the only way out was to bribe a soldier to allow one to rope down the wall.[105] When Hubei Provincial Commander Liu Yunxiao arrived at Zhenjiang with his troops on July 16, the suburbs were in chaos. He took immediate steps by decapitating two offenders, slicing the ears off a third, and flogging a number of others. The heads and ears were displayed, restoring a semblance of order,[106] but Liu's negotiations with Hailing were less successful. Though the garrison commander admitted Liu to the city and heard his arguments, he remained adamant on his closed-city policy, declaring that he would make Zhenjiang an "Iron Fortress" (*jincheng tangchi*), invulnerable to barbarian attack. Even if the suburbs were destroyed, Hailing reasoned, the city itself would be unaffected.[107] What he really anticipated can only be guessed at. Two pronouncements were circulated on July 19, one instructing civilians (who had no food) to collect bricks and water jugs with which they might defend themselves in case fighting came down into to the streets.[108] In the face of that, the other proclamation that same day could have offered little comfort:

> The barbarian ships have intruded into the river. Though we have fired cannon to force them to retreat, they have patrolled as far as the north shore [i.e., above the city]. Their strength is in naval fighting; therefore we will wait until they come ashore outside the wall where the Councillor [Qishen] and the Provincial Commander [Liu Yunxiao] will attack with their joint forces. I will charge out of the city and close the attack. A great victory is certain. Hai[ling].[109]

Most of Zhenjiang's inhabitants no doubt shared the sentiments of one who wrote, "there is nothing for us to do but wait, our hands tied, to die."[110]

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[102] Zhu: 79.
[103] *CBYWSM* 55:27a, where the term *jieyan* is used.
[104] Zhu: 78.
[105] Fa: 64.
[106] Zhu: 77.
[107] Zhu: 77.
[108] Zhu: 79.
[109] Fa: 65.
[110] Zhu: 78.

Dynastic Hero, Local Villain

In the event, the British victory came quickly, the city's defenses collapsing within a few hours as described in the opening section. The Chinese troops under Liu Yunxiao and Qishen, most of whom had to prepare for battle on empty stomachs,[111] fled without a fight—their generals led the retreat on horseback. The British were thus free to concentrate efforts on overcoming the startling opposition they encountered at the walls. The fighting was savage, but like all contests between Qing and western armies, military technology made a crucial difference. A last stand was fought around 2 p.m., rousing Gough, the British commander, from a nap. It was beaten back, though not without losses.[112] On the Chinese side, preliminary reports on the day's actions showed at least 400 bannermen dead or wounded, and final totals must have been considerably higher.[113] Thousands of garrison refugees were scattered in nearby towns, and their attempt in early August to move back was frustrated by British soldiers guarding the city.[114] Those who had not fled, hoping perhaps to save some of their property, in the end had to hide, some in the city's waterways and ponds, only to emerge later, "the duckweed still stuck all over their faces, [looking like] blue-faced ghosts. Having lost their possessions and their homes, it was difficult to tell whether it was they or those who had died in battle who had left this world."[115]

One of the most interesting aspects of the aftermath of the fall of Zhenjiang, and a further comment on the role of *hanjian*, was the change in the perception of the informant. Immediately after the city fell, the story began circulating that someone had gone over to inform the English of the internal state of affairs, urging them to act quickly. "To delay," he is supposed to have pleaded, "would on the contrary bring more harm to the people." This "turncoat," a monk, claimed to have been released by a Qingzhou banner captain who had confided in him that,

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[111] *CBYWSM* 56:22b.
[112] Bernard and Hail: 429–430; Ouchterlony: 389. The 168 casualties suffered by the British at Zhenjiang were the greatest of any engagement of the Opium War. Half of the 34 deaths were reported from sunstroke (Bernard and Hall: 432).
[113] GZD (DG) no. 6221: *JKBQZ* 2.24a. According to one source, 300 of the 400 Qingzhou bannermen fell in defense of Zhenjiang (Luo Chenglie, "Yapian zhanzhengzhong de Zhenjiang," cited in Crossley 1990: Chapter IV, n. 121).
[114] Zhu: 85.
[115] Yang: 43.

> Commander Hai[ling] is killing people every day and sees everybody as a traitor. Yet still he is not satisfied. Today he wants [us] Qingzhou soldiers to... patrol the four gates, killing anyone we happen to meet. After killing everybody on the streets, we are to do a house-by-house search, executing all whom we find. In just a few days no more commoners will be left With only banner soldiers left inside, they can defend the walls without worry. I can't bear to see your corpse, [so] I'll help you escape by rope. Go quickly![116]

Such a story helped explain the city's fall: since the British were thought to have been ignorant of the existence of the vulnerable northern gate,[117] the attack there the morning of the battle came as a surprise, and the monk thus held responsible for enlightening the enemy.[118]

This conforms with the Guangzhou *hanjian* pattern, with the telling exception that nowhere is the Zhenjiang informant labeled a traitor. In fact quite the opposite: "Fortunately, the Qingzhou troops let slip the word, otherwise, the lives of all in the city would have been imperiled."[119] This leads one to wonder whether the British capture of the city was held to be a fall or a liberation. For the bannermen, the answer is obvious. But for the Chinese of Zhenjiang, the longer Hailing had to prepare his defenses, the greater their chances of being picked up as *hanjian*, or of running out of food. Other sources aver likewise that "the people were only afraid that the English barbarians would not take the city."[120] Such feelings emphasize that the Han inhabitants of Zhenjiang feared the garrison commander's next move, hoping anxiously for an end to the internal siege, even to the point of welcoming the victory of the new foreigners over the old.

The other theme dominant in the legacy of Zhenjiang's fall is the fate of the garrison commander, on which subject there are two schools of opinion. The official version states that Hailing, his wife, and a grandson hanged themselves in Hailing's offices; their bodies were reported to be badly burned from fires that broke out after the sack of the banner quarter.[121] The corpses of Hailing and his wife were later positively identified by personal effects that escaped destruction—his silken robe, her gold ring.[122]

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[116] Yang: 47–48.

[117] *JKBQZ* 1:14b–15a.

[118] *Guochao qixian leizheng chubian* (Classified Compendium of Antique Documents of the Dynasty (First Compilation), 484*juan*, Li Heng et al., eds. (1890): 374:24a–b; Chen: 6a, 7b.

[119] Yang: 48.

[120] Bei: 217. The author was a one-time aide to the Manchu official, Yijing.

[121] *CBYWSM* 56:21a. Evidently some family members had rejoined Hailing in the garrison before July 21.

[122] ZB no. 1878–3.

When the British visited the garrison offices they found Hailing's secretary, who told them that Hailing himself had set the fire after returning from the final unsuccessful pitched battle.[123] According to another report, Hailing prepared for death by turning northward to express gratitude for imperial benevolence, and then gave orders to put the compound to the torch.[124] On July 31 the Daoguang emperor issued an edict praising Hailing for his noble sacrifice and instructing that he be accorded the honors due a lieutenant general (*dutong; gûsai ejen*). In addition he granted Hailing a posthumous title, ordered a shrine built in memory of him and his martyred wife and grandson, and requested that the surviving members of Hailing's family be brought to the capital for an audience when their period of one hundred days' deep mourning was over.[125]

The sheen of Mailing's glorious sacrifice was soon tarnished. A memorial from Shandong Censor Huang Zonghan impeaching Hailing for "unspeakable malfeasance" and dereliction of duty arrived in the capital in early August. Huang's catalogue of wrongdoings unearthed few excesses not already touched on above, and few probably not already guessed at by the court from the reports received in late July from Dejubu.[126] He blamed Hailing's policies for turning Han against bannerman and explained to the court that the city fell, "not because there was insufficient strength to resist, but [because] the hearts and minds of the people were dissipated." In the end, an inquiry undertaken by Qiying, though it acknowledged that innocent people were killed, confirmed that Hailing took proper steps in closing the city and exterminating *hanjian*, in essence forgiving any errors he may have committed.[127]

Zhenjiang's residents favored their own version of the fate that befell the garrison commander.[128] Accounts claimed (with a stereotypical ring) that as defenses crumbled, far from going to an honorable suicide, Hailing in fact escaped from the city, ignoring pleas that he lead his men in a last attack.[129] During his investigation of the situation in Zhenjiang, Qiying noted that the area was rife with rumors about Hailing's disappearance into the countryside, including one that he had taken the tonsure and was holed up in a monastery.[130] Other reports refer to a violent confrontation between garrison troops and townspeople just before the British attack.[131] In one of the more fantastic versions, it is related that the entire population of Zhenjiang turned against the garrison commander, "arising in a fury and surrounding him," at which point Hailing had his troops open fire. In the end, the mob is said to have taken justice into its own hands and put Hailing to death.[132] The drama of this imaginary jacquerie strengthens the impression of the breakdown of social order and underscores the polarization within the city.

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[123] Ouchterlony: 404–405; Loch: 123–124.

[124] *JKBQZ* 1:7b.

[125] *CBYWSM* 56:23a–b; *XZSL* 370:8b–9a. One might note here that the one hundred-day mourning period observed in the Eight Banners was much shorter than the two-year period observed by Chinese civil officials. Moreover, once a bannerman had completed his mourning he was assured of immediate reassignment, either to his original post (if in the capital) or to a new one (if in the garrisons) (*DQHD* 97:29b; Ura:71).

[126] *CBYWSM* 58:27b–28a.

[127] *CBYWSM* 60:26b–28b, 61:4a–7b.

[128] One commentator did accept the fact of Hailing's suicide, adding that it was the proper retribution for his crimes (Fa: 54).

Whatever the truth was—the evidence in the British reports would tend to indicate that Hailing in fact died in the line of duty—profound ambivalence regarding Hailing has persisted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Several eyewitness accounts of the city's collapse were circulated in defiance of an apparent attempt by the dynasty to gloss over the most sensitive aspects of the disaster,[133] and Wei Yuan publicized his contempt for Hailing—who, lest it be forgot, was designated a dynastic martyr—in a chapter appended to the popular *Shengwu ji*. Local historian Chen Qingnian, writing in the late nineteenth century, noted both sides of the debate concerning Hailing, but left the verdict to future historians.[134] The inscription at the shrine built in Hailing's memory mourns the "cruelty of the people's hearts," that they rejoiced at his death. Yet even this tribute to the late garrison commander gives three reasons why Hailing "could only have died" (*bude busi*) and five reasons why he "ought to have died" (*burong busi*).[135] An early twentieth-century local gazetteer describes this shrine as follows:

> The shrine is in memory of the Jingkou garrison commander, Garrison Lieutenant General Hailing, who wronged the nation and brought calamity to the people in the year *ren-yin* of the Daoguang reign. He paid for his foolishness with his life.[136]

Hailing appears in addition in two other gazetteers, one a minor two-*juan* affair put together by the Jingkou garrison (which found worth repeating the gossip that Hailing fled Zhenjiang after the defeat and hid in the countryside as a monk),[137] and the other the *Xu Dantuxian zhi*, published in 1930. The editors wrote regarding the supposed martyrdom of Hailing that, "up to today, local people have their doubts about it."[138] Even a history of Zhenjiang written as recently as 1984 reserves caustic language for Hailing's "erroneous thinking" and the resulting confrontation between bannerman and Han.[139] Hailing's crimes evidently surpassed even the ability of the emperor to whitewash: for the people of this small city on the lower Yangzi, his infamy well outlasted the dynasty.

Conclusion: Bannerman and Han in the Qing

It has been one aim of this study to show that ethnic tension was a persistent element in urban Qing society, most especially in those cities garrisoned by Eight Banner soldiers. As we saw in the first section, the initial settlement of bannermen in Zhenjiang in 1655 and their resettlement in 1659 were events accompanied by numerous difficulties, including not least the friction brought on by contrasting ethnic backgrounds. The reorganization of the garrison in 1760 saw the replacement of Han-martial by Mongol bannermen; not only did this change reflect ethnically-influenced thinking at the center, but it likely meant a renewal of ethnic awareness locally. In 1842, as depicted above, relations between the garrison and the city deteriorated completely, a deterioration which took place partly along ethnic lines, and we have tried to show how the events surrounding the fall of Zhenjiang were given ethnic interpretations both by survivors of the city's fall and by local historians.

The reader may rightly wonder if a similar sort of confrontation might not have taken place had the garrison troops been Green Standard soldiers

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[129] Zhu: 81; Yang: 43.

[130] *CBYWSM* 60:27a.

[131] Yang: 43, *CBYWSM* 61:4a–b.

[132] *CBYWSM* 58:27b–28a.

[133] Yang: 51.

[134] Chen: 10b.

[135] "Jingkou zhufang geying jiangshi ji dutong Haigong wen" (Text for Sacrifices of the Officers and Men of the Jingkou Garrison in Memory of the Honorable Lieutenant General Hai[ling]) (n.d.; in *YPZZ* 6:706–707): 706.

[136] *Dantuxian zhi zhiyu* (Collected Addenda to the Gazetteer of Dantu County), 21 *juan*, Li Enyuan, Li Bingrong, eds. (1918): 2:35b.

[137] *JKBQZ* 1:7b.

[138] *Xu Danntuxian zhi* (Continuation of the Gazetteer of Dantu Country), 20 *juan*, Zhang Yucao, Weng Youcheng, Liu Jiabin, eds. (1930): 7:27b.

[139] Wang 1984: 182–184.

and the commander a Han Chinese himself. Doubtless this is possible. In such a case, however, the "we-they" dichotomy would have been simply the opposition between military and civilian—the commander could not have taken the actions of *hanjian* to be ethnically-inspired plotting against the garrison, nor would the citizens have had reason to fear that "the commander would not stop until he had killed all the Han." The fact that the Jingkou garrison was staffed by bannermen and that bannermen were ethnically distinct from the townspeople meant that ethnicity was a category that could be, and was, called upon to express the tension between garrison and town in certain situations.

The limit of the focus here prevents coming to any definitive conclusions about the frequency or seriousness of ethnic tension between bannermen and Han Chinese during the Qing period. One is inclined to think that for the most part such tension was latent, but this may simply reflect the reality the dynasty was trying to project, or the fact that we have not looked hard enough. At present the most that can be said is that ethnic tension was unquestionably in evidence in Zhenjiang in 1842. Yet, given the existing historiography, even this modest assertion requires further explanation, After all, weren't all "Manchus" completely sinified by the nineteenth century?

This line of thinking, long dominant in the scholarship, stems from an ethnocentric view of the history of China, one which makes its interpretations from the vantage point of the Han people to whom is attributed absolute assimilative power.[140] The cherished assumption of the inherent superiority of Han culture and institutions upon which this view is predicated is surely overdue for retirement. Too much is known about the historical development of China under the Liao, Jin, and Yuan to continue to ascribe—to the genius of the central plain. As for the Qing, since over forty years ago when Franz Michael first pointed it out in English, it has been a favorite axiom of Western historians that the real reason for the success of the Qing state was its borrowing of "traditional Confucian forms" from the Ming,[141] and little attention has been paid to the "non-Confucian" elements of Manchu rule. While this is understandable—historians of China are naturally more familiar with things Chinese—the extension of the principle has led to an oversimplified picture of interethnic relations and to the conclusion that all bannermen were sinified (*hanhua*) during the Qing in an irresistible decline ending with their "disappearance" into Chinese society after the 1911 revolution.[142]

The matter is ticklish. For one thing, it is nonsense to dispute the utility of institutions inherited from the Ming, because they were a vital legacy and an important factor in Qing success (as were Yuan institutions, one might add, in Ming success). Yet at least as important a factor were the *differences* between Ming and Qing, differences having their origins in the separate ethnic styles of the Chinese and the Manchus. In this connection, the main problem has been that for the vast majority of bannermen there is no doubt that assimilation did take place: the atrophy of the Manchu language and widespread martial declension are only two of the more apparent examples of this process. This having been said, the fact is that ethnic identity is a sensibility not easily suppressed or overthrown. Few would be willing to deny its importance in the present, and we ought to be wary of dismissing it as an irrelevant factor historically. A better understanding of Qing rule will result, it is proposed, through an improved understanding of ethnic interaction in Qing China.

One reason that historians have had difficulty with ethnicity is that a sophisticated theoretical grasp of the concept has been lacking. Partly this is because of the influence of the tradition-bound view of sinification, and in part also because of discomfort in handling terms such as "people," "nationality," "race," and "ethnic group" (in Chinese, *zu* or *minzu*). "People" is vague (the *min* without the *zu*), while "nationality" is confusing because it implies modern ideas of self-determination, citizenship, or formal registration as a minority group. "Race" accentuates descent and physical characteristics, neglecting cultural and psychological factors. The term "ethnic group" (with its attendant forms, "ethnic," "ethnic identity," "ethnicity") seems least objectionable.[143] Though it, too, has its modern sociological usage, "ethnic group" calls also on a Greek root, *ethnos*, which would seem reasonably close to *zu* and to the modern Chinese *minzu*.

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[140] As exemplified in Yao 1960, where the cultures of all nationalities that have come to be included in the modern Chinese polity are labeled "sub-cultures" of the primary "Han-Tang" culture.

[141] Michael 1942.

[142] Hsiao 1955: 66; *Manzu jianshi*: 185; Kanda: 271–272, 296. Crossley discusses this issue also, citing Wittfogel, Feng, and Wright (1990: 224–225). Recently, Chinese scholars have come to realize that the nature of assimilation (*minzu ronghe*) is more complex than previously assumed; see, for example, Liu 1984.

[143] Pamela Crossley states her reasons for preferring "race" as the proper analytical category in a 1987 article, "*Manzhou yuanliu kao* and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage" (*Journal of Asian Studies* 46.4). Having also struggled with this question, I confess that, whatever the similarities between Chinese *zu* and early modern English "race" or "folk," I am more comfortable using "ethnicity" as explained above to analyze the situation in the banners. Rhetorical clarity demands a rigorous distinction between these categories,

For "ethnicity" I adopt its definition by Charles Keyes as a "cultural interpretation of descent," where descent includes both social and genetic aspects.[144] In this sense, ethnicity is understood not as something immutable, but rather as being flexible and adaptable. Though it is limited by facts of ancestry, birth, and appearance (ascription), the better part of ethnicity is in fact taught, meaning that the individual takes and internalizes the various symbols of his ethnic identity (affection). Such symbols include homeland, language, religion, music, myths, and so on. These symbols combine to form what Edward Spicer has called a "persistent identity system," an essential feature of which is the individual's "belief in his personal affiliation" with what the symbols stand for.[145] A final characteristic of such systems is that what is excluded from them is often just as important as what is included. Besides overt cultural features, then, the boundaries maintained by an ethnic group are of crucial importance.[146]

Such a definition permits a historically-informed approach to the problem of ethnic style and ethnic interaction in the Qing. For one thing, it acknowledges the possibility of change. This is vital—it would be futile to try to prove that the symbols (much less the connotations) of Manchu ethnic identity in the early seventeenth century were the same as those in the early twentieth. Once the fact of ethnic change is admitted, one can see that it is neither a unidirectional nor a unitary process.[147] A relevant example might be the loss of ability in Manchu among Manchu bannermen. Although they came to speak Chinese instead, this was a Chinese that, in the north, showed Altaic influence lexically[148] and possibly structurally as well.[149] Furthermore, this definition, since it lays bare the affective dimension of ethnicity, enables one to explore ethnic differences not only between bannermen and Han, but also (though no such analysis is attempted here) the differences *between* bannermen. After all, banner society, to coin a phrase, was divided internally in a number of ways: Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial, capital and garrison, grand councillor and banner supernumerary. The realization dawns that not all bannermen shared the same ethnic identity[150] and that these identities were not affected equally by the particular aspects of Chinese society they encountered. Finally, this definition allows us to dispense with the obsolete model of ethnic interaction as one of equilibrium punctuated by conflict, and replace it with a model of ethnic opposition as the norm. According to the oppositional model, differences between ethnic groups exist not so much in spite of contact with members of other groups, but rather because of such contact.[151] In the words of one anthropologist, Fredrik Barth,

> ... ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations in which embracing social system are built.[152]

This paradigm frees us from the lockstep conclusion of previous thinking that because bannermen had to function in a society overwhelmingly populated by Han Chinese they inevitably were completely assimilated into that society. The premises of the model of ethnic opposition permit a more balanced and textured examination of the nature of assimilation (defined as the "reduction of cultural distance" between groups)[153] of bannermen. To what degree and in what areas the ethnic identity of Qing bannermen actually persisted is a question that awaits a detailed examination of life in the Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial banners. That it persisted, however, seems beyond question. One preliminary observation should be made here, which is that we are speaking of ethnicity only within the banners, and only up until the early years of the Chinese republic. The growth

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and the interchanging of these terms as if they were synonymous (cf. Crossley 1990, 5, 185, and 221–223) would seem only to confuse the situation further.

[144] Keyes 1981: 5. Royce offers this definition for ethnic group: "a reference group invoked by people who share a common historical style (which may only be assumed), based on overt features and values, and who, through the process of interaction with others, identify themselves as sharing that style" (Royce 1982: 27).

[145] Spicer 1971: 795–796.

[146] Barth 1969.

[147] Banton 1981: 35–36. That Manchu and Han-martial ethnic identity underwent significant change over time is recognized and described by Crossley (1990, 1988), raising questions over her choice of the term "race," which she characterizes as "immutable" and "genealogically-determined" (1988: 65, n. 5).

[148] Okada 1980; Guan and Meng 1987.

[149] Hashimoto 1986.

[150] Evidence for this is seen in Zhenjiang in 1842, where discord was reported between Jingkou Mongol bannermen and the Manchu bannermen transferred from Qingzhou (Fa: 68).

[151] Examples of persistent identity systems which have survived in "contrasting sociocultural environments" are the Jewish, the Basque, the Irish, the Yaqui, the Navajo, and the Acadian, among others (Spicer: 797, 799; Keyes: 23).

[152] Barth: 9–10.

[153] Banton: 50.

of modern Mongol nationalism beginning in the 1890s, or the resurgence of Manchu ethnic awareness during the 1980s[154] represent a different sort of ethnic identity, one formed as a means of attaining objective aims with respect to the state, or as an effort to recover and reconstitute elements of an identity hastily concealed or abandoned seventy years ago. While according to our definition above not for these reasons any less valid as ethnic identities, still they are to be distinguished from ethnicity in the banners during the Qing.[155]

In sum, what is being proposed here is a reevaluation of the relationship between majority and minority in late imperial China, and a reassessment of the assumptions and conclusions of assimilation in China (sinification).[156] The historical memories of the Chinese and of bannermen were not so short, and historical instances of "total assimilation"[157] are in any event quite rare. Concluding from this that sinification was not a zero-sum game, we can be sure that it did not culminate in the elimination of all forms of ethnic identity in the banners and the substitution there of healthy, happy, Han people. Finally, despite the fact of assimilation among Manchu, Mongol, and Han-martial bannermen, it should be clear from the case of Jingkou that bannermen neither viewed themselves as Han Chinese, nor did Han living in garrison cities such as Zhenjiang, even in the nineteenth century, view bannermen as being other than different. This difference in consciousness, emphasizing as it does the definite limits to sinification, suggests that the ethnic picture in Qing China was more complex than has been recognized and encourages a revision in our thinking.

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[154] One might consider the rise in the number of those identifying themselves as Manchus in the last census (7 million in 1987, up from 2.65 million in 1978), the creation of four *Manzu zizhixian*, the founding of three new journals of Manchu studies, and the popularity of night courses in Manchu in the Beijing area as evidence of this resurgence.

[155] Crossley 1990: 222–223, 228, it might be pointed out, places them all in the continuum of an emerging "Manchu racial identity."

[156] The reader is referred to the sensitive discussion by Crossley (on "sinicization") in the conclusion to *Orphan Warriors*.

[157] Defined as the case in which "the migrant group or the descendants disappear into the larger society and lose their ethnic distinctiveness," (Keyes: 16).

Glossary

baixing	百姓
baqi	八旗
baqi zidi	八旗子弟
bobo	餑餑
bude busi	不得不死
burong busi	不容不死
chuanshan	圌山
Dejubu	德朱布
dutong	都統
fu wei nei ying	伏為内應
fudutong	副都統
Hailing	海齡, 海陵
hanhua	漢化
hanjian	漢奸
Hanjun	漢軍
Huang Zonghan	黃宗漢
Jiangnan	江南
Jiangning	江寧
jieyan	戒嚴
jincheng tangchi	金城湯池
Jingkou	京口
junmin	軍民
lishi zhengfa	立時政法
Liu Yunxiao	劉允孝
lüying	綠營
manto	饅頭
Manzhou	滿洲
Manzu zizhixian	滿族自治縣
min	民
minzu	民族
minzu ronghe	民族融合
Niujian	牛鑑
pian	片
Qian Yangui	錢燕貴
Qingzhou	青州
qiren	旗人
Qishen	齊慎
Qiying	耆英
Shi Tingzhu	石廷柱
shimin	市民
tiesuo zhi ji	鐵鎖之計
weisuo	衛所
weiji	危急
Xianglin	祥麟

xiaoqixiao	驍騎校
Zhapu	乍浦
zhenhai dajiangjun	鎮海大將軍
Zhenjiang	鎮江
Zhou Xu	周頊
zhufangying	駐防營
zu	族

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CBYWSM. Chouban yiwu shimo (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs), Daoguang reign. Beiping 1929–30. Reprinted Taipei: Wenhai, 1970–71.

DQHD. Qinding Da Qing huidian (Collected Institutes of the Qing) *juan*, 1764.

DQSL. Da Qing lichao shilu (The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty). 1937. Shizu (Shunzhi), Shengzu (Kangxi), Gaozong (Qianlong), Xuanzong (Daoguang) reigns. Fengtian (Shenyang): 1937. Reprinted Taipei: Huawen, 1963.

DTXZ. Dantuxian zhi (Gazetteer of Dantu County). 60 + 4 *juan*. Shen Baozhen, Lu Yaodou, et al., 1877.

DTXZY. Dantuxian zhi zhiyu (Collected Addenda to the Gazetteer of Dantu County). 21 *juan*. Li Enyuan, Li Bingrong, eds. 1918 (compiled during Qing).

Fa. Fa, Zhirui. *Jingkou fencheng lu* (Record of the Collapse of the City of Jiangkou). Preface dated 1843. In *YPZZ* 3:53–74.

GZD(DG). "Gongzhongdang" (Secret Palace Memorials), Daoguang reign. Held in National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei.

GZSL. Gaozong shilu. See *DQSL*.

HCBZ. "Huangchao bingzhi" (Military Monographs of the Dynasty), "*xunlianmen, junling*" chapters. Held in National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei.

HCWXTK. Huangchao wenxian tongkao (Documentary Encyclopedia of Imperial Institutions). 300 *juan*. 1786.

HTJGKHB. Hesei toktubuha jakûn gûsai kooli hacin-i bithe (Statutes and Precedents of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained). 12 *juan*. Laiboo, et al., eds. 1769.

HZBQZ. Hangzhou baqi zhufangying zhilue (Draft Gazetteer of the Hangzhou Eight Banner Garrison). 25 *juan*. Zhang Dachang, et al., eds. 1894.

JKBQZ. Jingkou baqi zhi (Gazetteer of the Jingkou Eight Banners). 2 *juan*. Zhong Rui, Chun Yuan, et al., eds. 1879.

JKJW. "Jingkou zhufang geying jiangshi ji dutong Haigong wen" (Text for Sacrifices of the Officers and Men of the Jingkou Garrison in Memory of the Honorable Lieutenant General Hai[ling]). In *YPZZ* 6:706–707.

LZCB. Guochao qixian leizheng chubian (Classified Compendium of Antique Documents of the Dynasty, First Compilation). 484 *juan*. Li Heng, et al., eds. 1890.

QDBQTZ. Qinding baqi tongzhi (Gazetteer of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained). 352 *juan*. Tiebao, et al., eds. 1799.

QDBQZL. Qinding baqi zeli (Statutes and Precedents of the Eight Banners, Imperially Ordained). 12 *Juan*. Yang Xicheng, Wu Ting, et al., eds. 1742.

QDZGNB. Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao (Annual Tables of Qing Period Officials). 4 vols. Qian Shipu, ed. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980.

QSLZ. Qingshi liezhuan (Qing History Biographies). 80 *juan*. 1928. Reprinted Taipei: 1966.

QSG. Qingshi gao (Draft History of the Qing). 529 *juan*. Zhao Erxun, et al., eds. 1928. Reprinted Beijing: Zhonghua, 1977.

SZSL. Shizu shilu. See *DQSL*.

SZuSL. Shengzu shilu. See *DQSL*.

XDTXZ. Xu Dantuxian zhi (Continuation of the Gazetteer of Dantu County). 20 *Juan*. Zhang Yucao, Weng Youcheng, Liu Jiabin, eds. 1930.

XTZL. Zhaolian. *Xiaoting zalu* (Miscellaneous Notes from the Whistling Bamboo Pavilion). 6 *juan*. 1880.

XZSL. Xuanzong shilu. See *DQSL*.

YDXZ. Yiduxian zhi (Gazetteer of Yidu County). 54 *juan*. Zhang Chengxie, Fa Weitang, et al., eds. 1907.

YPZZ. Yapian zhanzheng (The Opium War). 6 volumes. Qi Sihe, et al., eds. Shanghai: 1954. Reprinted Taipei: Dingwen, 1973 (editor given as Yang Jialuo).

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ZB. "Zhuanbao" (Biographic Packets). Held in National Palace Museum Archives, Taipei.

ZJFZ Zhenjiangfu zhi (Gazeteer of Zhenjiang Prefecture). 55 *juan*. Zhu Lin, et al., eds. 1750.

ZYBQZ. Zhuyue baqi zhi (Gazetteer of the Guangzhou Eight Banners). 24 *juan*. Changshan, ed. 1879.

Zhu. Zhu, Shiyun. *Caojian riji* (Diary from the Grass Room). Colophon dated 1852. In *YPZZ* 3:75–92.

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THE MANCHU-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP, 1618–1636

Gertraude Roth


Liaotung Area in the 1630s
LIAO-HSI
LIAO-TUNG
K'AI-YUAN
T'IEH-LING
FU-SHUN
CHIEH-FAN
SARHU
SUTZU HO
SHEN-YANG
FE ALA
HETU ALA
LIAO-HO
HUN HO
TALING HO
KUANG-NING
TUNG-CHING
LIAO-YANG
CH'ING-HO
CHIN-CHOU(1)
SUNG-SHAN
NIU-CHUANG
HAI-CHOU
NING-YUAN
YAO-CHOU
KAI-CHOU
KUAN-TIEN
YUNG-TIEN
YALU R
I-CHOU
Great Wall
TSUN-HUA
CH'IEN-AN
FU HO
YUNG-P'ING
LUAN-CHOU
SHANHAIKUAN
Gulf of Liaotung
FU-CHOU
CHIN-CHOU (2)
Korea Bay
SHANTUNG

Manchus

To some contemporary observers, Chinese and European, and to many writers down to our own time, the Ch'ing conquest was a bloody and utterly alien "Tartar conquest," something like the Mongol devastation of Russia. From this perspective it is very hard to explain the ease of the conquest and the long success of Ch'ing rule, both of which stand in great contrast to the Mongol Yuan. Some of the reasons for these contrasts are to be found in the history of China in the late Ming and are pointed out in later essays in this volume. Others are the results of the development of the Manchu Ch'ing state before 1644. The Manchus did not come out of a steppe nomadic economy and society but out of a mixed hunting, farming, and pastoral economy. They were deeply involved in trade with China and were developing some small iron works and other handicraft industries, often employing skilled Korean slaves. They had had long and complex political relations with the Chinese tribute system and frontier military system. They had been influenced by Mongolian and Chinese political traditions as well as by the heritage of their ancestors who had ruled northern China as the Chin Dynasty (1127–1235).

Nurhaci and his followers rose out of a political environment of rapid rise and fall, marriage alliances, blood feuds, and boundless scope for ambition. The heritage of that world would continue to affect their political style as rulers of China at least down to the 1720s. In the late sixteenth century many chieftains tried to expand their power in the area we call Manchuria, including Wan, Khan of the Hada, Yangginu, chief of the Yehe, and Giocangga, Nurhaci's father. Nurhaci's success was more permanent than theirs in part because the Japanese invasions of Korea gave him more leverage in dealing with the Ming authorities and in part because the Ming authorities were losing the military power and the administrative coherence that had enabled them to control the frontier, either by halting the rise of an ambitious man or by forcing a compromise settlement on him.

We already know a good deal, primarily from the official account in Chinese called the K'ai-kuo fang-lueh, *of the remarkable political-military-economic system Nurhaci and his successor worked out before 1644, drawing on Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese patterns of organization. In Roth's account of the crucial period of this development, based very largely on the contemporary records in Manchu called* Man-chou chiu-tang, *we get a much more vivid sense than we had from the Chinese sources of the false starts, the crises, the anxieties and angers amid which this system was evolved and by which it was shaped. The striking talent for balancing relations among men, land, and taxes, the evolving search for the right mix of segregation and conciliation in dealing with the subjugated Chinese population, the boldness with which political difficulties were met, the evolving relations with the Chinese military commanders of Liaotung, all offer important clues to the strengths of Ch'ing rule after 1644.*

Knowledge of Manchu is rare among present-day students of the early Ch'ing, and Roth's essay shows how profoundly our understanding of the conquest can be changed by exploring the original records. And even if it is probable that no post-conquest sources in Manchu exist that have the same freshness and interest as the ones she has used here, we are now presented with enough evidence to move beyond the hypotheses offered in Franz Michael's The Origins of Manchu Rule in China, *and to begin assessing the impact of these earliest institutions and politics on the post-1644 Ch'ing state with a new sophistication.*

Introduction

From the naming of the Dynasty in 1636 down past 1900, Ch'ing politics involved, in shifting forms and combinations, preservation of the cultural and organizational distinctiveness of the Manchu people, selective cooptation of Chinese power-holders and appeals to Chinese values, and watchful repression of Chinese anti-Manchu ideas and actions. In this essay I will show how all these aspects of Ch'ing politics already were highly developed by 1636. We also see in these early years considerable Manchu interest in the devising of complex systems of distribution of land and labor, systems that had their roots in Inner Asian traditions as well as in Chinese. The years from 1636 to 1644 saw further important steps in the maturing of the political attitudes and institutions that guided the conquest of China. The Manchu archival sources used in this paper do not extend into those later years, while the volume of Chinese sources and the problems of controlling their reliability increase enormously. Moreover, preliminary research suggests that despite the defection of large numbers of Ming officers and soldiers to the Ch'ing between 1636 and 1644, the basic structures of Manchu-Chinese social and economic relations did not change qualitatively in those years. Thus this paper concentrates on the period between the Manchus' conquest of Liaotung, between 1618 and 1621, which marks the beginning of major contact between the Manchus and the Chinese, and the proclamation of the Ch'ing dynasty in Shen-yang (Mukden) in 1636. It makes only a few general suggestions on developments after 1636.

The present study is based primarily on the *Man-chou chiu-tang*, a collection of Manchu documents written before 1644. A copy of these documents, which had been made during the Ch'ien-lung period, was discovered in 1905 and has been romanized and translated into Japanese under the title *Mambun Rōtō*. These two sources—for historical enquiries there seem to be only a few significant differences between the two—present a vast amount of new data. They reveal political, economic, and social problems of the early Manchu state which the official sources like the *Ch'ing-shih*, the *Shih-lu*, or the *K'ai-kuo fang-lueh* do not mention at all, or only in passing. Yet, as enlightening as the *Man-chou chiu-tang* is in many ways, it still lacks a great deal of desirable information. The material relating to the period before 1621 is scanty, leaving unanswered many questions about the functioning of the government and the early relationship between the Manchus and Chinese. The years between 1621 and 1636 are covered in more detail, but here too there are gaps; and the source contains no records at all for the period after 1636.

A certain amount of contact between the Manchus and Chinese had taken place throughout the Ming dynasty. During Ming times some Manchus moved into territory inhabited primarily by Chinese and some Chinese into areas with a Manchu population. Except for a relatively small number of enslaved Chinese prisoners and occasional conflicts between Manchus and certain Chinese officials, neither the Chinese nor the Manchus exploited or oppressed the other generally or systematically.[1]

When Nurhaci, the first Manchu khan, conquered several Jurchen tribes around 1600 and organized them into companies (*niru*) and banners (*gusa*), he treated his Jurchen and Chinese subjects equally. Though the Chinese population was small, there seem to have been a few Chinese companies as early as 1614[2] and Chinese could and did obtain high office. The absence of evidence of friction in the Manchu sources between the Manchus and the Chinese during the 1610s cannot be taken as a purposeful omission by the writers of the documents, because Manchu oppression of the Chinese is freely acknowledged a few years later. It is much more likely that the relatively easy relationship was the result of the fact that the free Chinese who lived among the Manchus at this time were there out of their own will, had not been subjected to Manchu rule by force or intimidation, and in many ways were considered to have simply "become Manchu." Perhaps the absence of major conflict in the past influenced Nurhaci's thinking after the conquest of Liaotung and led him to believe that Manchus and Chinese could easily live together.

If Nurhaci did in fact think so, he was mistaken. The Liaotung Chinese were not pioneers who had ventured into Manchu territory. They and their land belonged to the Manchu khan because of his military power.

The local officials saw their best chance in submitting, but the low degree holders (*sheng-yuan*) with the support of the people mustered opposition to Manchu rule. Nurhaci's policy initially aimed at equality and it was only after the Manchus showed their dissatisfaction and the Chinese their hostility that the early policy of equality and integration turned into one of separation and discrimination against the Chinese. The Manchu-Chinese relationship was further strained by economic scarcities and the necessity to temporarily house Manchus and Chinese together. A rebellion of the Liaotung Chinese in 1623 led to the abandoning of Manchu-Chinese equality on the official level, and another outbreak of Chinese discontent two years later to a reorganization of the Chinese in the course of which they were distributed to Manchu officials with the status resembling that of slaves.

The death of Nurhaci in 1626 marks a change in the Manchu-Chinese relationship as well as in leadership. Nurhaci's successor, Hung Taiji, again placed the Chinese under their own officials and tried to achieve Chinese equality with the Manchus through separation. The reason for Hung Taiji's renewed emphasis on Chinese equality must be found in his need for Chinese political support. Hung Taiji was not the heir-apparent under Nurhaci but usurped the throne. His title therefore should not be Huang Taiji, which is a later revision, but rather Hung Taiji, as it appears in the *Man-chou chiu-tang* and in at least two Korean sources. The title Hung Taiji almost certainly comes from the Mongolian though the meaning of the word *Hung* is not entirely clear. The origin of the name Abahai, commonly used in Western literature for Hung Taiji, has as yet not been established.[3]

In addition to a renewed effort to improve the status of the Chinese, another difference between the reigns of the two khans suggests a breaking point between Nurhaci's and Hung Taiji's reigns. While under Nurhaci most of the Chinese officials surrendering or submitting to the Manchus were of low rank. Hung Taiji appealed especially to the Chinese of high official rank. He did so with great success, partly because he was far more willing to make selective accommodations to Chinese culture and custom than his father had been.

From Integration to Segregation (1619–1626)

The period between 1619 and 1621 was one of conquest and rapid expansion. Already in 1618 Nurhaci had attacked the city of Fushun and induced its commander to surrender. In 1619 the Manchus fought a decisive victory over the Ming and their Korean allies at Sarhu, a victory followed by others at Shen-yang. Liao-yang, T'ieh-ling, and K'ai-yuan. The fall of Liao-yang in 1621 precipitated the surrender of most of the Liaotung peninsula. Nurhaci planned to head toward the strategic Shan-hai-kuan in 1623–24, but domestic problems demanded his attention and the presence of his troops in Liaotung.

At the time of the Liaotung conquest. Nurhaci already seems to have conceived of the possibility of expanding into China and setting up a Manchu dynasty in Peking, though on the basis of the present research it is impossible to determine how much of China he hoped or expected to win. Nurhaci's political ambition is apparent in his setting up the Latter Chin dynasty in 1616, reminding everyone of the parallel between the earlier Chin dynasty, which once controlled Northern China, and the latest developments in Manchuria. His ambition to become emperor also lies behind his interpretation of natural phenomena, such as heavenly omens which proved that Heaven supported him instead of the Ming, and in his propaganda in general.

Strange lines of light in the sky were said to have appeared in 1612 and 1614. They supposedly occurred twice in 1615 as a proper prelude to the establishment of the Latter Chin state in 1616.[4] But the notion that the emperor is endowed by Heaven and receives Heaven's approval or disapproval was adopted by the Manchus with the greatest zeal at the beginning of the period of conquest. During the year 1618 an overwhelming number of reports of such heavenly signs aided the Manchus and the Chinese both to gradually become used to the idea that a dynastic change was drawing near. Lines of light in the sky appeared nearly every month, once staying for the length of an entire month.[5] At other times, Nurhaci's scholarly aide Erdeni interpreted good weather or a rainstorm as having been sent by Heaven to facilitate Manchu victories.[6] Because the Manchus may not have begun writing the documents now collected in the *Manchou chiutang* until 1618, the records for the earlier years seem to have been written from recollection of the events. References to heavenly omens before 1618 therefore may have been construed later. The phenomena recorded for 1618, however, most likely occurred in some form and were interpreted in the above way at that time.

Propaganda through oral or written statements or through exemplary behavior was designed to win the support of the Chinese and prepare them for Manchu rule. If Nurhaci had any hopes of setting up a Chinese empire of whatever size, he had to work out a passable relationship with the Chinese. By offering a better life to the common people through a redistribution of land and wealth, and by promising to set up a just, capable, and corruption-free government not based on hereditary privileges but on the selection of the truly selfless, Nurhaci tried to convince the Chinese inside and outside the Manchu borders that he possessed the traditional qualities to be the founder of a new dynasty. Against the background of the conditions in China, where the agricultural population was harassed by harsh landlords, corrupt officials, and marauding troops and bandits, Manchu propaganda could probably hope for some results, though it is impossible to measure the degree of its success.

After the annexation of Liaotung, the Manchu government issued a statement inviting the people of Liao-hsi, the area west of the Liaotung River, to move to Liaotung and become free and equal landowners: "Do not think that the land and houses will not be yours, that they will belong to a master. All will equally be the khan's subjects and will live and work the fields on an equal basis."[7] The khan sent messengers to all villages to tell the people that "instead of letting the rich accumulate their grain and have it rot away, or letting them pile up the goods for no use, one should nourish the begging poor."[8] Especially during the period of 1618–21, but also later, the Manchus were constantly aware of the effect their policies toward the conquered and submitted people had on the population beyond the temporary borders. After a tour of inspection. Nurhaci instructed his supreme judges (*tu-t'ang*) never to maltreat the Chinese newcomers, steal their clothing, or separate their families, and to take extreme care to establish a good reputation by thoroughly investigating "the people who talk ill about us," because "if the people of Kuang-ning hear it they will not submit."[9]

The Manchu troops had to observe strict discipline. For example, after the surrender of the city of Hai-chou, the soldiers were forbidden to dismount from their horses in the villages through which they passed, lest they rob or harm the population. Even the Manchu princes (the *beiles*) who rode into the city in the company of a few selected troops, dismounted only in front of the yamen, demonstrating a well-disciplined take-over. One or two soldiers who did venture to steal something were caught and punished, and a few among the soldiers who through carelessness finished their rations of grain on the way, were not allowed to take anything from the country but had to go hungry.[10]

Manchu military power undoubtedly played a major part in frightening the people into submission, but the Manchus' efforts to attract the people may also have elicited some positive response. No throngs of people answered the invitation to come to the Manchu-occupied territory. Even a voluntary surrender was degrading in that it required the people to submit with shaven heads to the town authorities and to kowtow to the khan, but when it was a question of actually resisting the invading Manchus or quietly surrendering to them, the latter choice was often taken. Thus the officials of Hai-chou and Kuang-ning welcomed the Manchu liberators in the traditional way, with flutes and drums.[11] The *Man-chou chiu-tang* also lists a great many Mongols who voluntarily joined the Manchus.

Having people submit was important to the spread of the idea that the Manchus were about to set up an empire, for along with the idea of a heavenly mandate goes the notion that a benevolent ruler attracts the people from afar. While history provided ample evidence that non-Chinese felt attracted to China and settled within its borders, the Manchus considered it a unique case that the direction of attraction was now reversed. "There is no precedent to Chinese people going over to another country but [because] they have heard that we take good care of our people, they have come to us to submit."[12] The well-being of the Chinese under the Manchus retained a high propaganda value even in times of economic crisis. In 1623, a year of economic hardship, the Manchu government took special care to provide the Chinese newcomers with grain.[13]

Another aspect of Manchu propaganda promised the appointment or promotion of capable officials regardless of social rank.[14] Propaganda and a proper treatment of the Chinese people and their officials formed a preparatory step to the establishment of a Manchu empire. The intention to pass through the Shan-hai-kuan and enter China appears as early as 1622, when Nurhaci warned the Chinese fleeing before his approaching Manchu troops in the Kuang-ning area: "Come out of hiding and down from the mountains, because even if you go inside Shan-hai-kuan ... my great army will enter Shan-hai-kuan [in 1623–24]."[15]

There is no indication that expansion as a goal was ever abandoned at any time. In 1627, when the Manchu army was about to invade Korea, the Chinese memorialist Yueh Ch'i-luan advised the khan not to undertake the campaign to Korea, which would leave Liaotung under insufficient military protection, and urged him to return the Liaotung Chinese to China and make peace with the Ming government. Yueh Ch'i-luan predicted that otherwise the Manchu people would perish or be scattered. The khan's response left no doubt about his firm intention to continue a policy of expansion and about his view of peace negotiations with the Ming as a temporary, expedient measure only: "If the Chinese send someone to negotiate peace with us, let us obtain gold, silver, and silk and get

our escapees back. It will be a peace in name only. Why should we return the Chinese, whom Heaven has given to us?"[16] The fact that Yueh Ch'i-luan was killed by enraged Chinese officials under the khan instead of by the khan's order does not change the meaning of the event: peaceful coexistence with China was no longer a possibility under consideration.

After the conquest of Liaotung, the Chinese entered into all tiers of society. There were slaves and servants, registered households, and Chinese in high positions. Before the conquest the Chinese slaves (*aha*) or bondservants (*booi niyalma*, lit.: "person of the household") were the private property of their master, who had complete power over them. If the master chose to kill them, he was responsible to no one. After the conquest of Liaotung, the social status of the Chinese servant class became more differentiated, but there is little information on the obligations or rights of the various bound people. Some continued to be true slaves, while the bondservants seemed to have been higher in status. The occurrence of the terms "household slave" (*booi aha*), "bondservant" (*booi niyalma*), and "free person of the household" (*sula booi niyalma*) suggests that the status of the Chinese living in Manchu and perhaps in Chinese households ranged from that of slaves to that of free people.[17]

The power of the master to punish and kill his slaves was also limited after the conquest of Liaotung. Years earlier, when a company official killed a woman of his household and another woman from his company on the ground that they were witches, nobody accused him and he received no punishment. But in 1623, after he maltreated and blinded still another woman, charges were brought against him, and at the same time his former crimes also were disclosed. He lost his rank, was fined a sum of money, and had two women taken away from him in compensation for the two he had killed.[18] By 1623 the master could no longer punish his slaves on his own authority but was required to report any crime committed by a slave to the official in charge. A certain master who did punish a Chinese woman of his household (*booi nikan hehe*) on his own authority received thirty lashes.[19]

The khan decreed that the master-slave relationship should become a more paternal one: the master should love the slave, and the slave should love the master.[20] Although the decree described an idealized picture of a paternal master and not reality, its importance lies in the mere fact that a publicized legal guideline for the master-servant relationship existed. Servants could also report their masters for illegal conduct. Depending on the severity of the offense, the servant could be taken away and given to another master.[21] If the servant knew of and reported traitorous activities on the part of his master, he could even receive the reward of freedom. The slaves were originally people captured in battle and subsequently awarded (*shang* or *tz'u*) to the military leaders and soldiers who had participated in a particular campaign. But the misfortune of holding slave status was not always a consequence of previous resistance on the battlefield. On at least one occasion, households with a designated amount of grain per person were made free, while those with less were enslaved.[22]

The origin of the people receiving the status of bondservant (*booi niyalma*) in the 1620s and 1630s is not entirely clear. Quite likely they were the people whom the khan gave (*buhe*) to imperial relatives,[23] to companies,[24] and to officials of all ranks to provide for them in lieu of salary.[25] In those cases the master could draw a fixed amount of revenue from a given number of people.[26] In referring to the Chinese so distributed, however, the Manchu source usually does not use the term *booi niyalma*, but *aha*, and the Chinese sources use *chuang-ting* or *ting*—all terms which translate as "free able-bodied man." The *K'ai-kuo fang-lueh* and the *Shih-lu*, in recording an address which the khan made to the Chinese officials in 1634 reproaching them for the excessively high number of Chinese belonging to them, refer to these Chinese as servants (*nu-p'u*) in introducing the khan's speech, but in quoting the khan's words use the term *ting*.[27] Unfortunately, there is no Manchu version of the address, because quite possibly the ambivalence in the Chinese text arose from the lack of a proper Chinese translation for *booi niyalma*, whose status was one between *nu-p'u* and *ting*.

At some point—the date still needs to be established—the khan and the beiles organized their bondservants into companies (*booi niru*) and the Manchu word *booi* was transliterated into Chinese as *pao-i*. The *Shih-lu* notes that a census held in 1630 also counted the number of people in the bondservant companies (*booi niru*), but this may well have been a misconception dating from the later period when the *Shih-lu* was written and the bondservants were formally organized into companies. It does not necessarily mean that the bondservants of 1630 also formed bondservant companies. The ambivalent use of the terms *nu-p'u* and *ting* for the same group of people, as well as the absence of the term *booi niru* in the *Man-chou chiu-tang*, command caution about reading the existence and importance of bondservant companies of the postconquest time back into the period before 1636.

The large Chinese population of Liaotung, which had surrendered to the Manchus, were registered as households and administered by Chinese officials after the conquest. With the major exception of Li Yung-fang, the commander of Fu-shun, who surrendered in 1618, the officials under Nurhaci had not been high-ranking officials under the Ming. A list of officials taken over or appointed by the Manchus shows that the majority of the new officials were people who had held very low-level official positions or none at all. However, this may not be an accurate indication of the actual standing of these people in Ming Liaotung. The three names at the top of the list who received the highest ranks. T'ung Yang-hsing, Aita, and T'ung Yen, had no previous office listed. But Aita is not a Chinese name, and the other two were members of a famous Liao-tung military family whose relations with the Manchus went back to 1616 or earlier. Higher-ranking Chinese officials, closer to the mainstream of the Ming bureaucracy, would not be attracted by the idea of service under rulers who were largely unfamiliar with the Chinese language, economically and politically below Chinese standards, and had very different customs, food, clothing, and so on. Also, Nurhaci believed that high officials taken over from the Ming were less likely to be loyal than those who were appointed or promoted by the Manchus, those owing their rise to the new rulers. Some Chinese officials apparently were attached to the Manchu banners, but those of high rank, like T'ung Yang-hsing and Aita, who were in command of large numbers of Chinese, were directly under the central government.

Although the surrender of the officials generally also meant the surrender of the population under their administration, opposition by the Chinese people to Manchu rule appeared almost immediately after the conquest. Some city dwellers burnt their possessions in preparation for their escape. They were sent to the countryside and ordered to till the fields. Others tried to poison their conquerors.[28] The circumstances of poisoning in Hai-chou show that the common people had a very different attitude from the Chinese officials and local gentry, for while the officials and members of the gentry (*ba-i bayasa*) were greeting the arriving Manchus and entertaining them in the yamen, the people poisoned the wells outside. There are also frequent references to the Manchus being given poisoned foods. Indeed, the Manchus were at a loss to discover the culprits, and had to resort to taking a multiple number of precautions in order to avoid being poisoned.[29] The extent and variety of poisonings showed that many Chinese participated in the opposition. Judging from the later developments, the low-degree holders (*sheng-yuan*) may have been behind the popular opposition, but at the time of the conquest there is only one indication that this might have been so: when the Manchu troops under the leadership of Aita reached Chin-chou (2) in the south of the Liaotung peninsula, all but two *sheng-yuan*, apparently of a large number, had fled to the nearby islands.[30]

In order to secure Liaotung and prevent the Chinese from escaping, the Manchus settled and guarded the borders. They occupied the houses of the Chinese residents along the borders and moved the Chinese inward away from the border or to the north, which the Manchus had left empty when they moved south.[31] Nurhaci also planned to concentrate the Chinese into larger towns and cities which could be easily defended against the enemy and where the people could be kept from escaping.[32] When the officials made preparations to distribute Chinese land and houses among the Manchus, the Chinese requested that they be allowed to stay where they were and just share their houses, land, and food with the Manchus. "We are all subjects of the same khan. Let us live together and eat together. Why should we move?"[33] Their readiness to suffer a Manchu family to share their property may have been due to an official statement—an unfounded statement as it turned out—that the concentration of the people in the towns was meant to last only for one winter, for at the time the Manchu troops were on a campaign to Liao-hsi and could not leave enough soldiers behind to guard all places in the countryside.[34] Less than a month after the request, cooccupant living began in several areas. Manchus and Chinese lived, ate, and worked together.[35] The policy of cohabitancy was a primarily economic measure. The Manchus had their food supply secured without requiring transportation. The cooperative work was also expected to be more economical, since more could be accomplished in less time.[36] In addition, cooccupant living could also serve as a form of control over the individual Chinese household and give the Manchus, living with the more agriculturally skilled Chinese, a thorough training in agricultural work.

For the first winter 1621/22, just after the Manchus had moved into Liaotung and proceeded on to Liao-hsi, they had no grain reserves, and the Manchus received a monthly allowance of grain taken from the Chinese. According to the initial arrangement, only the Manchus were alloted four piculs (*sin*) of grain per month.[37] Many Chinese were probably left with less than that amount per capita for themselves. Therefore, only a month later a decree order that the Chinese be given equal rations.[38] To prevent either side from cheating the other in appropriating grain for themselves, both Manchus and Chinese were to be present when the stored grain was taken out.[39] In order to equalize the economic burden over the entire population—the cooccupant households were confined to the areas surrounding Liaotung—those Chinese not living together with Manchus had to compensate by giving more grain or making other contributions.[40]

The rationing of grain was an emergency measure only. The following year the Manchu government promised a redistribution of all land, giving each adult man five *cimari* (1 *cimari* equals 6 *mu* or about one acre).[41] There is no conclusive evidence that the promised redistribution of land did take place in 1623, but well into the 1630s it was a well-known law—though not always successfully implemented by the individual officials—that each adult man should have five *cimari* of land.[42]

Previously the tax system had been based on the banner organization, and each company had supplied ten men to cultivate public lands for government revenue. Now it was changed and made applicable to the Chinese outside the banner organization. Three men were to work one *cimari* of land jointly as *alban* (*alban*=public, corvée).[43] The grain tax was the same for Manchus and Chinese and remained the same after doubling a year later, bringing it to about 13 percent of the harvest.[44] The grain tax was not the only demand the government made on its subjects. The people had other corvée duties, but until this time there are no indications that according to the laws the Chinese received less land or paid higher taxes than the Manchus.

In 1622 free land that could be cultivated in the east, namely Liaotung, was no longer plentiful. There was still free land around Fu-shun, but the other parts of Liaotung were filled up: "The land is extremely scarce. There are people who say that even if we till there [around Fu-shun] there will not be enough because the land is too small. Old or new people, if willing, should go to Shen-yang, Pu-ho, I-lu, and Fan-ho [places along the Liaotung River north of Shen-yang]. In Fu-shun the land is plentiful."[45] In addition to the original Chinese population. Liaotung had already absorbed the Manchu population and many Chinese prisoners brought in from outside. After the campaign into Liao-hsi in the winter of 1621/22, more Chinese, especially from the Kuang-ning area in Liao-hsi, were moved to Liaotung. When they arrived in Liaotung many of them could not be given land but had to be taken in by Liaotung families and also live in units of two households. Thus, instead of the cooccupant households being dissolved as had been promised, more were formed. The basic economic difficulties resulting from the sudden increase of population in Liaotung were aggravated by the disruption caused by the moves. Grain shortages, already evident before the moves, became increasingly serious: during the summer of 1623 there was no salt, food was scarce, and famine occurred.[46]

In addition to the poor economic conditions, serious trouble stemmed from the attitude of the Manchus toward the Chinese. The policy of cooccupancy and Chinese equality was at variance with the expectations of the Manchu military officials and soldiers who saw themselves as conquerors and the Chinese as the conquered. Instances of Manchus oppressing and robbing the Chinese were numerous. In one case, the fishbuyers from the khan's own household slaughtered and ate Chinese livestock at will. They even killed some Chinese and took their clothing and horses. To demonstrate that standards of right and wrong applied to everyone. Nurhaci had the leader of the fishbuyers executed and punished the other participants.[47]

The Manchus living with the Chinese in cooccupant units frequently regarded their Chinese household not as equal partners but as servants. They freely used the oxen of their Chinese family, had the Chinese transport grain and grass on their carts for them, sent them on errands, or even had the women do the household chores for them.[48] Because of this attitude of the Manchu people it was necessary to reduce the scope of cohabitation from a social and working unit to a primarily social one: Manchu and Chinese households should still live and eat together, but they should work separately, working different parts of the land with separate animals.[49] Nurhaci also set up a series of particular rules. Manchus were not to oppress the Chinese, and not to steal anything from them. If a Manchu inflicted any harm on a Chinese, the Chinese had the right to file an accusation, and two judges—the source does not specify whether one of the judges was Chinese—were to decide the case; judgment had to be unanimous. A further general order made it "illegal" to live in discord with one's cooccupant partner.[50] Nevertheless, Manchu oppression persisted and Chinese complaints did little to change the situation. The various rules concerning the Manchu-Chinese relationship, trying to make cooccupant living a successful arrangement, show that Nurhaci recognized that the Manchus were to blame for most of the difficulties. Even though the Manchus had come as conquerors, he tried to force them into line in order to protect the Chinese.

Economic distress and Manchu oppression led to an open rebellion of the Chinese throughout Liaotung in 1623. The first signs came in the form of a series of simultaneous fires around Kuang-ning.[51] A month later poisoning became prominent once more. Chinese invited Manchus into their homes where they poisoned them with wine. Other Chinese stole grain from grain collectors, killed Manchus, and then went into hiding in the mountains.[52] In some cases, the Chinese killed border guards and watchtower personnel and escaped across the southern border.[53] In one case, as many as two hundred people tried to escape, but the Manchu troops caught them and killed the men.[54] In Yao-chou the Chinese killed Manchu women and children as soon as the soldiers had left.[55] During this time of revolt many officials received rewards for catching spies, which suggests that Chinese unrest under the Manchus may have been connected with Ming plans for a military offensive.[56]

The Manchus suppressed the rebellion easily, but the 1623 revolt marks the turning point for the policy of Manchu-Chinese integration and equality. Just before the revolt there was another instance of Manchus being punished for robbing Chinese.[57] It is the last entry of its kind for several years. During the time of the revolts the policy of integration began to be reversed: Manchu cavalry members and patrolmen were forbidden to visit Chinese homes and soldiers were warned that there was danger they might be beaten by the Chinese and therefore "should be on their guard day and night and not associate with the Chinese of the villages."[58]

The existing cooccupant living arrangements between Manchus and Chinese were not yet terminated, but from this time on no new ones were created. Certain returning troops received instructions "to go back where they had come from but not to live with the Chinese, but in different places."[59] In the moves of the households from the countryside into the towns, Manchus and Chinese for the first time were assigned separate quarters of the town. Later, Manchus were forbidden to enter the Chinese streets.[60] The clearest indication that Manchu-Chinese integration and equality were officially abandoned at this time were the new regulations concerning weapons.[61] It was illegal for the Chinese to possess weapons, while the Manchus were expected always to carry them, an unmistakable sign that one was master and the other subject.

The change from a policy of integration to one of segregation and discrimination also affected the high officialdom. There had been no discrimination against Chinese officials immediately after the conquest of Liaotung. Both Manchus and Chinese officials were in charge of Chinese subjects and received the same amounts when awards were given according to rank.[62] But as is seen from one case recorded in the *Man-chou chiu-tang* in great detail, the attitudes of the Manchu people impeded the performance of the Chinese officials just as they caused the failure of cohabitancy. After a Chinese subject sent in a complaint about being oppressed by his Manchu cooccupant household, the Chinese official in charge sent several messengers to the Manchu in question reminding him of the khan's edicts forbidding the maltreatment of Chinese. The Manchu thereupon refused to obey the Chinese high official, bound and beat the messengers, and destroyed the letter.[63] Although this case receives a somewhat lengthy treatment and therefore may have been special, still one suspects that there must have been many more cases of similar behavior which either escaped official notice or were not important enough to be included in the records.

With the outbreak of the 1623 revolts, Manchu-Chinese equality on the level of the officials was secretly abandoned. Because of its importance, Nurhaci's statement is quoted in full:

> Let us make all our beiles and officials live happily. If I [the khan] am now angry and spit into your faces, it is because your [the beiles' and Manchu high officials'] way of judging crimes is wrong. Why do you let the Chinese in high positions be equal to you? If a Manchu has committed some crime, look for his merits. Ask what he has accomplished. If there is any little reason, use it as a pretext to pardon him. If a Chinese committed some crime deserving capital punishment, if he did not make an all-out effort as he should, or stole things, why not kill him and all his decendants and relatives instead of letting him get away with a beating? Judge those Chinese who have been with us since Fe Ala [i.e. before 1619] on the same basis as the Jušens [i.e. Manchus]. Once a sentence has been decided upon, you cannot change it again. It is like a mule that does not know how to go backwards. You eight beiles read this letter in secret to the beiles and officials of the various banners. Do not let the people hear it. Do you not know that they [the Chinese] have killed and poisoned our women and children at Yao-chou after our troops left?[65]

Segregation on the psychological level took place simultaneously. It was remembered and written into the record that not only Chinese officials but also people without any rank had treated the Manchus in a haughty manner before the Manchus were in power. The Chinese were said to have freely entered the homes of Manchu nobles and behaved like masters. In comparison, since "we [the Manchus] obtained Liaotung, the Chinese haughtiness has been entirely dispelled."[66]

Separating the Chinese from the Manchu soldiers and keeping them apart in separate quarters of the towns probably eliminated some Manchu-Chinese friction among the people, but the new segregation, and the officially tolerated and secretly practiced discrimination against the Chinese, must have incited the opposition of the educated Chinese outside the Manchu officialdom. During the ninth lunar month of 1625 the most serious Chinese revolt of the pre-1644 period occurred. The Chinese killed Manchu soldiers, messengers, and people. They captured a Chinese official appointed by the Manchus and sent him to the Ming, but most of all they sought ways to escape themselves. They recruited soldiers or sent messengers to the Ming army asking them to come and safeguard their journey back to the Chinese side.[67] Since the Ming defeat at Sarhû in 1618, the Chinese had been making efforts to recover lost territory. However, since the uprising of the Chinese under the Manchus was again easily suppressed even with simultaneous Ming advances, one must assume that without outside activity there was no chance for a successful Chinese uprising under the Manchus.

In dealing with the 1625 uprising the Manchus distinguished between two main groups of people: one group consisted of people who had been low officials under the Ming but held no office under the Manchus, or low-degree holders, who were blamed for having incited the people to revolt; the other group, the common people in general, were considered to have been innocent, not to have harbored spies, and not to have made plans to escape. But even if this latter group had not been evil in themselves, neither had they shown themselves to be reliable. To cleanse the state of all rebellious elements, a nationwide purge took place in the eleventh lunar month of 1625. All Chinese people and officials, even in the areas where no open revolts had occurred, were investigated thoroughly. Many people and a large number of intellectuals (*saisa*) and low-degree holders were killed.[68]

Along with the purge came a new form of organization for the Chinese, the *tokso*. The term *tokso*, referring to imperial grants of cultivated land and people, had been in existence for some time. Before 1625 the number of men per *tokso* was not fixed,[69] but the creation of *tokso* on a large scale after the 1625 revolts brought standardization. The new *tokso* consisted of thirteen Chinese households under a Chinese headman (*jangturi*); they were administered by Manchu banner officials and thus belonged to one of the eight Manchu banners.[70] Each *tokso* owned seven oxen and worked one hundred *cimari* of land, eighty for their own sustenance and twenty as *alban*, which meant a tax increase from 13 percent of the harvest in 1623 to 20 percent in 1625. Nothing is known about a comparable tax increase for the Manchus; the 1625 increase seems to have been a vindictive measure against the Chinese after their revolt.

The organization into *tokso* existed for the remaining one and a half years of Nurhaci's reign. After Nurhaci's death in September 1626, Hung Taiji stated that the Chinese of the *tokso* had previously been given to the Manchu officials as slaves. "Because the khan [Hung Taiji] feared that the Chinese would be maltreated if they remained under Manchu officials for long, he abolished the *tokso* which had previously registered the submitted and surrendered people into units of thirteen men and which had distributed them as slaves to the Manchu high officials."[71] Hung Taiji's statement has often been cited to show that the Chinese under Nurhaci were slaves. However, as has been shown above, at least until the 1625 revolt most of the Chinese were not slaves. Even after 1625 they were not slaves, although they may have been *treated* as such by the Manchu officials. It is possible that Hung Taiji exaggerated the low position of the Chinese under Nurhaci in order to style himself their liberator.

Separation: An Approach to Equality? (1626–1636)

Hung Taiji (often later referred to as "Abahai"), the eighth son of Nurhaci, was not the recognized heir-apparent under Nurhaci, and although the exact circumstances under which he usurped power are not clear, he did not win the throne by the common consent of his brothers.[72] During his reign he encountered political opposition from his cousin Amin and his brothers Manggultai and Daišan, the three beiles (princes) who, together with Hung Taiji, had been the four most powerful men under Nurhaci and were called the Four Senior Beiles. In the struggle for power, the Chinese supported the khan and urged him to bolster his position against the beiles through political and economic measures. They advised the khan that booty from campaigns should no longer be divided equally among the leadership of the eight banners, the Eight Houses, which consisted of the banner beiles and groups of relatives. More booty should go to the central government under the khan than to the beiles, because "even if the beiles thus receive a little less, it is also for their own convenience, and although it may be somewhat troublesome for the khan, it has the benefit that he [the khan] alone is in command of things and receives human hearts."[73] On another occasion a Chinese memorialist warned "if ten sheep have nine shepherds... I feel that within a few years there will definitely be disorder and disunity and one cannot rule."[74] One Chinese official asked that the khan appoint "speaking officials" in order to get more objective information because "they [the speaking officials] will not embellish the mistakes of the beiles."[75]

In a collection of memorials to the khan written by Chinese officials between 1632 and 1635, the Chinese officials frequently urged the khan to take advantage of China's temporary weakness and embark on a major campaign against the Ming. By suggesting specific strategies on how to proceed with the conquest,[76] they showed the firm support of the Chinese officials for the khan's plan to conquer China. Although there are no memorials extant for the later years, quite likely more of a similar nature were written. In 1642 Tsu K'o-fa and Chang Ts'un-jen, two high-ranking Chinese under the Manchus, urged the khan to exploit the Manchu victory over Chin-chou (1) and extend the boundary of the Manchu state to the Yellow River,[77] and when the Manchus under the regent Dorgon entered Shan-hai-kuan in 1644, they did so on the advice of Grand Secretary Fan Wen-ch'eng, a Chinese who had been with the Manchus since 1618.[78]

Why did the Chinese officials so willingly support Hung Taiji? Their active participation suggests that their support was not merely the result of the collapse of the Ming defense in Manchuria, which took away the hopes for liberation of the Liaotung Chinese. Hung Taiji made a conscious effort to appeal to the Chinese official class. In doing so he even accused his father Nurhaci of having violated the basic principles of government by having killed so many Chinese after the 1625 revolt: "The killings of the people of Liaotung was the former khan's fault. I think it would compare to the killing of one body if we had two, or to destroying one head if we had two, at a time when the principles of government (*doro jurgan*) were not understood."[79]

Hung Taiji appealed to the Chinese official class by copying the form of the Ming government. He set up a chancellery (*Shu-fang* or *Wen-kuan*) that developed into a secretariat (*Nei-ko*), the Six Boards (*Liu Pu*) and a censorate (*Tu-ch'a-yuan*), and sinicized the process of official recruitment. Nurhaci had once used a kind of civil service examination,[80] but under Hung Taiji examinations took place on a more regular basis. Even though a frontier area like Manchuria did not produce a high number of degree candidates and the total number of officials recruited in this way was small, the examinations did offer a way to secure an official position.[81] A large group of high Chinese officials entered the Manchu bureaucracy after the siege and victory at Talingho in 1631. They subsequently urged the khan to look for more talent among the educated. The discussions on the matter of recruitment of officials after this time are couched entirely in Chinese terms.[82]

Hung Taiji's main concern was to attract the traditional upright Scholar, but he did not bar people who made other kinds of contributions to the Manchu state from obtaining high official posts. He accepted the surrender of K'ung Yu-te. Keng Chung-ming, and Shang K'o-hsi, K'ung Yu-te and Keng Chung-ming had begun their military careers under Mao Wen-lung, the leader of Chinese resistance against the Manchus, who after the Manchu conquest of Liaotung first withdrew to Korea and then to P'i-tao, a small island located near the mouth of the Yalu River. Later, having been transferred to another superior after Mao Wen-lung's death, they staged their own revolt in Shantung; but when they were pressed by Ming forces they surrendered to the Manchus, bringing with them their military forces and a considerable amount of military equipment. They received the highest possible ranks, and on ceremonial occasions were seated on a level with Hung Taiji's brothers, the beiles Manggultai and Daišan. Shang K'o-hsi had also been stationed on P'i-tao, and after the surrender of K'ung Yu-te and Keng Chung-ming he stayed on for another year, but surrendered in 1634. Like K'ung and Keng, who continued to command their own troops under the Manchus, Shang K'o-hsi retained his army.

Opposition to appointing people who had questionable moral integrity in the Confucian sense was voiced by Hung Taiji's Chinese officiais, who had entered the bureaucracy through the traditional channel of scholarship. Ning Wan-wo, one of the scholarly officials under Hung Taiji, strongly objected to promoting men like K'ung Yu-te and Keng Chung-ming, whom he called "boors without character,"[83] and in 1635 he again pointed to the hazards of recommendations by those without a proper education, particularly if there was no provision for making the sponsor responsible for his protégé.[84] Although K'ung, Keng, and Shang retained their eminent positions, Hung Taiji on the whole did heed the opinions of his Chinese officials. On their advice, amenities traditionally attached to the status of scholars and officials in China found their way into the Manchu system, among them the exemption from corvée. In 1629 each successful candidate in the examinations was allowed exemption from corvée for two adult men. After the later examinations the number of tax-exempt men varied, until in 1638 a regulation fixed the number for each rank.[85]

While Nurhaci had been extremely strict in dealing with the officials who tried to enrich themselves, for example, by hiding illegally acquired animals or secretly keeping refugees, Hung Taiji seems to have been very lax in this respect. No action was taken against officials who were known to occupy more land than they were entitled to and to take the best land, leaving the poor land to the people.[86] Conferring hereditary status or noble rank was another way to reward and please Chinese officialdom. If an official had gone over to the Manchus in time of peace the rank was given to his son and made hereditary; the title was also hereditary if the official was killed in battle for the Manchus or if he died from disease while in office.[87]

Another area in which the Manchu leadership appealed to the Chinese people in general, and to the officials in particular, was in the legal sphere. For several years after the conquest of Liaotung, officials could still receive corporal punishment.[88] Severing or piercing the nose and ears was the most common form of punishment. Nurhaci, immediately after the Manchu entry into Liaotung, had ordered the Chinese to write down the various customary laws of China.[89] After 1631 punishment for killing an escapee, and quite likely also for other crimes, depended on the status of the offender.[90] In 1632 Hung Taiji abolished the law that required the people to report the misconduct of their family members, a law which stood in conflict with the Chinese concept of family relationships. From then on, the obligation of a son to report his father, the wife her husband, and so on, was restricted to serious rebellious behavior; they were not required to report any other matter.[91] Thus, with the incorporation of a sizable Chinese population, Manchu law was adjusted to the Chinese concepts of human relationships.

Because experience had shown that "togetherness" of Manchus and Chinese resulted in Manchu oppression of the Chinese, Hung Taiji tried to emancipate the Chinese through separation. Immediately upon his succession to the throne, he abolished the *tokso*, took the Chinese away from the Manchu officials, and again made them registered households administered by Chinese officials. The Manchu officials retained only a small number of Chinese as private servants.[92] Hung Taiji proclaimed that there should be no discrimination and that all corvée was to be equal.[93]

Chinese and Manchus were also separated in the courts. Chinese judges dealt with the crimes of Chinese, and Manchu judges with those of the Manchus, a policy in line with the desires of the Chinese officials. When Hung Taiji set up the Six Boards in 1631 and Chinese and Manchu legal cases were again handled together by the Board of Punishments, the Chinese approached the khan with the request for a renewed separation of Chinese and Manchu legal affairs to assure impartiality in justice.[94] Unfortunately the khan's response is not known.

The organizational separation of Chinese and Manchus was there to stay. The Chinese remained under their own Chinese officials and in separate quarters in the towns, and in 1630 formed their first independent banner.[95] In that year a census of all adult men took place,[96] and it was probably at this time that the Chinese quota for military service, which had been one out of twenty since the conquest of Liaotung,[97] was increased to one out of ten.[98] Those Chinese who had formerly been attached to the Manchu banners were included in the newly formed Chinese banner.[99] Already in the 1630s the Chinese soldiers had received instruction in the use of cannon.[100] After the Manchus built their own cannon for the first time in 1631, the Chinese banner soldiers continued to be in charge of the heavy artillery and came to be referred to as *ujen cooha* (lit. "heavy troops"). In 1637 the Chinese troops were divided into two and in 1639 into four banners.[101] Additional soldiers were recruited from among the Chinese who surrendered to the Manchus during this time, or even from among the slaves.[102] The last increase that completed the Chinese banner system by creating another four banners was again preceded by an increase in the quota for military service. In 1642 one out of three Chinese became a soldier, a quota which had existed for the Manchus for at least a decade.

As bannermen the Chinese were free people administered by Chinese officials under Chinese commanders who were directly responsible to the central government. But even though Hung Taiji seems to have intended to practice the equality he preached, Chinese equality was limited. An authorized massacre of the Chinese civil population at Yung-p'ing by his cousin Amin came as a major blow. There is reason to believe that Amin, one of the eight beiles in charges of a banner, had from the beginning opposed the incorporation of the Chinese people on a level of equality with the Manchus, that he preferred to undertake campaigns for the sake of booty and to follow a policy which did not aim at political control over the Chinese population.[103] According to the *Tung-hua-lu*, Amin attempted but failed to win independence for himself and his banner after the death of Nurhaci by proposing to move outside the borders of Nurhaci's state.[104]

In 1629, the Manchus occupied four major cities inside the Shan-hai-kuan: Ch'ien-an, Luan-chou, Yung-p'ing, and Tsun-hua. Because Hung Taiji wanted to make these cities model areas of Manchu rule, thus inducing other Chinese to surrender, he ordered that the Chinese of these cities should be treated with extreme care. But "Amin after entering Yung-p'ing detested the Chinese residents and was displeased with the khan's policy of caring for them."[105] He "did not listen [to the other commanders and officials], killed all officials and people of Yung-p'ing and Ch'ien-an, took goods, livestock and women, and considering them [the booty] most important went back."[106] In order to preserve his credibility, the khan made Amin an enemy of the state, and through the mouth of the Beile Yoto, who maintained that "the khan had nothing to do with the crime,"[107] cleared himself for what had happened.

The Manchu-Chinese relationship was further adversely affected by the steadily deteriorating economic conditions. The Manchus faced a chronic lack of food which easily turned into a crisis. With a marginal economy at home the Manchus could not afford to lose battles. "All depends on sending out soldiers and horses and taking booty."[108] Success in campaigns was not merely desirable, it was necessary.

In 1626 the Manchus suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Ming army, a defeat which entailed high expenses without bringing the needed supplementary income. In addition, the aftereffects of the reorganization of the Chinese after the 1625 revolt and again under Hung Taiji, as well as the arrival of a large number of Mongols coming to submit,[109] intensified the economic difficulties. Widespread famine that drove the people to cannibalism occurred in 1627–28[110] and economic hardship continued after the famine was over. While the troops may have relieved the economy somewhat by living temporarily off the enemy countryside and by bringing back booty, in the 1630s the campaigns increasingly added to the economic difficulties, because each time the army returned it brought with it a large number of captives and people who had surrendered. Since the Manchus made no comparative territorial gains—Talingho was taken but the Kuang-ning area remained insecure because of military activities, and Chin-chou (1) and Sung-shan were not conquered until 1642—the population increased out of proportion to the land under cultivation. In theory, the people who submitted were to receive a certain amount of grain for a period of adjustment and later five *cimari* of land per adult man. Reality was different; there was neither enough grain nor enough land for the newcomers. "Nowadays the land is small, but the people are many. . . . As for the incoming grain, there is not even enough to give out [to the newcomers]. The people who have to be fed have lately increased in number. The officials in charge say they have no grain. The granaries are empty."[111]

Many people were suffering because they had less than the official five *cimari* of land.[112] Natural disasters added to the suffering: ". . . the land of the people is small and there is not enough to care for all the people. Moreover, there has been a natural disaster this year (1632): the mulberry trees are all under water. In the villages nine houses out of ten are empty and the people do not have enough to live on."[113] In 1635 the Manchu state was heading into another period of crisis. The price of grain rose sharply and the people hoarded it.[114] In 1637 another famine occurred.[115]

Because there was no empty land to give to the large number of Chinese who entered the Manchu state in the 1630s, the beiles and the officials who had had some of their Chinese taken away when Hung Taiji dissolved the *tokso* after his succession and some when the first Chinese banner was formed, received again an increasing number of Chinese, including many officials. The prisoners and the people who surrendered in the 1630s were assigned not only on the basis of merit, as had earlier been the case, but also according to the ability of the master to care for them. The Eight Houses received the highest number, but other officials and even rich households without official rank had people assigned to them.[116] Chinese officials who had been with the Manchus for some time had to take in and care for newly surrendered officials.[117]

Except for a certain number of people who were given to the beiles personally, most of the people so distributed did not belong to their "masters," who only bore the responsibility for feeding these people but drew little or no benefit from them. Thus some of them neglected their duty. A memorial advising the khan to place the Chinese under the central government likens the Chinese officials under the Eight Houses to the khan's horses:

> Nowadays there are people called officials, which means that they are the people of the court and work for the court. They are like the horses of the khan which are distributed among the different Houses.... Since this [caring for the people] basically is of merit to the beiles, the beiles should nurture them and should be happy to do so. But if these people do not work for the beiles and the beiles care for them for nothing it is difficult for the beiles.... For this reason, if an official happens to be under a beile who understands the emperor's intention, who is happy to nurture the people, he will not have to worry about food and clothing, but if the official happens to be under a beile who does not understand the emperor's intention and who is not happy to care for his people, then he [the official] has to suffer from hunger and cold.... It is because the country's people do not belong to his House. The interest of a given House is not equal to the interest of the country.[118]

Though the economic conditions were such that both the Chinese and the Manchus suffered,[119] it seems likely that the burden was not shared equally and that the Manchus, on an individual basis, continued to oppress the Chinese and tried to shift the economic burden onto them. After the Yung-p'ing massacre, Hung Taiji repeatedly warned the Manchus not to rob and molest the Chinese and reminded the beiles and officials to treat their people well.[120] Not only was a massive killing not permissible, even individual cases of killing and robbing Chinese became capital crimes. Though it is impossible to estimate the extent of Manchu oppression at this time, the khan's admonitions and the new law indicate that the Manchus still tended to regard themselves as above the Chinese. Unfortunately there is no information on the amount of taxes levied during Hung Taiji's reign. We only know that labor services were different for the Chinese and Manchus. When the Chinese officials complained that their corvée was heavier than that of the Manchus, the khan grew very impatient and replied that the Manchus had a much larger variety of services to fulfill and that their corvée was even heavier than that of the Chinese.[121] This may have been true.

About 1636 Hung Taiji's attitude toward the Chinese underwent a change. The near-equality did not turn into discrimination as in 1623–25, but nevertheless Hung Taiji's focus of concern noticeably shifted from the Chinese to the Manchus. The main factor behind this development was an awareness of a weakening in Manchu fighting power.

Already in 1635 it was clear that the military fighting power suffered from the weaknesses of the economy. The government lacked adequate provisions for the army,[122] and some later campaigns may have been cover-up operations to procure food for the soldiers.[123] The poverty of the people also affected the quality of the individual soldiers: "If one pursues the enemy more than two thousand *li* the rich who have [good] horses can still proceed, but the horses of the poor are tired and fall behind."[124] The Chinese contingent of The Manchu army increased numerically from one banner in 1630 to eight banners in 1642, but the quality of the Chinese soldiers left something to be desired. When the Chinese banner soldiers were first used in 1630 to guard Yung-p'ing, each soldier had a sign with the words "new soldier" attached to his back, indicating that the Manchus felt they had to watch these recruits extra carefully.[125] After the Chinese had participated in battles more extensively, there was little doubt that their military performance was inferior to that of the Manchus. The khan rebuked them severely for looking on while the Manchu troops courageously faced death in battle.[126] The Chinese soldiers were also reprimanded for the evil practice of using inferior substitutes to do the fighting,[127] and on several occasions Hung Taiji accused the Chinese officials of harboring bipartisan feelings.[128] Although there is no question that the Chinese were extremely important to the Manchu army because of their skill in the use of cannon, it seems that the increase in the numerical strength of the Chinese banner forces does not represent a proportional increase in the military strength of the Manchu army as a whole.

The awareness that the martial qualities of the Manchus themselves suffered from exposure to Chinese civilization and from contact with undisciplined Mongol troops weighed on the khan's mind, perhaps even more heavily than the military weakness that resulted from lack of provisions and from the inferior quality of the Chinese banners. Even the Manchus sent flunkies to go on duty in their stead. "Before we had set up rules to prevent disorder. But now disorder is abundant. When twenty soldiers go somewhere [on duty], twenty flunkies (*uksin kutule*) are expected to go with them, when fifteen soldiers go fifteen flunkies should go. But if one looks at the situation now, one discovers that the soldiers stay in camp and just let the flunkies go."[129] In 1631 Hung Taiji still claimed that Amin had committed his crime of killing the Chinese at Yung-p'ing because "he did not study and did not know the principles,"[130] but in 1636 the very acquaintance with Chinese civilization was blamed for the Manchus' weakness. Instead of being interested in going hunting as the older generation had been when they were young, young people preferred to "hang around the marketplaces and simply amuse themselves."[131] So far the military weakness of the Manchus had not yet progressed to such a degree as to make hopeless any further attempt to conquer China. But the realization of a gradual loss of strength made an immediate conquest of China urgent. Time was not in the Manchus' favor and Hung Taiji knew it.

While some Manchus easily submitted to the lure of Chinese civilization, others—Amin had been the most well-known and the most powerful representative of this group—resisted Chinese influence and resented Hung Taiji's efforts to appeal to the Chinese. They complained that "formerly T'ai-tsu (Nurhaci) executed the Chinese and favored the Manchus. Now there are even some *wangs* and *tsung-ping-kuan* (military generals) among the Chinese [in fact, there also were Chinese *tsung-ping-kuan* under Nurhaci!—e.g. T'ung Yang-hsing], and among the imperial relatives there are some officials and some commoners. How could we fall this low?"[132] Because of the crucial importance of the Manchu banners in a possible conquest of China, Hung Taiji after 1636 paid more attention to the wishes and likes of the more traditionally minded and still more martial group among the Manchus and, in addressing the Manchus, emphasized the importance of the traditional Manchu qualities.[133] In 1631 he had ordered that all sons of Chinese and Manchu officials should study.[134] However, the Manchus considered such study as "something extremely bitter," and there is no indication that Hung Taiji ever tried to enforce a Chinese education on the Manchus. Most significantly, the large number of high counseling officials whom Hung Taiji appointed after 1636 were all Manchu.[135]

Hung Taiji could afford to stop actively courting Chinese officials because by 1636 he had eliminated his political opponents, the three Senior Beiles, and power rested securely in his hands. Amin was in prison where he died in 1640.[136] Manggultai, who had plotted against the khan in 1633, had died (or possibly was executed) in that year.[137] Daišan was intimidated by Hung Taiji, who accused him in 1635 of having committed a crime similar to that of Amin thereby indirectly threatening Daišan that he, like Amin, might be eliminated as a rival and put into prison.[138]

In 1636 Hung Taiji had himself made emperor and assumed the name Ch'ing for his dynasty. Thus, as far as the domestic political scene was concerned, Hung Taiji sat firmly on the throne. Though China was still unconquered and the khan continued to welcome Chinese expertise and advice, the Chinese were no longer necessary as political support against Hung Taiji's internal rivals.

Conclusion

There is little information on the Manchu-Chinese relationship for the period between 1636 and 1644. Until further evidence becomes available, we can make some conjectures about these years on the basis of the official sources and of what is known about the situation around 1635 and 1636. The Chinese remained important to the Manchus for their technical skills, their knowledge of government affairs, and most of all for the building and servicing of the cannon. They were less important politically than before and as soldiers could not be entirely relied on to risk their lives. During the period when Hung Taiji actively appealed to the Chinese official class, he had promoted a fairly large number of Chinese to high posts. Almost all of the great Chinese under the Manchus were people who submitted to the Manchus or gained their prominence during Hung Taiji's reign before 1636. Ma Kuang-yuan, the commander of the Chinese banner after 1632, joined the Manchus in 1630; Liu T'ien-lu, Chang Ts'un-jen, Tsu Tse-hung, and Tsu K'o-fa after Talingho in 1631; K'ung Yu-te, Keng Chung-ming in 1633, and Shang K'o-hsi in 1634. Other prominent names like Shih T'ing-chu, King Wan-wo, and Fan Wen-ch'eng had submitted much earlier but remained relatively unimportant under Nurhaci. Only Hung Taiji promoted them to high office: Shih T'ing-chu became the first commander of the Chinese banner but died in 1632; Fan Wen-ch'eng had joined the Manchus when Fu-shun fell in 1618 but came into the limelight only in 1629, when he invented the story that the Ming commander Yuan Ch'ung-huan was in league with the Manchus, a story which made the Ming emperor suspicious and led to the execution of Yuan Ch'ung-huan. Ning Wan-wo served for years under Sahaliyan, one of Nurhaci's sons, before he was promoted to the Chancellery in 1629.

None of the officials who surrendered after 1636 was of great importance. Shen Chih-hsiang seems to have been the one who was given the greatest attention. It was not until 1642, the siege and conquest of Chin-chou (1) and Sung-shan, that the Manchus achieved the surrender of the two great Ming generals Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou and Tsu Ta-shou. Tsu Ta-shou, in fact had surrendered once before, in 1631, but had then been allowed to return to Chin-chou (1) in order to take the city for the Manchus. He remained in Chin-chou (1) again fighting the Manchus. Hung Taiji did not make special overtures to the two Ming generals in 1642. The surrender of Tsu Ta-shou and Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou was a great political success, but the Manchus probably owed this success more to the desperate situation of the Ming defense than to their own military strength. Even though there is no equivalent to the *Man-chou chiu-tang* for these years to reveal the weaknesses of the Manchus, the record of the official sources is at least suspicious. Time and again the Manchus are said to have won splendid victories, but instead of exploiting the situation and making the final conquest of Peking, their army returned home. It seems probable that the Manchus hoped with all their hearts to make new territorial acquisitions but that their strength was insufficient. The fall of Chin-chou (1) and Sung-shan was a victory that was long overdue.

The Manchus had been fighting over Chin-chou (1) for more than ten years. They had been repulsed many times. The recent reappraisal of Wu San-kuei's surrender by Angela Hsi[139] fits into the interpretation of a weakening Manchu military force. Wu San-kuei did not surrender to the Manchus. According to Hsi, he first singlehandedly defeated an army sent against him by the rebel Li Tzu-ch'eng and then abandoned the strategic Shan-hai-kuan in pursuit of Li Tzu-ch'eng. Thus, the Manchus who were outside the pass could easily enter. Subsequently, being caught between Li Tzu-ch'eng and the Manchus. Wu San-kuei had to negotiate with one of the two. He chose the Manchus. At the time Wu San-kuei decided to join the Manchus he was in command of a good and well-disciplined army. This was exactly what the Manchus needed. Previously when they had fought Wu San-kuei he had repelled them. Unable to defeat Wu alone, the Manchus could never have hoped to defeat a combination of Wu San-kuei and Li Tzu-ch'eng. Only with Wu San-kuei's army could they break the deadlock.

Abbreviations

CT	*Man-chou chiu-tang* (cited by volume and page)
CTPC	[*Ch'in-ting*] *pa-ch'i t'ung-chih*
KKFL	[*Huang-Ch'ing*] *k'ai-kuo fang-lueh*
MR	*Mambun Roto* (cited by volume and page)
THL	*Tung-hud-lu*
Tsou-i	*T'ien-tsung ch'ao ch'en kung tsou-i*

Notes

1. For a general discussion of the Jurchens prior to the rise of Nurhaci, see Morris Rossabi: "The Jurchen in the Yüan and the Ming," manuscript for the Chin Dynastic Project, edited by Herbert Franke, to be published by the University of Washington Press.
2. *Ta-Ch'ing Hui-tien* (Ch'ien-lung reign) and the *CTPC*, p. 3030 record a total of 400 companies for 1614. Thinking of a company as a unit of 300 households, some scholars question the reliability of the *Hui-tien* and the *CTPC* and believe that the passage refers to a later date (Fang Chao-ying: "A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces," *HJAS*, 13:195; cf. also Chao Ch'i-na: "Ch'ing-ch'u pa-ch'i Han-chun yen-chiu," *Ku-kung wen-hsien*, 4.2:55–65. However, it is quite likely that the 400 companies of 1614 were not companies of 300 households but were of a much smaller size, and later were combined to form fewer but larger companies. Nurhaci had created four banners in 1601; in 1615 he completed the banner system by adding another four banners, each consisting of twenty-five companies. He also set the size of a company at 300 households at this time. If in 1615 an average of two small companies were combined to form companies of 300 households, then the total number of 400 companies would be cut in half, accounting for the number needed to make up eight banners. It is probably the fact that these Chinese were, for all practical purposes, considered Manchus; the small number of their companies would explain the infrequent mention of Chinese companies before the establishment of a Chinese banner in 1630. The Chinese companies are mentioned only once (*CT* 5:2172; 2171; *MR* 3:1105–06) in an entry which is undated. According to Li Hsueh-chih's analysis, based on the handwriting and on the paper used, the year was 1623.
3. Li Hsueh-chih and Kuang Lu, "Lao Man-wen yuan-tang," *Annual Bulletin of the China Council for East Asian Studies*, no. 4 (1965), pp. 46–48.
4. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsu) 2:5, 7, 8.
5. *CT* 1:165, 343, 374–77, 383, 387; *MR* 1:81, 103–04, 109, 111–12.
6. *CT* 1:375–76; *MR* 1:103, 106–07.
7. *CT* 2:1086; *MR* 2:579.
8. *CT* 2:725–26; *MR* 1:355–57.
9. *CT* 1:189, 191; *MR* 1:89. *CT* 2:682–83, *MR* 1:334.
10. *CT* 2:633–35; *MR* 1:298–99.
11. Ibid.
12. *CT* 1:553–54; *MR* 1:164–65.
13. *CT* 4:1627; *MR* 2:805.
14. *CT* 2:695–96; *MR* 1:341.
15. *CT* 2:1089; *MR* 2:581–82.
16. *CT* 6:2580–81; *MR* 4:15; and *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung) 2:7b.
17. *CT* 2:1561; *MR* 2:745.
18. *CT* 3:1380–81; *MR* 2:673.
19. *CT* 3:1330; *MR* 2:643.
20. *CT* 2:586–87; *MR* 1:267.
21. *CT* 3:1386, 1485; *MR* 2:677, 753.
22. In 1624, officials were instructed to "send those Chinese households with five to seven Manchu *sin* (1 Manchu *sin* corresponds to 1 Chinese *tou* 8 *sheng*, about 11.9 kg) of grain per capita. One will give them land and houses.... Put together those without grain and inform the khan of their number." (*CT* 4:1790–91; *MR* 2:887–88). Only a few pages further on, the *CT* states that those with less than the standard amount of grain were turned into slaves (*CT* 4:1828; *MR* 2:906).
23. *CT* 4:1829–30, 5:2060; *MR* 2:885, 908–09.
24. *CT* 2:614–15; *MR* 2:795.
25. *CT* 3:1367; *MR* 2:666.
26. *CT* 3:1354–56: *MR* 2:658–59.

27. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung) 17:14b–15; *KKFL* (Hauer transl.), p. 334.
28. *CT* 2:631; *MR* 1:297–98. *CT* 2:680–81, 684–85, 1094; *MR* 1:333, 335, 2:584.
29. *CT* 2:693–94; *MR* 1:340.
30. *CT* 2:702–03; *MR* 1:344–45.
31. CT 3:1412; *MR* 2:697.
32. *CT* 2:805; *MR* 1:407.
33. *CT* 2:806;*MR* 1:407–08.
34. *CT* 2:824; *MR* 1:419.
35. *CT* 2:830–31; *MR* 1:422.
36. *CT* 2:1065; *MR* 2:564.
37. *CT* 2:856: *MR* 1:435.
38. *CT* 2:909; *MR* 2:465–66.
39. *CT* 2:832; *MR* 1:423.
40. *CT* 3:1412; *MR* 2:697, *CT* 2:857, 909; *MR* 1:435, 2:465.
41. *CT* 2:725–26; *MR* 1:356.
42. *CT* 3:1358–59; *MR* 2:660–61.
43. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, p. 7.
44. Before 1623, three Manchus worked one *cimari* of land jointly as alban (*CT* 2:726; *MR* 1:356). Since one *cimari* of land seems to have produced about one *hule* of grain—the Western or Chinese equivalent to one *hule* still needs to be established—every adult man paid one-third of a *hule*. If he in fact had five *cimari* and could grow five *hule*, the tax before 1623 amounted to 6.7 percent of the harvest. Beginning in 1623, a Manchu company consisting of 300 men paid 200 *hule*, while the Chinese administered by Manchu officials paid two *hule* per three men.
45. *CT* 2:1065; *MR* 2:565.
46. *CT* 2:597; 5:2164; *MR* 2:778, 3:1103.
47. *CT* 2:678; *MR* 1:331–32.
48. *CT* 3:1242–45; *MR* 2:609–10.
49. *CT* 2:1081; *MR* 2:575.
50. *CT* 2:830–32; *MR* 1:422–23.
51. *CT* 3:1375–76, 1455, 1474, 5:2040; *MR* 2:671, 728, 742, 759, 772, etc.
52. *CT* 3:1424–25; *MR* 2:706–07.
53. *CT* 3:1451; *MR* 2:726.
54. *CT* 3:1439; *MR* 2:712.
55. *CT* 3:1504; *MR* 2:771–72.
56. *CT* 3:1416–19, 1435; *MR* 2:701–03, 713.
57. *CT* 3:1386; *MR* 2:677.
58. *CT* 3:1451; *MR* 2:726; *CT* 4:1786; *MR* 2:886.
59. *CT* 4:1795; *MR* 2:889.
60. *CT* 4:1647; *MR* 2:819. *CT* 7:3235–36. 3154; *MR* 3:1094, 4:354.
61. *CT* 3:1433–34, 1443–45, 1484–85; *MR* 2:712, 720–22, 752–53.
62. *CT* 2:629–31; *MR* 1:296–97.
63. *CT* 3:1242–45; *MR* 2:609–10.
64. Fe Ala was Nurhaci's capital before 1603. In that year he moved to the nearby Hetu Ala, where he stayed until 1619. Since the *CT* after the conquest of Liaotung frequently refers to the time of Fe Ala but never to Hetu Ala, it seems likely that after 1621 Fe Ala as a time reference includes the period from 1603 to 1619.
65. *CT* 3:1585–87; *MR* 2:771–72.
66. *CT* 4:1846; *MR* 3:954.
67. *CT* 4:1935–38; *MR* 3:991–92.
68. *CT* 4:1938–40; *MR* 3:992–94.
69. *CT* 4:1829–30; *MR* 2:908–09.
70. *CT* 4:1939–40; *MR* 3:993–94.
71. *CTPC* 12:4865. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung) 1:2.

72. According to the *KKFL*, the transition of leadership was smooth and simple. The three Senior Beiles under Daišan's initiative offered the khanship to Hung Taiji, who refused several times before accepting. Franz Michael, accepting the *KKFL* story, writes: "They [the beiles] elected with little delay or difficulty Nurhaci's eighth son, Abahai, as successor" (*The Origin of Manchu Rule in China*, p. 87). According to a *THL* entry for 1626, it was also Daišan who offered the khanship to Hung Taiji, but a later *THL* reference (3:14) records that Amin in 1626 took the initiative in offering Hung Taiji the title of khan in return for a promise to let him (Amin) depart with his banner and be his own master somewhere else. Two Korean sources written about that time have still another version of what happened. The Korean Veritable Records state that Nurhaci, shortly before his death, appointed Daišan to succeed him, but Daisan renounced the throne in favor of Hung Taiji. The other Korean account reports that before his death Nurhaci appointed Daišan to be the regent for a younger brother, Nurhaci's ninth son Abatai, but that Daišan let Hung Taiji take his place (both Korean sources are quoted by Kuang Lu and Li Hsueh-chih, p. 48). In all of the accounts of events in 1626, Daišan was involved, but in view of a conflict between Hung Taiji and Daišan in 1635, it is not impossible that Daišan was pressured into renouncing his claim instead of voluntarily offering the khanship to Hung Taiji.
73. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 11a–b.
74. Ibid., p. 42.
75. Ibid., pt. 2, 3b.
76. Ibid., pt 1, 3–4, 18–19, 17b; pt. 2, 15, 20–22, 34, 37b–39; pt. 3, 9, 13–14, 21b–22.
77. *Ch'ing-shih*, 3:30a.
78. *Ch'ing-shih*, p. 232.
79. *CT* 7:3579; *MR* 5:583.
80. *CT* 4:1940; *MR* 3:994.
81. Periodic examinations were more widespread as a means of evaluation. After 1632 the Chinese officials in local administration or in the Six Boards had to undergo an examination after every three years of government service (*Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih*, 1739 ed., 9:2976, 2980).
82. E.g. *CT* 9:4165–66. *Chiu Man-chou tang*, trans. Kanda Nobuo (Tokyo, 1972), pp. 75–76.
83. *Tsou-i*, pt. 2, 23.
84. *CT* 9:4159. *Chiu Man-chou tang*, pp. 70–71.
85. *CTPC* 14:5687.
86. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 45.
87. *Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih*, 1739 ed., 7:2458.
88. *CT* 3:1286–87; *MR* 2:617.
89. *CT* 2:644; *MR* 1:305–06.
90. *CT* 7:3431; *MR* 5:514–15.
91. *CT* 8:3737; *MR* 5:726.
92. *THL* (T'ien-ts'ung), 1:2a.
93. *CTPC* 12:4865.
94. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 2b.
95. Chao Ch'i-na, pp. 57–58.
96. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung), 7:27b–29.
97. *CT* 2:851, 925–28; *MR* 1:432; 2:474–75.
98. *Tsou-i*, pt. 2, 4b.
99. *KKFL* (Hauer transl.), p. 319.
100. *CT* 2:1073–74;*MR* 2:571.
101. *CTPC* 7:2479–82.
102. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung), 14:32; *CT* 8:3660; *MR* 5:633.
103. Already under Nurhaci, Amin had moved on his own authority from the area assigned to his banner, thus endangering the border defense (*CT* 3:1254–57; *MR* 2:554). In 1627 the Manchus, with Amin as their supreme commander, invaded Korea. After the Korean king had already accepted the Manchus' demands, Amin, against the advice of the

other officers in the field, insisted on proceeding to the Korean capital, which undoubtedly would have yielded a rich booty. It was only because those under his command refused to join him that he gave up his plan (*CT* 7:3309–13; *MR* 4:404). He turned back, but not without getting a minimum of booty by pillaging Korean towns for three days.

104. *THL* (T'ien-ts'ung), 3:14.
105. *CT* 7:3335, 3338; *MR* 4:411–12.
106. *CT* 7:3343–46; *MR* 4:414–15.
107. *CT* 7:3579–80; *MR* 5:583.
108. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 11.
109. *CT* 6:2717; *MR* 4:111.
110. *CT* 6:2685; *MR* 4:87.
111. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 8b–9.
112. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 7.
113. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 22a–b.
114. *CT* 10:5196–97; *MR* 7:1362.
115. *CTPC* 14:5591–95.
116. *THL* (T'ien-ts'ung), 1:37.
117. *Tsou-i*, pt. 2, 27.
118. Ibid., pt. 1, 36b–37.
119. Ibid., p. 33b.
120. T'ao Hsi-sheng, "Man-tsu wei ju-kuan ch'ien ti fu-lu yu hsiang-jen," *Shih-huo*, 2.12:34–36.
121. *Shih-lu* (T'ai-tsung), 17:10b–12. *KKFL* (Hauer transl.), pp. 332–34.
122. *CT* 9:4151. *Chiu Man-chou tung*, p. 64.
123. Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih* (Shanghai, 1927–32), p. 206 ff.
124. *Tsou-i.* pt. 1, 16.
125. *Shih-lu*, (T'ai-tsung), 6:7.
126. *Tsou-i*, pt. 2, 40.
127. *Shih-lu*, (T'ai-tsung), 53:24b, *KKFL* (Hauer transl.), p. 514.
128. Chao Ch'i-na, pp. 60–61.
129. *CT* 7:3565–67; *MR* 5:575.
130. *Man-chou lao-tang pi-lu*, Chin-liang, ed. and trans. (Taipei, 1929), ts'e 2, 34b–35.
131. *CT* 10:4992; *MR* 6:1211.
132. *Shih-lu*, (T'ai-tsung), 64:8. *THL* (Ch'ung-te), 3:37b.
133. *CT* 10:4992–93; *MR* 6:1211–1 2. *KKFL* (Haucr transl.), p. 419.
134. *Tsou-i*, pt. 1, 12b–13.
135. *Ch'ing-shih*, 3:23b, 26b, 27.
136. Ibid., p. 216.
137. Ibid., p. 218.
138. *THL* (T'ien-ts'ung), 2:32–33b.
139. Angela Hsi, "Wu San-kuei in 1644: a Reappraisal," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34.2: 443–453.

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MARITAL POLITICS ON THE MANCHU-MONGOL FRONTIER IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Nicola Di Cosmo

The formative period of Manchu power, and especially the years that preceded the proclamation of the Qing dynasty in 1636, sits uneasily at the intersection between Chinese and Inner Asian history.[1] "Uneasily" in the sense that the focus on overcoming the strictures of a paradigm of sinicization that inserted the Manchus in the line of bona fide Chinese dynasties has not been counterbalanced by a comparable level of attention to the Inner Asian side of the equation. Over the past decade, an extended and at times heated debate has invested matters of identity and sinicization, ritual and representation, acculturation and assimilation, and change and continuity within the Chinese and Inner Asian cultures and traditions that converged in the formation of the Qing dynasty.[2] Yet the linkages between the Inner Asian "grand narrative" and the Manchu conquest remain anchored to notions that, not unlike the sinicization thesis, have a constraining effect on the way in which we tend to conceptualize the rise of an Inner Asian power such as the Manchu.

From the 1930s and 1940s to the present, Owen Lattimore's theoretical contribution has cast a large shadow on China's "frontier studies." Whether one agrees with it or not, Lattimore's analysis of the northern frontier, developed in his *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* and further expounded in a large production of essays and minor works, continues to be the chief single term of reference of current rationalizations of historical relations between China and Inner Asia.[3] The greatest appeal of Lattimore's theories possibly lies in the streamlined, neatly organized, and forcefully argued thesis that the frontier zone was the fountainhead of all Inner Asian "nomadic" dynasties and regimes that emerged as rivals or conquerors of China. Moving away from idealized notions of "civilization versus barbarism," the Great Wall was understood by Lattimore, mainly in geographical and ecological terms, as a transition zone between two mutually exclusive forms of human adaptation to the natural environment. The economic and social forces resulting from these forms of adaptation—agriculture and pastoralism, sedentary farmers, and horse-riding nomads—could not be integrated into a single system. Hence, the frontier became a contested place whose inherent instability accounted for the ebb and flow of nomadic cycles of power.

But it was on the frontier that ambitious Inner Asian leaders could emerge because it was there that they could muster the force needed to create a successful "supratribal" state.[4] To concentrate in one chieftain's hands the power to mobilize large numbers of people from outside one's natural body politic required access to resources from both the steppe and the sedentary areas: horses and riches. The cycle of nomadic power that Lattimore described as the central feature of Inner Asian history therefore could not have materialized without access to the frontier and the material opportunities that it offered.[5]

Lattimore's frontier thesis (or, better, theses) inspired broader studies on frontier relations and had considerable influence outside the fields of Chinese and Inner Asian studies, prompting historians to identify meanings that could be extended to a variety of other frontiers. Particularly appealing was the notion of frontier societies as bodies developing "their own interests quite different from those of the central government. They feel neither bound by the center nor binding the realm. Rather, they represent runaway elements and interests of the state's corporate body."[6] This definition describes well Frederick Wakeman's concepts of transfrontiersmen and frontiersmen as key social forces enabling the consolidation of Manchu power on the northeastern frontier. Frontier societies include both Chinese settlers and "barbarian tribesmen" that could be assimilated on both sides.[7] The Chinese frontiersmen's willingness to cross over to the Inner Asian side was essential to the Manchu conquest, and the possibility of assimilating people on either side of the frontier created the conditions for the expansion of the political space and ambitions of the founders of the Manchu dynasty.

This line of reasoning has notable advantages. For instance, it brings into question the historical circumstances under which the centrifugal pull of the periphery vis-à-vis the centre may be accelerated, thus implicitly working against near-deterministic views of a frontier largely explained in terms of deep ecological and socioeconomic dynamics. Yet, the frontiersmen thesis still needs to be taken with caution since it is essentially based on a representation of the frontier as a soft area between two separate and antagonistic worlds. The existence of a soft matter that can solidify in one form or another does not alter the notion of the Sino-Inner Asian frontier as bipolar and as shaped by opposite-pulling forces.

Clearly, Lattimore's thesis that Inner Asian dynastic founders use both worlds to forge their empires is compatible with Wakeman's frontiersmen thesis, which argues that people living on the frontiers could be easily persuaded to switch camps. But how do we explain the emergence of a Manchu-Mongol conflict, as it unfolded in the 1620s and 1630s and whose resolution required years of war and diplomacy? The concept of a bipolar Sino-Inner Asian frontier tends to screen from the historian's view the existence of other frontiers, mainly because not much attention is paid to the identification of "lines of cleavage" (to borrow Lattimore's term) between Mongols and Manchus.[8] The political scene among the Mongols was perhaps too fluid to permit the formation of clearly demarcated political centres. Moreover, perceived differences in the basic characteristics of the Mongolian and Manchurian economies, the first being more pastoral and the latter more "mixed" (with agriculture and gathering being important elements), must not be exaggerated. The actual economic strength of both areas derived more from the political leaders' ability to exploit trading opportunities with China and to extract payments from border towns than from the intrinsic quality of native economies.[9] Finally, from the cultural point of view, we cannot say that Manchus and Mongols saw themselves as possessing entirely different "identities." There was, of course, awareness of difference, but this was often overcome by a language of commonality.[10] The Manchus were sometimes referred to as "the Mongol nation with red-tasselled hats," referring to the distinctive ornament on the Manchu nobles' hats.[11] In turn, the Manchus often stressed the similarities of customs and language that existed between the two peoples. The traditional political culture and the manner of conducting diplomatic relations, including alliance ceremonies and rituals, did not differ in any significant way.[12]

Failing to identify the characteristics that were specific to the Manchu-Mongol "frontier" prevents us from understanding the dynamic nature of this portion of the complex phenomenon that was the Manchu conquest, while analytical criteria such as Wakeman's "transfrontiemen's" thesis, or Lattimore's concept of "ecological" frontier, clearly do not extend to the study of Manchu-Mongol relations. This lacuna has led to the theoretical difficulty, when it comes to frontier politics, of integrating frontier relations internal to the Inner Asian camp into the analysis of the political culture of the Manchus and of the Qing dynasty in general. Studies in this direction usually stress the indebtedness of the Manchus to Mongol political culture or the Inner Asian "affinity" of the two peoples. Yet surely the Manchu "debt" to the Mongols (the extent of which is by no means clear) was not an instance of passive cultural reception, nor should affinity imply that Mongol and Manchu traditions and practices were entirely coterminous. My contention is that investigating the internal nature of Manchu-Mongol relations, and in particular the tensions between war and diplomacy that carried on intensely for about fifteen years (1619–34), is essential to understanding the formation of the Qing elite and its attitude to frontier management. A possible point of entry into this territory is the Manchu diplomacy towards the Mongols at a critical juncture of their relations—namely at the time when the Manchu leadership intervened in the political crisis of the southern and eastern Mongols, which had been caused by the bid for imperial unification led by Ligdan Khan (1592–1634).

The facts are fairly well-established: as Nurhaci's (1559–1626) power increased after the establishment of the Jin (or Latter Jin) dynasty in 1616, and especially after the victory against overwhelming Ming forces at Mount Sarhū in 1619 followed by the Manchu move into Liaodong, the rising Mongol leader Ligdan Khan warned the Manchus to keep away from his territory or face punishment. In his long letter to Nurhaci of 27 November 1619, Ligdan Khan presented himself as the ruler of the "forty Mongol *tumens*."[13] Historians generally agree that Ligdan's project to reunify the Mongol tribes and to recreate a Mongol empire was under way by then and that it continued through more than ten years of wars and political upheaval. To explain its eventual failure, emphasis is usually placed on Ligdan's lack of popularity among the Mongol chiefs, which created disunity, favouring the Manchus' political and military intervention. This, ultimately, undermined Ligdan's hegemonic plan by luring various Mongol leaders to the Manchu side.[14]

Given that no accommodation could be found between Nurhaci and Ligdan Khan, hostilities ensued, but this was no ordinary confrontation. The period roughly between 1620 and 1634 deepened and finalized the Manchu strategy vis-à-vis the Southern Mongols, while shaping the political process along the northern frontier. It is difficult to explain in purely military terms why the Mongol tribes attacked by Ligdan, or simply caught in between the two emerging powers, would choose to submit to the Manchus while they had defended their independence against Ligdan.[15] A close analysis of Manchu and Mongol sources, such as the diplomatic correspondence between Mongol chieftains and Manchu leaders, reveals instead that the success of the Manchus was due to a skilful combination of marital arrangements and legal practices that allowed them to enter and eventually dominate the political world of the Mongol tribes.[16]

Marital contracts in particular fulfilled a vital political function, whose implications in shaping the frontier strategy of the early Manchus has yet to be investigated properly. Here I present an attempt to glean from the Manchu-Mongol diplomatic correspondence the political meanings of marriage and how kinship relations (real, not fictive) affected the process that led to the expansion of Manchu hegemony into southern Mongolia and to the completion of a critical step towards the creation of the future Qing state.

Manchu-Mongol Marital Relations during the Chakhar Wars

In 1606, after Nurhaci's defeat of a hostile coalition of Jurchen-Mongol forces that included members of the five southern Khalkha tribes, a peace treaty was concluded whereby the defeated Khalkha leaders conferred upon Nurhaci the title of Kündülen Khaghan (Most Honoured Ruler).[17] This was a term of respect and political recognition that certainly did not lead to the submission of the Mongols or to a serious expansion of Nurhaci's power into Mongol territory, but it did greatly elevate the position of the Manchus among the Mongols.[18] More important, the higher status allowed the Manchu leaders to forge alliances with Mongol aristocrats and thus extend the range of their political and military reach. Indeed, Nurhaci's strategy in the early period of his rise to power (i.e., before 1616), was carefully conceived in terms of making alliances with faraway tribes while antagonizing the adjacent ones.[19] Within this logic, a series of marital alliances were forged that made it clear that the Manchus were pursuing a "Mongol strategy" that, albeit temporarily secondary to the "Manchurian strategy," was going to develop further after the consolidation of the Jianzhou Jurchen's power in southern Manchuria. It is therefore no surprise that Ligdan Khan, for all the bravado contained in his letter of 1619, appeared to be gravely concerned that Nurhaci, after having defeated the multinational force sent against him by the Ming in the same year (inclusive of Chinese, Korean, and Yehe troops), would turn his attention to "unifying" the Mongol tribes.[20]

The difficulties the Manchus met in their occupation of Liaodong, however, prevented any serious military action against the Mongols as ethnic strife between occupying forces and local population and economic strictures forced them to consolidate their hold on the peninsula before attempting further expansion.[21] Hence, Ligdan's anticipated competition from the Manchus did not materialize until a few years after 1619, allowing him to pursue unchallenged his own policy of forcibly uniting the southern Mongol tribes. Ligdan's heavy-handedness, however, alienated a large number of Mongol chiefs, fomenting opposition and generating widespread violence. It is against this backdrop of chaos and danger that we must situate Manchu diplomatic efforts and military involvement among the south Mongol tribes. The political advantages offered by marital relations was exploited with great skill by Nurhaci and by his son and successor Hong Taiji (1592–1643). Marriages soon became an essential element in their strategy to defeat Ligdan, while recruiting the Mongol aristocracy into the Manchu political project and placing the Mongol tribes under Manchu sovereignty.

As is customary in Inner Asian politics, intertribal alliances were marked by oaths, sacrifices, and marriages.[22] Diplomacy operated, broadly speaking, through a class system and a kinship system. The system of marriage alliances, known in Mongolian by the term *khuda*, was based on exogamous relations among patrilineal lineages. This had been current among the Mongols at the time of Chinggis Khan, although during the late Ming dynasty inter-Mongol marital alliances had shifted with the tendency of the Chinggisid aristocracy, descended from Dayan Khan (c. 1480–1517), to marry into prominent but subordinate families.[23] Still, the system offered Mongol and Manchu aristocracies the possibility of recognizing and co-opting each other into their respective political spheres, not unlike European royal families during the same period in time, and not unlike Chinese nobility during the "Springs and Autumns" period in preimperial Chinese history (770–481 BC).

Nurhaci's marriages with women of allied clans (or even rival ones) closely followed the twists and turns of his political ascent. His main consorts came from Manchurian (i.e., Jurchen) clans: Tunggiya, Fuca, and the Nara clan of the Yehe tribe.[24] Still, among the so-called "royal concubines," or *fei*, we find no less than thirteen Mongol women, one of whom, a *dafei* (or grand concubine) was the daughter of a Khorchin Mongol chief. Moreover, some of his daughters were married off to Mongols, such as Mangguji, who married first a Manchu from the Hada tribe in 1601 and then a Mongol in 1628.[25] The relationship between Khorchin Mongols and the Manchu royal clan became particularly close in 1614, when Hong Taiji and his two brothers, Haoge and Dorgon, married aristocratic women of the Khorchin Borjigid clan.[26] In the same year, Manggultai (1587–1633), fifth son of Nurhaci, also married a Mongol noblewoman from the Jarut tribe.[27]

Hong Taiji, more than any of his siblings, participated in this marriage diplomacy.[28] His first wife, daughter of the Khorchin chief Manggus, was later honoured with the title of Xiaoduan Wen Huanghou.[29] Altogether he married seven Mongol women, three of whom occupied the highest possible ranks in the hierarchy of his consorts.[30] On the other hand, ten out of fourteen daughters of Hong Taiji married Mongol aristocrats, including the son of Hong Taiji's arch-enemy Ligdan Khan, Erke Khonggor-eje (1622–41).[31] The following Mongol tribes were represented among the Manchus' "in-laws": Khorchin, Chakhar, Barin, Aukhan, and Abagha. Two of Nurhaci's daughters were married to Aukhan (a Chinggisid line of the Chakhar tribe) and Khalka noblemen, and a presumed sister of Hong Taiji was married to the chief of the Khorchin Tüsiyetü Khan.

This is "genetic engineering" on a grand scale, as a consequence of which the later generations of south Mongol leaders were to be, by virtue of their family affiliations created through the institution of the *efu* (Imperial Son-in-Law), very closely connected to the Manchu royal house. However, given that the outcome of the Manchu struggle for power was unknown at the time, the future of these marriage alliances does not explain, in itself, either why Mongol clans entered marriage alliances with the Manchus or what advantages either side hoped to gain from these relations. Looking at the political situation, the marital connection made it possible for one or the other party to use its "in-law" status to manipulate the political process and increase its leverage in political negotiation. In addition to the obvious advantage of securing a degree of protection against one's external enemies, we can identify several other uses of the marriage alliance: to gauge the trustworthiness of an alleged friend and ally, to enhance a leader's power vis-à-vis challenges coming from within his own family, and even to provoke war.

First, the presence of wives offered the option of ranking one's political allies or, conversely, gauging one's position in another tribe's estimation. Second, the in-law line ensured the continuance of the "genetic pool" of a clan or family in case military disaster led to the destruction of the patrilineal lineage. Third, marriage supported the internal politics of a given tribe, particularly with regard to securing assistance in the struggle among siblings—something that was all too frequent in steppe politics.

Alliances in the steppe could be fickle, and oaths of alliance, even when sworn with great pomp and gravity, were often short-lived.[32] The position of a given wife within the allied (and potentially adversarial) camp, then, could be a useful indicator of the political direction in which a given chief might be leaning. Since male aristocrats could have multiple consorts and concubines, and since these were "ranked," the Manchu bride could be given a lower position than the one originally desired or negotiated. These marital ranks, in addition to actual titles assigned to wives and concubines, were expressed by positioning the individual tent of the consort in a more or less honourable place within the encampment.

Prime locations reflected a high position in the hierarchy of the tribe's "foreign relations." If a Manchu bride did not attain a high rank, while consorts from some other tribe did, this was tantamount to a loss of Manchu political status. Since agreements were generally concluded on the understanding that the two parties were equal (even though, in reality, this may not have been true), the subsequent lowering of the status of one of the parties by "demoting" the acquired bride created a disconnect that could produce a series of unhappy consequences: trust could be compromised, mutual aid might no longer be expected, and, in the last instance, war could break out.

During the Chakhar wars, the close relationship between the Khorchin and the Manchus was subject to severe strain, and, in a public document, Hong Taiji decided to denounce his ally Oba (d. 1632, known by the title of Tüsiyetü Khan) for his "three crimes and nine sins." Among them, the crime of having showed little respect to the Manchu bride, is cited as one of the most serious offences:[33]

> You let the tent of your guilty wife[34] be set up in the front [of the encampment, i.e., the most honoured place], while you had the tent of our daughter set up in the back. Over and over again you have said that your guilty wife is the offspring of a great man; but what *qaγan* prepared [her for marriage] and married her to you? What kind of great princes are her relatives now? Have they not all become retainers? They [i.e., the Chakhar] killed your paternal uncle. Then you were afraid that they would kill you, and therefore you call her the offspring of a great man. Why would you make this woman higher [than ours] when her Chakhar family was going to kill you? Why would you make our daughter lower, when we always cherished you? This is the sixth instance in which you humiliated us. Bring our lowly man's offspring back to us, and live with the descendent of the great man!

Few documents reveal more openly the political dimension of the marital alliance. The position held by the wives reflected the standing of the wife's relatives and tribe in the hierarchy of relations that the husband established in his external politics. By asking Oba to return his daughter, Hong Taiji effectively threatened to cut off any relationship, thus leaving him and his tribe at the mercy of the Chakhars. If a wife was not given due respect by the clan into which she married, then obviously the in-laws could not be trusted.

The same Oba had communicated with Hong Taiji in a previous letter, in which he attempted to exculpate himself for not having gone in person to receive the Manchu bride Junje Gege, who was promised to him as a result of the compact concluded in 1626.[35] Here the marital relation—that is, the promise of marriage made to him by Nurhaci himself (Kündülen Khaghan)—is seemingly mentioned to confirm his trustworthiness as a relative. Since his claims that he could not attend in person—first, he was injured; second, he was unable to leave his territory lest it remained unprotected—came from an imperial son-in-law (*efu*), they were supposed to carry great weight and might, therefore, more easily elicit a pardon:[36]

> As I was loved by your good father Kündülen Qaγan, he let [me] become his ninth son after his eight sons, and gave me his daughter in marriage.
>
> If you say "come," then I shall go [to meet her]; if you say "don't come," then you Qaγan decide yourself how to send [her to me].
>
> If you let me go while I am lame, there is no question that I will not go. But if I stay home, there are no men [who can go] out, and if I go out, there are no men at home. I have met you at a time when I should not have met you.[37] Why should I not go at a time when you have [already] forgiven me? These words of mine are true. The Qaγan himself shall decide in what manner he himself shall forgive me.

A somewhat similar letter was sent to Hong Taiji by a Kharachin nobleman identified as Dügureng Güyeng, who justifies himself for not having attended the ceremony of the oath of alliance between Kharachin and Manchus.[38] Concerned that he may be marginalized in the political relationship between the two parties, he seems to imply that the reason he did not attend the ceremonies was that his wife, who was the daughter of the Khaghan of the Kharachin, was present. He invoked his status as an in-law of an important political person to justify his behaviour:[39]

> Ever since the Year of the Rabbit [1627] [we] have regularly sent each other messengers for the sake of political consultation. Because of [my waiting for] the arrival of Sečen Qaγan's messengers, I had [many] delays. The daughter of the Qaγan [of the Qaračin] is my [own] wife.[40] [Hence] I did not go to the ceremony for the oath of alliance.[41] In harmony with all [the other nobles] led by the Qaγan and Qong Tayiji [of the Qaračin], I shall not transgress Sečen Qaγan's commands. Although the messenger and the letter issued by [Sečen] Qaγan's authority reached everyone under the [Qaračin] Qaγan, Qong Tayiji, and all the high and low-ranking nobles, they did not come to me.

Second, a marriage alliance could also be used as leverage to curb the inappropriate or disruptive behaviour of an ally who needed to be kept in check. This is the case of the reprimand issued by Hong Taiji against Yeldeng, who was guilty of having pillaged people and property within his own tribe. The argument brought forward by Hong Taiji, which is quoted only partially below, makes it clear that the status of in-law had allowed Yeldeng to gain the confidence of the Manchus but that he was going to lose it if he did not reform this ways. His reference to the possibility that Yeldeng's victims might unite against him is a clear message that the Manchus would be withdrawing whatever protection they had so far provided for him. Clearly, the Manchus did not want their Mongol allies to begin fighting among themselves, and his status as a relative gave Hong Taiji the legitimacy to intervene politically in this dispute:[42]

> Initially you, who became a relative of us before any other person, behaved well...
>
> The [Qorčin] people intend to carry on together with us and keep to their word, but if there is an enemy such as you in their own homes, how can they leave their homes and come to us? If you give back completely all and every person and head of livestock that you have seized, there will be no crime or fault. If you do not give them back, when all of them [i.e., the Qorčin chiefs] assemble and hold discussions according to the Mongol laws, we shall hold discussion together with them. Would it not be good if all of you *noyans* of the Naγun Qorčin lived happily embracing peace and law, settling where the grass and water are good, and breeding your own livestock? Would it not be bad if you acted in such a way as to destroy the political order and to stir up disorder and violence?... If you do not stop your robberies and disorderly conduct, it would be easy for those who have been robbed to hold joint consultations and come to an agreement regarding you.
>
> I have openly expressed my thoughts because we have become relatives and have an alliance. You must know [what to do] reflecting by yourself. That you pillaged and seized the Jürced and the γoulčin[43] [indicates that] you were not pleased with [them] and were tormenting [them] for having come towards us and settled there. If the nobles of the right wing and you make a union with me, we will go on [war] expeditions in every direction. If Heaven shows mercy to me, these people and animals will be taken in by me. But if within a group somebody seizes the people and livestock of their own brothers, it would be very difficult to absorb [them].

Above all, a marriage alliance was a form of insurance against the worst possible outcome of steppe warfare—namely, that one's family could be wiped out entirely, with the consequent annihilation of the whole "genetic pool" of a given clan. This type of concern is made explicit in the oaths of alliance. Although the mode of expression of the oaths is formulaic and fairly standardized, such oaths refer to the importance of the preservation of progeny.[44]

In a piece of correspondence with the Naγun Khorchin probably dated between 1627 and 1628, Hong Taiji tried to persuade the chieftains to join the Manchus in a marital alliance. Here he alluded to the possibility that they might be annihilated by the Chakhar. Arguably, while Hong Taiji is overtly concerned about their survival as in-laws—and, on this account, he promises to extend his protection to them—there may be also an additional, hidden message. And that would be that the marital alliance itself would ensure the survival of at least some of their descendants should the main tribe be wiped out:[45] "In my opinion our two nations should marry each other's daughters and the marriage relationship should never be interrupted. If you were to be wiped out by the Chakhar, then with what nation would we keep marriage relations?" In-laws, in other words, could offer a way to prevent the extinction of a given lineage, an outcome not too uncommon given the ruthless wars that were current in the steppe region.

Marriages also allowed leaders to recover a common political ground after having had a falling out. In this letter written by a Khorchin leader, Erdeni Khong Tayiji (possibly Ukšan, son of Jayisang and grandson of Manggus), the in-law relationship is regarded as something that does not require the observance of normal diplomatic etiquette and, therefore, allows a special closeness, aptly described as a thrice-knotted rope:[46]

> Erdeni Qong Tayiji sent [this] letter to Hong Taiji: "I was your elder brother-in-law, you were the husband of my sister. From among the many, we were dear to each other; from among the few we were necessary [important] to each other. When you gave me a poor suit of armor [as a gift], did I stop sending my messengers? Why did you stop [sending] messengers saying that [I] gave [you] bad horses? But rather than sending gifts to each other, let us be united by strengthening at the utmost our own feelings. What if we came without gifts and [simply] inquired about one another's health? If we [just] considered getting good things, we would not be like relatives. People say that a robe with two layers does not feel cold, and a rope with three knots cannot be untied.

On the other hand, marriage did not provide ironclad security. The in-laws could easily become outlaws. The previously mentioned Jarut tribe, for instance, had intermarried with the Manchu royal clan in 1614, but in 1619 it broke the alliance. The betrayal and endless vexations caused by Jarut raids on Manchu-controlled land angered and exasperated Nurhaci, who continued to protest this behaviour for years. It is remarkable that, even in the midst of mounting violence, the Jarut envoys who had come to Nurhaci under the protection of a marital agreement would be given favourable treatment.[47] Eventually, when the Jarut came under attack from the Chakhar, they sought protection with the Khorchin Mongols and surrendered to the Manchus, who celebrated their submission in 1629.[48]

In the steppe world, sibling rivalry was common and was surely not limited to the struggle to succeed as khan. The famous episode of the young Temüjin (Chinggis Khan) slaying his half-brother Bekhter can be taken as a parable that conveys one of the most useful pieces of advice in steppe politics: do not trust your relatives. For a long time, Nurhaci himself had to contend with his uncles, brothers, and other relatives.[49] Likewise, Mongol chieftains would regard support from the Manchu in-laws as valuable in their own family feuds. Here are the words of a Mongol chieftain requesting Hong Taiji's support to persuade Nurhaci to protect him against his relatives—a request based on Hong Taiji's position as in-law:[50]

> If Kündülen Qaγan does not protect me mercifully. I will not have the strength to engage them in battle. Since older and younger brothers are in disagreement, and because our life is dear [to us], we shall become tributaries... If we are not protected by you, we shall have no place to flee and no strength to fight. Do not think that there are ulterior motives in my words. Since you, Hong Taiji, are a relative of mine by marriage, I told you the truth.

Again, the word of a powerful in-law was worth something, and at times of crisis this was an asset that could mean the difference between life and death.

Resolution of hostilities and protection from enemies were not the only areas in which marital alliances were of use. Along with the ever-present obligation to right a perceived wrong, or to exact revenge for a hostile action, marriage diplomacy allowed a party to find pretexts for concocting accusations against an adversary without disclosing his or her real motives. The Manchus reacted fiercely when a marriage promise that had been made to them was broken—an act that could easily constitute a casus belli.

For instance, in the famous Seven Grievances included in Nurhaci's open declaration of war to the Ming, the fourth accusation refers to Ming intervention in Manchu territory which—according to Nurhaci—resulted in a woman from another Jurchen tribe, who had been betrothed to him, being instead married to a Mongolian prince.[51] Another case in point is the already mentioned accusation levelled by the Manchus at their foremost ally, Tüsiyetü Khan, for having insulted his Manchu bride by placing a wife from the rival Chakhar tribe in the most honoured position.

Let us not forget, however, that the attention paid to the condition of the sisters and daughters married off to Mongol chieftains may not have been as sincere as it appears in some pronouncements. We have a document that reports the unhappiness of a Manchu princess who asks her "brother" Hong Taiji why he never writes to her:[52] "Your elder sister presents a letter to her own younger brother Sečen Qaγan. Previously, when we lived in a single home, we inquired after each other's health, and exchanged with one another our own wishes and requests. When I acquired a second home, my younger brother the Qaγan became estranged from me, and did not send any messenger to me. For this reason I sent an envoy with special instructions, wishing that you may think more of me." This rare testimony indicates that the bride's contacts with her original family had become extremely infrequent. Moreover, the situation of brides sent off to their Mongol in-laws, often as very young girls, was made more difficult by the fact that it was either hard or impossible to come back to their original families even for a short visit.[53]

Conclusion

After Nurhaci's unification of the Manchu tribes, the axis of marriage relations shifted dramatically from the Manchurian to the Mongol area. This shows the importance of the Mongol front in Manchu politics and the sustained efforts made by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji to position the Manchu royal clan favourably within the web of alliances that determined inter-Mongol relations. Through intermarriage, the Manchus fully inserted themselves into the Mongol political space, and this allowed them to take part in the power struggle triggered by Ligdan's bid for the creation of a unified Mongol regime. Both offensive and defensive marriage diplomacy expanded the manoeuvring and negotiating range of the contracting parties, ensured military protection, established a trusted diplomatic plane, and allowed the fabrication of pretexts for war as well as of opportunities for peace.

Nurhaci and Hong Taiji used in-law relations with great effectiveness to construct the skeletal structure of the Manchu-Mongol political relationship, and their policy is consistent with the politics of marital relations adopted by Nurhaci in the course of the wars to unify the various Jurchen tribes and confederations. However, the Manchu strategy towards the

Mongol tribes cannot be regarded simply as an extension of the Jurchen-oriented one. Once on Mongol political turf, the Manchus had to compete with a rival force, the powerful Chakhar tribe, which was openly pursuing an analogous, if not identical, project of political centralization. While the oaths and marriage arrangements sucked the Manchus into the depths of treacherous Mongol politics, they also allowed them to subvert Ligdan's process of unification and to intervene with the Mongols from a position of higher status, which authorized the legitimate use of coercive measures in case of non-compliance.

Moreover, marital alliances helped the Manchus to co-opt Mongol political and military elites into a new "conquest elite" that, aimed explicitly at the conquest of China, promised to yield enormous returns. This prospect may not have been sufficient in itself to lure the Mongols to the Manchu side, but, at a time when Ligdan's project to forcibly unify the Mongol tribes promised only additional violence and insecurity, it made the traditional protection that marriage relations offered from the perils of steppe politics especially attractive. The wars among Mongol tribes also caused the widespread territorial displacement of individuals and families, who then had to flee their lands and seek a safer place elsewhere. In-laws could, and indeed were under an obligation to, provide refuge in case of need, and the Manchus were able to assist Mongol refugees who were otherwise entirely defenceless and devoid of the means to support themselves. From the Manchu point of view, anchoring the Mongol aristocracies to the Manchu polity was important in that it offered a way to limit the uncertainty that was implicit in the system of tribal alliances. it also offered, if needed, a ready cause for war against "in-laws" who strayed from the alliance, as a compact sealed by marriage carried a high moral burden and commanded great loyalty.

At the same time, marriage alliances were fluid and had limited currency, given that multiple marriage alliances could be made by the same person. And since mutual obligations could easily be reversed, these marital contracts were insufficient either to ensure loyalty or to force another party into submission. The incorporation of Mongol leaders—that is, powerful aristocratic families and their retainers—into the Manchu "conquest elite" required another and more complex level of coercion, which led to a layered approach that eventually comprised the introduction of legislative measures, the creation of administrative structures, and substantial changes in Mongol territorial allocation and distribution.

Military force had to be used against those Mongols who were openly hostile or repeatedly deceitful and untrustworthy. At the same time, armed intervention was of limited use since the Mongol fighters were just as good as were the Manchu fighters, making the outcome of military action uncertain and being potentially taxing for the thinly stretched Manchu forces. More important, the Manchus could not be indefinitely engaged in chronic intertribal wars lest they expend excessive time and resources trying to police Mongol political boundaries. Soon after the end of the Ligdan wars, the Manchu leadership made the restoration of order among the Mongol tribes a priority and, thus, introduced a series of laws and regulations meant, in essence, to bring the Mongols under the formal suzerainty of the Manchus and to ensure that the alliance would be transformed into an asymmetric partnership (with the Manchus being, of course, the senior partner), eventually resulting in Mongol submission.[54] The frontier policy of marriage and diplomacy was clearly essential to achieving this end, and any evaluation of the Qing conquest and, especially, of the Sino-Inner Asian frontier in the preconquest period has to consider the multifarious aspects of Manchu-Mongol relations. Indeed, this is a long-standing issue, and it is central to Manchu progress towards the formation of a power that was eventually able to challenge and to conquer China.

Notes

1. For the sake of consistency and simplicity I use the term "Manchu" for both the Nurhaci and Hong Taiji periods, although strictly speaking this is anachronistic.
2. These issues have been discussed, most recently, in Joanna Waley-Cohen, "The New Qing History," *Radical History Review* 88 (2004): 193–206.
3. Arthur Waldron refers repeatedly to Lattimore's views in his *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Peter Perdue refers to Lattimore's theories on the origins of steppe nomads in *China Marches West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 30.
4. The concept of a "supra-tribal leadership" within the context of the Inner Asian monarchic tradition is partly dealt with in Joseph Fletcher, "Tuceo-Mongolian Monarchic tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III/IV (1979–80): pt. 1, 236–51.
5. On the nomadic cycle, see Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 519–23. On the function of the frontier zone as the place of origin of Inner Asian dynasties, see Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 540–49.
6. Ladis K.D. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 49, 3 (1959): 271–72.
7. Frederick Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in 17th-Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 41.
8. Owen Lattimore, "Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice" in *Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928–1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 114.
9. This is not to say that there were no differences in their economic products, which in fact lent themselves to different commercial uses. The Manchurian forest economy, in particular hunting and gathering, provided various items that were valued highly in the

border markets (e.g., ginseng, pelts, and pearls). On the other hand, Mongolian horses and other pastoral products had long been an important item in frontier trade.

10. On the other hand, sometimes differences would be stressed, as in the communication between Nurhaci and the Jarut chiefs (See G. Kara, *Chants d'un Barde Mongol* [Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970], 17–23, note 37). The rhetoric of cultural similarities and differences was often resorted to in order to support a particular political point.

11. Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), 96.

12. The article by David M. Farquhar on early Manchu political concepts remains one of the few studies of this issue in English. See his "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy," in *The Chinese World Order*, edited by John K. Fairbank, 198–205 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). On the other hand, we should stress that the similarities did not extend to some of the more specific features of Mongolian political thought, in particular the relationship established by the Mongol elites with Tibetan Buddhism and the Chinggisid principle of imperial inheritance.

13. Michael Weiers, "Die Kuang-Ning Affäre, Beginn des Zerwürfnisses zwischen den Mongolischen Tsakhar und den Mandschuren" [The Kuang-ning affair: The beginning of the hostility between Chakhar Mongols and Manchus], *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979): 73–91; Walter Heissig, *Die Zeit des letzten mongolischen Großkhans Ligdan (1604–1634)* [The time of the last Mongolian Great Khan Ligdan] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979); Veronika Veit, "Die mongolischen Völkerschaften vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1691" [The Mongolian tribes from the fifteenth century to 1691], in *Die Mongolen: Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur* [The Mongols: Contributions on their history and culture], edited by Michael Weiers (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986), 397.

14. For instance, see Gertraude Roth li "State Building before 1644," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9.1: *The Ch'ing Dynasty to 1800*, edited by Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18; Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 113; Fred W. Bergholz, *The Partition of the Steppe. The Struggle of the Russians, Manchus and the Zunghar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619–1758: A Study in Power Politics* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 163.

15. On the military aspects of the war, see: "Military Aspects of the Manchu Wars against the Čaqars," In *Inner Asian Warfare (500–1800)*, edited by Nicola Di Cosmo, 337–67 (Leiden/Boston: Brill 2002).

16. For a detailed historical account of this period, see Dalizhabu, *Mingdai mo nan Menggu lishi γanjiu* [Studies on the history of the Southern Mongols in the Ming Dynasty] (Hailaer: Nei Menggu chubanshe, 1997), 251–335.

17. Nicola Di Cosmo, "Introduction: A Brief Survey of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest," in *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest*, 8.

18. The Khalkha began to pay the tribute of the "Nine Whites" (eight white horses and a white camel) to the Manchus in 1636, with Sečen Khan Šoloi; see Veronika Veit, "Die Mongolen: von der Clanföderation zur Volksrepublik" [The Mongols: From tribal confederation to people's republic], in *Die Mongolen: Beitrage zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur* [The Mongols: Contributions to their history and culture], edited by Michael Weiers (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986).

19. Wada Sei, "Some Problems Concerning the Rise of T'ai-tsu the Founder of Manchu Dynasty," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 16 (1957): 51–63.

20. Ray Huang, "The Liaotung Campaign of 1619," *Oriens Extremus* 28 (1981): 29–54.

21. Gertraude Roth, "The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636," in *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, edited by Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., 1–38 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

22. On some aspects of Mongolian oaths, see Henry Serruys, "Oaths in the Qalqa Jirum," *Oriens Extremus* 19 (1972): 131–41.

23. Christopher Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 460–61. Changes in patterns of marital alliances among the Mongol tribes may be attributed to the political and ideological changes that occurred within the "Mongol nation" at the time of Altan Khan (1507–83). According to Johan Elverskog, Altan Khan's political reform led to political fragmentation among the Mongols. See his *The Jewel Translucent Sūtra: Altan Khan and the Mongols in the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), 40.

24. On Nurhaci's marital alliances with Manchurian tribes, in particular the Hada and Yehe, see Wada Sei, "Some Problems Concerning the Rise of T'ai-tsu," 51–59.

25. Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Dynasty*, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943 [rpt Taipei: Ch'eng Wen, 1970]), 562.

26. For a list of marriages contracted between Mongols and Manchus, see Sechin Jagchid, "Mongolian-Manchu Intermarriage In the Ch'ing Period," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 19 (1986): 68–87.

27. Jagchid, "Mongolia-Manchu Intermarriage," 72. On Manggultai, see also Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, 562–63.

28. Jun Matsumura, "The Queens and Royal Concubines of the Emperor Ch'ing T'aitsung," *Bulletin of the Institute of China Border Area Studies* 3 (1972): 55–76.

29. Wang Zhonghan, "Empress Xiao Duan Wen of the Borjigit Clan," in *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women: The Qing Period, 1644–1911*, edited by Lily Xiao Hong Lee, A.D. Stefanowska, and Clara Wing-Chung Ho, 336–37 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). See also Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, 304.

30. Di Cosmo, "Introduction: A Brief Survey," 8–9.

31. In 1636, after he surrendered to the Manchus, Erke Khonggor-eje married at the age of fourteen the Manchu Princess Makata, daughter of Hong Taiji and Empress Xiaoduan. See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, 304.

32. For instance, the Jarud, a south Qalqa tribe, began to plunder the Manchu people only a short while after a marriage alliance and a solemn oath had been sworn in 1614 and 1619, respectively. Nurhaci reacted fiercely to this betrayal, but there was relatively little he could do. See also Veit, "Die mongolischen Völkerschaften," 399.

33. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Munchu-Mongol Relations*, 57.

34. This "guilty wife" is one from the Chahar tribe, led by the Manchu's enemy Ligdan Khan.

35. Michael Weiers, "Der Manschu-Khortsin Bund von 1626," in *Documenta Barbarorum: Festschrift für Walter Heissig*, edited by Rudolf Kaschewsky, Klaus Sagaster, and Michael Weiers, 412–35 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1983).

36. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 26–27.

37. This refers to the battle between Nurhaci's Manchurian forces and the enemy coalition of nine tribes, which took place in 1593 (twenty-first year of the Wanli emperor). This coalition also included the Qorčin Mongols headed by Mingγan. See Yan Chongnian, *Nuerhachi zhuan* [Biography of Nurhaci], Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1983, 103.

38. On this, see Michael Weiers, "Zum Mandschu-Kharatsin Bund des Jahres 1628" [On the Manchu-Qaračin alliance of the year 1628], *Zentralasiatische Studien* 26 (1996): 84–119.

39. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 125.

40. This is Donui Günji, daughter of the Qaračin Qaγan Lask'ib.

41. Literally, to the aspersion of libations.

42. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 101–2.

43. In Mongol, γoulčin is the Gūwalca clan of the Manchus. See *Manbun Rōtō: Tongki fuka sindaha hergen i dangse* [The secret chronicles of the Manchu Dynasty, 1607–1637 AD], edited by Nobuo Kanda, Keiji Okamoto, Hideo Ishibashi, Jun Matsumura, and Hidehiro Okada (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1955–63), 1:37, 306–7; 2:900; 3:981, 1054–55, 1057–64.

44. A typical formula that concludes an oath is: "if we follow our own words sworn to Heaven and Earth, Heaven and Earth will bless us and our lives will be long, our descendants will follow us for a thousand eons and will live in peace and happiness."

45. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 37.

46. Ibid., 157.

47. The Manchu account of their relationship with the Jarut tribe is summarized in G. Kara, *Chants d'un Barde Mongol*, 17–23, note 37. The specific passage regarding the Jarut envoy whose life was spared because of the bridal connection can be found on page 21.

48. *Manbun Rōtō, Tongki fuka sindaha hergen i dangse*, vol. 4 (1959), 6, 129, 192.

49. Wada Sei, "Some Problems Concerning the Rise of T'ai-tsu," 41–51.

50. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 24.

51. On the Seven Grievances, see Meng Sen, "Qing Taizu gaotian qi da hen zhi zhenben yanjiu" in *Qingshi luncong* [Essays in Qing History] (Hong Kong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1977), 62–76; Giovanni Stary, "La politica mancese delle 'sette accuse': Una costante per giustificare la conquista della Cina e della Corea," in Giampiero Bellingeri and Giorgio Vercellin, eds., *Studi Eurasiatici in Onore di M. Grignaschi* [Eurasian studies in honour of M. Grignaschi] (Venezia: Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 1988), 43–55.

52. Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 113.

53. Even later Qing regulations made it very difficult for the princesses and noblewomen married to Mongol aristocrats to come to the capital. See Sechin Jagchid, "Mongolian-Manchu Intermarriage," 80–81.

54. On this issue, see Dorothea Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," *International History Review* 20, 2 (1998): 310–24.